NATO MULTIMEDIA ACCOUNT

Access NATO’s broadcast-quality video content free of charge

Register

Create an account

Create an account

Check your inbox and enter verification code

We have sent a verification code to your email address. . Enter the code to verify your account. This code will expire in 30 minutes.
Verification code

Didn't receive a code? Send new Code

You have successfully created your account

From now on you can download videos from our website

Subscribe to our newsletter

If you would also like to subscribe to the newsletter and receive our latest updates, click on the button below.

Reset password

Enter the email address you registered with and we will send you a code to reset your password.

Log in or Create an account
Reset password
Check your inbox and enter verification code
We have sent a verification code to your email address. Enter the code to verify your account. This code will expire in 30 minutes.
Verification code

Didn't receive a code? Send new Code

Create a new password

The password must be at least 12 characters long, no spaces, include upper/lowercase letters, numbers and symbols.

Your password has been updated

Click the button to return to the page you were on and log in with your new password.

 

Continuing threats to security and international stability - Firmness in defence and persistence in the search for peaceful solutions - Afghanistan - Helsinki Final Act - Poland - Economic and social stability of the Alliance - Increase in Warsaw Pact

I

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Rome on 4th and 5th May 1981, deeply concerned at the continuing threats to security and international stability. Determined to counter these threats by effective restraints including firmness in defence and persistence in the search for peaceful solutions, Ministers in that spirit agreed on the following:

  1. The strength and cohesion of the Alliance remain indispensable to guarantee the security of its members and thereby to foster stable international relations. This stability requires that all nations act with restraint and responsibility. Claims by the Soviet Union that it too subscribes to such policies are not borne out by Soviet deeds. The more constructive East-West relationship which the Allies seek requires tangible signs that the Soviet Union is prepared to abandon the disturbing build-up of its military strength, to desist from resorting to force and intimidation and to cease creating or exploiting situations of crisis and instability in the Third World .
  2. The Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan is a particularly flagrant example of violation of the principles of restraint and responsibility in international affairs. This occupation is now in its second year, with a mounting toll of human suffering and loss of life. It remains and will remain totally unacceptable to the Allies and to world opinion. The Soviet Union has ignored international condemnation of its actions and appeals by the United Nations, the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement. Soviet forces must be withdrawn and a political settlement must be found enabling the Afghan people to exercise fully their rights of independence and self-determination and permitting the two million refugees to return to their homes.
  3. In Europe, efforts to restore East-West co-operation and exchanges on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act cannot but be severely undermined by the use or threat of force for intervention in the affairs of other countries. Poland must be left free to resolve its own problems. Any outside intervention would have the gravest consequences for international relations as a whole and would fundamentally change the entire international situation. The Allies, for their part, will continue to adhere strictly to their policy of non-intervention and they call on all other states to do the same.
  4. In this situation, the Allies will strengthen their capability to deter aggression and act, individually or collectively, to encourage Soviet restraint and responsibility in international affairs with the goal of laying a stable basis for East-West relations. In pursuance of the established policies of the Alliance they will seek these objectives in particular in the following areas:
  5. They will ensure their solidarity, consulting closely in the North Atlantic Council on all matters affecting security and East-West relations. In the same spirit, they will strive, in particular by providing assistance for the economically less advanced member countries, to strengthen the economic and social stability of the Alliance as a whole in accordance with Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
  6. In the area of military capability, the increase in Warsaw Pact military power has created a disturbingly adverse trend in the military balance between East and West, particularly in Europe. The Allies agree that assuring an overall military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is fundamental to the security of the Alliance, the enforcement of restraint and the maintenance of peace. They are resolved to make available all the resources needed to provide the requisite strengthening of their deterrent and defence forces.
  7. Genuine non-alignment is an important factor for stability in the world. The Allies will continue to consult among themselves and to work together with others to encourage stability and reduce the risks of crisis in the Third World, especially where the independence of sovereign nations is threatened. The maintenance of this independence, peace and international equilibrium is a vital interest of the West. Political settlements must be found to crisis or conflict situations, especially when they affect sensitive areas such as the Middle East, South-East and South-West Asia or Southern Africa; the Allies desire to work to this end in co-operation with other countries.

The stability and genuine non-alignment of Third World countries also depend on the freedom to develop economically and socially without outside interference. All states must refrain from exploiting social problems or fomenting instability for political advantage. Equally, all must contribute actively to strengthening the economies of developing countries and to the fight against hunger, poverty and under-development. For their part, the Western nations also offer these countries the trade technology and respect for political sovereignty that are vital for their independence and economic well-being.

A number of Allied countries possess, or are determined to acquire, the capability to deter aggression and to respond to requests by nations for help in resisting threats to their security or independence.

  1. They will maintain a dialogue with the Soviet Union and will work together for genuine détente and the development of East-West relations, whenever Soviet behaviour makes this possible. The principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act provide a code of conduct that must he observed by all the signatories. At the CSCE meeting in Madrid, the Allies seek substantive and balanced results which will lead to better implementation of these principles and provisions, including respect for human rights, improved human contacts, a freer flow of information and enhanced security and co-operation. This would clearly demonstrate the continuing value of the CSCE process.

The Allies reaffirm their support for the French proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe aimed at achieving in an initial phase an agreement on a coherent set of militarily significant, binding and verifiable confidence-building measures, applicable throughout the European Continent from the Atlantic to the Urals. Underlining the importance they attach to such a Conference taking place as an integral part of the CSCE process, they consider that it would be for a future CSCE follow-up meeting to examine ways of continuing their efforts for security and disarmament, in the light of the progress achieved by the end of the initial phase of the Conference and taking into account other current negotiations. While welcoming the progress made so far, they express the hope that, as part of a balanced outcome, agreement can be reached at Madrid on a precise and unambiguous mandate incorporating the above criteria.

  1. Arms control and disarmament, together with deterrence and defence, are integral parts of Alliance security policy. The Allies support negotiations to achieve meaningful restraints on Soviet military power and to improve security. The object of this policy is a stable military balance, if possible at reduced levels of forces. The Allies stress the value of stabilizing, equitable and verifiable arms control through limitations on Soviet and US strategic arms. They recognize that arms control negotiations can only lead to fruitful results in an international climate of confidence.
  2. The Allies taking part in the Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions continue in their determination to achieve genuine manpower parity in the form of a common collective ceiling based on agreed data. They regret that no substantial progress has been made in the negotiations, largely because the Eastern participating states are still unprepared to make the required contribution to the clarification of the data problem.
  3. The Allies continue to attach particular importance to the maintenance of the calm situation in and around Berlin. The strict observance and full implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement of 3 September 1971 remain vitally important for security in Europe, East-West relations and the international situation as a whole. The Alliance continues to support the efforts being made by the Federal Republic of Germany to secure the cancellation of the increase in the minimum exchange requirements imposed by the GDR, which is having a particularly adverse effect on the number of tourists and visitors travelling to the GDR and East Berlin.

II

  1. The Allies who participated in the December 1919 NATO decision on LRTNF modernization and arms control reaffirmed their commitment to that decision. They emphasized that in light of increasing Soviet LRTNF deployments which in the case of the SS-20 already exceed the total LRTNF deployment planned by NATO, the modernizing of NATO's LRTNF is more essential than ever, and offers the only realistic basis for parallel TNF arms control. Since the December 1979 decision, Soviet threats and efforts to divide the Allies have only strengthened their resolve to take the steps necessary to maintain deterrence, redress the imbalance in LRTNF, and ensure their security. The latest Soviet proposal for a moratorium on LRTNF deployments is wholly unacceptable to these Allies. It would freeze them into inferiority by blocking the NATO modernization programme altogether. Moreover, the proposal would permit the Soviets to increase the threat to NATO by failing to limit systems capable of striking Allied territory from east of the Urals.

These Allies welcomed the intention of the United States to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on TNF arms control within the SALT framework by the end of the year. The American Secretary of State intends to discuss the timing and procedures for these negotiations with Foreign Minister Gromyko in September at the United Nations. These negotiations will rely on an updated Alliance threat assessment and a study of functional requirements for NATO TNF to be undertaken within the framework of the Special Consultative Group and the High Level Group as matters of immediate priority.

In addition to the Communiqué, the Foreign Ministers decided to publish the following extracts from the Minutes of their Meeting of the 4th and 5th May 1981: