Remarks
by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte at the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Security and Defence
(As delivered)
Opening Remarks
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte
Thank you so much. Good afternoon and a very Happy New Year to you all. It's great to join you today, and this is for me the first time in this big room after so many years. To be back now to the European Parliament in this particular room. I think I was here once before, 10 or 12 years ago, for a big meeting between the European Council and the European Parliament. So, I have some memory of this room, but I didn't realize it was that big and there will be that many members visiting. So, thank you all for being here, and thank you very much for inviting me, Madam Chair, Mr Chair. I am a European, through and through. So, I feel very much at home here, and it's great to be here, back here in the European Parliament.
Since starting my job in October, I've had many meetings with European leaders. I had the pleasure of hosting the press European Commission. I had lunch in her office, and then she came for dinner at my residence. I met with the President of the European Council, António Costa, with Kaja Kallas, the EU High Representative, and the European Commissioner for Defence [Andrius] Kubilius, and I had the honour to participate in the EU for the first Council in November. And again, I’m very happy to meet with you today. In the coming month, I intend also to have a somewhat longer meeting with Roberta Metsola, your President, and the heads of the political groups in the European Parliament. And I think this marks the start of a dialog, but also a continuation of all the efforts to bring NATO and the EU closer together. At this particular dangerous time for security, stepping up of our corporation, I believe, is essential.
Russia's war against Ukraine rages on. At the same time, Russia is accelerating its destabilization campaign against our own countries with cyber-attacks, with assassination attempts, acts of sabotage and more. We used to call this ‘hybrid’. I tried to get rid of that word ‘hybrid’. I would call it a ‘destabilization campaign’. And Russia is not alone. It has China, North Korea and Iran by its side. Meanwhile, many other dangers persist, from terrorism to nuclear proliferation, disinformation and, of course, climate change. And I've said it before and I say it again, I'm deeply concerned about the security situation in Europe. We are not at war, but we are not at peace either.
The good news is that we know what to do to protect our people and way of life now and in the long term, we just need to do it. That means we need to invest more in defence and produce more capabilities. This cannot wait. We need to boost the resilience of our societies and critical infrastructure, and we need to sustain and step up our support for Ukraine to change the trajectory of the war and deter further Russian aggression in the future.
On all of this - defence resilience, Ukraine - NATO and the EU must work hand in hand. Since the start of Russia's all-out war against Ukraine, we have demonstrated, I believe, unprecedented political unity and unprecedented coherence. I have every intention to help keep this going. And I know there is the same level of commitment within the EU's leadership, in the Parliament, in the Commission, in the Council. Stronger defence is my top priority, and this is about spending more, spending better, but also producing more, not to provoke war, but to prevent war. NATO Allies have certainly increased defence spending. Two thirds are now spending at least 2% of GDP on defence, and that's good, and I very much welcome their efforts. But to be honest, 2% is not nearly enough.
To stay safe in the years to come, Allies will need to spend considerably more than 2%. As parliamentarians, you know well that security does not come for free. You have a powerful voice, and you have a critical role to play in the debate on the urgent need to increase defence spending. I know spending more on defence means spending less on other priorities. If you do not want to raise taxes. I'm a central high politician, so I don't like raising taxes, but of course, you could still do it, as long as the money is being is being delivered. But generally speaking, spending more on defence means spending less on other priorities, but it can make a big difference for our future security. On average, European countries easily spend up to a quarter of their national income on pensions, health and social security systems, and we need only a small fraction of that money to make defence much stronger. So, I count on you to make sure we all invest more in defence. It is an investment in our security, and the security of our children and grandchildren. We also need to quickly ramp up the production of crucial assets and capabilities, including ships, tanks, jets, ammunitions, satellites and drones. A few months ago, I visited engineers in Paris at Thales, and a Rheinmetall factory in Italy - yes, a Rheinmetall factory in Italy, so this was a subsidiary of Rheinmetall based outside Rome - European defence industry is doing truly impressive work. And the capabilities they provide are essential. But the reality is that we are not where we need to be. Not yet. Our industry is still too small, it is too fragmented, and to be honest, it is too slow.
I welcome and support that the EU is now redoubling efforts to remedy this by enhancing our defence industrial base. And with the European Defence Industry Programme, we have an opportunity to bolster our shared security.
Yet, while I enthusiastically applaud, I also here urge caution. I believe we must avoid creating new barriers between Allies that would only increase costs, complicate production, and hamper innovation. Involving non-EU Allies in EU defence industrial efforts is vital, I believe, for the security of Europe.
Transatlantic defence industrial cooperation makes us all stronger. At a time when Russia, China, North Korea and Iran are increasing their defence industrial cooperation to unprecedented levels, it would be an act of self-harm to put up new barriers between Allies within NATO. We must also avoid duplicating existing structures, we cannot afford to waste time and resources. But we are all well placed to complement each other, and that's exactly what we should work to do. NATO is great at hard stuff. We have the structures in place to set military standards, to set capability targets, and to produce them jointly. On the other hand, the EU has the awesome advantage of the internal market. That's a huge soft power element that can help get defence production going at a much higher pace. And therefore, I believe that cooperation is truly win-win.
My next point is on resilience, another area where both our organizations, EU and NATO, already work closely together, which we can and we must do more. Cyber-attacks, acts of sabotage, espionage, disinformation, instrumentalized migration: Our countries are increasingly the target of hostile actions. The most recent example is a damage to an undersea power cable connecting Estonia and Finland on December 25th, and a communications cable between Lithuania and Sweden was damaged last November. We must be more resilient to such hostile actions, and we must make clear that efforts to raise war through sabotage and other destabilization will not go unanswered.
And that's why I am traveling to Finland tonight: tomorrow, together with Finnish President Stubb and Estonian Prime Minister Michal, I am co-hosting the first ever Baltic Sea NATO Allies Summit in Helsinki. At the Summit, a group of Allied leaders will take further steps to prevent any further damage of undersea assets, and to improve the resilience of energy and communications infrastructure. And we will also strengthen NATO's military presence in the region. And of course, we will discuss the shadow fleet and what to do about it. So, we are responding and will continue to ensure no country can exploit us, control our infrastructure, or disrupt our societies. This is not a job for NATO alone. We need to work together, leveraging our strength and expertise in tandem to keep our population safe.
And then my last point on Ukraine: The future of European and global security hinges on the outcome of the war in Ukraine. We all want this war to end, but above all, we want a peace to last. I don't know how or when the war will end, but I do know peace will not last if Putin gets his way in Ukraine, because then he will press ahead. He has threatened to start wars in the past, and he has started them: Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014 and again in 2022, so what is the next target to be? Peace will not last if war ends with a deal where Putin, Xi Jinping, Kim Jong Un, and the regime in Tehran are high fiving each other, feeling empowered. A deal in Ukraine that serves their interest paves the way to global instability. So, I am convinced that peace can only last if Ukraine comes to the table from a position of strength. For this, it needs our continued help, more weapons and faster, so it can defend itself better and negotiate a good deal for Ukraine, for Europe and for the world. NATO Allies are providing more and the EU’s support continues to be crucial. Last week, at the Ukraine Defence Contact Group meeting in Ramstein, last Thursday, the US and European Allies announced further aid to Ukraine, and these additional contributions are vital.
NATO and the European Union have a lot to do together, and I can count on you, I know, as Members of the European Parliament, to keep up the support for Ukraine, for their freedom and ours too. And I can count on you to continue strengthening our own defences. We can't afford to wait. We are safe now, we are not safe in five years. So, we have to start today, spending more, ramping up production, getting resilience right and supporting Ukraine.
I will now stop. I very much look forward to our discussion. I will try to answer as many questions as possible. I know you cannot come back if you do not like my answer, but I will not give you, I hope, any reason to get back to me by answering the question in the first place in the correct way. So, I'll try to do my utmost. Thank you.
Exchange of Views
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte
Good to see you, and thanks for all the questions. Let me try to deal with as many as possible. So first of all, on the issue of the yeah, of course, elections will be taking place always. So we will have elections all over Europe and in Canada, elsewhere. We have to deal with them, this is democracy. I'm happy that we have these elections, I think you are too.
But on the second question, which was on the Mediterranean and the Western Balkans and youth, specifically youth, we just launched a process for a Youth Advisory Council, and we will again host a Youth Summit. I totally agree that we should also focus on the Mediterranean, the southern neighbourhood - there is a special Secretary General, Special Representative for the southern neighbourhood. He worked very closely with Jordan but also, of course, in Iraq, we have a big Mission, but also with countries like Tunisia, Mauritania, other countries in the southern neighbourhood. And we have a close cooperation with basically, most of the countries over there.
And then on the Balkans. And many of you raised that, so maybe I can answer that because of the first question, also going into the Balkans. Yes, of course, we have some worries there, particularly, of course, the situation between Bosnia, in Bosnia, but also between Serbia and Kosovo. When I get to Bosnia first - and there were some other questions on Bosnia also here - we are closely monitoring, of course, security developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I think NATO Allies are always very clear; we will not allow a security vacuum to emerge in Bosnia and Herzegovina and more generally, in the Western Balkans. It is crucial that the EUFOR mandate is renewed in November. EUFOR plays a key role in maintaining a safe and secure environment with support from NATO under the Berlin plus arrangements. And of course, NATO and the EU cooperate closely on the ground, as you know, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and we support a robust EUFOR Althea. And we will keep in close contact at all levels to ensure that we manage all potential challenges effectively together. That’s on Bosnia. And we also are very much in contact, of course, with Kosovo, but also with Serbia to make sure that also the elections coming up in Kosovo later, I think it is later this month or early February, that they will not lead to destabilisation - that's also crucial. But again, the Western Balkans, we really have to make sure that we take a close look into this and stay closely connected. It is a crucial, crucial neighbourhood.
Then on, the security guarantees. Yes, well, I would say, let's play it step by step. First of all, we have to make sure that Ukraine is in a position of strength as soon as it enters into peace talks - that's what we can do now to make sure that they get into a position of strength. As far as we are concerned, in the future, Ukraine should become a member of NATO - that is what we promised Ukraine. We are building that bridge now by all the bilateral security agreements between many, many Allies and Ukraine, but also through the $40 billion pledge, the NSATU organization, which is the command in Wiesbaden, has started a couple of weeks ago taking over tasks of the previous structures. So that is now all taking place.
And as I said in my short introductory remarks, whenever peace talks start to happen, it is will be crucial that going forward Russia has to understand that both those talks, it is impossible for them to again attack Ukraine. So part of the peace talks has to be the exact way of going forward in terms of Ukraine's relationship with NATO, preferably within NATO. But it's, I think, too early now to exactly sketch out what that exactly will mean. Also something we have to discuss with the new incoming US administration, but let's hope that we will get to that point as soon as possible. That we have the luxury of discussing the ongoing security guarantees for Ukraine, because that would mean that we have started into talks, and that we have moved to the next phase. And at this moment, clearly Ukraine is not there because they cannot at this moment negotiate from a position of strength, and we have to do more to make sure by changing the trajectory of the conflict that they can get to that position of strength.
On standards, totally agree, NATO is strong here. The EU is strong on all the soft power, including the internal market, ramping up defence production, and when it comes to, let's say, industry standards - so from the NATO standards, the more industry specific standards. And sometimes what you will see is that you have 155 ammunition and you would think that is one particular design for every company which is producing the 155 ammunition. But you would then be amazed how many companies would have some very small specific additions to their system so that you can only use their 155 ammunition and not generally. So this is something we are working on.
And I mentioned already that we have started to work closely together, of course, we are all colleagues from previous days. So that's easy with Kaja Kallas, with Ursula von der Leyen, with Antonio Costa, but also with the new defence Commissioner, Kubilius. And one of the things we agreed is that we will set up a high-level coordination group between NATO and the EU. And more specifically, I agreed with Ursula that whenever there is an issue which is not solved in that committee, that she and I will phone each other and we will only hang up when we have agreed, even if it takes the whole weekend and we cannot eat in the meantime. So we will have to deal with this issue, and we will have to solve them, and we will, and she is a former defence minister of Germany, we are great friends, so this should work. We are great friends, so this should work, because we have to make sure that we are in a position of maximum strength vis a vis Russia and others, and not spending too much time internally between the EU and NATO when it should be easy to get to an agreement, and that's also an answer to how to get the EU and NATO close together, more coordination, but light touch, no heavy structures, with lots of minutes and meetings and committees. Let's make it as easy going as possible so that we can focus on the main salient points and the big issues.
On capacity planning, yes, absolutely, we have to work on this. I discussed this with the Defence Commissioner on how to do this, and totally agree on shortening the time to develop new weapon systems. And that's particularly crucial that we do that, and we can learn here, of course, from what we see in Ukraine. And Ukraine is extremely fast now at bringing new developments to the battlefield, but Russia is then extremely fast in implementing what Ukraine has just implemented two weeks ago. So, we are learning from this and this whole idea that we can in detail describe what a design should look like, including the colour and the type of paint you use, etc, is silly.
The big risk in EU and NATO is that the better is the enemy of good. And we don't have to go for the 10 or one to 10 skill or for the A+, sometimes the B is good enough, and speed sometimes is more important than perfection. Then, of course, the new incoming administration, they will start next Monday. We have seen some press conferences, some things being said by some people in the US, but I would say, let's take this forward, starting from next Monday onwards. What I know from Donald Trump and from the incoming administration is that they were the ones pushing us for more defence spending. They were successful at this, and they were right. I mean, we did not spend enough, and now, luckily, we are, overall, close to the 2%.
The problem is, of course, that in the meantime, the 2% is not enough. And some of you asked me, okay, what should it be? I don't want to commit to a number, but as I said in my Carnegie talk after my speech, when you look, so, let's say, at a sort of first glance at the capability requirements emerging from the internal planning process within NATO, it will be north of 3% but then you're right, if you do joint buying and making use of the NSPA Luxembourg structures and everything else we have within NATO and the EU, you can deduct joint buying. You can deduct innovation, for example, Ukraine is experimenting with new radar systems, which are extremely less expensive than some of the more traditional radar systems to detect enemy missiles coming in, just one example, if you do that, deduct that you don't have to get to what we are afraid of what you would need now, which is 3.6, 3.7. So, you would bring that number somewhat down, but it will be impressively more than a 2% we are at now, I'm afraid.
But that is a structured process within NATO. We will conclude it over the coming month with the defence ministers, latest in June, before the Summit in the Hague. Then on the more autonomous European defence. Well, it's great to have a sort of European NATO, but then forget about the 2%, then you have to bring it up to 8%, 9% or 10% if you really want, you have to build your own nuclear capability, and it will take 15, 20 years if you want to build a European NATO without the US. At this moment, the US is spending over 60% of all the money being spent within NATO territory, over 60%: that means the other 31 are doing less than 40%, including Canada.
And so, it is an illusion that you can build a European NATO over the next 10 or 15 years. And why would you? I mean the transatlantic relationship, I think, after the First World War, but particularly after the Second World War, has served us very well. So why would we disconnect from the US, I will be against it. But again, if you want this for ideological reasons, then you have to quadruple even more your defence spending, and then it will still take you 10 or 15 years. And I agree, better spending is always better than more spending, but I think it is both. It is better spending, like making use of the joint procurement but in this mean at the same time, we need to do more spending. Because simply, when you look what he spent during the Cold War, the levels were north of 3% generally, and the 2% we are now is absolutely not enough. When you look what Russia is producing now in three months, it's what all of NATO is producing from Los Angeles up to Ankara in a full year, and then Russia is not bigger than the Netherlands and Belgium combined as an economy, the two of you together is the Russian economy, and they're producing in three months what the whole of NATO is producing in the year. And don't forget, when you compare Russian numbers, that what you can buy in Russia for the same money is, of course, much more because they do not have our high salaries. They don't have our bureaucracy. They can move at a higher speed, and they have basically created a war economy, and the whole industry is now on a war footing. So don't compare their 8% or 9% defence spending, 1/3 of the of the 8% or 9% of GDP, 1/3 of the whole state budget being spent on defence. When you cobble it all together, it might be less than what the European NATO is doing. But again, you can buy so much more, do so much more, and they have this urgent need to get there.
Then opening up the US Defence market versus spending more in Europe, it is both. It is absolutely both, because in Europe we have fantastic companies, but for example, on air defence, we still, and on the fifth-generation fighter jets, we cannot lose out on the US. So, you need both, and there is so much money going around. This was my argument with Trump, open up the US defence market. Because if you want to buy something in the in the US, you have to go through Congress, the White House, the Defense Department, Pentagon, etc, before you can get your hands on the Patriot system. So, make that easy. And at the same time, there's so much money going around that Thalys and Rheinmetall and Leonardo and all the fantastic defence companies here in Europe will have plenty opportunity to put in extra production lines, extra shifts. And by the way, they have to do this, and don't wait for the 10-year contracts they are all asking because they will not be able to create 10-year contracts, but they know the demand is there for the long term.
So please, defence industry ramp up production and be good businessmen and don't lose out to the South Koreans, because South Korean is getting into the market. Poland, Romania, Estonia, they are all buying South Korean because European, American defence companies are not delivering at the speed we need, the prices we need.
Then on, of course, sabotage and all that. And as I said, hybrid, it should be, I think, more towards destabilising actions by the Russians. And we should do more than just tracking what they are doing. And one of the great things of what will happen tomorrow in Finland and Helsinki is that you have a meeting discussing how we can counter what the Russians are doing, and also how we can survey the Baltic Sea. And the Russians don't like that, that we have a bigger NATO presence there, but that is the result of some of these anchors dragging. And if it is really just a mistake of Russians not being able to sail ships, then we should launch huge initiatives by the EU and NATO to have a huge training course for all Russian sailors to learn how to navigate their ships and experience what it means when your anchor is 400 miles on the seabed.
Then on Trump, yes, he has been right many times I agree and he, and he might be right many times in the future, and we have to dialogue with him. And I like the reaction of Mette Frederiksen, the Prime Minister of Denmark, who did not immediately react to what he said about Greenland, but she brought it back to the issue which is at stake, which is the Arctic, and how to make sure that in the Arctic, we have a strategic issue to be discussed between NATO, the US, within NATO and the EU, how to deal with the Arctic, etc. And this is not about who rules or controls Greenland. This is, of course, about making sure that the Arctic stay stays same. So, yes, Europe can rely on the United States. I'm absolutely convinced the United States will stay within NATO. I'm not worried about that, but we have to make sure that the argument which the US had in the past and still can have to a certain extent at this moment, that because over their spending, we can spend more on other stuff because they spend it on defence. That we take out that argument by spending more ourselves. And when I say spending more ourselves, yet is better spending, joint procurement, innovation, etc, but again, also more spending, the 2%, everything I'm seeing at this moment is not nearly enough, and if we don't do it, we are safe now, but not in four or five years. So, if you don't do it, get your Russian language courses or go to New Zealand, or decide now to spend more. And that's exactly the debate we have to finalise over the next three or four months to stay safe in this part of the world and defend ourselves.
On Eurobonds and all that. that's for the EU. I just need a way to spend more money and where you get it from, I had some clear views on this in the past, but I've been forced by the new team to not discuss that any longer. And as long as the money is there. Then, I've never committed to 4%, there was somebody saying, I think it was here that I mentioned 4%. No, I've not committed to a new number. Just saying 2% is not nearly enough. I would say if I was in Bulgaria, I would be very happy to be in NATO. But of course, I accept your argument, but I do not agree.
Then on Greenland, Canada already went to that. Bosnia already mentioned that. Then on, I think finally, Türkiye. Well, in 2016 it was Türkiye. with Germany, and the Dutch were then heading the European Union Council, EUCO, and we were able to come to a deal with Turks on the in the Syrian refugee crisis. And I was very happy with that, because that made it possible to bring down the numbers of Syrians coming into Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. Because particularly you remember the then chair of the European Parliament saying, oh no, sorry, Viktor Orbán saying nobody wants to go to Hungary. They all want to go to Germany. And that's true. And in 2016 we risked that the number would reach a million but because of this deal with Türkiye, it did not. And I have always felt that Türkiye is a worthwhile member of NATO, playing its role, and, yes, also defending its interests, like everybody here is defending its interest within the EU and within NATO, that's fine, but they're a very valuable member of the of the Alliance.
And then maybe finally, on the Eastern Flank. One of the things I learned, madam, is that, yes, I'm happy with the forward land forces, etc, so all the initiatives we have now to secure the eight countries, including now Finland on the eastern flank. But at the same time, let's never forget that in the end, we have to also, at the same time, message towards the Russians that whenever you will decide to attack us, it is not only the Latvian military which will fight you back, not only the forward land forces, it will be the whole of NATO, including our mighty Navy, our mighty land forces, our fighter jets, which will take you out. So not even dare to take one square kilometre of Latvia. And when you say you are on the eastern flank, it is the Hague, London and New York at the eastern flank. Latvia, yes, maybe physically, but we are all in the eastern flank. We are all in this together. There are no first or second-class citizens in NATO and the EU, it's really crucial that we understand this and that our collective defence is really collective and connected. So, I think I tried to answer as many as possible question as possible.