NATO and Russia, partners for the future
Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations

Dear Prof. Torkunov and Mr. Trenin Deputy Minister, Ambassadors, Duma members, Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Friends,
It is a great pleasure to be here, and let me start by thanking MGIMO for the invitation. This institute is well known in international circles, and I’m pleased to make my first speech as NATO Secretary General in Russia right here. Indeed I have been looking very much forward to meeting you, students, future leaders of Russia and elsewhere in the world. Let me also thank Carnegie for their role in organising this event.
I’m pleased to be in Moscow for another important reason, of course. The discussions I’m having over these two days are helping to meet one of the priorities I set out on my very first day on the job: to work towards transforming NATO-Russia relations into a true strategic Partnership. I have already discussed this at length with President Medvedev, Prime Minister Putin, and Minister Lavrov, as well as other Russian leaders. And it’s what I’d like to discuss with you today.
Now, you may not be aware of this, but I actually have two jobs. One is Secretary General of NATO. The other is Chairman of the NATO-Russia Council – the body where the 28 NATO countries and Russia sit together, as 29 equal states, to discuss common security challenges, and to see what they can do together to solve them.
I can tell you that, when I was considering taking up the post as NATO Secretary General, I was also very much looking forward to the other job as well. Because I believe that the blueprints are already in place for a true security partnership between NATO and Russia. And because I think that a trusting relationship between these 29 countries has enormous potential to make Russia safer, to make the NATO Allies safer, and to make a real contribution to global security as well.
I know that, when foreigners come to Russia to give a speech, they are often tempted to quote from one of the great classic Russian writers, such as Tolstoy, Pushkin, or Dostoyevsky. But instead, I’d like to take a page from the famous science fiction writers, the Strugatsky brothers, and think about what the future could look like. And then we’ll discuss what we need to do to get there.
So what could the NATO-Russia relationship look like, in, say, the year 2020? In my vision, NATO-Russia security cooperation will at that time be an established feature of the international security landscape. We will share intelligence and work together in combating terrorism and drug-trafficking. Our navies will cooperate closely in fighting piracy at sea. And Russian soldiers will be deployed alongside NATO soldiers in UN-mandated peacekeeping operations.
I also believe that, by 2020, cooperation between NATO and Russia on missile defence will have advanced to the point where we are able to link our systems to create a genuine missile shield in the Euro-Atlantic area. Which will not only protect us all against proliferation, but bind us together politically as well.
Finally, I believe that the NATO-Russia Council will be a key forum for discussing matters of European and international security. A place for frank and open discussion, focused debate and pragmatic decisions.
Now some people say that, when you have visions, you should go and see a doctor. And I realise that, to some, my vision for “NATO and Russia in 20-20” may seem as fantastic as the work of the Strugatsky brothers. But although what I just said may be ambitious, I believe that it is both achievable and desirable.
And when I say it is desirable, I am speaking not only as NATO Secretary General, but also as NRC Chairman. Because I am convinced that a better NATO-Russia relationship is in Russia’s direct security interest, as much as it is for the other 28 NRC countries.
Let me say one thing very clearly as NATO Secretary General: NATO will never atttack Russia. Never. And we do not think Russia will attack NATO. We have stopped worrying about that and Russia should stop worrying about that as well.
If we can build real trust and confidence in the relationship between Russia and her partners in the NRC, then Russia can stop worrying about a menace from the West that simply doesn’t exist. She can put her resources into defending against the real threats this country faces – like terrorism, extremism, proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction, or drug trafficking.
And because the NATO countries face exactly the same risks, Russia can count on the other countries in the NRC as true partners. Together, we can make a real, substantial contribution to protecting our citizens against the things that really threaten them today, rather than fighting the ghosts of the past.
But to get there, we have to look at our relations in a different way. Let me give you an example: NATO’s Open Door policy. And it is an important example, because I know it is something which many in Russia see as a deliberate strategy to encircle this country.
But let me tell you: that is simply not the case. I know that I won’t be able to convince everyone in this room. But let me make the case for why I think Russia should look at NATO’s Open Door in a different way.
There is a longstanding principle in international affairs – endorsed repeatedly also by Russia – which says that every sovereign state has the right to decide its own security policy, and choose its own Allies. This is the very essence of sovereignty – and it is a principle that has to be upheld. Which is why, when countries ask to join NATO, the Alliance has an obligation at least to consider their membership.
Does this mean NATO is actively going out to look for new members? We do not. But if a European democracy wants to join, they have a right to apply – even if, to get in, they have to meet the standards NATO insists on, just like the EU.
The next question is this: today, more than twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, is Russia less secure because democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe have joined the Alliance?
I believe that the opposite is true. When Russia’s neighbours joined NATO in 1999 and 2004, Russia benefited from a stable western border. And that stability, of course along with EU membership, led to increased investor confidence, economic growth and prosperity.
And what is the result? Exports from Russia to NATO’s new member countries have increased eleven times. Imports to Russia from the new member states increased five times. So it's a substantial increase in our mutual trade. Last year, Poland was not only Russia’s second largest import partner, but it was also its sixth largest export partner. Foreign Direct Investments by Russia in the new member states of NATO almost doubled between 2007 and 2008. And cultural and education exchanges and other kinds of cross-border cooperation have increased significantly as well.
To me, all this is no accident. Once a country feels secure, once it has a home, it finds greater political and economic stability, and the confidence to reach out constructively to all its neighbours. That is why I firmly believe that the admission of new members into NATO – alongside the enlargement of the European Union – has been, and will continue to be, a net benefit to European security. And that includes for Russia.
NATO’s Open Door Policy is one example where outdated perceptions are distracting us from tackling the real problems. There are others. To my mind, we need to focus less on our suspicions about each other, and more on what we can do together. Because we face real common threats. Urgent ones. And the most obvious example is Afghanistan.
NATO soldiers are fighting, and dying, in Afghanistan to counter the extremism, terrorism and drugs that would, if left unchecked, spread into Central Asia and then into Russia too. We would all pay the price if we don’t succeed. We know it. Russia knows it too.
I warmly welcome the cooperation we’ve had until now. We need to step it up further. I believe that Afghanistan must be a centrepiece of our partnership in 2010. We need to look at what more we can do together to train the Afghans to secure their own country; to provide them the equipment they need to fight; to stem the flow of drugs into our schools and back-alleys; and to support the UN mandated, NATO-led mission.
This is a shared fight and we need to step it up. I have made three specific proposals to my Russian interlocutors during my visit here. First, could Russia take a leadership role when it comes to helicopters for the Afghan forces from providing helicopters themselves to training the pilots to supplying spare parts to providing fuel? That is a package of support that would give the Afghans a concrete capability they need.
Second, NATO is now going to train not only the Afghan Army but also the police. Perhaps Russia could support us, and the Afghans, by training Afghan police here in Russia as well.
Third, I think we could also step up further our training of counter-narcotic officials. Afghan narcotics kill 100,000 people a year, including many here in Russia. For all our countries, this is a tragedy. We have a clear shared interest in doing more together to fight this scourge.
Some might think it’s a bit ironic that Afghanistan could become the flagship of cooperation between the West and Russia. And it is. But this is a new world. We need new ways of doing business together, if we’re to shape it for the better.
What does that mean, in practical terms? Let me make three suggestions.
First, we need to agree, together, a list of the threats we actually face in the 21st century – a fresh list, which I can guarantee will not include each other. Two weeks ago, we agreed to launch a joint review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges that NATO and Russia face together. We agreed to focus on fighting terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy and the threats from Afghanistan. We need to get that work going.
Second, we should aim for the greatest possible transparency in our strategies and doctrines. As you may know, NATO is currently developing a new Strategic Concept. I have asked a group of international experts, led by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, to come up with recommendations. The group of experts is scheduled to visit Moscow early next year, to discuss their ideas.
And I encourage all of you to make your views known through our Web site. But, having said that, I also believe that transparency should work both ways. Russia's new military doctrine would benefit from a NATO perspective. What is actually the basis for portraying NATO in key Russian documents as a major threat to Russia's security? Is Russia fully aware of the message sent by military exercises that rehearse the invasion of a smaller NATO member? I can assure you that our process will be transparent as we develop our strategy and I hope that Russia will show the same openness to NATO.
Third, and finally, we need to ensure that the NATO-Russia Council works smoothly and effectively. We recently agreed some improvements. I will spare you the intricacies of our bureaucratic streamlining, but there was one important point. We reaffirmed the importance of using the NRC to address any legitimate concerns that any of our countries may have. Because it is important that the NRC is a place where all the 29 countries can feel they have a place and a voice.
To my mind, we haven’t yet explored the potential of the NRC to meet the requirements of all its members, including Russia. I am convinced that the blueprints are there: in the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, which first formalised our relationship, and the Rome Declaration of 2002, which took it to a new level of cooperation as equal partners.
For example, we’ve agreed that, in case one of our nations perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or, security, we will promptly consult in the NRC. We’ve agreed that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic area is indivisible. We’ve agreed that we will observe in good faith our obligations under international law. We have all signed up to the principle that free democracies can choose their own futures. And we’ve agreed, many times, to respect the territorial integrity of states.
These are important principles. And there is plenty more in these documents. Together, they form a package of political commitments that I believe has great potential to deepen trust and cooperation in the NRC. And in so doing, we can make the NRC an essential part of the 21st century Euro-Atlantic security architecture.
President Medvedev has proposed a new European Security Treaty. And of course, we can discuss it also in the NRC. But the primary and natural venue for discussing these proposals is the OSCE, which brings together all the nations that have an interest in discussing President Medvedev’s ideas. That is why I support the decision taken at this month’s OSCE Ministerial in Athens to continue work on these proposals.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I started out by sharing with you my vision of how our relationship could look in ten years’ time. I am fully aware that turning that vision into reality requires a big change in the way we think and act. But the fact is that the key to the NATO-Russia relationship does not lie in the past. If we are to be safer; if we are to be more secure; if we are to put our resources where they do the most good, we must set our sights on the future.
In the early 20th century, an American inventor was asked why he was so interested in the future. His answer was to the point: “I am interested in the future”, he said, “because this is where I will spend the rest of my life”. That should also be our motto. We must think about what it takes to build a better, a safer future – and then we must start to build it. Starting now.
Thank you.