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Possibility for real progress in East/West relations - Continued validity of NATO's strategy of flexible response and forward defence - Indivisibility of the defence of Europe and North America - Position of Greece on nuclear matters - 1987 Ministerial G

  1. The Defence Planning Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in Ministerial Session in Brussels on 26th and 27th May 1987.
  1. We confirmed that the peace and security of the Alliance depend on the maintenance of adequate military strength and the development of a more constructive relationship between East and West. Recent developments suggest the possibility for real progress in relations between East and West, particularly in the field of arms control. We welcome these developments and will make every effort to ensure that they result in improved security and stability; to do so they must address the disparities and asymmetries that underlie our existing relationship with the East. Our objective is enhanced security at lower levels of force. As in the past, Alliance cohesion, solidarity and consultation will be indispensable to securing progress towards that objective.
  2. In considering these developments, we recalled the realities of growing Soviet military power as well as the variety and offensive capabilities of the Warsaw Pact forces arrayed against the Alliance. Given this situation, NATO's strategy of flexible response and forward defence, which is defensive in nature, remain both valid and necessary and continues as the basis for NATO's defence planning. We reaffirmed that there is, for the foreseeable future, no alternative to NATO's concept for the prevention of war, which must continue to be based on an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces; both are essential to provide a credible deterrent against all forms of aggression.
  3. We reaffirmed that the defence of Europe and North America is indivisible. The commitment of United States nuclear forces in Europe1 remains indispensable for the security of the whole Alliance. The continued presence of Canadian and United States forces at existing levels in Europe plays an irreplaceable role in the defence of North America as well as Europe. We also reaffirmed the importance of maintaining the commitment of nations to for- ward deployed forces and to strengthening them through the Conventional Defence Improvements (CDI) programme.
  4. Such considerations were reflected in the development of the 1987 Ministerial Guidance, which we approved. Ministerial Guidance is the major political directive for defence planning both by nations and the NATO Military Authorities; it sets the broad guidelines for the development of NATO's deterrence and defence requirements and, in particular, gives direction for the preparation of the next set of NATO force goals. We recognise that the allocation of sufficient resources to meet our requirements will continue to be a major challenge to all nations. In this respect we reaffirmed the aim of a 3% real increase in defence expenditure as a general guide, and the need to obtain the best possible value from the resources made available.
  5. The adoption in May 1985 of the Conventional Defence Improvements action plan was an important step in the direction of more effective conventional forces. CDI has allowed us to identify those key deficiencies and priority areas where we all agree a special effort will bring the greatest return for our collective defence. So far progress has been good and a large number of significant force improvements have been achieved or are being initiated. Nevertheless, serious deficiencies still remain in important areas, as has been pointed out to us in the assessments of the Major NATO Commanders. Therefore the momentum of CDI must be maintained and, where necessary, increased.
  6. We took note of a number of positive developments designed to strengthen the defence planning machinery of the Alliance, particularly over the longer term. These include further refinement of the Conceptual Military Framework and an increased emphasis on the development of concepts and long term planning guidelines. All of this will facilitate a closer alignment between national and Alliance planning.
  7. We welcomed the progress made by the NATO Air Defence Committee in its work on tactical ballistic missiles and extended air defence, noted the work in hand on assessing the threat and identifying possible countermeasures, and agreed to an approach and a programme of further work.
  8. The challenge of matching available resources with our requirements puts an even greater emphasis on the implementation of CDI. In coping with the many demands on our resources we must examine and explore new approaches and new ideas, but this needs to be done on a collective basis. Like- wise, while nations will make every effort to avoid reductions in their defence contributions, those changes and adjustments that prove to be necessary will be made within the Alliance planning framework and reflect the collective interests of the Alliance as a whole. Solidarity and the willingness to share equitably the risks and burdens as well as the benefits of defence has always been a fundamental principle of Alliance policy; it must remain so.
  9. We stressed the need for more assistance to be provided to Greece, Portugal and Turkey to strengthen their conventional defences, in order that they may more effectively fulfil their proper roles in the collective defence of the Alliance. We also expressed particular interest in the continuing work of the Independent European Programme Group on assistance to these countries which aims at permitting them to participate more fully as partners in armaments co-operation programmes with their NATO Allies.
  10. In the context of our CDI efforts, we strongly supported the improvement of armaments planning, which would enable nations to be better informed of NATO needs, and NATO of the way these needs are likely to be met by nations. As well as improving armaments planning, better equipment co-operation, standardization, and sharing of technology between the European and North American and the developed and developing members of the Alliance are also important for ensuring the most effective use of resources, as is the continued protection of militarily relevant technology.
  11. We noted with satisfaction the progress made in co-operative projects including those launched as a result of United States legislation, and reaffirmed the need to give emphasis to the exploitation of emerging technologies in our defence equipment programmes. In the light of experience gained to date, the Independent European Programme Group nations have put forward a number of"Principles for Collaboration" related to programme management which have been welcomed by their North American Allies. We will continue to work to ensure the enhanced armaments co-operation among Alliance members that will help us to field the equipment NATO must have to maintain credible conventional forces.
  12. Efforts to secure equitable and effectively verifiable reductions in military forces, both conventional and nuclear, are an integral element of our security policy in seeking to achieve a more stable and secure environment at lower levels of armaments. Continuing our consultations on INF arms control, we recalled the position we stated in Stavanger. We welcomed the improved prospects for nuclear arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union and look for progress in other areas of arms control, particularly since reductions in nuclear weapons will increase the importance of removing conventional disparities. We emphasised that it is in our goal to achieve a comprehensive, verifiable ban on chemical weapons. We renewed our appeal to the Soviet Union to take a constructive attitude towards effective verification provisions.
  13. In the field of conventional arms control the aim of the Alliance is to strengthen stability and security in the whole of Europe, through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. We stressed the necessity of a step by step negotiation process which guarantees the undiminished security of all concerned at each stage. In this process we must focus on the elimination of the serious imbalance of conventional forces and combat capability in favour of the Warsaw Pact, and their capability for surprise attack and for the initiation of large-scale offensive action.
  14. In conclusion, we reaffirmed that our first task is the prevention of war and the preservation of our peace and freedom. This requires us to maintain adequate military capabilities; we are determined to do so. Our military strength will continue to provide the foundation for the development of peaceful relations through dialogue and communication across the full range of security issues of concern to East and West.

Footnote:

 

1. Greece recalls its position on nuclear matters.