Speech

I am very pleased to be here with you today, and I thank you for those kind introductory comments. The IFRI has long played a very important role in the public debate on foreign policy and defence issues. IFRI is therefore the right place to talk about the future of NATO and European security.

I was still Prime Minister of Denmark on 11 March 2009, when President Sarkozy gave his speech about “France, European Defence and NATO in the 21st century”.  I followed it closely.  Because I knew that that speech meant major changes for France, for the Alliance and for European security. 

President Sarkozy made a powerful case that the time had come for France to resume her full place in the Atlantic Alliance.  An Alliance of shared values.  An organisation where all Allies remain sovereign, but where every member is committed to defend each other in case of an attack.   An Alliance in which the bonds between Europe and North America have been forged for over 60 years. 

But President Sarkozy also rightly said that things had to change.  That NATO had to adapt to the new risks and threats to our security. That the Alliance had to adapt its capabilities to deliver security.   And that building a strong European Union defence was an essential part of keeping NATO as well. 

I shared those priorities then.  I share them today.  We are just a few weeks from a NATO Summit in Lisbon.  My firm intent is that we will leave Lisbon with an Alliance that is more modern; more efficient; and better able to work with our partners around the globe, especially the European Union.

First, the Summit should transform how NATO looks at defence.  NATO’s core task was, is, and will remain, territorial defence and deterrence.  That means we must retain sufficient forces, and capable forces.  And as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, it means NATO must also remain a nuclear alliance.  The new Strategic Concept must be very clear on these points.

But territorial defence no longer starts and ends at the border.  Today, it can start in Kapisa district, halfway around the world, in Afghanistan, where French soldiers are working alongside their Allies to defend against terrorism here in Europe.

Because of NATO’s operations, Al Qaeda has no safe haven in Afghanistan from which to launch attacks against us.  That is an important part of the fight against international terrorism.  And the Alliance will play its full part in the struggle against terrorism, through ground operations in areas at risk, through our naval mission in the Mediterranean, and by exchanging intelligence.

Modern defence also starts in cyberspace.  Cyber attacks can cripple a country’s banks, government services, and air traffic control. They are a menace to our way of life.  And they can reach a level that threatens a country’s fundamental security interests. 

This is not science fiction.  We face cyber-attacks every day.  The French Government does.  NATO does – a hundred times a day, I can tell you.  Which means that, as an Alliance, we must upgrade our defences.   This is a transnational threat; the best response is multinational cooperation.  I hope that the Lisbon Summit will give a clear mandate to NATO to take this on.

I also hope that, at Lisbon, we can decide that the Alliance should be able to defend the populations and territory of Europe against missile attack. 

Today, over 30 countries have, or are trying to acquire, ballistic missiles.  Some can already hit Europe.  We can’t just turn a blind eye to this problem.  It is real.  It is growing.  We must have the means of preventing a missile strike on one of our cities. And we must not be held hostage by a regime that could and would launch missile attacks against us. 

To my mind, we must take the decision, as an Alliance, to build the capability to protect European populations and territory against missile strikes. Territorial missile defence is necessary for our security.  But missile defence is not a substitute for deterrence – it is a complement to it.

There is, of course, the obvious question about missile defence:  what will it cost?  As a former minister of taxation, I fully respect that question.  I also believe there is quite a good answer.

NATO Allies have already agreed to build a system to protect our deployed forces against missile attack.  Broadening that system to protect all of Europe would cost an extra 200 million dollars from our common NATO budget, over 10 years, divided among 28 nations.  To my mind, that is affordable, even in times of financial restraint.  In fact, it is exactly the kind of investment that makes sense – it is a lot of security, for a very good price.

Which brings me to a second main area: reform. The Lisbon Summit must produce decisions and provide direction for our ongoing efforts.

In his speech on 11 March last year, President Sarkozy rightly said that the Alliance had to become more efficient, and deliver more security for the money we invest in defence.  It was one of the key reasons he took the decision for France to fully participate in NATO.  I fully agree.  And the financial crisis has only made that more important.

I believe that reform in NATO starts from a very strong foundation.  NATO is already good value for money, for all the Allies.  NATO is a force multiplier.  By consulting together; by buying equipment together; by conducting operations together, we get more security than we could by going it alone.   It is something we take for granted.  We should never forget it.

But of course we can and must do better.  We must reform NATO’s command structure, to make it leaner and more efficient.  The Alliance has 14 supporting bodies called Agencies; I think we could manage with three.  We should buy and operate more equipment together, such as planes or helicopters, which are too expensive for the Allies individually.

We’ve already made a good start, in the past year.  But reform is not an event; it is a process that must continue.  I hope that the Lisbon Summit will give me a clear and strong mandate for continued reform.  And I know I can count on active French support for a successful reform of the Alliance.

I want to stress, however, that the word “reform” is not a code word for “cuts”.   I am fully aware of the pressure all Governments are under to find savings.  I also understand that defence budgets do not get a free pass, when finance ministers are looking to cut spending. 

Nevertheless, I am specifically concerned when it comes to defence spending in Europe.  Country after country is announcing cuts in defence spending.  As I said, I understand why.  But the cumulative impact of this will be substantial.  We need to be very aware of the risks of cutting defence budgets; risks which the European Union faces as much as NATO.

President Sarkozy has been a tireless supporter of a stronger European defence.  So have I.  As Prime Minister of Denmark, I signed the Lisbon Treaty, not least to help make Europe a stronger, more effective actor on the international stage.  I believe deeply that Europe must be capable of taking action – politically and militarily.  And I am convinced that a strong EU is good for NATO – as a trusting partner in the field, without competition and in full complementarity.

But I see a very real risk to that vision in what is happening today.  If European countries cut their defences too deeply, and if they cut in an uncoordinated way, the Lisbon Treaty can become a hollow shell. Europe could get weaker, rather than stronger.  That would obviously be bad for Europe.  But it would also be bad for NATO, and bad for transatlantic relations more broadly.

It would be bad operationally, because European forces would find it increasingly difficult to operate with the United States in the field.  It would be bad politically as well.  There are many Americans who think it is unfair that the US is taking on an increasing share of the responsibility to defend international security, even though they face the same financial pressures as the rest of us.  To speak frankly about it, they are right.  The more that imbalance grows, the harder it will be to explain to the United States why it should see Europe as a serious partner, or why it should invest in NATO.  A few years ago, the US used to worry about Europe being too strong.  Now they worry about the risk of a too-weak Europe. 
 
Some people might shrug their shoulders when they hear that.  They might say, well, the US can go it alone.  That would be a big mistake.  First, because Europe and North America share fundamental values, and we must stand together to defend them.  But also because the history of the last century makes it clear that Europe is most stable and at peace when the United States is present here, politically and militarily.  Not everyone might be comfortable with that fact.  But it is a fact nonetheless.  NATO is the framework for that presence today.  We need to keep it strong.  And today, that requires a strong EU, a strong relationship between the EU and NATO, and the continued political and military presence of the US in Europe.

What do I mean by a strong NATO/EU-relationship?  I mean broader political consultations. Increased cooperation in the field.  And coordination between the two organisations when it comes to defence procurement, so that we avoid duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness.   All done in ways which respect the autonomy and missions of the two organisations. They are not the same.  But we have 21 members in common.  And there is a lot of room for improvement in the way we do business together. 

Ladies and Gentlemen,

When France resumed her full place in the Atlantic Alliance, I considered it an historic step.  It put to rest any lingering fears about competition between a strong Europe and a strong NATO.   It recognised the important role France plays in our Alliance, politically and militarily.  And it was a powerful vote of confidence in NATO as the ultimate guarantee of the security of its member states, on both sides of the Atlantic.  

NATO remains the most effective political military Alliance in history. I fully intend for it to remain that way.  Which is why I hope, and predict, that the Lisbon Summit, in just a few weeks, will set a clear course for NATO’s next decade – a decade of active engagement and modern defence.