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Brussels -- Secretary of State Christopher says the United States has left "no doubt" about its "support for democratic change in Serbia" and added he hoped for and expected "a unified action on the part of NATO members" reflecting that position.
The Secretary of State told reporters gathering December 9 for the NATO meetings in Brussels this week that he wanted "to emphasize" to Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic "the importance of not using force" in connection with the demonstrations by "tens of thousands, sometimes more than that, despite the very bad weather" that have been going on "for 18 straight days."
Stablity in the region of the Balkans as a whole, Christopher said, is "very important, and democratization in Serbia is a key factor."
Christopher will represent U.S. views at the December 10 North Atlantic Council (NAC) Ministerial Meeting and at the December 11 meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), both being held at NATO headquarters in Brusssls.
"The meeting tomorrow (December 10)," Christopher said, "will be significant in setting a date for the NATO Summit next year, and a full agenda of decisions for that Summit.
"At the same time, we move forward with NATO's cooperation with non-members as it proceeds with enlargement," he said. "Certainly one of the things we look to is to explore ways to institutionalize the cooperation with Russia and, significantly also, with Ukraine. Strengthening the Partnership for Peace will be high on the agenda, and closely allied to -- that will be the proposal for the new Atlantic Partnership Council, the so called APC."
The Secretary of State said that "NACC is, in my judgement, really a relic of the Cold War period and ought to be supplanted by the Atlantic Partnership Council which will be a very important step to give a voice to all the members of the Partnership for Peace, and it will be very significant to those who are not in the first tranche of the (NATO) enlargement."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S.
Department
of State
Office of the
Spokesman
(Brussels,
Belgium)
Conrad Hotel
Brussels,
Belgium
Dec. 9, 1996
Following is the State Department text:
Press Briefing
by Secretary of State Warren Christopher
CHRISTOPHER: Good morning and thanks for showing up on a night without much sleep. As every one in the room knows, one of President Clinton's priorities in his first term and now in his second term was emphasized yesterday by Sandy Berger: European integration. This meeting could be a very important meeting. We will take decisive steps in the direction of European integration. From my standpoint, this process is very much on track. In a sense, this meeting reminds me of the meeting three years ago, prior to the 1994 NATO Summit which was the key point in launching this whole effort. In the December meeting of the NAC, we prepared for the 1994 Summit in January and, in the same sense, we are setting up a work program for the period between now and the 1997 Summit. The last ten days have involved a number of significant meetings leading up to the Summit, basically building blocks for the Summit. First, of course, was the OSCE meeting in Lisbon which set a number of comprehensive goals for European integration. A very significant event was an agreement of the members to modernize the CFE Treaty with commencement next year. Then at London, of course, there was agreement on encouraging reconciliation and implementation in Bosnia.
Here at NATO an important decision will be taken tomorrow to have a NATO-lead stabilization force, so called SFOR, to support that effort. We have the decision taken, of course, assuming that the United Nation Security Council will provide the umbrella for SFOR. When we come down to tomorrow's meeting, I think there will be very important decisions by the Ministers to review and implement NATO's efforts in three respects. First, the assumption of new roles and missions for NATO, so dramatically reflected in IFOR and now SFOR's role. IFOR comes to an end, of course, in about a week. Second, the adaptation of NATO's internal structures and, third, the external outreach of the Alliance to new members, so called "Enlargement."
The meeting tomorrow will be significant in setting a date for the NATO Summit next year, and a full agenda of decisions for that Summit. At the same time, we move forward with NATO's cooperation with non-members as it proceeds with enlargement. Certainly one of the things we look to is to explore ways to institutionalize the cooperation with Russia and, significantly also, with Ukraine. Strengthening the Partnership for Peace will be high on the agenda, and closely allied to -- that will be the proposal for the new Atlantic Partnership Council, the so called APC. NACC is, in my judgement, really a relic of the Cold War period and ought to be supplanted by the Atlantic Partnership Council which will be a very important step to give a voice to all the members of the Partnership for Peace, and it will be very significant to those who are not in the first tranche of the enlargement.
The internal adaptation of NATO is also moving forward on a very steady basis. The recent decision of Spain to participate fully and to join all the integrated structures just as any other member of NATO is a big step forward. I would not expect any final decisions on internal adaptation tomorrow; I would not expect any final decisions on issues like AFSOUTH, but nevertheless, we will be discussing those and moving forward. One thing I would emphasize in that context is that AFSOUTH is only one very small piece of a much, much broader context. The vast overwhelming aspect of internal adaptation has already been agreed to and I think we are now dealing with the final issues on internal adaptation. I would expect something to be worked out over time.
Of course, a major question which will be addressed here will be the NATO-Russia issues. Primakov will join in a 16 plus 1 meeting which has become a key part of these meetings. The offer that we have to Russia to work out a Russia-NATO charter still stands. We are hopeful that following the OSCE meeting last week, Russia will now accept our offer for discussions. The Vice President had a good meeting with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in Lisbon, as you know. My own prediction would be that this NATO meeting will authorize the Secretary General to open discussions with Russia formally in the name of the Alliance. That will be a decision for Russia to make. It is Russia's choice really. We pursue those discussions on integration and I hope that choice will be a positive one. I think it will be.
Just a word or two about Serbia, and then I will take your questions.
We have been in a quite extraordinary situation for 18 straight days now in which there have been continued demonstrations of tens of thousands, sometimes more than that, despite the very bad weather. There have been, day after day, demonstrations without violence on the part of the demonstrators. The United States has left no doubt and I leave no doubt about our support for democratic change in Serbia. Consistently, I have made these points to Milosevic over the long course of our meetings together, the importance of democratic change. John Kornblum has been echoing these sentiments very effectively in the last several weeks. We urge Milosevic, have been and continue to, to open dialogue with the opposition, to recognize the importance of freedom of assembly, to accept the results of the election, and especially, to preserve freedom of the media. I want to emphasize to him as well again the importance of not using force in connection with these demonstrations, but to find a way to recognize and accept the election results, and to open a dialogue with the opposition. I think that is the only prudent course for him to follow. I would hope and expect a unified action on the part of NATO members reflecting the comments that I have just made. Stability in the region of the Balkans as a whole is very important and democratization in Serbia is a key factor.
With those opening comments, I am glad to try to take any questions you have.
QUESTION: Sir, if you will permit me, I would like to ask one from Column A and one from Column B, but they are just hard questions, I will keep them brief. Can you have that reform without the removal of Milosevic? And so far as the NATO deliberations, can the Council ensure the charter, the concessions, or gestures to Russia? Are there any others that you think might come out of this meeting to make this enlargement more digestible for Moscow?
CHRISTOPHER: On the first point, Milosevic has shown himself to be a pragmatic and flexible person, certainly his conduct at Dayton showed he has the capacity to reverse long-standing positions and I will hope he will reverse the long-standing positions here. I do not think he is incapable of that. I hope he can be persuaded that it is in his own self-interest to do that. On the second question, I do not see it, in terms of concessions. But I do see that NATO is prepared to have an open, positive dialogue with Russia on establishing a charter that can try to provide the way forward with a recognition that enlargement has been long-committed by the Alliance, but it does need to be in any way hostile to Russia or to in any way impair Russia's interests.
Q: Mr. Secretary, you are meeting Mr. Primakov tomorrow. Do you see any hope at all of getting Russia to join the U.S. in any move to restore economic sanctions against Serbia if this continues without resolution?
CHRISTOPHER: We will certainly maintain that option and I want to talk to Foreign Minister Primakov about conditions in Serbia and emphasize to him that I believe that Milosevic's position at the present time is self-defeating and he should recognize the importance of accepting the election results, having a dialogue with the opposition as being in his own interests, and I hope to persuade Mr. Primakov of that. Let me say, I certainly am pleased that we have maintained the outer wall of sanctions and have not given full recognition to Serbia. I think our judgement was right in that regard, and it gives us some remaining leverage without the need to have multilateral sanctions, but we retain the option of seeking multilateral sanctions if the situation continues.
Q: But can you do that if Russia has its current attitude?
CHRISTOPHER: Certainly Russia's acquiescence or support in the Security Council would be necessary for that and that's one of the reasons why I want to talk to the Foreign Minister about that subject.
Q: Mr. Secretary, to follow-up on Barry's question: Have you talked to Mr. Milosevic personally, and, if you have not, we know that Secretary Talbott has made representations and we know John Kornblum has been in touch. If you have not, why have you chosen not to take this to him directly, this question of not using violence against demonstrators, etc.?
CHRISTOPHER: In the past I have talked to him about the importance of democratization. The last time was when we were together in Geneva, but he cannot possibly misunderstand our position. I have day-in and day-out authorized our spokesman to go out in the name of the United States and take the positions that Nick has, so there can be no doubt about that. And John Kornblum has made his positions known on a personal basis. If I am in direct contact with Milosevic, I will certainly do that, but there is no doubt about the U.S. position. The daily briefings by our spokesman are approved on a daily basis by me and so Milosevic should not be in any doubt as to what our positions are.
Q: What would you suggest to do to avoid destabilization of Zaire? Will you have some consultations with some European partner about Zaire in Brussels?
CHRISTOPHER: Zaire is a very important issue and it would be surprising if, around the edges at least of the NATO meeting, that subject were not discussed. We have, as you can tell from my opening remarks, a very full agenda here at NATO, especially with the Serbia issues to be confronted as well. We are continuing to consult with our allies and friends about the situation in Zaire. The situation, of course, changed quite dramatically from the one that we first addressed together with the Canadians in the lead, but we continue to discuss those matters to see if there is some basis for, some need for a multilateral force. On the other hand, there are certain issues that are internal to Zaire which really need to be addressed by that country. We continue, though, to have great concern for the humanitarian issues there and are following that as the situation evolves and changes rapidly. Nevertheless, our concern remains high for the humanitarian issues.
Q: The NATO-Russia dialogue is not going forward as fast as we all expected and it still remains that there might continue to be some opposition to enlargement. I am wondering, leaving aside the CFE and some of the discussions of the offers that were made during the OSCE last week, would the U.S. consider supporting Russia's persistent demand to bolster the OSCE perhaps as a way to advance the NATO-Russia dialogue?
CHRISTOPHER: We think the OSCE plays an important role in the overall European picture, but not as a treaty and not as a legally-binding document, but really in the role OSCE has played in the past. The positions we took at Lisbon are the ones we will continue to take but we, as I say, regard OSCE as an important building block, an important part of this approach to European security that has been critical to President Clinton's overall foreign policy. I would not expect any major change though in our position on that subject. We are anxious to proceed with discussions with Russia on a NATO-Russia charter. As I say, it is really Russia's choice. I hope they will choose the decision of integration.
Q: Sir, just to follow-up on that. In all your discussions with the Russians, what do you think they are waiting for before they start discussions, specifically?
CHRISTOPHER: I hope and expect they will choose at this meeting to proceed with those discussions. There have been a number of exploratory discussions with us and with other countries. I think we have made progress in sorting out the issues. I want to identify the meeting between the Vice President and Mr. Chernomyrdin as being an important part of those discussions. The discussion between my colleague Strobe Talbott and Primakov in Lisbon could give an important impetus to these discussions. But as I say, I think, here, what I would anticipate is the authorization for the Secretary-General to open discussions with Russia on a charter and, as I say, I hope that the Russians will be in a position to accept that.
Q: Mr. Secretary, regarding the adaptation of NATO commands. The United States has said repeatedly that it wants to see the Europeans take a greater responsibility for their own defense. I am familiar with the argument put forward by the administration that it cannot reject, or cannot desist from manning SouthCom because of the importance of the Sixth Fleet. But don't you think that the time has come for greater responsibility to be invested in the Europeans, and that more resources should be placed in the Commands by the Europeans themselves?
CHRISTOPHER: Absolutely. And part of the overall discussion has involved that. For example, as part of an overall package, the United States would be quite agreeable to there being a Deputy SACEUR with special responsibility for involvement with the European forces. I want to emphasize again that the AFSOUTH issue is only a small percentage in the overall adaptation that will emphasize significantly the points you make and that is greater European responsibility. And, so often in one of these negotiations you come down to a single point or a couple of points and those points get magnified and the overall thrust at what is happening gets minimized, but I urge you to step back and see how much has been accomplished in the direction of adaptation. My own hope and expectation is that we will find a way to finish it -- not at this meeting, but between now and the summer.
Q: Mr. Secretary . . .
CHRISTOPHER: Steve, welcome to these sleepless nights.
Q: It is not so bad. On that point, is this question not, though, what is holding up all of the other areas that have not been agreed on? And how can we resolve them?
CHRISTOPHER: Well, as sometimes happens, the last piece is a difficult one, but I think there are ways to address the overall situation without in any way modifying the United States' position on that particular issue, which is one of great tradition and historic importance for us on which I do not expect to see change. But this is a very broad engagement and there may be ways, in connection with other issues, to give reassurance that there will be full European involvement.
Q: Is this your last trip, really?
CHRISTOPHER: Well, I think it is my last trip. I have a little bit more than a month ahead of me and lots to do. But as far as I know, this is my last overseas trip. Thank you very much.