Press briefing

JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman): Colleagues, sorry I'm late, and I will, as usual, try to be as brief as possible so we can have a discussion amongst ourselves.

Let me touch on three or four issues very quickly. One is obviously Operation Achilles. You all know that at the request of the Afghan government ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces yesterday launched Operation Achilles. It has been very widely covered, so I don't need to go into too many details. It is concentrated on the region of northern Helmand province, focusing in the initial stages on the Sangeen Valley. This is the largest multinational combined ANSF and ISAF, that is Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF operation launched to date. Its aim is, of course, to improve security in Helmand, set the conditions for the development and reconstruction. A particular focus is the... I used to pronounce it Kajaki, I know now it is correctly pronounced Kajaki dam project which is in Helmand province. I was there accompanying the Secretary General just ten days ago.

The aim, I think, of this project is symbolic of the whole effort, the whole NATO effort in Afghanistan. The aim is to create the conditions for a road to be built so that a turbine can be brought to the dam and installed. When it is installed it will provide electricity to almost two million people. It will provide electricity also to the businesses in the area, so it will have a positive effect on the local economy. It will provide irrigation for farmers, and jobs for about 2,000 people on an ongoing basis.

This is the purpose of why we are there in Afghanistan, because, of course, the Taliban and other spoilers do not want this project to go ahead, precisely because it will benefit the local population. They have, therefore, been regularly, indeed, on an almost daily basis, attacking those who are trying to build the road and install the turbine. And we have visited the British marines who are there now protecting this project and have been there for quite some time. Operation Achilles will further improve the security conditions, which will help to allow this project and others like it to go ahead.
Op Achilles comprises 5,500 troops approximately, 4,500 NATO ISAF and about a 1,000 Afghan National Security Forces.

And I'm happy to come back to this if you wish.
This was, of course, briefed extensively today in the North Atlantic Council and there were long discussion of it. I'm just trying to see if there's anything that I missed. Yes, I think it's worth pointing... the, what we call the kinetic operations, in other words, the military operations, are directly linked both in the planning and in execution to immediate reconstruction and development. So reconstruction and development teams are on their way immediately following military operations to begin that effort, what we call a comprehensive approach.

Okay, that's it on that. Second issue, tomorrow the Secretary General will go to Belgrade. He will meet with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Draskovic, Minister of Defence Stankovic, Prime Minister Kostunica, President Tadic. There will be a press conference at 1300; Secretary General and President Tadic together. He will give a speech from 1500 to 1545 and that's it. We will send out... I think we have already sent out a media advisory with the locations and contact information.

There will be, I think you will not be surprised to hear, two main themes of discussion, or at least I expect two main themes of discussion. One, of course, will be the new Partnership for Peace membership that Serbia has newly acquired. We have moved forward with also setting up a military liaison office in Belgrade to assist with Defence reform in the context of Partnership for Peace.

The Partnership for Peace membership of Serbia indicates, or illustrates two things. One is that Serbian defence reform has advanced significantly and NATO has had a part in helping support that process, to the point where Partnership for Peace membership certainly makes sense. But secondly, of course, it's an indication in a political sense of how far the relationship between NATO and Serbia has come. And NATO's desire to see Serbia, like the rest of the Balkan region, move closer to NATO, pursue Euro-Atlantic and European integration. And this is NATO's, of course, very structured way of assisting that process.

The second item of discussion I can certainly anticipate will be the Kosovo status process. The Secretary General will want to speak, of course, directly to Serbian leaders on that issue. They have their views, Pristina has its views. NATO's perspective is, of course, that we support President Ahtisaari and of course that KFOR will continue to play its role now through the status process and beyond. The final modalities of exactly what the status process will conclude with is of course up to other parties, up to President Ahtisaari, up to the Security Council, with the contact group playing a very important role, but there will certainly be a political discussion between the Secretary General and his interlocutors in Serbia.

Third point, and I don't often mention Japan. Well, sometimes I do mention Japan and now I will mention Japan again. Assistant Secretary General Martin Erdmann s at present in Japan for high-level talks. He has met with the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Vice Minister of Defence, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs bilaterally and then has held high-level talks which have included the Chief of Staff Admiral Saito, I believe, of the Defence Forces.
This is, I believe, the highest level official visit by NATO to Japan. Certainly building on the very successful visit of Mr. Abe to NATO Headquarters. They have discussed a whole range of issues from NATO's transformation in operations, from... with a specific focus on ISAF and I will come back to that. Also non-proliferation and other... and related issues. I believe that has included discussions, of course, of North Korea.

They have discussed how NATO can work more closely with Japan including opening our partnership tools to Japan in accordance with the Riga Summit declaration of last November. That could include activities such as in the areas of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, civil emergency planning and humanitarian mine action.

On Afghanistan they shared views on how to enhance synergies between the humanitarian and reconstruction activities of the NATO-led PRTs and the humanitarian efforts conducted by Japan in this regard.

In that context, Ambassador Erdmann has finalized today in Tokyo, with the Japanese authorities, a framework for NATO-Japan cooperation in Afghanistan. This framework will enable Japan to provide humanitarian assistance in support of the NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The projects will be selected by the government in Japan in consultation with the NATO senior civilian representative to Afghanistan, with the necessary inputs from the relevant Provincial Reconstruction Teams. It is up to the Japanese government to decide and then to announce the specifics of how they wish to provide their humanitarian assistance. I can tell you that we expect it to be in the amounts of several million dollars per year over a defined period. That will be defined by the Japanese authorities of course. Several million dollars per year. Precise amounts will be made clear by the Japanese authorities.

Final point, coming... well, I suppose sticking with Afghanistan in this case. Next Monday the speaker of the Afghan Parliament, Mr. Qanooni, Mohammad Yunus Qanooni will be in NATO Headquarters. He will meet with ambassadors and of course with the Secretary General. We are also working to make possible a press opportunity for him, with you, so when we find the time and location I presume we'll do that today. We will send out a media advisory so you can meet him. It is, of course, in the context of our regular contacts with high level Afghan officials and Mr. Qanooni, I believe, is the number three official, ranking official in the Afghan government.

That it is for me and I'm happy to take questions on this or any of the other very interesting issues which I'm sure you wish to raise. Please go ahead.

Q: On Afghanistan, how would you describe the character and the role of the operation in the framework of other ISAF operations, past operations. Is it an offensive, that's the first question on the character? And how decisive is it for the success of ISAF operations, the scope you've mentioned. It's been... it is the biggest joint operation. How important is it in the whole presence there?

APPATHURAI: It is certainly NATO taking the initiative. And NATO ISAF taking the initiative, but very much in cooperation with and on the initiative of the Afghan authorities. I think that's a very, very important point to make. In the briefing that ambassadors received today from the military authorities it was made very clear that Afghan National Security Forces are playing a fully integrated role in this operation, in a way that we have not necessarily seen before.

Is it important? Yes, it's important. Helmand province is an area with a high level of Taliban activity. As a result of the lack of security the poppy cultivation is at a higher level than it is, for example, in the north or the west. There is a clear and direct link to the lack of security and poppy cultivation so there will be a clear benefit in that regard if we can establish the conditions whereby an effective multi-faceted counternarcotics effort can take place. And that means not just crop eradication, but providing alternative livelihoods, providing the infrastructure necessary for crops to go to market, putting in place more effective governance. All of these things require security. In the absence of all of those things the Taliban and other spoilers can thrive, and the narcotics industry can thrive.

So the purpose of this is to, as I've said before, create the conditions for reconstruction and development. Is it important, yes because Helmand province is clearly a centre of gravity for this operation. It is centre of gravity for the Afghan government.
Please.

Q: How long should it take normally to build that you talked about and is that the determining factor to deciding how long the operation goes on or not?
And secondly, could you just bring us up to date on where we are on the fulfilment of the CJSOR in Afghanistan in the light of the U.K. announcements?

APPATHURAI: Yes. In terms of the project, there is no specific timeline for Operation Achilles, and I can't say I know exactly about the road, but what I was told was that the project from now to completion should take about two years, and that means the installation of the turbine and that it comes on-line and electricity is  provided.

Now how that exactly has to be integrated with the military operation, of course, depends on the security environment and the decisions, first and foremost of COMISAF, but it's a two year project from now, I was told, to its completion.

In terms of the CJSOR, yeah, you will have heard me complain about the force generation treadmill. I believe that, first point, and I think again it's context that you have heard, but it is worth remembering we have added 7,000 troops to this mission in the last three months, so there has been a dramatic increase in the amount of forces devoted to NATO ISAF. Much of that will be devoted to the south of the country so we have, and I use this line one more time, substantially enhance the combat power available to COMISAF to create the conditions for reconstruction and development.
SACEUR, I believe, has been quoted in the press as saying there is still a shortfall. I know that there are certain enablers that he would like, that is helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, I believe intelligence and surveillance assets, and potentially one battalion. That is something, I believe, Prime Minister Blair has mentioned also this morning as a subject he may wish to bring up in Brussels, or at the EU Summit.

So there are still some shortfalls. But we are getting closer and closer to a full fill of what is already a very substantially enlarged mission.
Did you have a follow-up?

Q: (inaudible)... potentially one battalion.

APPATHURAI: Yes.

Q: Where should that be, what's the kind of the role, task, function of that?
APPATHURAI: I think that's for SACEUR to decide, or COMISAF. I couldn't speak to it.

Q: So it essentially means... it's not clear whether he does need it or not or...?

APPATHURAI: I just don't want to speak for him. He has said that, I'm repeating what he said, so I'm putting caveats in it, but I think the best thing to do is to go back and read his comments.
Please.

Q: James, my first question is very serious. Why such a name was chosen for a NATO operation in Afghanistan, because Achilles...

APPATHURAI: A heel? (Laughs).

Q: No, like a hero who started good, but ended pretty badly, you know. And the second question is maybe less serious, what is the practical sense of the U.S. Senate resolution concerning the future enlargement of NATO and including such countries like Ukraine and Georgia, for example, into the process? What is the practical sense and influence on the cooperation with the irrelevant(?) countries. Thank you.

APPATHURAI: Thank you. Why was Achilles chosen? I have to say I really have no idea. I can tell you, now I'm going off the record for a second, so I apologize to those who are recording it. You'll have to do a little bit of editing. But we have had randomly generated, for example, names of operations, which when typed into Google took you to very unfortunate websites.
(LAUGHTER)

APPATHURAI: So, forcing a quick change away from that. So I don't know... but I have to say I think in the case of my country, for example, they are often computer generated to avoid, in fact, choosing names, even subconsciously that indicate what you're going to do. So I don't know if that was the case here.

The less serious question, of course when the United States, Congress and Senate discuss and eventually pass resolutions, it is something to take note of. Any decision to bring a country into NATO, you know this, or even to enter into the Membership Action Plan, has to be taken at 26. So it is an important indication of U.S. interest. I believe that it comes with, if I read the resolutions correctly, they indicate a desire on the part of the U.S. government to provide support for the ambitions of those countries, and of course, that will have a positive effect.

But it is no surprise to you for entry into the map and then for membership, all 26 NATO allies would have to provide the invitation and then of course, all the relevant parliaments would have to ratify it. And that's simply the way it goes.

I think we have Brooks back there. All the way back.

Q: Yes, a couple of questions, both concerning Serbia. You mentioned that NATO's going to set up a liaison office in Belgrade, among other reasons, because the Serbian military has achieved considerable reform. my discussions with the security... with Balkan security experts and debates and talking with them almost to a man they say that the Serbian military remains widely unreconstructed in attitude, structure and in the influence of the military over government policy decision. So I would... maybe they've got it wrong, but could you then elucidate what the advanced military reforms have been in the Serbian military?

That's one question. And secondly, I have some difficulty trying to understand what NATO and Serbia can discuss about Kosovo. I mean, the die's been cast and NATO's role doesn't change. It's going forward. So what are you discussing? Thanks.

APPATHURAI: I'm quite sure, to answer the second question first, I would be surprised if the political leadership in Serbia did not want to speak directly to the Secretary General to express their views on the issue. And of course, NATO, too, as an international body, wishes to see a resolution, best of all, a negotiated resolution, but certainly a resolution as quickly as possible to this issue and the Secretary General will wish to discuss with them their views, his views on how the process should go forward. Of course, he supports President Ahtisaari, but he will have an interest, as you have heard from COMKFOR, as we all do in NATO, to ensure that this process goes forward as quickly as possible.

I think I would be surprised if he would not also use the opportunity to reiterate that KFOR is in Kosovo, not only to protect the majority population, but also to protect the minority population, also to help protect patrimonial sites, as we are doing now and that offer assurances that NATO will continue to play that role, those roles, if asked, by the... or is so tasked by the resolution on Kosovo status, which will be, or should be approved by the UN Security Council.

So I think there's plenty for them to discuss frankly. I might add, that we have also agreed with Serbia, a transit agreement for the transit of personnel and equipment, in support of operations and the Balkans, in particular for Kosovo. My understanding is that that has not been used, but we do have an agreement in place which this military liaison office would also have a responsibility to help implement. So that will be another subject which they could bring up.

As to the improvements in Serbian military reform, I can tell you that we have had, through the partnership agreements, and I use a small 'p' here, NATO has had... in fact, let me be even more precise, NATO's defence planning experts have had regular contacts with Serbian defence authorities, focusing on all the areas in which, frankly, Partnership for Peace provides the opportunity for further support by NATO, including improvements to, as I mentioned, defence planning, defence budgeting, the reform of defence structures, retirement... programs for reintegrating retired defence or military personnel into civilian life. In all of these areas NATO has been providing support. Our view is, the view of defence experts is there has been improvement. We want to continue that in the more structured form of Partnership for Peace.

I think Pascal was next, but we'll come back to him.

Q: Two questions. The first one of Afghanistan. We were told those last months that there could be some request from other allies in other places in Afghanistan to provide reinforcements in case of problem in the south.
To what extent the Secretary General of NATO and ambassadors of all countries of NATO were well informed and were in advance of the Achilles Operation and is it we're not told exactly what was going on in advance to what extent this put a kind of risk on the so-called solidarity amongst allies (inaudible)... my first question.

Second question is, the German Minister of Defence, Mr. Jung, as a recent EU meeting, expressed the view that NATO should discuss of the defence missile problem. It seem to us that it was a kind of veto that NATO intended to put on a purely bilateral question. So what do you think (inaudible)... was it discussed?

APPATHURAI: Thank you. On Afghanistan, I think we should, of course, separate out the in extremis support issue from Operation Achilles. At Riga all 26 Heads of State and Government committed to allowing their forces to go anywhere in Afghanistan in emergency situations, in support of other allies. Again, not on a regular basis, but in extremis. That commitment has already been met. I can, by coincidence note that French Mirage aircraft have been deployed in direct close air support of Canadian troops in the south in a very difficult situation and help them get out of it.

So we have seen it demonstrated. It is exactly the kind of solidarity we need in NATO and it is being demonstrated in action.

In terms of whether or not ambassadors were made aware of Operation Achilles I don't normally discuss here that kind of internal business. I can tell you that ambassadors have been regularly briefed in the run-up to the operation as to in general what it would comprise. They were also given, by me, which is why I will speak to this, a full media pack of the day of the launch of the operation to provide all the necessary information on it. Not only to them but to capitals. For reasons of operational security, of course, the military does not publicly announce launch minutes, but NATO allies have been well briefed in the run-up to and now again today and yesterday on the operation.

Missile defence. I see heads bowing. To put this in context there are two tracks. There is a U.S.... Czech Republic, U.S., Poland bilateral discussion or bilateral discussions taking place, and the Czech Prime Minister, of course, raised this with the Secretary General. NATO is not part of those discussions. There is, however, a separate track of missile defence discussion within NATO. And this has, in essence, two elements. One is focused on theatre missile defence. That is, missile defence for deployed troops.

That project is moving forward. A test bed for the technologies has been approved. We are expecting that within the next three to four years that allies would have that capability within NATO for theatre missile defence.
There is a second track and that is the larger issue of missile defence, strategic missile defence, protection of, for example, the European continent. A feasibility study has been conducted. The feasibility study concluded, last year, that missile defence, strategic missile defence of the European continent was technically feasible. There has been no discussion yet within NATO of whether it is politically desirable, but at Riga, in the communiqué and you can, certainly, the Riga declaration you can go and look at it, it provides language which says something like, that the Secretary General and allies should move forward with a discussion of the missile threat. And the security environment relating to proliferation and missiles in the larger context.
Sorry, that's not exactly the language, so I might ask you to, if you're going to write that story, have a quick look on the website.

Now, is that discussion beginning? It will begin soon. And it is a tasking by Heads of State and Government and it will go forward. So I think that's where we are. Ça répond à ta question? 

Q: (inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: Qu'est-ce que tu voulais... veto... yeah, aucun veto. They're separate tracks.

Q: No no, I know there is no veto, but the way the Germans are insisting with Mr. Steinmeier and Mr. Jung on the fact that NATO and now EU should get... (inaudible), should get involved, more(?) of discussions because two of the nations are member of EU and NATO and one, of course, is our best and strongest ally, that it should be a problem for the population, for instance in case of things falling on the head...

APPATHURAI: (inaudible)...

Q: ...of Europe and people in the name of the American territory, first point. Second point, who should decide, technically, strategically, to use or not use? And third, the discussion with Russia, where is it?
So you answer the technically correct answer, but are you aware of Germany or any other country in Europe, member of NATO, trying to convince NATO... conceal that we should discuss with Russians and we should discuss amongst ourselves of those things, even if it's a bilateral think. I'm not talking about NATO system.

APPATHURAI: Mm, sorry that I didn't quite understand the question, excuse me. There are certainly nations who want to have a discussion of this within NATO. In other words, of the larger questions related to missile defence. Nations have not yet even started a formal discussion of whether or not as 26 they want to (inaudible)... NATO. So we are certainly not there yet, but yes, you're right, of course, some nations have indicated an interest to have a discussion in that context within NATO and we will see where it goes.
I can tell you it is not surprise to you that certainly the Secretary General's very strong belief is that one of NATO's pillars is the principle of indivisibility of security. In other words, that allies should share the same security as 26 and so he believes that a discussion of missile defence, strategic missile defence, is very appropriate within NATO.

On Russia, of course, there are concerns within Russia. We have heard them about these missile defence initiatives. President Putin has made no secret of them, nor have several of his ministers and generals.

I know, for a fact, that the United States has made every effort to be fully transparent with the Russian Federation. It has briefed the Russian Federation regularly on its bilateral discussions on missile defence. I can also be quite sure that NATO has played its part, because in the NATO-Russia Council I believe just last week General Obering, who's the head of the U.S. Missile Defence Agency, briefed all of the participants, including, of course, the Russian Federation on U.S. plans and steps taken.

So there are no secrets. Everything is fully transparent. I think it is quite clear that such a system, as proposed in the discussions the U.S. is holding, poses absolutely no threat either to the Russia Federation or to its deterrent capability. I think anyone who has heard those briefings should be aware of that.

But we clearly need to make every effort to continue to be transparent, as NATO, and I know the United States shares this view, that the United States will continue to make every effort to be transparent as it goes forward with these plans.

I think there's patient people back there, so we'll (inaudible)...

Q: No, I had... just to go back to Afghanistan on a particular issue. You know there is an Italian journalist has been kidnapped by the Taliban?

APPATHURAI: Yes.  

Q: I wanted to ask you if, first of all, if NATO ISAF can help in, first of all, in collecting information on his whereabouts (inaudible)... might have kidnapped exactly, and if NATO can help in freeing him?
APPATHURAI: If NATO can help in?

Q: (inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: I will be frank, I have not been made aware that NATO has been asked to help. I will check that, but I am not for the moment... no one has told me that ISAF has been anyway asked to help on this one.

Q: Missile shield again. How much did NATO know before the U.S. revealed the plans about the missile shield? And now you say the U.S. has been very transparent. Do you know how much they told Russia before they started or made the plans public, the cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic? Thanks.

APPATHURAI: I can tell you that the United States, since I have been in this job, so for many years, three years at least, the U.S. has been regularly briefing all allies on its missile defence discussions. So there have been absolutely no secrets on this issue. I believe, I'm not the U.S. government spokesman, so I don't know exactly what they have said to the Russians, but I am told, and believe, of course, that they have been as transparent with the Russian Federation as they have been with NATO allies. They have nothing to hide, and have been regularly briefing the Russian Federation on this issue.

Q: I have a question on Afghanistan. In Italy and also in Britain there is a debate on how to use the Afghan poppy cultivation to produce something useful like morphine instead of eradicating the crops. So what do you think about that? What can you tell us about that?

APPATHURAI: I'll give you two answers. One is NATO doesn't have a formal view on this. That's the first one. The second point, however, is I've had, and I'm speaking on a personal basis, extensive discussions on this subject, including with UN officials and Afghans.

First point, President Karzai does not want this. And I have heard that from his lips. He does not want the legalization of the opium crop. He believes it is un-Islamic and he wants it eradicated.

Second point, the UN believes that it is an unworkable scheme and the UN has come out very clearly against this idea. In the context of Afghanistan where governance is not strong, where there is not yet an effective police force, not yet an effective system of governance in all parts of the country, and where border control is clearly still an issue, this kind of idea of legalizing the crop and then managing it, is deemed by the UN to be totally unworkable.
And what it will do, by going forward with such an idea, is simply stimulate the illegal crop as much as the legal crop.

Furthermore, and now this is anecdotal, but what you will hear, what UN officials hear when they go into regions where there is poppy cultivation is that this kind of proposal is precisely undermining counternarcotics efforts, because farmers say well, we've heard that next year it might be legal. So it is having a counterproductive effect, even to have this discussion.

Final point. I believe that much of the motivation behind this theory of legalizing the crop is a feeling that the poppy crop cannot effectively be tackled. And therefore we need to look at other solutions. I think that history demonstrates that this is absolutely not the case.

First in countries like Turkey or Thailand it has been tackled, but even in Pakistan, just next door, I was just reading about this, in the 1980s Pakistan was one of the biggest producers of poppy in the world. Nine hundred tonnes per year. By 1997 that was down to 24 tonnes per year, and by 1999 down to two tonnes per year, and that's right next door.

So it is doable. The UN wants it done. Afghanistan... the Afghan government wants it done, and NATO will play its full part in a supporting role.

But, and now I conclude with my long speech, eradication is only one element of an eight pillar counternarcotics plan. All of those elements have to be put into place for it to be effective. Which means, and here we come back to what NATO has called the comprehensive strategy, it has to be a comprehensive approach. With the Afghan government in the lead, but with international bodies fully playing their part in creating alternative livelihoods, in helping to build an effective police force, in helping to build a jail system to put in those people who are arrested for committing this crime, to ensure that the judiciary functions and is non-corrupt.

I could go on... I can't remember all eight elements, but you're getting a picture of all the pieces that have to be put into place. Border control, also a very important issue.

All this to say, while NATO has no position I can tell you my position, but certainly the UN position and the Afghan government position is this is not a good idea.

I'll stop with my speech. We'll go all the way to the back and then we'll come back up.

Q: Thank you. I'd like to come back to the issue of the Italian journalist, please.

APPATHURAI: Yes.

Q: To your knowledge is there any examples you can give us, as in the past were there other journalists that have been kidnapped in the same region and there's been initiatives by NATO to help to look for the journalist or what has NATO done in the past?

Secondly, give the deterioration of the situation which this case has proved, I'd like to know if it's feasible to think of a sort of advice by NATO against... to journalists against travelling to Afghanistan now?

APPATHURAI: Good questions. I will have to look up an answer. I will have to do research on the first one. I have a dim memory that, in fact, NATO has played a supporting role to the Afghan authorities when at least one individual, and I don't know if it was a journalist, was abducted. Supporting role. But I will have to go and confirm that. I'm sorry that I just don't have it off the top of my head.

In terms of the safety of individuals in Afghanistan, NATO of course cannot provide guarantees to anyone, including those journalists who are embedded with ISAF forces. But we do have a program or we NATO nations have a program of embedding journalists. That doesn't necessarily always translate into more security because, of course, that means they deploy with our forces eventually into combat areas.

But certainly I believe journalists do make contact with their national authorities when they're in government and that's what happened here. NATO worked very closely with any journalists which wishes to work with them, but I do not know if NATO has issued any kind of security guidelines for journalists who are working outside of the NATO context. Again, I will have to go and check with ISAF.

The easiest thing might be to just call ISAF directly for both questions, because I think they probably have better answers than I do. I think Mark's been waiting and we'll come back.

Q: So I just wanted to go back to your point about the Tony Blair initiative on the Afghan troops. My understanding of the force generation process in NATO is it's essentially SACEUR and his commanders on the ground who lead that and have an oversight of to what extent the CJSOR is achieved and so on.

APPATHURAI: Yes.

Q: Is it therefore not actually a bit counterproductive when you have one ally who's making personal appeals for other allies to come forward with troops and not only doing that, but actually doing it outside of a NATO framework?

APPATHURAI: Well, I don't believe so. The Supreme Allied Commander engages with his military counterparts in capitals to set out the requirements and indeed to appeal for contributions, but in the end these are always political decisions. It is up to Heads of State and Government in every country to decide whether or not troops are deployed. If Prime Minister Blair wishes, as he indicates that he may, wishes to raise this issue with his counterparts, of course it is ultimately his authority and his decision. It is ultimately their authority and their decision to deploy forces, and I can tell you, having been at a number of summits and ministerial meetings, it is, of course, a regular subject of discussion, the force generation issue.
So if Prime Minister Blair wishes to raise it, that's not only his prerogative, but I think it's perfectly appropriate.  

Q: Some questions on missile defence. You said about indivisibility of European defence, but as I know there are three or four projects already of antimissile defence. It is American one, strategic one, then theatre defence system of NATO. And theatre defence system NATO-Russia. It was a very, very successful project, this I know. Is there a link between them, and how it is... does it exist? And then this theatre defence project with Russia, is it going on or it stop somehow, because in this plan for year 2007 I don't know if it is included.

And one more question. You said about briefings, so the Americans brief Russians and NATO allies on their system. Do you expect consultations? Instead of briefings? And not on political level because ambassadors and ministers does not understand anything.
(LAUGHTER)

APPATHURAI: I so won't repeat that sentence.

Q: (inaudible)...by Russian ambassador (inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: I saw it.  In terms of the indivisibility of security that, of course, is a key principle and Article 5 is really the foundation for that, regardless of whatever systems or forces are deployed. It's a political commitment more than anything else.

But in terms of these different systems you will know and I'll give you an example, which is the U.S. example, there are multiple layers, literally almost  in terms of height to an effective missile defence system, from theatre missile defence to area missile defence, to strategic missile defence, all of which can act individually or can be integrated if the technical capabilities or arrangements are made into a multilayered system.

So the idea of having different systems, meaning you have totally different levels of security, it doesn't necessarily go together. On the contrary.
The NATO-Russia theatre missile defence project continues, to my knowledge. Is it moving as fast as NATO or Russia would like, I'm not sure. But my understanding is these discussions do continue and will continue.
In terms of briefings, well, maybe briefing was only half the story. A briefing is followed by consultations. In other words, first there is a presentation of what U.S. thinking is, and I'll speak only for the North Atlantic Council, or for the NRC, and then of course, the floor is open to consultations.
Have those taken place at the technical level I have to say I am not aware. I have seen them only at the political level, but that's with me present, so that means no technical knowledge.

Q: Bearing in mind normal coalition practice, it should be very sort of say strong reasons for United States to start their missile defence system, not within NATO framework, and when I asked General Obering what are those reasons, his answer was very simple. It will slow down everything if started within NATO. So it's... on the one hand we have this... the anxiety to make it quick. On the other, well, this balancing the political situation in Europe. Do you think it's really worth speeding up and well, to have troubles with Russia?

APPATHURAI: It is not for me to pronounce on the U.S....

Q: No, it's not for commenting. For just what do you think?
(LAUGHTER)

Q: What is the reason... what is the real reason not to do it within the Alliance?

APPATHURAI: That is for you to discuss with the United States authorities. They have had their own missile defence program for many years, for their national reasons. And that is exactly what they are pursuing now. I might add, of course, that having defence arrangements outside of the NATO framework is totally normal. I speak as a Canadian, for example. We have a very profound set of defence arrangements with the United States, air, land and sea, which are not in the NATO context. And have no place in the NATO context.

So I... and the same is true for all NATO countries in a variety of constellations. So I would not see this as abnormal that the U.S. has bilateral relations with, or security relations on specific projects with NATO allies, or with others like the Japanese.

Q: (inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: Yes, please.

Q: But General Obering told that the main purpose of the system is to defend friends and allies in Europe. Well, it's again natural to defend friends and allies together with them in a...

APPATHURAI: Again, I will defer you to the U.S. authorities to ask for clarifications on what U.S. generals say.

Q: I have two questions about Afghanistan. The first one is, is Operation Achilles directly linked to Musa Qala and the second one is about do you hear anything about a deal made between Pakistan and the Taliban leader Mullah Obaidullah.

APPATHURAI: In the first case not specifically. Operation Achilles has a specific purpose. The situation with Musa Qala is being dealt with on its own merits. And no, I haven't heard anything about that. I've seen one press report, but I don't know anything more about it.

Q: The framework agreement you signed today with the Japanese side, is it something like a base for Japan and NATO to work jointly on certain project in Afghanistan or is something else?

APPATHURAI: The idea is, and I want to be very careful here, because I know that there's very specific language and to be frank, I don't want to get out of it, outside of it.
It is a framework through which Japan and NATO can work more closely together when it comes to our work, and I mean separate work, but possibly with elements of support for humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. That is the idea. It sets out specific modalities. I don't know what those are... well, I have an idea, but they have to be defined and then made public by the Japanese authorities. So I'll be careful now not to go any further because this is delicate language and I'm not party to the discussion. Excuse me, but that's as far as I can go.
Yes.

Q: Something similar to that, you mentioned about synergy...
APPATHURAI: Yes.

Q: And I checked my dictionary. It doesn't say very much.
APPATHURAI: It's a well-chosen word.

Q: And is that synergy with military part of PRT or only civilian part of PRTs?
APPATHURAI: My belief, now I'm speaking on a personal basis, is this relates specifically to civilian. Civilian humanitarian efforts. That is my understanding.

Q: Back to Afghanistan this time. Did you say at the beginning that the works of the road will be a couple of years?

APPATHURAI: No, the whole (inaudible)... couple of years. That means the road, installation of the turbine and getting it going.

Q: Okay. But at least that means that the Afghans will need two more years to wait for the benefits of the whole operation.

APPATHURAI: Yes. Yes. Yes.

Q: Okay. And how long will this ... Medusa lasted for a couple of weeks in mid-September. Will be these more or less a couple of weeks and after that we'll move in somewhere else or...

Q: (inaudible)... the beginning of more operations?

APPATHURAI: There will be, I have no doubt, operations throughout the country throughout the year, and there are quite specific plans about that.

Q: (inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: Yes, significant operations. This particular one has no end date on it. It is designed to create the necessary conditions. When those conditions are met then the operation can...