Press briefing

JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman): Great to see you. We have our usual pre-ministerial briefing and we have the privilege for the second time, I think it is... 

JIŘI ŠEDIVÝ (Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning): Second, yes.

APPATHURAI: ...to have Ambassador Šedivý, who is the Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Policy and is the mastermind of the ministerial, or this ministerial anyway.

So let me, without further ado, hand the floor over to him. I think we will do it on background. Background. Senior NATO official.

ŠEDIVÝ: Thank you. Thank you very much, James, and good afternoon. Still don't know whether friends or colleagues, we'll see.

APPATHURAI: (Laughs).

ŠEDIVÝ: But anyway, a great pleasure to brief you. I think it's a little bit too strong to speaking about me as... about a mastermind. We are in the hands of nations and we are just serving the nations, and I would like to lead you briefly through the sequence of meetings and then we will have time for your questions, and perhaps even some of my answers.

So I would like to touch upon the key issues that I expect Ministers are going to address in the series of meetings, because it's not just a defence ministerial meeting, it's a meeting consisting of a series of meetings in various formats.

And you will recall that this event takes place once a year, usually in June, and that the meetings are formal ones; formal ones with decisions to be taken in a number of areas. And let me also stress that this will be the first ministerial meeting since the Bucharest Summit and it will therefore be, I believe, a good opportunity to review progress on the decisions taken at Bucharest by Heads of State and Government concerning our operations, in particular Afghanistan and Kosovo and the Alliance's defence transformation agenda.

And last, but not least, this will also be the first of a series of meetings leading to the 2009 summit, meetings of ministerial defence, ministerial meetings between Budapest Summit... sorry Bucharest Summit and Strasbourg-Kehl Summit. It should be also therefore seen in conjunction with the subsequent meetings as building blocks towards the summit.

So the Defence Ministers meetings will start tomorrow afternoon with a meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group at 25, because France does not participate, and Ministers will have the opportunity to exchange views on the status of nuclear forces and relevant training exercises, undertake consultations in the area of nuclear policy and also reflect on the developing nature of deterrents in the 21st Century.

And the same format, 25 Ministers, will then meet in the Defence Planning Committee format which brings together the allies who participate in NATO's force planning process, and Ministers are expected to approve the 2008 NATO force goals, comprehensive report.

Now following these meetings Ministers will meet with non-NATO nations contributing to KFOR and this will be an important, and I believe also, a timely session to address issues of common concern only a few days ahead of the entry into force of the constitution in Pristina next Monday. And I expect Ministers to reiterate NATO's long-term commitment to peace and security in Kosovo and, indeed, exchange views on how to ensure that KFOR continues to bring security and stability to Kosovo over this sensitive and, indeed, challenging period.

And in this regard they will surely discuss the way forward for the international community as such.

Now, tomorrow evening, allied Ministers will have a working dinner during which they will discuss Afghanistan and Kosovo. As for Kosovo they are expected to assess the latest developments on the ground and examine the challenges that lie ahead in the coming weeks, particularly regarding the uncertainty surrounding the international police presence and specifically the impact that this will have on KFOR.

On Afghanistan the meeting will be an occasion for Ministers to review decisions taken in Bucharest, in particular the implementation of the comprehensive strategic political-military plan. And also I expect Ministers to focus on the need to ensure that ISAF has the right capabilities and the flexibility to use them to meet the current challenging situation on the ground.

And I also expect them to discuss the need for continued support to the Afghan National Security Forces and for the coordination of international efforts.

On Friday morning Ministers will start the day with a meeting to take up the issue of defence transformation and there will be a number of practical issues. It will be, I think, the longest meeting, two hours discussion, on and about a number of practical issues, and I would mention current security changes, indeed, and emerging threats and I believe that, more concretely, Ministers will assess efforts to improve strategic and intra-theatre lift and especially mission capability helicopters.

They will review the implementation of the NATO Response Force concept and they are expected to provide further impetus to the development of the Alliance ground surveillance system.

Then Ministers will gather with their Russian colleague, Minister Serdyukov, for a formal meeting of the NATO-Russia Council and in the NATO-Russia Council the Defence Ministers will have an opportunity to talk about defence and military cooperation, including continuing cooperation in Afghanistan and Russia's support to Operation Active Endeavour, as well as international security issues.

And I also expect frank discussion on some critical issues such as missile defence, CFE, or the Balkans.

And finally, Ministers will have a session of the NATO-Ukraine Commission which will be an opportunity to focus on the development of NATO-Ukraine defence and security relations in the period of intensive engagement, as it was defined in Bucharest, or launched in Bucharest, and indeed, they will review ongoing Ukrainian support for NATO operations.

So it's, I believe, quite a busy agenda ahead of Ministers. Six meetings in total, and a number of important issues to be addressed. And this by way of background and now I'm ready to answer your questions.

APPATHURAI: Identify yourselves. Thanks.

Q:(Inaudible)... could you tell us something more on the missile defence, what exactly will be discussed and what can we expect actually? Thank you very much.

ŠEDIVÝ: Okay, are we going to call it more or one by one?

APPATHURAI: Let's do it one by one.

ŠEDIVÝ: One by one. Okay, missile defence. First of all, we are two months after Bucharest, so there will be... we should not expect any decision to be made on this issue. And I believe that the Ministers will be informed about the expected technical and political, military works that are now being done based on the Bucharest Summit decisions, or language. And indeed, they will be also presented with a sort of a road map of activities between now and the next summit, next year's summit in April 2009, where, according to the Bucharest communiqué the options for possible bolting on between the third pillar of the U.S. system and NATO, NATO's own system, should be reviewed before any further political decision. So no big decision expected.

APPATHURAI: Chris.

Q:Chris Dickson, European Diplomacy Defence. My first question was just that there's something I missed there. Just after talking about the strategic lift you said there was going to be the review of the concept of the... sorry, I missed what you said.

APPATHURAI: Strategic lift...

Q:Strategic lift and then straight after that you said on one of the... oh sorry, NRF.

My other question is about Macedonia. I was wondering what the prospects of Macedonia are if they miss... if they don't resolve the name issue in time for the ratification of the amended treaty to include the other two? Does that mean that the timetable is going to be pushed way into the future, or is there any thought being given to that?

I can't... I find it difficult to imagine the whole process being relaunched just for the one country afterward.

ŠEDIVÝ: As far as I know I'm sure this question is not being... or at least not addressed in the expected agenda. But indeed may come up. And here again, I would refer to what was agreed in Bucharest. So it's now bilateral issue between the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Greece and indeed, we can imagine that if we don't have... if they don't have agreement that it could have impact on further schedule. But...

APPATHURAI: Did you have a follow-up...

Q:Concerning the strategic air lift do you expect some progress concerning the C-17 issue?

ŠEDIVÝ: Actually we are now in a final, I would say, phase when there will be a next step done in terms of a Memorandum of Understanding. Not at the meeting, not at the meeting, but indeed it will be discussed and it will be a review of where we stand. Concerning the air lift issues, perhaps more substantive debate will be now about helicopters because we are delivering quite a substantive review of tasks concerning the helicopter initiative.

Q:When do you expect the formal decision to launch the acquisition of C-17s and with how many countries?

ŠEDIVÝ: I mean, we expect that we can have further development or further steps around this summer perhaps.

Q:À propos des C-17 justement, j'ai lu dans la presse spécialisée que l'OTAN avait déjà "earmark", je crois que c'est comme ça qu'on dit, 700 millions de dollars pour l'achat de deux C-17.  Donc, il semble que ça soit beaucoup plus avancé que vous ne le disiez.  Où est-ce que c'est par pure précaution?

Et la deuxième question, ça porte sur la Turquie.  Est-ce que vous pouvez nous en dire un peu plus sur les difficultés actuelles au Kosovo en raison du différend entre la Turquie et certains pays au sein de l'OTAN et l'Union européenne? Qu'est-ce que ça a comme conséquence pratique aujourd'hui?  Qu'est-ce que ça peut avoir comme conséquence à terme?  Et en Afghanistan, apparemment, la question se pose aussi, en principe, mais dans les faits ne semble pas avoir les mêmes conséquences.  Pourriez-vous nous expliquer la différence entre l'Afghanistan et le Kosovo sur le terrain?

ŠEDIVÝ: Okay, so on C-17, again, I can hardly add anything more than I have just done. We are... we will have... there will be a base in Hungary and so on and so forth, so the development more or less as expected.

Concerning Turkey the question exactly was...

APPATHURAI: Tu peux répéter la question, s'il te plaît?

Q:La Turquie, la question c'était: "Jusqu'à quel point ça peut affecter effectivement les opérations de l'OTAN ou la coordination entre l'OTAN et d'autres choses, d'autres forces?  Et quelle est la différence dans ce domaine entre ce qui va se passer au Kosovo et ce qui se passe déjà en Afghanistan?  C'est-à-dire qu'apparemment en Afghanistan, les commandants locaux de l'OTAN passent un accord avec la force de police de l'Union européenne, région par région, pour régler le problème, c'est-à-dire comme vous savez mieux que moi, en cas d'urgence, d'attaque, l'OTAN ne va pas laisser massacrer les policiers de l'Union européenne sans réagir en principe.  En même temps, ceci... ceci est un problème politique parce qu'il n'y a pas d'accord et que même on dit de sources américaines qu'on ne veut pas entendre parler de ce problème.  Donc, je veux savoir concrètement ce qui va être... ce qui est discuté sur ce qui se passe en Afghanistan.  Et quelle est la différence entre ce qui se passe sur le terrain en Afghanistan avec région par région des accords et le Kosovo?  Pourquoi, est-ce qu'au Kosovo, on ne peut pas faire la même chose pour contourner, si je peux me permettre, l'obstacle?

ŠEDIVÝ: I'm very sorry, but I can't tell you concretely what will be discussed. It depends on the Defence Ministers first. Second remark, I wouldn't narrow down the whole situation just, you know, pointing out Turkey. It's more complex and pointing out to Turkey as the main source of certain difficulties, I mean, that would not be fair.

Concerning situation in Kosovo, we are there. We are there with a robust military presence. We have our mandate. We are deployed throughout the whole territory of Kosovo , KFOR acts impartial manner and I think that for the moment that's all I can say.

And again, the question concerning Afghanistan, I think it's perhaps a little bit too much overstated. I really do not know exactly what to answer to that question. I don't know whether James here...

APPATHURAI: Our approach is quite clear. NATO, you heard me say this before, will not offer any less support and protection to European officials than the Alliance would to any other representatives of the international community in Afghanistan. And you're quite right. I don't know if it's region by region, but certainly nations have established relationships as necessary with European officials in Afghanistan to provide for their protection. And as Jiři has quite rightly pointed out, let us not put the cart before the horse when it comes to Kosovo. The Ambassadors and the Ministers are discussing and will discuss exactly the arrangements for NATO, including its relations with other international organizations beyond the 15th of June in the coming days.

I think Paul was next, then Mark.

Q:Yes, Paul Ames for the Associated Press. First of all, I was a little bit surprised when you were going through the issues which are going to be raised with the Russian Minister, that you didn't mention Georgia, given that the Secretary General has himself raised concerns about this quite forcefully several times.

Do you expect the Secretary General to raise this issue and in what terms do you think he's going to be putting forward his concerns there?

And on Afghanistan do you expect any concrete decision, do you expect any concrete discussion on which NATO members are going to be replacing the U.S. marines who are due to come out towards the end of the year?

ŠEDIVÝ: Okay, on the second question, I believe there will be discussion about that, but again, I can't prejudge that discussion. And on the question of Georgia, I believe that it will be definitely raised within the NATO-Russia Council by Russia, by Russia itself, and I'm not aware actually whether Secretary General himself intends to open that issue.

APPATHURAI: I don't know whether he intends to open it, but the context is slightly different in the NRC, let's be clear. He's the NRC chairman. He's the chairman of the 27, not the NATO Secretary General stricto senso in that context, so he... at most he would put it on the table, but as Jiři said I'll be very, very surprised if it were not to come up, certainly from more than one nation.

ŠEDIVÝ: We can expect that it will be in the list of issues that Russia will put on the table.

APPATHURAI: Mark from Reuters.

ŠEDIVÝ: Yes.

Q:Mark John from Reuters. You mentioned the uncertainty of the International Police mission in Kosovo and the possible impact on the NATO KFOR. Is there already a discussion in the Alliance about contingency planning in case this uncertainty continues? Or do you expect discussion about various plans, actions, that KFOR should be taking if this uncertainty remains?

And the second is just a follow up really to Pascal's question. Could you therefore give us an update of where the discussions are on the revised OPLAN for KFOR and the new tasks it wants to take on? Is it... is there a deal on that? If not, what are the sticking points?

ŠEDIVÝ: Okay, on KFOR, OPLAN discussions are going on and as they are going on it would not be appropriate to tell you anything more about that. Not to speak about some of the outstanding issues. And on the first part of your questions, again, I can only repeat what I said before when we touched on our presence in Kosovo and the situation in Kosovo is such we simply have our mandate, we have robust presence there and the command of soldiers. The troops, they know what's to do, so that's all I can tell you at this moment.

APPATHURAI: Maybe to Chris and then Brooks.

Q:Chris Dickson from EDD. It's a follow-up to Mark's question really on Kosovo and on the contingency planning.

If I could just ask a bit more precisely, is NATO involved in the discussions between the UN and the EU at all? I mean,%ScriptVersionEditor=6.147