Ballistic missile defence

  • Last updated: 09 Oct. 2019 15:54

Proliferation of ballistic missiles poses an increasing threat to NATO populations, territory and forces. Many countries have ballistic missiles or are trying to develop or acquire them. NATO ballistic missile defence (BMD) is part of the Alliance’s response against the increasing threat and of its core task of collective defence.

 

Highlights

  • In 2010, Allies decided to develop a territorial BMD capability to pursue NATO's core task of collective defence.
  • NATO has the responsibility to protect its European populations, territory and forces in light of the increasing proliferation of ballistic missiles and against threats emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area.
  • NATO BMD is purely defensive; it is a long-term investment to address a long-term security threat.
  • In July 2016, Allies declared Initial Operational Capability of NATO BMD, which offers a stronger capability to defend Alliance populations, territory and forces across southern NATO Europe against a potential ballistic missile attack.
  • NATO BMD capability combines assets commonly funded by all Allies as well as voluntary contributions provided by individual Allies.
  • Several Allies already offered their contributions or are undergoing development or acquisition of further BMD assets such as upgraded ships with BMD-capable radars, ground-based air and missile defence systems or advanced detection and alert capabilities.

More background information


  • Introduction and components

    Introduction

    At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO leaders decided to develop a territorial BMD capability. At that time, the Alliance decided to expand the scope of its already ongoing Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme beyond the protection of NATO deployed forces to also provide territorial missile defence.

    At the Chicago Summit in May 2012, the Alliance declared the achievement of the Interim NATO BMD capability. It provided an operationally significant first step and offered maximum coverage within the available means to defend populations, territory and forces across southern NATO Europe against a potential ballistic missile attack.

    In July 2016, Allies declared the achievement of the Initial Operational Capability of NATO BMD, which offers a stronger capability to defend Alliance populations, territory and forces across southern NATO Europe against a potential ballistic missile attack.

    The increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the vicinity of the south-east border of the Alliance has been, and remains a driver in NATO’s development and deployment of a ballistic missile defence system, which is configured to counter threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. The final aim of NATO BMD is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. This coverage is based on the principles of indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge. It also takes into account the level of threat, affordability and technical feasibility, and is in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance.  Should international efforts reduce the threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation, NATO missile defence can, and will, adapt accordingly.

    Components

    NATO BMD is based on voluntary national contributions, including nationally funded interceptors and sensors, hosting arrangements and on the command and control backbone delivered through the NATO BMD Programme. Only these command and control systems are eligible for common funding.

    The United States contributes to NATO BMD through its European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).  Turkey is hosting a US BMD radar at Kürecik; Romania is hosting a US Aegis Ashore site at Deveselu Air Base; Germany is hosting the command centre at Ramstein Air Base; and Poland will be hosting another Aegis Ashore site at the Redzikowo Military Base. Additionally, in the context of the EPAA, Spain is hosting four multi-mission BMD-capable Aegis ships at its naval base in Rota. All of these assets are voluntary national contributions and are integral parts of the NATO BMD capability.

    Several Allies currently offer further ground-based air and missile defence systems (such as Patriot or SAMP/T) or complementary ships as a force protection of other BMD assets. Other Allies are also developing or acquiring BMD-capable assets that could eventually be made available for NATO BMD.

  • Mechanisms

    The Defence Policy and Planning Committee on Missile Defence (DPPC MD) is the senior committee under the North Atlantic Council that oversees and coordinates all efforts at the political-military level to develop the NATO BMD capability. It also provides political-military advice on NATO BMD.

    The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is the senior committee responsible for steering the BMD programme aimed at developing the necessary technical functionalities for BMD planners and operators.

    NATO Military Authorities are responsible for developing a military doctrinal framework for BMD and related operational planning, training and execution.

    The Air and Missile Defence Committee (AMDC) is the senior committee responsible for overall policy aspects of NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD).

    Several other NATO senior committees address NATO BMD in the context of broader topics, such as civil emergency planning or crisis management.

  • Evolution

    The key policy document providing the framework for NATO's activities in the area of BMD is NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept. In addition, BMD is an important aspect of the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review of 2012.

    The Strategic Concept recognises, inter alia, that "the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world's most volatile regions". "Therefore, NATO will develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of our Alliance". As a defensive capability, BMD will be one element of a broader response to the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

    The Deterrence and Defence Posture Review of 2012 states that missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute for them. It is a purely defensive capability and is being established in the light of threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. It is expected that NATO's missile defence capabilities would complicate an adversary's planning, and provide damage mitigation. Effective missile defence could also provide valuable decision space in times of crisis. Like other weapons systems, missile defence capabilities cannot promise complete and enduring effectiveness. NATO missile defence capability, along with effective nuclear and conventional forces, will signal our determination to deter and defend against any threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic area to the safety and security of our populations.

    At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, Allied leaders agreed to address air and missile defence in a holistic way by developing a NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS). NATINAMDS is based on the previously existing NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS) enhanced by the new BMD elements.

    Since 2003 NATO and Russia engaged in TBMD-related discussions and activities under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). From 2010 onwards, discussions and activities expanded from Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD) towards territorial BMD. NATO and Russia examined possible areas for cooperation in this field. Progress, however, was difficult and, in October 2013, NATO-Russia BMD-related discussions were paused by Russia. In April 2014, NATO suspended all practical cooperation with Russia in response to its illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea.

    Key milestones

    NATO

    May 2001
    NATO launches two parallel feasibility studies for a future Alliance Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD) system.

    November 2002
    At the Prague Summit, Allied leaders direct that a missile defence feasibility study be launched to examine options for protecting Alliance forces, territory and populations against the full range of ballistic missile threats.

    June 2004
    At the Istanbul Summit, Allied leaders direct that work on TBMD be taken forward expeditiously.

    April 2006
    The study concludes that ballistic missile defence is technically feasible within the limits and assumptions of the study. The results are approved by the CNAD.

    2007
    An update of a 2004 Alliance assessment of ballistic missile threat developments is completed.

    April 2008
    At the Bucharest Summit, Allied leaders agree that the planned deployment of European-based US BMD assets should be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defence architecture. They call for options for a comprehensive ballistic missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory not otherwise covered by the US system to be prepared in time for NATO's next Summit.

    April 2009
    At the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, Allies recognise that a future US contribution of important architectural elements could enhance NATO elaboration of Alliance efforts and judge that ballistic missile threats should be addressed in a prioritised manner that includes consideration of the level of imminence of the threat and the level of acceptable risk.

    September 2009
    The United States announces its plan for the US European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).

    November 2010
    At the Lisbon Summit,  Allied leaders decide to develop a BMD capability to pursue its core task of collective defence. To this end, they decide that the scope of the existing TBMD programme will be expanded beyond the capability to protect forces to also include NATO European populations and territory. In this context, the EPAA and other national contributions are welcomed as valuable to the NATO BMD architecture.

    June 2011
    NATO defence ministers approve the NATO BMD Action Plan.

    September 2011
    Turkey announces a decision to host a US-owned missile defence radar as part of the NATO BMD capability.

    September 2011
    Romania and the United States sign an agreement to base a US Aegis Ashore system in Romania as part of NATO's BMD capability.

    September 2011
    An agreement between Poland and the United States on basing a US Aegis Ashore system in Poland enters into force.

    September 2011
    The Netherlands announces plans to upgrade four air-defence frigates with extended long-range radar systems as its national contribution to NATO's BMD capability.

    October 2011
    Spain and the United States announce an agreement to port US Aegis ships in Rota, Spain, as part of the US contribution to NATO's ballistic missile defence capability.

    February 2012
    Germany announces a decision to offer its Patriot air- and missile defence systems as a national contribution to NATO's BMD capability.

    April 2012
    NATO successfully installs and tests the command and control architecture for the soon to be announced Interim Capability at Allied Air Command in Ramstein, Germany.

    May 2012
    At the Chicago Summit, Allies declare the Interim NATO BMD Capability, which is an operationally significant first step, offering the maximum coverage within available means to defend the populations, territory and forces across southern NATO Europe against a ballistic missile attack.

    March 2013
    The United States announces a revised EPAA.

    October 2013
    Ground-breaking ceremony for the US Aegis Ashore system in Deveselu, Romania.

    2014
    First US Aegis destroyer stationed in Rota, Spain in February; second US Aegis destroyer stationed in Rota in June.

    August 2014
    Denmark announces the decision to acquire a frigate-based radar system for NATO BMD.

    September 2014
    NATO Summit in Wales. Allies reiterate basic parameters for NATO BMD and note additional contributions offered or considered by Allies.

    2015
    Third US Aegis destroyer stationed in Rota in April; fourth US Aegis destroyer stationed in Rota in September.

    November 2015
    The United Kingdom announces it will invest in a ground-based BMD radar, which will enhance the coverage and effectiveness of the NATO BMD capability.

    December 2015
    The Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu, Romania is technically completed and handed over to military users.

    May 2016
    The Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu is declared operational.

    July 2016
    Allies declare Initial Operational Capability of NATO BMD, which offers a stronger capability to defend Alliance populations, territory and forces across southern NATO Europe against a potential ballistic missile attack.

    July 2018
    At the Brussels Summit, Allied leaders confirm that the next major milestone would be the completion of the core element of NATO BMD Command and Control, to further enhance planning and execution of BMD operations. They also acknowledge that further work would be required to reach the ultimate goal of Full Operational Capability

    NATO-Russia Council

    2003
    A study is launched under the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) to assess possible levels of interoperability among TBMD systems of NATO Allies and Russia.

    March 2004
    An NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise is held in the United States.

    March 2005
    An NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise is held in the Netherlands.

    October 2006
    An NRC theatre missile defence command post exercise is held in Russia.

    January 2008
    An NRC theatre missile defence computer-assisted exercise takes place in Germany.

    December 2010
    First meeting of the NRC Missile Defence Working Group aimed at assessing decisions taken at the 2010 Lisbon Summit and exploring a possible way forward for cooperation on ballistic missile defence.

    June 2011
    NRC Defence Ministers take stock of the work on missile defence since the 2010 Lisbon Summit.

    April 2012
    A computer-assisted exercise takes place in Ottobrunn, Germany.

    October 2013
    Russia unilaterally pauses the discussions on missile defence in the NRC framework.

    April 2014
    In response to the illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea by Russia, NATO suspends all practical cooperation with Russia, including on missile defence.