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Mr Secretary General, Dear Colleagues,

In many ways 1997 has been a remarkable year. The combined impact on security in Europe of the decision to enlarge NATO with three new members, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, together with the enhanced Partnership for Peace, has been fundamentally positive. We are closer than ever to a pan-European security order. But let us not forget that structures alone are not enough. The credibility of our undertakings will be determined by how we handle the real challenges of today and tomorrow.

Mr Secretary General, There are many lessons to be learned from almost seven years of international efforts to come to grips with the events in former Yugoslavia.

  1. The importance of conflict prevention has again been demonstrated. After the outbreak of hostilities, a much more comprehensive and costly international effort has been required to settle the conflict.

     

  2. Endurance and patience are key words in crisis management. There are no easy solutions or short cuts. The military and civilian efforts have to go hand in hand and reinforce each other. A satisfactory degree of implementation on the civilian side is necessary before a military force can be withdrawn. Although much has been achieved, there has to be a continued substantial military presence to support the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord. A strengthened civilian effort is necessary in Bosnia, but it would run the risk of failure if we do not support it with an adequate military component.

    Sweden is prepared to contribute to such a military force in Bosnia if it continues to be a UN-mandated, NATO-led, post SFOR- operation with US participation on the ground. It is also our view that the broad and successful cooperation among NATO and non-NATO-members should continue in a post SFOR force.

     

  3. Reconstruction in a material sense is relatively easy compared to the more complex task of reconciliation. In this context, I would like to emphasize the crucial importance of bringing war criminals to justice. If we do not arrest those resposible we run the risk of having an entire population blamed for the war.

     

  4. A good indicator of more normal conditions is that refugees are willing to return. Or the other way around, the situation can not be described as normal as long as people can not return to their homes.

     

  5. The successful cooperation between NATO-states and non-NATO-states in Bosnia has set a pattern. If NATO in the future is authorized to lead peace support operations in Europe it seems likely that this will be done together with partner countries. With the creation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, we have put a political structure in place for dealing with future military peace support operations.

    I welcome the fact that a political military framwork for NATO-led PfP operations has been listed as a matter of priority in the EAPC Action Plan. We look forward to working together with our friends to develop such a framework within the context of the EAPC work plan. Shared risks in peace support operations should also be reflected in influence on planning and decision-making.

    Such a framework, however, should not be elaborated in the abstract. It should meet practical needs. The multinational operation in Bosnia is a case in point. The process towards increased involvement of partners in planning, decision-making and political oversight must continue as we proceed towards the final period of the SFOR-mandate and the discussions on a follow-on force.

    Tasks related to territorial defence lie solely upon NATO member states. They must be kept separate. However, the creation of a pan-European security order requires a common system and mechanism for peace support operations. Sweden has shared its ideas with partner countries in a non-paper

     

  6. Finally Mr Secretary General,

    In accordance with the views I have presented, I would like to invite all EAPC countries to a meeting in Sweden next year to discuss what might be needed to further strengthen the coalition of NATO member states and partner countries in peace support operations. On the basis of a realistic scenario, I propose that we discuss the needs of partner countries for greater influence on peace support operations and how NATO member states might best respond to these needs.