Final Communiqué

1. The Defence Planning Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation met in Ministerial Session in Brussels on 16 and 17 May 1984.
2. NATO was created 35 years ago, a defensive alliance of free and sovereign nations determined to preserve their way of life through collective security. Their solidarity and united strength have enabled them to achieve this goal without threatening anyone. NATO's history has been one of success: its members have now enjoyed peace, freedom and stability for one of the longest periods in European history. Unity of purpose and the will to share equitably the risks and burdens as well as the benefits of collective defence are essential for the continuation of this achievement.
3. Lasting security will require the development of a stable and constructive East-West relationship; it also requires adequate military strength. NATO seeks to preserve peace through the maintenance of the forces necessary to support NATO's agreed strategy of deterrence and defence. Deterrence and arms control are complementary and integral parts of the security policy of the Alliance. NATO therefore seeks a stable balance of forces at the lowest possible level to strengthen peace and international security through militarily significant arms control agreements which are both equitable and verifiable.
4. Ministers noted with concern the steady accumulation of Soviet military power and the scale of modernisation of Warsaw Pact forces across the entire spectrum, conventional to strategic. In contrast to NATO's restraint, as specifically shown in the Montebello decision, the Soviet Union has continued to increase deployment of INF missiles, including additional SS-20 missiles. Ministers attention to a particularly striking illustration of Soviet attitudes in the latest announcement by the Soviet Union of plans to deploy forward into the German Democratic Republic INF missile systems in addition to those already being deployed in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, allegedly in reaction to NATO's initial deployment of LRINF systems. Ministers saw no Justification for such Soviet actions in view of their current nuclear and conventional advantages. Clearly the Soviet Union is, using the implementation of the"double track" decision as a pretext to carry out an already planned programme of modernisation and upgrading of its INF potential in Europe which began even before the 1979 decision by NATO.
5. Trends in Warsaw Pact military capabilities underline the 3 continuing need for a strong and cohesive Alliance based on the transatlantic partnership. While NATO has made considerable progress in modernisation, the growing offensive strength of Warsaw Pact forces means that NATO nations must improve their current efforts.
6. The strategy of flexible response and forward defence is the only effective way of deterring the use or threatened use of Warsaw Pact military power against NATO. Flexible response requires that NATO has the ability to deter aggression at whatever level it might occur, but as a defensive alliance NATO does not seek superiority, nor does it attempt to match the Warsaw Pact man for man or weapon for weapon. The credibility of flexible response depends on the possession of balanced, modern and effective forces, conventional and nuclear. In order to enhance the flexibility and therefore the credibility of NATO strategy, Ministers reaffirmed their determination to strengthen the conventional capabilities of the Alliance.
7. They reviewed the Force Goals for 1985-1990 developed in accordance with Ministerial Guidance, which included the resource guidance formula aiming at real increases in defence expenditure in the order of 3 % annually for the nations of the Alliance. In this context, they emphasised the importance of achieving the most effective use of and the greatest output from increased defence resources. The Force Goals concentrate on rectifying the most critical deficiencies in NATO's conventional defence posture, notably in the readiness, survivability and sustainability of NATO's forces. Ministers welcomed the progress made thus far in examining the use of emerging technologies to make substantial and yet affordable improvements to conventional defence. In this regard Ministers emphasised the importance for long-term planning of a more comprehensive conceptual military framework for implementing NATO strategy. They also acknowledged the value of the closely related work in the coordination of defence planning as an important step towards a more comprehensive resource strategy and they emphasised the need for further and early progress.
8. Ministers recognised that in current economic circumstances achieving the required improvements to NATO's defence posture constitutes a considerable challenge. They welcomed the progress made by the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) in identifying potential programmes for multilateral cooperation, for example the NATO Frigate Programme for the 1990s, and in agreeing that certain emerging technology systems would receive high priority attention. They reaffirmed the need for a balanced and enhanced framework of transatlantic cooperation. In this context they welcomed the report from the EUROGROUP and the progress achieved by the Independent European Programme Group IIEPG in providing a response to the recent United States' initiatives. Ministers also recognised that effective steps undertaken to restrict the transfer of militarily relevant technology to the Warsaw Pact serve to preserve the West's technological advantage required to offset Warsaw Pact superiority in the field of -conventional armaments.
9. Recognising that a strengthening of the conventional capabilities of the Alliance in realisation of the Force Goals for 1985-1990 will depend to a large extent an the availability of necessary common infrastructure facilities, Ministers agreed on the need to continue the NATO Commonly Funded Infrastructure Programme at a substantially increased funding level. They considered alternative proposals for a financial ceiling and asked Permanent Representatives to consider further all relevant factors and to make recommendations regarding specific funding levels within 90 days. Further, Ministers called for a continuation of the ongoing review of infrastructure procedures in order to ensure their close alignment with other defence planning and effective control of expenditures. Ministers also reached a cost-sharing agreement for the new Slice Group.
10. Ministers again. stressed the importance of Greece, Portugal and Turkey having adequate Allied assistance to carry out their missions and to implement their Force Goals more effectively to the advantage of all. Ministers agreed that despite commendable efforts by some Allies more aid, and by more nations, is essential.
11. Ministers, recalling the Bonn Summit documents, reaffirmed the position they adopted in previous communiqués concerning developments outside the NATO Treaty area that might threaten the vital interests of members of the Alliance. This position includes the need for timely consultations and shared assessments on all aspects of such developments and, on the basis of national decision, possible responses by countries able to take action and by those able to facilitate deployments. Against the background of United States planning for its rapidly deployable forces and the implications for the defence of the NATO area, Ministers reviewed work in progress on measures necessary to maintain deterrent and defence capabilities within the NATO area, in particular in the new Force Goals. They expressed their determination to ensure that NATO defence planning continues to take account of the need for such measures.
12. In the absence of a concrete arms control agreement obviating the need for deployment, NATO began its LRINF missile deployment at the lend of 1983 in conformity with the December 1979 dual-track decision . Ministers however emphasised NATO's determination, if a concrete negotiated result cannot be achieved, to continue the deployment of LRINF missiles as scheduled. Ministers regretted that the Soviet Union had as yet refused to proceed with the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the INF negotiations. Ministers welcomed the readiness of the United States to resume both sets of negotiations at any time, and repeated their willingness to reverse, halt or modify the deployment of land-based longer-range INF (LRINF) missiles, including the dismantling and removal of missiles already deployed, upon the achievement of a balanced, equitable and verifiable agreement calling for such actions.
13. The recent proposal submitted by the Alliance at the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Vienna represents a new and constructive attempt to break the current impasse. Likewise Western initiatives at the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in Stockholm show the importance that the West attaches to the CDE as a means to increase security through reducing the risk of conflict by accident or miscalculation and the threat of surprise attack. Finally, Ministers welcomed the tabling in Geneva by the United States of a draft Treaty on Chemical Weapons which includes effective provisions for verification.

As on previous occasions, the Spanish Minister of Defence reserved his Government's position on the present Communiqué.

Denmark and Greece reserved their positions on the INF part of this Communiqué.

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Ministers expressed their deep appreciation to Secretary General Luns for the distinguished and tireless service he has rendered to the Alliance and to the cause of peace.