Close
Back
Download NATO’s broadcast-quality video content free of charge
Log in
No account?
Forgot your password?
NATO MULTIMEDIA ACCOUNT
Access NATO’s broadcast-quality video content free of charge
Create an account
Check your inbox and enter verification code
We have sent a verification code to your email address.
.
Enter the code to verify your account. This code will expire in 30 minutes.
You have successfully created your account
From now on you can download videos from our website
Subscribe to our newsletter
If you would also like to subscribe to the newsletter and receive our latest updates, click on the button below.
Reset password
Enter the email address you registered with and we will send you a code to reset your password.
Reset password
We have sent a verification code to your email address.
Enter the code to verify your account. This code will expire in 30 minutes.
Create a new password
The password must be at least 12 characters long, no spaces, include upper/lowercase letters, numbers and symbols.
Your password has been updated
Click the button to return to the page you were on and log in with your new password.
Kosova and the role of NATO in it, has probably been the most emblematic for the challenges of this century and the way NATO will find answers for its own role in the future. NATO entered fully into a conflict, as a decisive force in creating change:
- by intervening in the air campaign in1999 it prevented genocide and reversed the effects of ethnic cleansing
- by establishing a security force in Kosova as of June 1999 it created conditions for return of refugees and the beginning of a long process of institution building
- by its continuous presence in Kosova it has served as a stabilizing force for the whole region and as a condition sine qua non for the resolution of two very important issues in South-eastern Europe; the permanent status of Kosova and the question of Stability of South-eastern Europe through a process of Euro-Atlantic integration.
Seen from this perspective, NATO has been the stabilizing force that has drawn the Balkans from the path of genocide to a path of integration, a role similar in positive effects to the core of the mission NATO had in its original, establishing mission for Europe, when it overturned the European history of genocide into one of integration.
The important effects of the past four years of international military and civilian presence in Kosova are by all means impressive.
Starting from scratch, in June of 1999 Kosova has gone successfully through tests of electoral democracy and can certainly be considered one today. Starting from scratch, it has also created the basis of administrative capacity, be it in civil registry, banking and business. The majority of the people have a roof over their head today, when only four years ago over 100 thousand houses had been partially or totally destroyed by Serb forces. And, instead of the rule of the gun in June of 1999 we now have an ever increasing police force educated to implement the rule of law, and an increasingly growing number of better and more efficient judges.
Nevertheless, as time has gone by with the international administration of Kosova, objective impediments have emerged in the way of going further.
We are now already for some time in a situation of blockage, due basically to the limited capacity of the concept of international administration.
Now, the international civilian administration (UNMIK) and the international security presence (KFOR) have different standing in society, and different perceptions of reality.
KFOR has a precise mission, UNMIK has a vague mission due to be interpreted and reinterpreted at will. KFOR has a more or less clear chain of command, UNMIK has at its head an all powerful figure who rarely hears from his boss, if he can even identify him.
But more importantly, there is an issue of balance of powers which has reached its peak, it is about the friction that is created by the natural evolution of the autochthonous democratic authority and of that of UNMIK.
Presently, most of the governance levers are in the hands of UNMIK, whereas most of the responsibility for governance is nominally addressed to the kosovar institutions. This creates a series of gridlocks, of Catch 22's in which UNMIK will rightly blame the kosovar institutions for slow application of their powers, and the kosovar institutions will blame UNMIK rightly for not handing them the right powers. Or the other in which UNMIK will rightly question the capacity of the kosovar institutions to have more competencies handed over, whereas the kosovar institutions will also rightly question the indecision of UNMIK in handing over decision making powers as a way to stop the path of building of the kosovar institutions.
Kosova is today blocked, after at least two and a half years of continuous restrictions in interpreting UNSC 1244, and of the joint negative attitude of both UNMIK and the kosovar institutions. The first for taking the short-cut, and monopolizing decision making , the second for not proving dynamic or innovative in dealing with the powers they already have. Both have succeeded very much in only one thing, the blame game.
And this grid lock is not about to be broken. UNMIK will spend the next 12 months preparing two things: dialogue with Belgrade and elections. The kosovar institutions will spend the next 12 months trying to wrestle away some competency from UNMIK, and also preparing for elections.
But this situation will not go on for much more.
NATO needs its vision of future in Kosova, derived from its own mission and from how the future of Kosova will inherently be developed.
Within the next 12-18 months, the status of Kosova will be defined. As the situation has developed, including the war and the post-war period, there are only two options at the table. One is the independence of Kosova with its entire territory, and the other is the independence of Kosova with part of its territory partitioned and annexed to Serbia. The second outcome, which has a certain degree of sympathy in a good deal of the Serbian political elite, and which to a certain extent is being applied even now through Serb parallel administrative structures in the Serb enclaves, would establish a negative precedent of ethnic territorial solutions. This precedent would in turn be a powerful negative trigger for both destabilizing Serbia in the Preshevo valley and for the stability, as well as an existence of a Macedonia as we know it now. Furthermore, such a precedent would derail the dynamic, although, albeit fragile, process of democracy building in Kosova.
Be it as it may, the outcome will be one of Kosova earning its sovereignty in the near future.
And that means a set of options for NATO:
- Continue with the status quo, being part of a process that does not create results any more but will degenerate to the contrary
- go along with the stream, in which both Belgrade and Prishtina may lead to a more problematic outcome
- try to create a rational , forward looking process in which both parties will find themselves more comfortable. This is the Euro-Atlantic integration context, in which NATO, EU and the US set the standards.
The basic historical context of this independence of Kosova is one of the whole Southeastern Europe moving much faster into integration. As was the intervention of NATO of Kosova and emblem of NATO in the new century, involving itself in missions of out of area stabilization through security presence and democratic institution building, so is the independence of Kosova emblematic for the need for new relations. Independence, in the sense of Euro-Atlantic integrations means interdependence of partners, equal partners.
If this is the case, let me mention the points that I see as crucial for embarking on a proper road:
- Security: Serbia and Kosova cannot base their security without an umbrella. Serbian soldiers may march one day in Kosova, but the same way the German soldiers march in Liberation day parades in Paris, within a totally new concept. Serbian and Kosovar soldiers will be part of new units, but not units of the Serbian or Yugoslav army. They could serve together in units, in no more than a decade, in areas to the East of Europe, or maybe to the South of it, that need the stabilizing help of security that people of Kosova needed in 1999.
For this, they need to develop their capacities within a new doctrine of NATO, of collective security plus increased portion of peacekeeping or peacemaking operations. And, in order to do this, there need to be more courageous advances in directing the transformation of the KPC in a mobile peacekeeping unit.
- Minorities: Serbia and Kosova will, whatever the case, have an interest in the minority populations. It is key for both Serbia and Kosova to see the minorities in their respective societies as an added value for the future. For the kosovar Albanians, the Serb community in Kosova, its language and culture are a challenge for building a new interethnic relationship but also a new way to approach the future of both Serbia and Kosova. We will need a Bill of rights, custom designed for our citizens who are in a minority position.
- Challenge: can the local Serbs be treated as Kosovars, by both the majority Albanians in Kosova , as well as by Serbia
- Negotiations: There can be a more secure road for negotiations between Prishtina and Belgrade than the present shy and disorganized one , initiated by UNMIK. It is the road that deals both with the past, present and future of Kosova and Serbia through a Euro-Atlantic context. And within it, it presents both the carrots and the sticks.
One thing that has proven crucial in war, and that is a joint work of NATO, the EU and the US, has proven itself crucial in peace as well. There is no sustainable process towards finding the solution for the status of Kosova, until we have this Trio fully engaged , both as actors and as concept.