Press briefing by Lieutenant General Nick Carter, Deputy Commander, ISAF

OANA LUNGESCU (NATO Spokesperson): Good afternoon. Thank you very much for coming. Thank you very much to General Nick Carter who, as you can see, is joining us from Kabul. Great pleasure to have you with us today! The last time General Carter addressed the Brussels press corps was in September 2010 in his capacity as commander of Regional Command Southwest.

Since then of course, a lot happened. Transition to Afghan security responsibility is well underway. And ISAF's mission is progressing its shift to a train, advise and assist role. So this is a busy time. Therefore, we're looking forward to hearing what General Carter has to say as Deputy Commander ISAF. General Carter, over to you.

NICK CARTER (Deputy Commander ISAF): Thank you very much for that introduction and good afternoon to all of you in Brussels. It's good to be back with you, after a three-year layoff. In fact, I commanded RC South, rather than RC Southwest, although during my tenure the two RCs were divided, about nine months into my command there.

What I thought I would do for you this afternoon is to give you a sort of overview of how we see the campaign at the moment, which I hope will prompt some questions thereafter.

I think the first point to make is that we are at an inflection point in the campaign. The announcement that President Obama and President Karzai gave on the 11th of January this year in Washington that brought forward Tranche 5 and the associated Milestone 13 to the spring time has, in a sense, brought on this inflection point perhaps more quickly than one might otherwise have expected.

What it means is that the ISAF mission is being refocused. And from a military perspective, it means that we are supporting the Afghans and they are the supported piece of this. They effectively will have from the moment this announcement occurs the security lead at the national level.

Now, this refocusing of the mission means that we will place our effort very much on the basis of train, advise, assist and also support. And the support piece is important; because as we stand at the moment there are a certain capabilities that the Afghans still require us to supply for them.

And particularly here, we're talking about air power, aviation, medical evacuation, some logistics support, the counter-IED piece, intelligence support and some help with command and control. And those are important supporting capabilities which without I think the Afghans would find life quite difficult at the moment.

Now, what we're trying to do is to build on the concept of a layered security which will bring together many of the different Afghan security force capabilities on the ground, provincial and at regional level, which will deliver collectively an output that is rather greater than the sum of the parts. And that's the piece that we'll work on very closely with the Afghans during this summer. And it's our goal that come this autumn we should be able to look back with the Afghan security forces having managed the period of high operational tempo that generally comes in the summer and look back with some confidence on what they've achieved. And we hope that as a result of that the conditions will be effectively created for what will happen in early 2014 with the election.

Now at that juncture, it's our plan that we will effectively thin up the Afghan chain of command, both in the army and in the police. Because during the course of this summer we will have sufficient forces and security force advisory teams to be able to provide advice at the Kandak or battalion level and at the police provincial level.

What should happen in the autumn is that we will then lift up to the brigade level. And I beg your pardon, to the provincial level as distinct from the district police level; and will stay at that level throughout the election period from the 5th of April onwards; and then after the elections there will then be a further lift up of the Afghan chain of command to the corps level and to the police zone or regional level. Now, clearly, it needs to be conditions-based. And we will retain the flexibility and the numbers of troops to be able to make judgments where greater effort is required.

So, for example, during the course of this summer, those harder parts in geographical terms of Afghanistan, particularly the frontier areas with Pakistan and some areas at the south in Kandahar and Helmand, my old haunt, may well get greater attention than the other parts that have already entered the transition process, during the course of the last four tranches of transition.

Now, that brings me in a sense neatly to Afghan National Security Force capability. Because, of course, that's what this is all about. And I think I can say with some confidence that their success at the tactical level is impressive. The trick is sustaining that tactical success at the levels above and connecting the tactical success at provincial level up to and out to Kabul and to the ministerial level.

And we're in no doubt that it's that connecting piece between the provincial and local level, back to Kabul, which is the bit that we need to apply great attention to, during the course of the next 18 months or so. And the notion of ministry development, both in the MOD and the Ministry of Interior is important. And we're applying some attention to that at the moment. Because it's only through having the proper processes in place that some of the capabilities the Afghans will need in terms of logistics, command and control, and the ability to share intelligence will be transmitted down to the lower level; and in return, the lower level be able to inform the higher level.

What is encouraging is the progress though at brigade level. And you'll recall, I'm sure, that there were some negative articles written about the capability of the Afghan brigades last summer when only one of the 26 ANA brigades was judged as capable of operating independently. That number has now increased to five out of the 26 brigades. And we also judge that some further sixteen of the 26 are effective with advisers. And at that rate of progression I think we can be confident that come 2014 the majority of our Afghan brigades will be able to operate independently.

And of course, this is important; because what we want to ensure through all of this is confident forces operating in support of the police force, this concept of layered security that I described to protect the Afghan population. And of course, where we find ourselves today is with 90% of the Afghan population being protected, secured and guarded by their security forces with us in support.

Now, of course, you would always expect soldiers to say at this juncture that the enemy has a vote. And it's right and proper that I should touch on the insurgency.

I think at the strategic level, it's my personal sense that the insurgency is confused in some regard. First and foremost, it's been my sense that the Pakistani behaviour and the prisoner releases that have occurred during the course of the last three months or so have asked questions of the insurgency. And I think they are reflecting on what this means and why the Pakistanis are behaving that way.

I'm also certain that the noises that are being made about opening the office in Doha which will provide a vehicle for negotiation with the Afghan Government is also causing the insurgency to have to think quite hard about its political approach.

And I also believe that it is much harder for them to persuade Afghans to fight Afghans. Much easier to claim Jihad if you are focussing on coalition troops than Afghans.

But here I am in my third tour in this country. My first tour was in 2002. And what is most striking to me is how much the country has changed over the last 10 or 11 years; and therefore how much Afghan expectations have changed. It is the case that this country has now leapt forward in technological terms. Some 40% of Afghans have use of mobile phones now. There are some six million Internet subscribers. There's a first generation... sorry rather a third and fourth generation fibre optic cable now being laid around Afghanistan which will provide extreme bandwidth and connectivity to all Afghans. There is a transport network now which is 90% complete in terms of Highway 1 which is the Ring Road. Forty-five per cent of Afghans now live in secure urban areas.

And indeed when you look at the education statistics, the minister, Minister Farooq Wardak was claiming only yesterday that there are now some nine million Afghan children in school of which some 40% are female. There are now some 200,000 teachers; and there some 40,000 odd educational centres. Compare that to the 1990s when there are only 650 schools in the country as a whole.

And when you look at the access to health care and the fact that maternal mortality is now down some 80% during the course of the last 10 years, I think that you have a very different country. And it's a country that the insurgency is having to think very carefully about how it re-engages with in political terms.

Only in last November, in his Eid speech, Mullah Omar was being very cautious about the idea of how the Afghan population should be treated by the insurgency. And it's my sense that were the insurgency to return - and I put that in parentheses - they would return a very different political grouping to when they left 10 or 11 years ago. It would have to be a very different party that engage with the Afghan people in political terms.

But we should be in no doubt that they still have capability. And the two complex attacks that have taken place in the last 24 to 36 hours are indicators of that: One in Helmand and one in Jalalabad. They also have the capability to attack Kabul and to mount spectacular attacks against government institutions and people in Kabul.

And of course they have the capability and the capacity through coercion to be able to apply the insider threat, which we have become to know well during the course of the last 18 months or so. So the capability is very much there. And the plain fact is that it will be a political solution that ultimately will remove that capability.

It is, of course, a regional problem. And I think what has encouraged me, returning to this country after a couple of years' layoff is the extent to which I detect a change in Pakistani behaviours and outlook.

For the first time ever, one hears General Kayani, the chief of staff of the Pakistani Army talking about counter-insurgency and the fact that Afghanistan and Pakistan have a shared threat. And Pakistan is leaning into confidence-building measures both on the border in terms of the exchange of liaison officers; but it's also in terms of invitations to Afghan security forces to come over and be educated in their military institutions. And all of that, to my mind, is very positive because it's about confidence-building and about getting the two countries and their militaries to become better partners.

Now, all of that you may think is quite rosy. My sense is that it's realistic. But I'm in no doubt that we've got two very important years ahead of ourselves. 2013 will create the conditions for we hope a successful political transition in 2014. And that will be, I think, the basis on which so much of our effort over the last 10 to 11 years will be judged.

And we should be in no doubt that deadlines have a habit of focusing minds in political terms, in regional terms; but also in the minds of the Afghan population. And I think if I had a concern... and what I judge to be the centre of gravity of the campaign at the moment it is the notion of Afghan confidence.

Afghans, unless we’re careful, will think and do think that the end of 2014 will be like 1991. And despite the Tokyo pledges and the Chicago commitment and the overall commitment to the international community, it's very important that we continue to bolster Afghan confidence and to make them feel genuinely that 2014 is simply a waypoint into the decade of transformation.

And what we are doing now through this process of transition is that we are simply starting this process or continuum that will lead into the decade of transformation.

So, in sum, it's about retaining Afghan confidence. And it's Afghan confidence that will ensure that all the various ingredients of this campaign come together to achieve campaign success. Thank you for that. And I look forward to taking your questions.

OANA LUNGESCU (NATO Spokesperson): Thank you very much for that overview General Carter. We have colleagues here in the room. We also have some questions that have been sent in by email from other colleagues who are unable to attend; but who are watching this live cast. And because you were referring to those complex attacks we've seen, I'll actually start with a question that was emailed in by Jonathan Beale, defence correspondent of the BBC, who is in London, saying this Monday, insurgents mounted a complex attack on a joint British and Afghan patrol base that injured many and left one British soldier dead. Is this a sign that there will be more intense fighting over the summer and that the Afghans will still require the help of international forces, even though they are now in the security lead? That's the question from the BBC.

NICK CARTER: Thank you. No, I don't think it's a sign that we should expect any greater or more intense fighting during the course of this summer. As I said in my opening remarks it is the case that the insurgency has the capability to mount complex attacks. And regardless of our role in all of this and the relationship that we have in terms of train, advise, assist to the Afghans, we should still be on our guard for those sorts of complex attacks. I think if you analyse the statistics between what took place in the first quarter of 2012 with what is taking place this quarter, recognizing there's still three or four days to go in it, it is a reduction of some 14% in terms of the amount of violence that we're seeing.

It is the case that in terms of violence, around 40% of the violence during the course of last year was confined to some 10 districts. And of course, the complex attack that took place in Nad Ali last night is representative of one of the districts that does tend to come under pressure during the course of the violence that I described. So no, I don't think it's an indicator that we should expect things to be any more intense this summer. We'll be on our guard, but I am also confident that the Afghans with us in support will be able to handle any pressure that comes during the course of the summer. Thank you.

OANA LUNGESCU: Over there.

Q: Good afternoon, my name is Christophe Lamfalussy. I'm a journalist for la Libre Belgique. I would like to know when are you turning to Phase 4 of the transition. Is there an agenda for that?

NICK CARTER: I'm not entirely familiar with the term you are using. As we understand it and as it was laid out after Lisbon, the transition process is in five tranches. Tranche 4 of transition was announced by President Karzai on the 31st of December, last year; and was implemented during the course of February. The final tranche, Tranche 5 we expect to see or hear an announcement at some stage later in the spring and then effectively all of the geographical aspect of Afghanistan will be in transition. I hope that answers your question.

OANA LUNGESCU: Do you have a follow-up?

Q: Another question about the number of casualties among the police and Afghan soldiers. We were told there were 3,000 soldiers and policemen killed in the last 12 months. What is your reaction to that?

NICK CARTER: Well, first and foremost, it is a great sympathy for the families and of course people who have lost their lives during the course of last year. We should be in no doubt that the level of attrition in terms of the Afghan security forces is something that causes us great concern. And we work very closely with our Afghan partners to try and reduce the level of attrition.

And you would expect, I think, as the Afghans increasingly assume the responsibility for the security lead that they are going to be more in the frontline than ISAF and therefore it is inevitable that their casualty rate is going to be greater than the coalition's casualty rate.

I think there are number of areas where we're going to have to focus our attention in order to reduce this though. First and foremost, of course, is the IED threat and the way in which Afghans are equipped and trained to deal with this threat is something that we're going to play and do pay a great deal of attention to currently. And we'll do during the course of the summer.

Of course, it's important that leadership understands all of this as well. And I'm in no doubt, in my regular engagements with Bismullah Khan Mohammadi, the Minister of Defence and General Karimi, the Chief of Staff of the Afghan Army that they take this very, very seriously. And they are working hard to see how they can inculcate in their chain of command the sort of leadership that's necessary to mitigate a great deal of this particular issue.

Having said that in terms of sustainability, it is the case that the Kabul Military Training Centre is full of recruits and that the Afghan Army has no difficulty in recruiting soldiers at the moment. But clearly, a rotation of some 25% in an army on an annual basis is unsustainable. And that's why it has to be fixed. Thank you.

OANA LUNGESCU: Let me proceed with a couple of other questions that we got by email. One is from Brian McManus from Agence France Presse. He's asking: Recent US intelligence report, which was presented by the National Intelligence director James Clapper at a Senate hearing on the 12th of March, was decidely negative on the outlook of Afghanistan. What is the military view of this report?

And a second question from Sid Standerfer (sp?) from Stars and Stripes regarding the agreement reached last week that ISAF Forces in Wardak province will be replaced by the Afghan Security Forces. Will certain types of operations such as night raids be restricted before the transition is complete?

NICK CARTER: OK, thank you for that. I'll deal with the intelligence report first and foremost. I think it is one of the ironies of Afghanistan that the nearer you come to Afghanistan in geographical terms the better things look. And I would judge firmly that sitting here in Afghanistan the view that I gave you in my opening remarks is an accurate reflection of the state of affairs as we speak.

It is also everybody's right to have their own perception of how things look in the campaign. And I think that in the assessment I gave you I am being realistic. There will always be problems. And there will be always be setbacks. But what reassures me as I look forwards is the confidence that the Afghan security forces seem to have today, and ever increasing, in order to take charge of their own destiny in all of this.

And whilst you could always take hostage of your fears, I'm pretty confident that as things stand at the moment we are going in the right direction. There will always be setbacks. But generally speaking we're well tilted for the future.

Now the Wardak issue is a complicated issue. Wardak is one of the most complicated provinces in Afghanistan. And it's a sure bellwether as to how the transitional process will evolve during this summer I sense.

It sits on many political divides. There is a political divide between Taliban and Hig. There is a divide between Kuchi nomads and Azaris. And there is Pashtu dimension to all of that. None of this is helped by the fact that much of the landed leadership has left Wardak and resides in Kabul which is adjacent to Wardak. And that means that the nature of political leadership on the ground is not perhaps as strong as it might be in some other provinces.

Now for all of those reasons, Wardak has always been a difficult province to provide governance in and to provide security in tandem with that governance. So I think it's not surprising that it emerged as an issue this winter. And it will be something that will need to be very carefully monitored during the course of the summer.

Now, I talked about a bellwether in terms of transition. It's entirely sensible for the District of Nirkh which has a great deal of political complication as well to be transitioned to an Afghan solution. And the Afghans at the moment are working through their plans for how they will assume responsibility for that district.

Elsewhere in Wardak, it's still the same that we have conventional forces and we have ISAF special forces operating in partnership with Afghans to deliver a layered security effect. And none of that has changed. Thank you.

OANA LUNGESCU: We'll go to Jane's.

Q: Yes, where am I now? I was just wondering as you are carrying training up to the corps level what the potential stumbling blocks are going to be. And also are there any equipment deficiencies on the ANSF's side there? Thank you.

NICK CARTER: I think that as we lift up the Afghan chain of command to the corps we'll need to be certain as we do this that the connecting tissue between the corps level and the brigade level is as good as it can possibly be.

The corps level, of course, in functionality terms is much more about force generation; about training; about recruiting; and about the sort of administration that comes with being at the district command level.

It's the brigades that are the organizations where you bring together the combined diamonds (?) effect of armies. And they are the elements within the Afghan Army that manoeuver to achieve tactical output on the ground. And the relationship between those two levels of command is a really important one. And it's our sense that going back to where we need to supply support to the Afghans that it will be command and control, the sharing of intelligence and the delivery of some of the supporting effects like counter-IED, the airpower piece of it; and of course the medivac piece of it which will need attention. And it will be the corps level that will deliver much of that to the brigade level.

And those are the areas which we'll have to apply good deal of attention to, I sense, during the course of the summer; and then in developmental terms thereafter.

I would emphasize, though, that as we lift up to the corps level we will retain some capability to be able to visit the brigade level and make sure that the connection is properly effected. And I know that the Afghans are very keen that that should endure. And President Karzai was opining on that, only today, himself. Thank you.

OANA LUNGESCU: Reuters.

Q: General, Adrian Croft from Reuters. On the Tranche Five, I wonder if you could more specific about when you expect Tranche Five to begin. Rather than just the end of spring, could you give us a more specific timing? And on any spring offensive this year, from the intelligence you’re getting, do you think it's more likely to be larger attacks in major centers that the Taliban and the Haqqani network would focus on; or a more traditional battleground offensive. Thanks.

NICK CARTER: On the Tranche Five piece of it, we're still working the details through with the Afghans. And as you know, there's a process that has gone through, known as the Janib Process where we have discussions with the lead or the chair of the transition commission Dr Ashraf Ghani who I work very closely with, with the NATO SCR. And subject to his recommendations which he will discuss with President Karzai, we will come forward, I suspect, with some suggestions as to when the right timing should be for this announcement. Whether it is connected to a NATO Mini-Summit in June or something like that, I don't know. But we are working the issues at the moment.

I think, you know, we will want to be absolutely certain that as we do all of this that we've got the right conditions in place for that tranche to be announced. And that's the issue that needs to be worked closely with the Afghans at the moment.

Now, in terms of how we think the insurgency will behave during the course of the spring and the summer, it's our belief that the frontier districts running down the Pakistani border will, as they've always been, be areas where the threat will be significant.

And of course it is Kabul that is the centre of gravity in geographical terms. And it is Kabul that we would expect, also, to be threatened. And that's why the belt districts and provinces around Kabul are important, whether it's Logar or Wardak, or the areas to the north of Kabul as well.

And if you look at a map, you know as well as I do, that's only some 70 miles from Pakistan through to Kabul if you take the direct route through Paktia and up into Logar and Wardak.

It's also our expectation that the insurgency will want to have a go in the Pashtun heartlands in the south. And the complex attack you heard about in Helmand in the last 24 hours is an indicator of that I sense. And they will also, I suspect, wish to have a go at Kandahar. Now, personally, I've not been back to Kandahar since I left it in November of 2010, until about five or six weeks ago. And it was extraordinarily encouraging for me to see what the conditions look like on the ground there.

You've got an impressive security situation. And it's impressive to the extent that the local population and the governor are now able to focus their efforts very much on the economy, on prosperity and on employment. And that is not a dynamic that would have been evident in November of 2010. So to my mind, there's been a great deal of progress in Kandahar. And I sense that the insurgency will find it difficult during the course of this spring and summer to make progress in Kandahar. And Afghans will tell you that a secure Kandahar leads to a secure Afghanistan. So I think that's extremely reassuring, thank you.

OANA LUNGESCU: I've got two more questions sent in by email if you have a couple more minutes, General Carter. Both about the future and I think we have one more here. Let me just quickly give you one from Europa Press from Ana Pisonero: How important is it for ISAF to see progress with reconciliation before the post-2014 mission is lined up? And I'll go to the back to the Stuttgart Zeitung so we group those two questions.

Q: Christopher Ziedler from the Stuttgart Zeitung in Germany. I'm interested in what your reading is of President Karzai's latest comments on the NATO presence in Afghanistan and if there have been sort of actual setbacks or deteriorations in the cooperation with the Afghan side following those comments. Thank you.

NICK CARTER: I'll deal first with the question on reconciliation. The answer is that it's essential to campaign success that there is a process of reconciliation and political participation. Counter-insurgencies are only ultimately solved through politics. And almost everything you see in Afghanistan ultimately comes back to politics.

Now, I would emphasize that whilst it's vital to the ISAF campaign we should be in no doubt that it will be the Afghan Government that will lead this process. And it will be the Afghan Government that will create the conditions for political participation and a process that all Afghans can buy into. So yes, it's very, very important to the success of the campaign. And it's absolutely critical to future peace and prosperity in Afghanistan.

Now turning to the NATO presence in Afghanistan, I'm confident that we have a well-thought through plan which brings together in a strategic partnership all of the issues that need to be resolved as we step through transition. This is a plan that General Dunford discusses regularly with President Karzai. He's been with him a couple of times today to talk about these sorts of issues. And we're in a place now, I think, where we have established mutual understanding on many of the difficult issues associated with transition and how it is that over time we will build Afghan capacity to be able to assume responsibility for the issues that come with sovereignty.

And of course sovereignty is a two-way process. It's about also being capable of assuring sovereignty as well as it being capable of receiving sovereignty. And I'm much encouraged by the way in which this problem is being tackled. And I think the recent resolution of the DFIP transfer at Parwan is a good indicator of how we could work together collaboratively to deal with the issues that we need to resolve as we step forward through the whole transition process, thank you.

OANA LUNGESCU: I'm fully aware, General Carter, that you need to go in I think exactly two minutes. I don't see any hands raised here. I have one final question from the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun from Oshiko Saite (sp?). This is a question about the post-2014 planned NATO-led train, advise and assist mission. He says the former Secretary of Defense... US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta indicated that the entire NATO troops post-2014 in Afghanistan might be between 8,000 and 12,000. Would that be enough? How many Afghan security forces would be needed to maintain security with this amount of foreign troops? Of course, I would stress before I pass over to you for your final answer that this is a planning assumption of a possible range and that of course the planned post-2014 NATO-led mission would not be a combat mission. So we're not talking about fighting troops. This would be a mission to train, advise and assist. But over to you for your views.

NICK CARTER: No, and I echo the point you make about this being a planning assumption and what is happening based upon that assumption is that the NATO process is now looking at how one might use that assumption to translate effect on the ground and how that might work out into a deployment around Afghanistan. It's our judgment that it provides us with the capability and capacity to provide what's called a limited regional presence which means that we would expect to have train, advise, assist missions in each of the six Afghan corps and at the police level. Turning to whether or not this is enough to do the job and indeed whether the figure of 352,000 Afghan security forces is adequate to do the job, I think that I'm going to slightly duck the question if you'd excuse me because it goes back to the answer that I gave to the previous question: It all depends upon politics.

If there is political participation and if there is an outcome to the transition in 2014 that is acceptable to the majority of Afghans, then the quantity of security forces would not necessarily need to be as great as 3-5-2.

On the other hand, if political participation doesn't happen in the way that we'd like it to happen, 3-5-2 may be a necessary figure. Everything has to be conditions based. And it all falls out of the political circumstances and situation that evolves during the course of 2014 and into 2015. Thank you very much for your attention. It's been a pleasure being with you this afternoon. And I much look forward to re-engaging, if you require it, at some stage in the next three to four months. Thank you.

OANA LUNGESCU: Thank you very much General Nick Carter, Deputy Commander of ISAF. Thank you very much from Brussels.