Final Communiqué

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) held its Spring Ministerial meeting at Vilamoura, Portugal on 22nd and 23rd March, 1983. Spain attended as an observer. Ministers discussed a wide range of security matters, including the trends in the balance of nuclear forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the preparations of NATO's Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) missile deployments, and the state of arms control negotiations between the United-States and the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear forces and on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

The main purpose of the Alliance is to prevent war, safeguard democracy and build the foundations of lasting peace. As was made clear by Heads of State and Government in their Programme for Peace in Freedom laid out following their meeting in Bonn on 10th June last year, deterrence and defence, together with arms control and disarmament are integral to the achievement of this purpose. NATO is determined to preserve its security by possessing a spectrum of capabilities adequate to deter aggression and intimidation. For its deterrence strategy to remain credible, NATO has to maintain adequate forces in each area of the interlocking triad of forces: strategic nuclear forces, intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces, and conventional forces, with intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces in NATO Europe providing a crucial link between the defence of NATO Europe and the United States strategic nuclear deterrent. At the same time, the Alliance seeks a stable balance of forces at the lowest possible level to strengthen peace and international security, and to this end has initiated a comprehensive series of proposals for militarily significant, equitable and verifiable agreements on the control and reduction of armaments.

Ministers noted with concern that in spite of statements to the contrary, the Soviet Union continues to build up its nuclear forces. They are improving their capabilities over the entire spectrum from short-range to strategic weapons. Ministers, in discussing Soviet strategic nuclear forces, noted that amongst other developments the Soviet Union, while having already deployed modern, accurate SS-17, SS-18 and SS-l9 missiles, had recently flight-tested two new intercontinental ballistic missiles. In the field of Longer-Range INF (LRINF), the Soviet Union now has 351 launchers for the mobile and accurate SS-20 missile deployed and operational, comprising 1,053 warheads. Combining these with the SS-4 and SS-S missiles still operational, the Soviet Union has about 1,300 longer-range land-based INF missile warheads on operational launchers. This is more than twice as many warheads as the Soviet Union had in this category before the deployment of the SS-20 missiles had begun. The deployment of the SS-20 was a key factor leading to NATO's double- track decision in December 1979. In addition, Ministers noted that the Soviets are replacing older shorter-range missiles with a formidable array of new more accurate systems, namely the SS-21, ss-22, and SS-23 which if deployed forward could reach deep into Western Europe . They agreed that such a concerted build-up - in spite of a decade of restraint by NATO - was far more than was necessary for purely defensive purposes.

Ministers discussed trends in the strategic capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States. They supported the determination of the United States and the United Kingdom to ensure the deterrent capabilities of their strategic nuclear forces which are of fundamental importance to the Alliance's strategy. Strategic nuclear forces remain the ultimate guarantee of NATO's security. Ministers underlined that the stability and security of all countries concerned would be greatly enhanced by an equitable and verifiable agreement as proposed by the United States at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks CSTART) that calls for substantial reductions in strategic nuclear systems and strategic ballistic missile warheads.

Ministers also discussed the proposals tabled in Geneva concerning Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). They welcomed the United States proposals aimed a further enhancing international safeguards in this area.

Ministers emphasized their determination to move ahead with the double-track approach of modernization and arms control. For arms control negotiations to be successful, the Soviets must be convinced that NATO is determined to deploy its missiles as planned. In this connection Ministers noted with satisfaction that the ongoing development, flight testing and initial production of the Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) in the United States were proceeding well. They agreed that, while vigorously pursuing the arms control negotiation track in Geneva, the Alliance must at the same time continue preparations, which are currently on schedule, for the planned deployment of modernized LRINF. Minis- ters fully supported the United States efforts to achieve the total elimination of all longer-range land-based INF missiles (the zero-zero solution) and reiterated that in the absence of such an agreement the deployment of NATO's LRINF missiles would begin according to schedule at the end of 1983. Ministers welcomed the fact that the United States would continue to maintain an active and flexible negotiating position. They stressed that the Alliance commitment to negotiations would, if necessary, continue even after initial deployment.

Ministers reviewed the state of the INF negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. They reaffirmed that the United States proposal, developed in close consultation with the Alliance, to eliminate the entire category of United States and Soviet longer-range land-based INF missiles remains the-best and most equitable outcome. At the same time they welcomed the continuing close consultations within the Alliance and fully supported the United States' determination to explore in Geneva every proposed solution for an INF arms control agreement that meets the basic criteria of balanced and effective arms control: that is, significant reductions based on equality of rights and limits between the United States and the Soviet Union, no inclusion of or compensation for third-country systems, global limitations, no weakening of the United States contribution to NATO's convention- al deterrence and defence, and effective verifiability.

Ministers noted that the Soviet Union has yet to make proposals which recognize the legitimate security interests of the West, as reflected in the above criteria. Contrary to recent claims by Soviet leaders, the Soviet proposals have not substantially changed since the beginning of the negotiations. In fact, their most recent proposal would leave the Soviet Union with more SS-20 missiles than they had when the negotiations began, deny NATO the right to modernize its means of deterring this threat, allow them to have an unlimited number of mobile SS-20s east of the Urals which would still pose a threat to NATO Europe and almost totally eliminate from the European continent United States aircraft which are indispensable to NATO's conventional defences. The result would be to preserve the Soviet monopoly in the field of land-based LRINF missiles, to erode seriously the linkage between the United States' strategic deterrent and the defence of NATO Europe and to further the Soviet long-term aim of dividing the Alliance.

Ministers noted that Soviet proposal to reduce the number of their "medium-range" missiles in Europe to the number of the strategic systems of the United Kingdom and France was unacceptable. In particular this proposal would result in the virtual elimination of the presence of United States intermediate-range nuclear forces from the European continent and thus constitute a fundamental change in the security situation of the Alliance. Only adequate United States forces in Europe, both conventional and nuclear, can provide the necessary linkage between the defence of NATO Europe and the United States strategic deterrent, which remains the ultimate guarantee of NATO security. The United Kingdom and French nuclear forces are independent strategic deterrents and hence cannot be compared with the Soviet or United States longer-range land-based missiles under consideration in the INF negotiations.

Ministers noted progress in the comprehensive work of the High Level Group which, as a matter of priority and against the background of INF arms control negotiations, is thoroughly examining the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustments which would be required by longer-range INF deployments as well as the possible implications of these deployments for the balance of roles and systems in NATO's nuclear armoury as a whole. Ministers stated that in present circumstances both short- and intermediate-range nuclear forces continue to play their necessary role in maintaining an unbroken spectrum of deterrence. Further, they reaffirmed that the overall size of NATO's nuclear forces should be at the lowest level consistent with the Alliance's agreed deterrent strategy and that no more nuclear weapons than are needed should be retained in NATO's inventory. Ministers also pointed to the completed withdrawal of 1,000 United States nuclear warheads from Europe and the commitment, undertaken as part of the 1979 decision to modernize longer-range INF missiles, that the deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles would not result in an increase in the number of warheads in Europe over that reduced level.

Ministers accepted with pleasure an invitation from the Honourable J. Gilles Lamontagne, the Canadian Minister of Defence, to hold their next meeting in Canada in Autumn 1983.

Greece has expressed its views in a statement included in the minutes.