NATO's response to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

Facts and way ahead

Introduction

1. At the January 1994 Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government formally acknowledged the security threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and associated delivery means and recognized this as a matter of concern to the Alliance. They therefore decided to intensify and expand NATO's political and defence efforts against proliferation. The first result of these efforts was a comprehensive statement of NATO's approach to proliferation laid out in the Alliance Policy Framework issued at the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 9th June 1994 . (1)

New challenges and risks

2. The security challenges and risks which NATO faces now are different in nature from what they were in the past: they are multi-faceted, multi-directional, and hard to predict and assess. Proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons(2) poses a military risk to the Alliance and can lead to direct military threats. Proliferation must be taken into account in order to maintain NATO's ability to safeguard the security of its member states and to carry out new missions. Of particular concern are growing proliferation risks on NATO's periphery, the role of suppliers of WMD-related technology to them, the continuing risks of illicit transfers of WMD and related materials, and political-military uncertainties and future technological trends related to WMD. NATO is well-suited to deal with the security dimensions of the proliferation problem and can bring together the resources of sixteen nations in this effort.

The political dimension

3. In responding to the risks of proliferation, the principal objective of the Alliance is to prevent proliferation, or, if it occurs, to reverse it through diplomatic means. In this regard, NATO seeks to support, without duplicating, work already underway in other international fora and institutions. The Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) was established by the North Atlantic Council to address the political aspects of NATO's approach to the proliferation problem. The SGP has considered a range of factors in the political, security and economic field that may cause or influence proliferation and identified political and economic instruments available to prevent or respond to proliferation. Based on its initial analysis, the Group is currently assessing proliferation problems in geographical areas of particular concern to the Alliance, with the main focus on developments on the periphery of NATO's territory.
4. The SGP has focused its activities on current political issues with a view to contributing to the implementation and strengthening of international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation norms and agreements. It has emphasized the need to make clear to potential proliferants the grave consequences of efforts to acquire WMD and the necessity of respecting international non-proliferation norms and has underscored the importance of creating a climate of confidence and security that contributes to alleviating regional tensions, thereby reducing possible incentives for would-be proliferants to acquire WMD. Ad hoc consultations have taken place with Russia and other countries to engage them in a dialogue and eventual common effort to prevent proliferation.
5. Allies recognize that political efforts to prevent proliferation may not always be successful. For this reason, the Alliance is also addressing the defence aspects of dealing with proliferation risks to ensure it can safeguard the security of all its member states despite the presence, threat or use of NBC weapons. Alliance preparedness to deal with the military implications of proliferation is equally a fundamental aspect of NATO's overall adaptation to the new security environment.

The defence dimension

6. While proliferants will probably lack the capability to threaten the destruction of NATO member states, any crisis involving proliferants could carry the risk of NBC weapons being used. It is important to ensure that NATO's military posture makes manifest Alliance cohesion, and that it provides reassurance and maintains NATO's freedom of action in the face of proliferation risks. NATO's military posture should demonstrate to any potential aggressor that the Alliance cannot be coerced by the threat or use of NBC weapons and has the ability to respond effectively to threats to its security as they emerge.
7. The NATO Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP) was established by the North Atlantic Council to address the military capabilities needed to discourage NBC proliferation, deter threats or use of NBC weapons, and to protect NATO populations, territory and forces. In the first phase of its work, the DGP conducted a comprehensive assessment of the risks to the Alliance posed by proliferation. Building on this assessment in a second phase that has just been concluded, the DGP has identified a range of capabilities needed to support NATO's defence posture for that purpose. Its findings can be summarized as follows:
   1. Military Capabilities Complement Prevention Efforts. Alliance military capabilities reinforce and complement international efforts to prevent proliferation. Strategic intelligence capabilities, in particular, enrich the Alliance's knowledge about supplier-proliferant relations and weapons development programmes. Robust military capabilities signal to proliferants the utmost seriousness with which NATO approaches proliferation risks, Alliance resolve and its refusal to be intimidated by NBC threats. This, in turn, should strengthen internationally-shared norms against proliferation. All of the Alliance's military capabilities have a role in devaluing NBC weapons, by reducing the incentives and raising the costs of acquiring or using them. NATO's development of military capabilities to deal with proliferation risks also will provide a better technical basis for non-proliferation-related monitoring and verification.
   2. No One Capability Alone Will Suffice. A mix of capabilities will provide a firm basis for deterring or protecting against the risks from proliferation, and will also contribute significantly to the Alliance's primary aim of preventing proliferation. The Alliance has identified needed capabilities and will consider how these capabilities should evolve in the face of future security challenges and risks.
   3. Complement Nuclear Deterrence. Complementing nuclear forces with an appropriate mix of conventional response capabilities and passive and active defences, as well as effective intelligence and surveillance means, would reinforce the Alliance's overall deterrence posture against the threats posed by proliferation.
   4. Core Capabilities. Greatest emphasis should be placed on core, integrative capabilities that would make the most substantial contributions to the Alliance's objectives for dealing with proliferation. These capabilities will increase the overall effectiveness of the Alliance's defence posture against proliferation risks and provide a foundation for enhancements to, and evolution of, NATO's response to proliferation. They include:
      • Strategic and Operational Intelligence;
      • Automated and Deployable Command, Control, and Communications;
      • Wide Area Ground Surveillance;
      • Standoff/Point Biological and Chemical Agent Detection, Identification, and Warning;
      • Extended Air Defences, including Tactical Ballistic Missile Defence for Deployed Forces;
      • Individual Protective Equipment for Deployed Forces.

      Many of the capabilities identified are already available to NATO, or are being developed. Taken together, these capabilities would devalue the political and military benefits for a proliferant contemplating the acquisition of NBC weapons.

Conclusions and way ahead

8. NATO's approach to prevent proliferation and reverse it through diplomatic means is steadily developing. It is a continuing process complementing international non-proliferation efforts. An important element in this process are the ad hoc consultations with Russia and other countries with the aim of fostering a common understanding of and approach to the proliferation problem. In the defence field the third phase of the DGP's work will now focus on identifying areas in NATO's current military posture where progress has to be made to better counter the risks posed by proliferation. Thus, Alliance capabilities reinforce and complement international efforts to prevent the spread of WMD by demonstrating the Alliance's serious concern regarding proliferation.

1. See Press Release M-NAC-1(94)45 and the Basic Factsheet on NATO's Approach to proliferation published in September 1995.
2. "WMD" and "NBC weapons" can be used interchangeably.