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Thank you so much for a warm welcome at a cold but sunny morning. It is really a pleasure to join you here at the Belfer Center, one of the world's most influential policy research institutions. And I say this with all the bias, because I was part of a small task group led by Ivo [Daalder] and some of the other colleagues discussing many of the challenges that you have mentioned. But it is really a pleasure to finally add picture after so many Zoom meetings that we have had and to see and to feel the energy of one of those American spaces where free, finest minds really managed to think deeply about national security, about nuclear policy. We heard some of these discussions in the morning about technology, about foreign policy and international relations. Your fellows often ascend to senior roles in the White House, in the Pentagon, in the State Department, in the CIA. And the Belfer Center has really strong connections to the NATO Alliance, because senior figures from here have sat around the NATO table for many years. And Ivo has been one of the really, really vocal voices on the importance of the Alliance, but also on the importance of all Allies contributing to this shared security. So, I already felt at home when arriving here.

Few months ago, we have commemorated or celebrated the 80th anniversary of Europe's Victory Day in NATO Headquarters. And there was a big event, and the German Foreign Office shared a short film that many of you might have seen. It's a short video made by filmmaker Wim Wenders, and it's called ‘The Keys of Freedom.’ And I really liked it. I really appreciate it. It was a very timely video, a short one, but it takes place at a school in Reims in France, the site of the Nazi surrender in 1945. And Wenders, the filmmaker, says the following: 80 years after the liberation of our continent, we are realising again that peace cannot be taken for granted.

So let me start here. And let me start by saying that for me, someone coming from the Balkans, actually peace was never considered granted. I was a bit younger than you when wars broke around my country and when most of my student days were actually spent on thinking whether war will come home or whether we will be able to avoid it. So, this is why I have never, we have never taken peace for granted. We have witnessed armed conflicts. We have witnessed refugees, sanctions. We have seen the panic and the chaos associated with this. I have also witnessed violence in my country, and I have also been through the struggle to end sometimes very painful bilateral issues with another country so that I can anchor mine in this great Alliance: NATO.

So I have lived most of my student years surrounded by the fear or the presence of war. And in 2001, after joining one of the Skopje University, North Macedonia faced an armed conflict with an insurgent group. And at that point of time, it was NATO who supported a ceasefire. It was NATO who supported an agreement to end the hostilities and the conflict. And it was NATO who deployed peacemakers to make these peace negotiations possible, feasible and successful. So, NATO has supported peace and stability right across the Western Balkans for many years.

And therefore, for me, peace and security that NATO provides is not just theory. It is really personal. It is tangible, and it is very much real. And this is why it gave me even more of a privilege to be here in this moment in the leadership of the Alliance. So, I'm really very, very respectful of the privilege that I have.

But I know that NATO's role is much more than this. NATO protects us from those foreign actors that seek to destroy not only our democracies, but also to dominate us and to divide us. We have always, and we do always even now, take all decisions by consensus, which means 32 Allies need to agree on these decisions. So, nothing is agreed until all say yes. And I have learned throughout my career that sometimes actually compromise can be trickier than conflict. We always say among our friends and colleagues in the political circles, we don't need to remind ourselves that sometimes fighting is inevitable. But sometimes we need to remind ourselves that even though we should not avoid a fight, we should not also fear a compromise. That was a big lesson for my country. I have participated in the discussions that we had with Greece. And it was only through a decision on a bilateral issue that was bothering us for almost three decades that we have managed to move on and become a member of the greatest military and political Alliance in the history of mankind.

So, this is why I know, in a way that sometimes compromises take time. They require patience. They require a very good analysis of what you can gain, but also what you can lose. But they also require a certain kind of exercise. We need to remind ourselves constantly that we have to listen and respect different views among Allies. And although sometimes there can be disagreements, we always agree on the fundamentals. And the fundamentals for this Alliance is that we stand together to defend each other, one for all and all for one. And this is very much the basis for this strongest political and military Alliance in the history of mankind. It is our unity, our ability to get to a unity and our ability to adapt in difficult circumstances.

NATO has always been a shield against aggression. We have stood together for more than 76 years to ensure our citizens are safe on both sides of the Atlantic. We have deterred the Soviet Union during the Cold War and fought terrorism beyond our borders following 9/11 attacks. Now we are facing multiple threats and we are facing complex challenges. I should not be saying this to you. You know this better. We are in an age of confrontation. And these are not the confrontations that we have [sought]. But these are the realities, and to these realities we do adapt. Russia has brought war back to Europe. China is enabling Russia's war against Ukraine. North Korea and Iran are supporting it, missiles, but also troops. And they're expanding their cooperation and their ability to exert influence.

So, this was the background of the NATO Summit that took place in The Hague just this June. And at this Summit, we really started a new chapter in the development of the Alliance. We agreed, and when I say we it means 32 leaders saying yes, to invest 5% of our GDP annually in defence by 2035. To increase also defence production, so that we can match the needs with something available concrete capabilities across the Alliance. And to continue our strong support to Ukraine.

Delivering on all these commitments is essential for our security. On both sides of the Atlantic, we benefit from the protection that NATO provides. But it is true, and we have been discussing this very much with Ivo and our team, that for too long the United States has carried too much of the burden in the Alliance in terms of defence spending, in terms of providing the necessary capabilities, in terms of giving additional strength to the Alliance. And what we have heard, especially during the Summit in The Hague, is that United States remains committed to the Alliance. But that this commitment comes up again, with an expectation that European Allies and Canada will take more responsibility, will offer more in this burden-sharing arrangement.

And this is why one of the issues on which we focus now is also to rebalance our security for the better of the Alliance. America's Allies, which means both Canada and European Allies, are now on a trajectory to equalise their defence spending with the United States. Over the last decade, European Allies and Canada added an extra 700 billion for defence. And more money is being invested in defence as we speak. American Allies have broad shoulders in a way, so they can afford to step up to today, and they are stepping up today and working to fulfil their commitments.

Therefore, both in the course of this year and in the future, we will see a burden shifting process, which means that European Allies and Canada will invest more in their militaries and what is necessary for credible collective defence. We see this in the contributions to the eastern flank. We see this in terms of defence spending. We see this in the procurement of capabilities; let me just mention F-35s. We see it across the table. Everyone doing their fair share makes the transatlantic bond stronger. It makes the transatlantic Alliance stronger, but it also makes all of us safer. As Europe and Canada take on the lion's share for our own defence, they can be sure that America has their back and our enduring commitment, when I say our I mean all of us, to Article Five sends a powerful message. NATO has the will, but it also has the capacity to respond to any aggression.

The military power of the United States really packs a punch and there is strength in numbers. NATO's 32 Allies represent half of the world's economic and military might. Peace through strength is what NATO was made for. A strong NATO also means that there are less problems that America has to worry and concentrate on. A secure Europe, a secure Arctic and secure Atlantic are priorities for NATO, but they're also essential for America's long-term security.

Europe knows, and this was a very clear message from The Hague Summit, but especially after European Allies started increasing their defence spending. Europe knows it cannot continue to outsource its own security to the United States. It is also our responsibility and it is also our ambition.

In those terms, Europe is growing in both confidence but also in building capabilities. Allies did not only commit to large increases in defence spending, we have also agreed to expand our defence industrial base across NATO, which means on both sides of the Atlantic.

I said we need all these military capabilities in order to protect our citizens, to keep our country safe, for our deterrence and defence. But also, we need additional capabilities and appropriate defence spending also in order to continue supporting Ukraine. This was also one of the conclusions at The Hague Summit. And we don't see it as charity. We do this because we know that Ukraine’s security affects ours. Our security is closely linked to the security of Ukraine, so we support the efforts to secure a just and a lasting peace. The US President broke the deadlock with Russia, and he was the one bringing Putin to the negotiating table. America's Allies have also stepped up, including through the UDCG, the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, but also by the so-called Coalition of the Willing.

Just two weeks ago, I was in Kyiv and I joined Ukrainian President Zelenskyy at the meeting of the Coalition of the Willing. And in all my discussions with Ukrainian leadership, I have sent the same message. And this is that NATO continues to support Ukraine. We believe that this support is necessary so that Ukraine can defend itself against Russia today, be in a stronger position during the negotiations, but also because Ukraine needs to be able to deter future aggressions from the Russian side.

So, on top of all the previous models in which NATO was supportive to Ukraine, this year after The Hague Summit, we have initiated a new model of support to Ukraine. It's called PURL, Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List, where European Allies and Canada are making strong contributions with military equipment from US stockpiles. So, through PURL, funded not only by Allies, but also by two of our partners, we are delivering essential, lethal and non-lethal US capabilities. They include ammunition, but they also include needed air defence, and practically most of the air defences that protect Ukraine’s energy capabilities, battlefield, but very much also cities and civilians, are very much a result of PURL and the delivery of this equipment.

Until now, the total contributions for this year were a bit over 4 billion US dollars, and almost two-thirds of all NATO Allies are already contributing in this model. So, the visit of Ukraine, as always, was a sobering experience. You see war in its very, very visible form. You see the suffering. You see on one side, an attempt of a normal life during the day. And then you go to the shelter, and you can only imagine how does it feel if you have to do it every single night. And this is what Ukrainian citizens, what Ukrainian families, are faced almost every day and every week. So Ukrainian people have really endured very much, both on the front line, but very much in the cities as civilians. The Russian terror from the skies is a daily occurrence, night after night, day after day. And the destruction of homes, but also hospitals, energy plants, transmission is happening as we speak.

Our support is not only saving Ukrainian lives, it is also, as I said, an investment in our security. Because even when the war in Ukraine ends, the danger from Moscow will not disappear. And the challenge from China that enables these war efforts by Russia will continue to grow. So, we can only be secure and successful if we stand together and if we provide to our military the necessary capabilities.

Let me end where I began with ‘The Keys to Freedom’ and the filmmaker Wenders. He said freedom is not something that we inherit. It's something that we earn. It's something that we must protect and something that we have to share. So, this is what we do: Europe and America in NATO together. Two continents, 32 nations and 1 billion people. Sticking together, standing together is how we stay safe in a world that has become very dangerous, very volatile and sometimes very unpredictable. But the predictable part is that I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

Ivo Daalder (Moderator)

Thank you. That was wonderful. Speaking about, I'll have to look at ‘The Keys to Freedom.’ That sounds like a great thing to do over the holidays. But speaking of freedom, one of the areas that Europe is facing a challenge to its freedom is, of course, Ukraine. The other one is the kinds of hybrid and covert attacks that have been part of the war-making machine that Russia has engaged in when it was the Soviet Union, but has particularly engaged in the last few years. We've seen all kinds of sabotages, assassinations. Just couple of days ago, a railway line in Poland being blown up, lines of communication, electricity across the seas and under to be cut, drones flying over aircraft, nuclear submarine bases in France, bases that may or may not have nuclear weapons in Belgium and in the Netherlands. War is coming very close. How does an alliance like NATO that is actually geared to deterring an attack directly in the old-fashioned way? How does an alliance like NATO deal with that?

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

As I said, one of the big strengths is that we adapt. And we were very clear-eyed about the dangers. And Allies were united in saying Russia is and will continue to be a threat to Euro-Atlantic security. And this modus operandus is not new for Russia. They have always been very good at moving along the spectre from peace to conflict to war, and challenging us where they believe they could surprise us. But I remember, at the beginning of this year, we have had a number of incidents in the Baltic Sea, where parts of the Russian Shadow Fleet, the vessels that they use to avoid sanctions and sell their oil and gas, were involved in series of incidents which actually cut very important under sea infrastructure. So, basically threatening some of the Baltic countries with loss of electricity, loss of data, et cetera. So, in the first few months, the focus was very much on the hybrid activities that the Russians were doing in the Baltic Sea. And what NATO did was we changed our posture. We adjusted to this. We created an activity that was called Baltic Sentry, which basically meant that a certain number of assets by our military command were sent there. But we also worked hand in hand with the NATO Command from this side of the Atlantic that does transformation, the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, SACT. And they came up with more innovative solutions in terms of situational awareness, using drones, but also using sensors so that our presence was visible. Our flexibility was bigger, and we became stronger in that domain. And although it took, I think us for this readjustment sometime, one or two months, actually, after the Baltic Sentry was activated with full capacity, we have not seen afterwards, incidentally or non-incidentally any lines being cut. So, in a way, we have the capabilities. We have the knowledge, and this is what we are doing now, with a new approach on the eastern flank. Because most of the incursions that Russia was doing were on the eastern flank, drones, jets entering air light territory. And this is why now we have a large number of assets which are more flexible, which also work a lot with industry on counter-drone technology, experimenting, testing, fielding all this equipment. And this is how our posture actually reflects this new reality. But generally, this has been a playbook by the Russians since always. It's very good that some Allies are coming forward with proofs, with naming names, with attributing all these actions with whether it's sabotage, arson, actually even murders. The UK came up with a very clear case on how GRU was implicated in these events. Raising the cost for Russia is also very helpful. And what we have seen with Baltic Sentry and with Eastern Sentry is that when you have the assets, when you have the military, the military capabilities and command, you are able to deal with this. And this is what makes NATO good, even in the hybrid domain.

Ivo Daalder (Moderator)

I'm going to open it up for in a minute to everyone in the in the room here who are, I'm sure, very eager to ask questions. But I'm going to have one more question, which actually sort of derives from part of your answer, which is to think about this incredible amount of money that is now starting to be made available for defence. How to ensure that it is adaptable to the situation that we find ourselves, the old traditional way in which you spent money, you buy airplanes, you train pilots, you buy tanks, you train a mechanised infantry, and you go to war, and you need to have a lot of that kind of stuff.

The new way of warfare still has that, but it also has this adaptability. You see this in Ukraine, where the nature in which Ukraine is fighting the war is fundamentally different than it was a year ago, two years ago, three years ago. So how does an Alliance prepare for this adaptability, for working with individual countries and defence industries, ‘trans-atlantically,’ and within Europe, to provide that flexibility, that ability to generate quick innovation to deal with new issues? How is NATO adapted to that new reality?

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

Well, first, we do learn a lot from the Ukrainian war, and we have a large number of, let's say, meeting points with Ukrainian counterparts. I mentioned how NATO is providing PURL assistance to Ukraine. It actually goes through our command that we have stood in Wiesbaden, in Germany. Most of the equipment flowing towards Ukraine goes there, but it's also a meeting point for our military experts and Ukrainian.

And then we also have a special centre that we have opened at the beginning of this year in Poland. It's called JATEC, and it basically, it's the first entity [within the NATO Command Structure] between NATO and a partner country Ukraine. We don't have this with other partners. And this is a centre where we actually go through the lessons learned from the Ukrainian war, on strategy, on tactics, things like this.

And because we have had strong commitment to Ukraine with training, with maintenance, with spare parts, actually the links between the experts are of a daily nature. They have really, really, this was a two-way street, not really just us sending support, but also learning from their experience. Of course, most of our military leaders say the following: When we need to defend Allied territory, we will fight a different war, because we have more means. We do have much stronger capabilities.

But still, especially in domains such as drones and counter drones, but also adjustments on the on the battlefield, we really learn a lot. And what we have spoken with all of the Allies is that sometimes we have to really rethink our acquisition processes. We have slightly changed our defence planning.

In the past, defence planning in NATO was done in total, and then we would say to Allies, ‘okay, these are the capabilities that you need to procure, and it was a very finite and concrete list.’ Now we give Allies, countries, also the opportunity to focus on the result, on the output, and not just the means to reach that output. So, there is a lot of jets and tanks and vehicles, but it's also how can we make a more innovative solution with regards to this, and especially in terms of new technology. We pair with defence industry very much, because we see defence industry as part of our deterrence and defence. So, in peace times, you can really make a very, very straight line. You know,’ this is my domain. You stick to yours.’ But now, if we don't have this context with defence industry, it would be a mission impossible. So, when leaders gathered in The Hague, we also had an Industry Forum event, a large number of primes, the typical traditional defence companies, but also a lot of startups, a lot of new technologies. And now we had in Romania, big event.

So this is what we tell them, we are the same ecosystem, in a way. And they also have enormous contacts with Ukrainian counterparts. They do joint ventures, they send their people. And what we have seen is that they have grown in terms of expertise and knowledge and innovation by using the experience from Ukraine. So we ask our Allies to take a bit of a different approach in acquisition, and we ask them to try also group or joint procurements, because this makes interoperability easier, and it also drives the prices lower. We don't want, with the increased defence spending, to just drive the prices up. We really want to have the capabilities, because you don't deter and defend with percentages of GDP. You actually need them to procure the capabilities.

Ivo Daalder (Moderator)

Great. Let me open it up two things. Number one, we wait for a microphone because we are taping this, and if you want not to have your question to be part of this, would not be good. And number two, do state your name, and please make your question to question, and we'll start and start right up here in front.

Question

Thank you so much for being here. My name is Maria. I'm doing my master's at The Fletcher School, yes, and also doing some classes. Thank you. At the Harvard Law. So, I'm from Spain, and I wanted to ask about the contribution, as Spain has said that it will not contribute 5%, but Trump has made very clear he doesn't like that. So I wanted to see what's the viewpoint of, like the headquarters in that and, yeah. Thank you.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

Thank you. We go one of them. Well, thank you very much for reminding me of the easier days when I would listen, and not speak, not far from here. And by the way, I envy all of you. I mean, when I returned from Fletcher, I had this idea that I should ask for a new constitutional change, because my country went through several rounds of constitutional changes. And I said, oh, ‘I'll ask a constitutional change where I would prescribe that every citizen has the right to go back to school every 10 years.’ Because it keeps your mind agile, because it opens up your horizon. So I envy you trust me.

On the question of Spain. Spain is a valuable Ally, and we see them supporting our efforts at the eastern flank. They have been supporting a number of air policing missions, and we have no doubts that this will remain to be the case. But the fact is that at The Hague Summit, all of us committed to spending 5% of GDP to defence, and it was not a number that was created overnight. I mean, there was a very, I would say, step by step process that led to the result. In 2024 our military leaders, NATO military leaders, were asked to develop defence plans. How do we deter? How do we defend in case of an attack? And they came up with a proposal, and all 32 Allies agreed, full consensus. These are the plans. So, when you have the plans, you have the curriculum. Now you have to procure the capabilities.

So, six months afterwards, we had a Defence Ministerial, or all defence ministers were around the table, and by then, every Ally had a list of so-called capability targets, that we do. So that these are the things that the Ally needs to have in the course of next X number of years. There was full consensus on this as well. So we all know what every Ally needs to contribute. And all the planners, all the military experts, were clear that on these just core defence, military related capabilities, we would need around 3.5, 3.7%, of GDPs.

But then many Allies came forward and said, ‘listen, if we are to defend ourselves, it's not just the tanks and the jets and the ammunition and the long strike missiles.’ It's also, how do we increase our readiness? If there is a problem on the eastern flank, how much time does it need us to reinforce our troops? We need military mobility. We need also to protect ourselves from cyber threats. We also need to invest in our societal resilience. We need to invest in a stronger defence industrial base. All these things are important. They are not typical military capabilities, but they are defence related. So, all Allies agreed 1.5% of GDP on these additional things. And this is how the 5% came about, and this is what all Allies felt, was a contribution to our joint security. And when we talk about burden sharing, we talk about an equalised burden sharing, and this is why the percentages of GDP work, because they show that we are willing to invest in our security. In an equalized manner.

Question

My name is [inaudible], and I'm a first year MPA student at Chan School of Public Health. So last week, US published its latest national security strategy, and saying that Europe is going through, quote, civilizational erasure, and it will shift its focus to west hemisphere and especially its southern border. Do you have any comments on it? Thank you.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

All US presidents come up with security strategies, and I talk about the US, but all Allies have their own security strategies. We don't comment on them because we focus on what we do together, and what we do together is providing for a collective security. And this was the recipe for collective security, that we should increase our defence spending, equalise us with European Allies and Canada, and also allow that European Allies take the lead when it comes to conventional deterrence in our part of the world.

And I have to say that this is hardly new. Why? Because, yeah, [inaudible] can vouch this even more. I remember when I first came for a defence ministerial in NATO, we were still not a member of the Alliance, but we joined sessions dedicated to the mission in Afghanistan, Resolute Support. So it was usually the third or the fourth session of the day, right?

And even after three sessions, at the last one, every US secretary would ask European Allies and Canada to do more in defence investment. And several European ministers would say, yes, we know that. It's just, we know it's legitimate, but maybe next year. And this has been a reoccurring pattern from Eisenhower, JFK, these calls for more equalised approach, for better burden sharing, have been around practically with every administration. The pivot to Asia happened, started being mentioned less than 20 years ago. So, the idea, the goal, the purpose, of the North Atlantic Alliance, is to be able to vouch for our collective security by having all Allies contributing. And we do have the same threat assessment. We do have this approach that a secure Atlantic, a secure Arctic, a secure area of responsibility for NATO is important, both for Europe and for America.

Ivo Daalder (Moderator)

Just right there in the back, then we'll come over here.

Question

Yes, thank you very much. My name is Michael. I am also an MPA second year. Madam Secretary, I appreciate a lot that you're here today. This will make the question a little bit harder, because I have to say it was a very nice speech that you just held, but I think it was mostly for the cameras and for people listening to this later. And I would make the bold claim that pretty much no one in this entire room believes what you said, at least not to the extent you said it, not after the National Security Strategy yesterday, anyways.

And I think many of us have friends in Ukraine, have friends at the border, friends who are currently fighting, and some of them told us that they're expecting to die within next six months, and we at the same time, see that American support for Ukraine, for Europe, has gone down significantly. So, my question would be, what are we actually doing to keep our people there alive, to keep our Ukrainian friends free, and to keep Russia from taking more parts of Europe and pressing their security plans on us, because, to be honest, despite all the Alliance that we have, America is currently more fraternizing with the power that NATO was once created to defend us against, than actually helping to defeat them.

Ivo Daalder (Moderator)

So remember that your time at Tufts, you would be able to ask those kind of questions.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

We would be obliged to ask this question. So, I will again put my head of someone who has gone through war. And you know, I have appreciated the speeches of support. I appreciated actions of support more. So sometimes, whenever we as an Alliance, as members of the Alliance, special countries, when we talk about how do we support Ukraine, we really have to actually look and see what we have done.

And I do believe that the case of bringing air defences to Ukraine is more important than the speech I have delivered, here or in Ukraine. Bringing ammunition to Ukraine is more important than the than the statement I will give for the media. But we have to keep sending this, and we have to keep Allies being ready to support the equipment. So, my job is to deliver statements, but my real interest, my real mission is to make sure that this is followed by action, and NATO has delivered on that action.

I know that many people were wondering what will happen at The Hague Summit. We didn't mince our words. We did not alter course. We were there, and we produced a declaration supported by all 32 Allies, that we will continue supporting Ukraine. And the next day, if you would go to Wiesbaden, if you would go to the hubs in Poland and in Romania, the flow of equipment was going. So I agree with you, speeches don't make that happen, but action does, and our job, our work, was to actually put maximum volume on making these billions of euros, of military equipment, available to the Ukrainians.

But also being there and follow their lead when it comes to peace negotiations, because it is very easy to be here in Cambridge and talk about what needs to happen in Ukraine, but it is very difficult for them in the shelters. It is very difficult for Ukrainians at a battlefield, and it is their role to decide what kind of a peace agreement. It is their role to decide what kind of guarantees that they need, and it is our role to make sure that these security guarantees are available. The suffering cannot go on forever, and this is why we were very supportive as NATO to US led negotiations to end the war.

And we were very clear in saying that this has to be a just and lasting peace, because Ukraine had different, also, experiences. But going back to the beginning, our job was to make sure that the support is there. If you go at the border, the support is there. If you go in Kyiv, the support is there. And this is why I do believe we can we can all criticise each other very much. But when it comes to NATO and Ukraine, we have been consistent, and we have helped them in times of need. And I hope, and I know that this will continue.

Ivo Daalder (Moderator)

Let me just add I think that in order to get action, sometimes you do need speeches. You do need to explain why it is that you're doing what it is, particularly for those people who are not in areas like we are right now, where we're spending day in and day out thinking about those things. We're talking to a wider public, and that's important too. But not, not to diminish your question, just to add to that. You grab the microphone. So that was really smart. Go ahead.

Question

Thank you. I'm Sofia Anastazievsky. I'm a PhD student in the Department of Government. I have a two-part question. The first part is to do with Russia's rhetoric around Svalbard and the Arctic. So, I guess this is an open invitation to speak further about both the Arctic and NATO's stance towards information warfare. And the other question is about sort of, maybe, tensions that exist between NATO's ability to be agile and NATO's commitment to consensus.

Obviously, Europe's been at war since 2008, or if you think that's irrelevant, 2014 at least, and you're saying that there's been a commitment to increasing spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, so that's like maybe a 20 year lag, optimistically. So, I guess I would just like to hear more about that, and then… when we talk about a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, I just want to throw out there that a just peace would involve peace at the 1991 borders.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

I started writing down so that I do remember. But let me start with Arctic. Very much. We are. This is one of the areas of, let's say, needed shift. Because in the past, NATO was not focusing very much on this area, because Allies believed that this is not something for NATO to deal with. So, they really consider it more like a national interest. But it has become clear that the Arctic is essential for the security in the Euro-Atlantic, and it was also clear that A) Russia's approach in the Arctic has been very, very systematic, coherent, and that the dangers posed both to European Allies, but also to Canada and the US are exacerbated also by the melting of, the opening of the pathways, especially for some of their navy. So we are actually focusing very much on the Arctic. We have had quite a number of formats with countries involved. I think seven out of eight Arctic countries are NATO members. So this is, this is an area where we can really deliver meaningful change, and there is a big appetite to take this into account, even when we develop our defence capability targets, which was not the case in the past. So very much now, several Allies have called on our defence planners to reconsider and add this.

And we have seen also implications for space and all these things. So this was a very, very needed change, and I, we welcomed it. On the philosophical question of agile and consensus. I don't have a new answer to an old problem. We sometimes take time, and sometimes this is why we have to be flexible. And you have named already one example, 2035. Yes, there were countries who actually advocated very strongly for the 5% target to be reached in 2030. Some advocated for this target not to be as ambitious. So as one Ambassador mentioned, flexibility is the mother of unity. This was the end result.

But you know, there are no magic wands when, when you have to come up with a consensus. But you know, what counts is not just the timetable. What counts is that large number of Allies have already stepped up remarkably. I mean, look at the Baltics and Poland. They already made it to 5% or even some of them a bit over 5%, and they really showed real leadership. And I remember we used their example before The Hague Summit to lobby around all the members. They could have sat around the table and asked for a decision on 5% to be made before moving forward, but no, they actually showed that it's feasible to everyone by moving to 5%, even before the Summit conclusions.

And if they can do it, this was the message that we brought to other countries: others can do it. We have seen Poland, Baltic States, but also the Nordic states. And what we are seeing in Germany is really remarkable, and their plan to reach the targets to 3.5 in 2029 I think, it also is a big boost, especially for the European pillar, and for European capabilities.

So this was very much the plan, or at least the result that we hoped for. It's not just, that not everyone will delay everything until 2035, because you need to start the procurements now. If you are to have these capabilities, you need to start by having the money and the acquisition processes several years in advance. But on the other side, we do have capabilities. These targets, the previous targets were not meaningless. Not everyone was at 2%, but this year, we have finally made sure that all Allies respect the 2% pledge that was made in 2014. You were right, but just few years ago, we were at 1.2 in certain countries, 1.4, 1.6, so it is a clear… The call was there, but now I think the combination of a very clear threat to our societies, but also. A very clear message that just burden sharing is a must. Did it, and this is how we managed to be to build a consensus, even in difficult circumstances, and be a bit more agile than usual.

Ivo Daalder (Moderator)

Going to go up over here and while the microphone makes its way, just two other things on consensus. Because, on the one hand, it makes no sense to think about you can be agile and have consensus. On the other hand, consensus creates unity, and unity is a very powerful force to get people to do things they otherwise wouldn't do. The other thing about consensus in NATO is NATO is really clever at figuring out how to agree to disagree. We have footnotes. We have people walking away or not in the meeting when it happens. So there's a whole way you can get to consensus in a very, very interesting kind of way.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

And the big success this time was not even footnotes.

Ivo Daalder (Moderator)

It was a statement by the Spanish Prime Minister.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

But the page was very clean and clear.

Ivo Daalder (Moderator)

But there's different ways of doing it. Consensus is also it's not yes, it's not no, which is another interesting way in which you get to do this. So I used to be a sceptic, having lived through it for four years. It's a very powerful tool to get stuff done that you otherwise might not be able to get done. And I think that's the case in the 3.5, 5%

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

I remember one Ambassador, sorry for one second, when we were negotiating the conclusions at The Hague Summit. He said, ‘listen, I mean a declaration especially a statement by leaders, it shouldn't be a Christmas tree. You know, we should not expect all of our things to be there. Let's try and focus on the bare essentials, what we believe is a must now, and deliver on this.’ And it did work. But now until the Summit, the focus was to have the decision. After the Summit, the decision is there. It's as relevant as its implementation.

Question

Thank you very much for being here. My name is Carlotta Guerini. I'm a student here at Harvard Kennedy School and an officer in the German Armed Forces. Given the diverging strategic and priorities between the US and many European Allies and the growing internal socioeconomic and political pressures across Europe, what concrete institutional reforms will NATO undertake to ensure that collective decision-making and burden-sharing and mutual trust remain intact, even if individual members says threat perceptions or political agendas diverge?

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

Well, what the Secretary General made very clear at the beginning of his mandate, so second half of last year, was that he wants the organisation to focus on its core mission. And the core mission is collective security. This is why we actually did have reforms within the organisation. And the idea was to focus on things that we do well, which is basically, capability targets, defence planning, military issues, interoperability, military standards. This is the only organisation that does this, and we have to focus on this. And was there any period in our history as an Alliance where Allies did not have diverse positions on something? The idea is to focus on the things on which we agree and we agree that the Euro-Atlantic Alliance and the investing in our collective security, in our deterrence and defence is necessary in order to deter aggression and defend our Allies. So, the focus is very much this, and this is why the priorities of the Summit were very simple and very straightforward: increase defence investment, increase defence production and support Ukraine. He really believes that on many other things, we allow other organisations or Allies to focus on them, but our focus is collective security.

Question

Hi, thank you very much. My name is Hao Nan, MPP student here. My question is like this. It seems to me, each side of the reverie is working very diligently for the arm race. But what's your perception? Do you think it's inevitable? And secondly, about the technology use. Those modern warfares not mentioned, the Ukraine war, but also we see in the Pakistan, the Indian Wars. Where do you see this changing the nature of war in the upcoming future? Thank you.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

Well, two questions for two totally also separated events, quite a lot to discuss on them. But let me, let me just deal with the issue of is this an arms race? 20 years ago, many people considered investing in defence a luxury they don't need. And maybe for those that were talking about increased defence spending, they would warn them of a potential for an arms race. But especially after what happened first in 2014, you mentioned even before, especially after 2022, we are not talking about an arms race. We are talking about us being prepared to defend ourselves. And self-defence is enshrined in all UN Charter. You know, I was at an OSCE meeting, so the kind of commitments of the OSCE, the right of self-defence. European countries especially and Canada have really used the peace dividend to change their budgets. And defence spending has really hit record low. And we were talking with Ivo that actually it was a trend from especially 2000 onwards. But when circumstances change, what do we do? We don't sit and wait. We look at the reality and we adjust our posture, our budget, our political action. So, when you look at Russia, when you look at their actions, not only in Ukraine, but the hybrid action that that Ivo mentioned and very much, if you look at their budgets, their war economy, if you listen to some of their statements. I mean, I remember some time ago, one of Putin's aide had a statement that actually ‘expansion is the only game in town.’ I mean, I'm really paraphrasing it, but basically this has been how Russia looks at its neighbourhood. Expansion is not one of the strategies, ‘it's the only game in town.’ And you don't see their military strategy changing from aggressive into offensive. So NATO was built as an Alliance which is defensive. When we look back at our history, we say we were successful. Why? Not because war. Because we've managed to preserve peace. And this is very much our thinking. Now we try to push and convince everyone of the importance of defence spending so that we can prevent war. So, that our military superiority is visible and it deters aggression.

And on the second issue of innovation, there is a lot to say. Talking to our people, we have an accelerator, DIANA, in London. We do have a NATO Innovation Fund. So, when we talk with them, it's one level. When we also talk with industry, especially those the newcomers in the domain, but also some of the primes who have really excelled at innovating their solutions. It's a completely different ball game. And what is important, and what we do in NATO is very much allow for Allies’ industry, to interact with our military commanders, with our troops to actually test these solutions during exercises. As we speak, Eastern Sentry does that on the eastern flank. They test, they really use the lessons learned, both in exercise mode but also in Ukraine, to really change the platforms and to change the different capabilities. So, this is very much in our DNA, the potential to innovate.

Question

Thank you very much. My name is Carlo Giorno. I'm Italian, and I'm a student here at the Kennedy School. My question is, in the National Security Strategy, one of the main support from US goes to the far right parties in Europe. The same far right parties are the ones that don't want to invest in defence. And they say that actually, let's continue invest in Ukraine is useless. So we should become friends of Russia. In the moment in which in 2028, let's assume you have a Marine Le Pen in France. You have the AFD in Germany. You have Nigel Farage in UK. How will you guarantee that the NATO countries still stick to the 5% and just don't say, ‘You know what? I don't care. This is not my war. Why should I spend money?’ How, at your level, at your position, will you enforce countries, regardless of their ideology and government, to stick to planning, to efforts?

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

With 25 years in national politics, you know how difficult it is for me to avoid, but we never comment on domestic politics. I don't comment even in my own domestic politics. I keep my mouth shut like this. It's a strong impulse, but I survive. The history of the Alliance, and even when you talk about the investment pledges, a history of different governments coming around the table. I cannot recall a ministerial meeting in the last 10 years where you would not have a comment that someone is leaving and a newcomer is coming to the table. So, the strength of the Alliance was that with all the differences, with all the different political views, we sit around the table and we stick as an Alliance on the issue of collective security. We might disagree on many other issues, but on this issue, we agree. And sometimes this consensus, this decision making, takes a while. But at the end of the day, when we make it, the Alliance is stronger for this. So this is our plan, and this is something that has worked for the Alliance for many years.

Question

Good afternoon, thank you so much. My name is Maria, and thank you for your words, and even more for your actions of support. I am from Ukraine, and I wanted to follow up on a question about the air defences. The strikes by Russia have intensified, and they're using multiple actions, sending 600 drones together with the missiles, different range of missiles. And well our systems are failing, and from what extent, the supplies are also running out short. So, my question is, what sort of NATO is thinking in terms of securing the sky over civilian population in Ukraine? And in particular, is there again, discussions about the no-fly zone, or that's off the table? Is there a variation of it? I know there has been some discussions about protection to cities in western part of Ukraine, so if you can elaborate a bit more, thank you.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

Thank you for the question. There were discussions in the media by certain members. But the way our deterrence and defence has been created and works is that it can protect Allied territory. And on Ukraine, we were very clear, and Allies were very clear that they will do their utmost to send the necessary military equipment so that Ukraine can defend itself. And I know that sometimes it is not enough, especially because the production is not at par to our needs. I was talking, you were talking about air defence, essential part of the military equipment that we are sending. The problem is that there isn't enough of air defence in the stockpiles around the Alliance. So, one of our first push to defence industry was very much to produce more in terms of air defence. And this is what we were discussing also with Ukrainian counterparts, both in Brussels, but very much in Kyiv. Because the number of attacks, the combination of missiles and drones, they are really stretching the air defences, in spite of all the innovation and resilience that Ukraine has shown. But this is why we will keep on pushing and getting enough military equipment to Ukraine.

Question

Hi, thanks so much. My name is Alana. I'm a first year in the MPP. My question was really just on the future of AI with NATO. Just also looking at AI as a tool for targeting and intelligence, but also as a threat, especially with AI enhanced cyberattacks. We also have a pretty large transatlantic gap when it comes to what responsible AI looks like, and just our legal codes and policy towards AI. So, if you could just speak to how NATO's leveraging its AI strategy moving forward.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

Thank you very much. We spoke also with some Ukrainian counterparts on this, but also some of the companies offering services in this domain. It's really next century. So, we have a team that focuses on defence industry, but very much innovation, and especially the questions such as AI, but also quantum technology. And there in our leadership team, people who are very focused on this, but discussions about responsible use were raised by a number of Allies. And what we have seen is a genuine interest to invest and test more. And this is where our also commander, both SACEUR, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and our SACT work very much. What is the next step? How should we prepare and how should we integrate? Because it's artificial intelligence, but it's also the traditional domains and the traditional structures within the military and really use some of it. But we have had some very good examples of systems that we have introduced within NATO, and we are sharing these experiences with a number of Allies so that they can both profit and that we can be more interoperable in this.

Question

Thank you for being here. So I think that there's a common understanding that Ukraine security is fundamental to Europe’s security. And NATO member countries have been sending aircraft, rifles and whatnot, to Ukraine. But do you think that this aid is limited in nature? What Ukraine seems to lack on the battlefield right now is manpower, right? Men and women in infantry. And so given that, we have this claim that Ukraine’s security is super important to Europe. But do you think that there's a tension between that claim and the fact that the aid that we're pledging will always be limited in nature? Because we're not willing to send troops or deploy assets.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska

What is essential now is that the Coalition of the Willing is, as the words say, a coalition of a large number of Allies, and also not just Allies, who are willing to send a reassurance force, a security guarantee once there is a ceasefire or a peace deal, to support Ukraine in several ways. One of these is to support them in training, reconstituting a bit the armed forces of Ukraine. But also, very much to deter and it's not an easy decision for any country. I mean, if you go back in time, it's always risky. But I think the fact that a number of Allies have already committed to supporting this security guarantee for Ukraine, I think speaks loud of this commitment to Ukraine security. We would all want to do more, but this is a clear commitment that required political leadership in many countries. It's not an easy thing to explain. But when you look at the map and when you look at what happens in Ukraine, you know that investing in Ukraine’s security will influence our security for the better, not for the worse. So, I really appreciate those countries for moving forward and being strong and being dedicated on doing something meaningful.