Press briefing

Moderator: You are listening to General Carter who commands RC South and who, as you know, is focussed on operations in Kandahar. And I think afterwards there will be some questions or opportunities for questions. But without further ado, General Carter, I think you have an opening statement you wish to make. And then I'll help you with the Q & A afterwards. Does that sound all right to you?

Major General Nick Carter (Commander of ISAF Forces in Southern Afghanistan): There, that sounds fine. And I'll start talking. I have what you call a copy of a graphic which shows the map of the region around of Kandahar and gives a sense of what's going on, which I'll talk in a minute.

What I have, upfront, is give people a sense of how RC South looks now But you've been aware of how the RC South split away from RC South West in the middle of June.

And RC South is therefore now in an area which connects to a route to (the provinces of) Uruzgan, Daykundi, Zabul and Kandahar. And in terms of those nations which are represent in RC South it's about Americans, Brits, Canadians, and a Dutch force which is in the process of recovering much of its assets from Uruzgan after a very successful mission in the last three or four years. And if you get a map, there are Romanians in Zabul, working with the Americans, in that Province. And of course, you've got Slovakians, French and Belgians (Kandahar Airfield). So it's still a very representation of the principal NATO nations.

Now, in terms of RC South, there is probably a total of about 25 to 28 thousand troops at the moment which is about the same size as RC South West in terms of commander and control.

Now, …in terms of what's going on in Kandahar and the operation that effectively commenced in Kandahar back in April this year. I think it's probably a bit of a surprise after the operation we did in Helmand in the first couple of months of this year, that there has not been some sort of great iconic aviation assault operation, or one of those things that characterized the operation in Central Helmand. And the reason for that of course is that Kandahar is a very different problem set to that to which we found when we were responsible for Central Helmand.

I mean... the problem set... requires a deliberate counterinsurgency operation which is now about on since April. It is a deliberate counterinsurgency operation also because we're dealing with a much larger area, where in Central Helmand the operation was about a population of about 200,000. And the focus of that was on one district, which is now of course divided into two. Kandahar is about a city of between 500,000 and 800,000 people and about rural districts around the city which have populations of around 400,000. So it is a much bigger problem, a larger municipal area and four rural districts.

Now, keep focus on the map. I'll give a sense of the things that really matter. I'm saying what characterizes Kandahar, of course, other than the city itself is the fact that it sits on the confluents of two or three very important roads.

And the road that runs east-west through the diagram is Highway 1 which of course is the Afghanistan Ring Road in the map where it connects Kandahar with Helmand. The other road that matters is the one that runs south of Kandahar, towards the Chaman border-crossing, not marked on the map that you have in front of you, Highway 4. And that makes Kandahar into a very important economic part. It's a also historically the cultural capital if you like of the Pashtun part of Afghanistan. And therefore it occupies a very important place in their views and ideas.

The other thing that's relevant on the map is the river Arghandab which flows from the northeast side of the diagram through the western side of the diagram. The Arghandab is a big river. It's a river that runs throughout the year. And it's a river that has had a good deal investment in it since the 1940s where (INAUDIBLE) authority fixed major irrigations projects out of it. They constructed the Dahla Dam just off the diagram to the northeast. And they constructed a series of canal systems which have provided the city with water and it irrigates the District of Arghandab which you can see on the top right hand side of the map there and to a lesser degree the districts of Zhari and Panjwaye.

Now, it's been told that because you have water you have irrigation. It means that people could live and have livelihoods. And that is why the Kandahar City all year round is densely populated in much the same way as Central Helmand which is densely because of the rural area and the rural irrigation projects there.

Now, the problem itself... It's again a complicated problem not because of the city itself. Superficially, it's very secure. The problems, I think, are characterized by the clashes in the 1990s. It's a problem of thugs, of mafias, or gang lords or patronage networks and systems and of course of people having to pay charges for what they want in a system that is frankly not one that we would like to think.

Now, the problem with all of that is that it creates an environment in which the insurgency can flourish. And the first drop that we've had in terms of Kandahar and the operations around it has been to improve the security situation in the city. And that involves the construction of a good deal of security infrastructure And around the city, there are around 11 or 12 security stations which cover theses functions. The first one is to act as a filter to prevent Taliban from entering the center of the city. but also to act as a station from which combined patrols of Afghan National Civil Order Police, together with a US infantry battalion can operate in and around the community. Because clearly, if you block the roads, you'll find the insurgency trying to work its way around it. And it's also important that in those areas immediately around the city, the population feels protected, and working in support of the government.

In that... in the city itself what has been constructed at the moment are 17 police substations. And each of those police substations will have US military policemen partnered with freshly-trained Afghan uniformed police. And the task of the military policemen will be to get the Afghan uniformed police to work in support of the population. And the key area they will focus on is getting processes right; such as registration to be improved. Because at the moment, what you won’t find in Kandahar city is a process of vehicle registration; or registration of madrases and seminaries, throughout to security companies and weapons and all sorts of things that we would take for granted in our societies.

So in conjunction with the policeman, that is what they are working to achieve. The critical tool here is governance. And of course, you can't get genuine stability unless you get security and governance working in parallel.

And interestingly, the population of the city has not had a representation in government since 1978 which was the last time there were community councils or "Shuras" of any sort. So what is happening with a number of US civilians who were deployed in 10 municipal districts in the city is that we are working to try build representative Shuras from the bottom up. And each of the Afghan subdistrict managers who are responsible for the 10 municipal districts, are working out of an an office with the US civilians in support. In parallel, the police force of working to build these representative structures. And all of that sits under the municipal plan where the mayor is above it. And he is also responsible for supervising the subdistrict manager and all that happens within the city.

Another key part of this of course is to begin to get some productive capacity in the city. And therefore, we're looking to see how we can improve the electrical distribution system and the amount of megawatts that should go to the city. And plans look great to see if we can double the amount of electricity over the course of the next six to nine months. And that will have a significant impact. Because over the last two years, about 800 businesses had to close around Kandahar. And of course if you haven't got employment you can't have productive capacity, say, you begin to drive people to idleness and potentially, therefore, the insurgency. So it is important that all of that happens in tandem.

Now, outside the city in Arghandab and also in the districts of Zhari and Panjwa’i shown in your diagram, there is still a rural insurgency which is resilient and needs to be dealt with.

And the second phase of operations around Kandahar involved the clearance of the District of Arghandab. And that operation is still underway. It started towards the end of July. And interestingly again, from your perspective, this is now being very much led by the Afghans. Because of course what we are trying to do as we conduct these operations is gradually to transition them to an Afghan lead. And therefore all of the orders and the planning for operations in Arghandab were led by the Afghans with NATO forces in support. And so far, that's been reasonably successful. But we haven't yet finished operations in Arghandab. Like in (audible) Central Helmand where the hold phase comes after you conducted a clearing operation.

It's also the case that the political dynamics in Arghandab are difficult. And you recall that one of the key, the iconic tribal leader of the Alokozai tribe who was assassinated in 2007 allowed the tribes really to dissipate and to break up and fracture. In a good sense, it's been very difficult given the Alokozai makeup of in the District of Arghandab to put together a cohesive grouping.

What's going to happen is that we have to get the politics squared alongside with the security situation so we can lead to all of the population genuinely having freedom of movement and from the District Governour who sits in the district centre to be able to reach out to the population and connect the Afghan government to the population as a whole.

And we are kind of distance away from that being the case in all of the Arghandab. And that remains the objective of what we wish to achieve during the course of the “hold” phase with the operation over the next two or three months. Now, the third phase of what will happen around Kandahar will be the clearance of the insurgency throughout those areas of Zhari and Panjwa’i which are at the moment contested.

And if you look up at the diagram, a few more attention earlier to Highway 1 which runs east west across the diagram. And aside of Highway 1, in a triangle formed between the Highway 1 and the river Arghandab we have a significant challenge where we properly will see between 500 and 800 insurgents who are operating with a degree of freedom against Highway 1.

And one of our prime objectives is to ensure freedom of movements on Highway 1 at the same time as protecting the population in the key population centres which are strung out along Highway 1. And we are talking about the village of Senjaray in the centre of the diagram; the village of Pashmul just above of that, and not shown on the map is the Hi-Nee-Madazh (?) which is just of Sangsar. Now, it is also the case, that the insurgency is alive and well in what's called the Horn of Panjwa’i. And that is a triangle formed by the river Arghistan in the South and the river Arghandab just north of it. In that area there are a number of insurgents. And then again, there's a degree of freedom of action. And the challenge that we have in the next few months will be to clear the insurgency from there as well and to genuinely provide protection to the population.

This, again, will be operation that will be very much an Afghan operation. And it will interest you to know I'm sure that around 10 ANA kandaks will be involved in this operation. And between two and three Afghan brigades will be involved in it. And it is our intention to have them at the forefront of the fight and the leadership of all of it and begin a process of getting them to take ownership of what's happening here. And of course, the greater part of that is that they understand the problem there in a way that foreigners probably can really understand the problems there.

Now, I'll start to be going to the timing of all of it. Suffice, I can say, it will happen at some stage in the next two or three months. But our expectation is to fight mid to the end of November that we hope will rid the Taliban or rid those areas very much of the Taliban (inaudible) on the space on the diagram there.
I think probably that's enough. And I'm happy to take questions on the total dynamics associated with Kandahar as a whole because people will be entirely familiar with the parallel structures that are here in the moment.

(INAUDIBLE)... In terms of the nature of the operations, and the timelines associated with them and whose involved and the key objectives we want to get from it I'm setting them out for you. And I'm very happy to you speak during the course of the next 15 minutes or so. That's offered... from me over to you.

Moderator: General Carter thanks very much for that. And I appreciate you taking the time to walk us through that. I think it's important. I would ask that the journalist asking the questions clearly state your name and agency so that the general can understand. And we'll take the question at the back.

Q: Hello, Klaus Eking (?) speaking from German Financial Times. Two questions: one for a favour. Could you go a little bit closer to the microphone please, because it's very difficult to understand for non-native speaker just like me? And the second question could you elaborate a little bit on the significance of the Ring Road thanks?

Gen. Nick Carter: Yes, the Ring Road, it's very important because of course it connects the key population centres. And by that, I mean Kabul, Kandahar, Lashkar Gahr up to Farah,, Herat, across to Mazar-e Sharif and then it goes to Kunduz. And those population centres needs to have to ability for governance and trade to live between them. And therefore freedom of movement on the Ring Road or Highway 1 has always been an important objective of ISAF through the last four or five years. And that of course is important in RC South as well. But much of our logistics move on it. But importantly, the Afghan economy moves on it. And as a manner, its economy is more about around Kandahar. It's predominantly an economy that is driven by the growing of fruits, grapes, pomegranates, apricots, peaches, that sort of things. At the moment, it's very difficult for the average Afghan to get any of these produce from a market or to a market because of the lack of freedom on the key highways. And that is really why it is important. Over.

Moderator: Second row.

Q: Ben Nimmo from the German Press Agency, DPA. General, looking at the larger context, the map that you've shown us is a fairly small snapshot of one part of Afghanistan. But clearly, it's an important part of the insurgency. Could give us some impression of how important a part of the insurgency is this? And also in the sense as... if you do manage to clear this area by say mid to late November how many more areas are you going to have to go into with this intensity and this scale before you can actually say: "OK, Afghanistan as a whole is now empty of really, really large Taliban hot spots." Thank you.

Gen. Nick Carter: In terms of the wider context, and that's really a question that you need to address to those based in Kabul, in my chain of command, I mean, it's suffice to say that Commander IJC (Integrated Joint Command) has designed the operation that's upcoming in Kandahar as the main effort. I think that probably gives you a sense of how important he would regard the operation.

In terms of what happens hereafter and what it means for the campaign in South, I said at the beginning of my remarks how important Kandahar as a province and as city is to the Pashtuns, particularly in the South. And it's also of great importance to the Taliban, because if you go back in history it was in the district of Zhari which I've been talking about where Mullah Omar metaphorically put his flag up back in the early 1990s. And that's why they probably will fight for the district of Zhari, Panjwa’i and the areas around Kandahar. And indeed they are fighting for the areas around Kandahar as I speak.

Now, what happens after this? It's for others to judge. But in terms of the timeframe that we've set ourselves and we've now being running this operation since the beginning of November last year. It's always been our intention to focus our efforts on the key population centres. And when you're talking about Southern Afghanistan the two key population centres are the Central Helmand Valley around Lashkar Gahr which three quarters of a million of people live and of course here in Kandahar with a city and its immediate rural entrance around one... to 1.1 million people live.

In terms of the overall population of the South, that represents about two thirds of it. And in population-centric counterinsurgency terms, I think if you could genuinely protect two thirds of the population and get that two third of the population connected to its government and get those people therefore positive about their government and negative about the insurgency, then you'll get to go a very long way to a successful outcome. Over.

Q: Yes, General, David Brunnstrom from Reuters, the operation you're talking about with the aim of clearing insurgents out by November in Zhari and Panjwaye you talked about involvement of... what two to three Afghan brigades. How heavily involved will the international force be in that?

Gen. Nick Carter: You'll be aware that we have a policy of what's called "embedded partnering". And the idea of "embedded partnering" is first of all it's not an end in itself, it's the means to an end. And that end is to “transition” functions and specifically military functions to the Afghan National Army.

To that end, coalition forces will be involved in this operation in the context of "embedded partnering". It much depends upon the level, whether it's brigades, battalion or company level, the extent to which that involvement is there.

And much of which of course depends upon the nature of the threat against which people are going up against. So in some areas, the coalition forces will be very closely involved. And in other areas it will be less directly involved, depending upon the nature of the threat and the conditions they fight on the ground.

Where the coalition will have to be closely involved though is with the so-called "enablers" to use a military term. So when we're talking about clearance of IEDs, improvised explosive devices; when we're talking Medevac or Casevac; when we're talking about some logistic support; and of course when we're talking about air and aviation; and I would guess for some time to come it will be necessary for the coalition to provide those "enablers" for the Afghans. Over.

Q: Slobo Lekic from the Associated Press. Can you tell us how many international troops are.... will be deployed in this operation? How many Afghan National Army and National Police will take part? And also what's your estimate of the total number of Taliban guerillas in this area around Kandahar?

Gen. Nick Carter: First of all, in terms of the Afghan National Army, you'll be talking at about between 10 and 12 thousand ANA deployed in the operations as a whole around Kandahar.

And of course, I'm talking about what you see on the diagram, essentially, we're not just talking about Zhari and Panjwaye, it's all of Kandahar, Greater Kandahar if you like.

In terms of policemen, we're talking about between five, actually 5,000, it's a good enough rule-of-thumb. And in terms of coalition soldiers we're around 15,000 based around Kandahar at the moment.

In terms of the number of insurgents that we expect to see, I would describe in Zhari and Panjwaye that it's been between 500 to 800... Again rough rule of thumb. Because of course, you have to be careful. It's about who you define as an insurgent and what their motivations are. But in terms of trying to find the Taliban fighters that probably good enough for government work.

Elsewhere in the region, you can probably talk about 100 here or there. It's all sorts of numbers. Now, I suspect you'd be asking me: "Why is this that we need great many forces to deal with what appears to be superficially a quite small amount of opposition?

The reality all of it, of course, is you remember that Washington was disrupted completely by one sniper for four days. The insurgents have the capacity to operate on what the military calls “interior lines”. And it's for that reason that you need to be able to dominate the population and dominate the ground to achieve the freedom of movement that I described earlier as necessary for the political solutions to be found. Over.

Moderator: Any other questions? General, I have a question from a journalist that wanted to be here but was unable. Her name is Linda Hayword.... Haywood excuse me. She's the editor of the Global Herald. And her question relates to some reporting about Taliban activities in the North. Now, I realize and I'm sure she realizes that you're commanding forces in RC South. But her question is posed to you. Do you believe that given the activities and the operations that you're conducting, do you believe that the recent spread of Taliban activities to the North is a sign of desperation or perhaps Taliban leaving your area to go elsewhere in Afghanistan which some media have suggested? Over.

Gen. Nick Carter: Very honestly, I've no idea because I'm only competent to talk about what's going on in RC South. I mean, It would be a nice thought if were being so effective in RC South, that we'd be pushing the insurgency elsewhere. But I think there's no any evidence to confirm that or the other. Over.

Moderator: General if I may, just for our own education, we read today in the New York Times a piece that talks about the difference or the threat to the future of Afghanistan between the one posed by the insurgency and the one posed by corruption.

When it comes to Kandahar, would you... would you give your views on what you feel the threat of corruption means to the people of Kandahar? How important is that in terms of the threat that the insurgency poses on the people of that province? Over.

Gen. Nick Carter: Yes, this is a complicated subject. And it's one that one could talk for several hours on that. And I'll also try be brief as possible. I think the first point I'd make... it's that... in Afghanistan, that Clausewitz’s diction that war is an extension of politics by other means is of course reversed. In Afghanistan, politics is an extension of war by other means.

And when you talk about these. (inaudible) and you talk about corruption they are feature of the political system that currently prevails in Afghanistan. And you have to look your history and go back to the circumstances that were created during the war against the Russian occupation and what took place immediately after that.

Because it's a political system that's dominated up to that period was one that was characterized by a tribal aristocracy. And it was through the tribal aristocracy that the country was governed.

With the demise of the tribal aristocracy which took place until the dawn of the Russian war and then jihad period that took place after that in the Early Nineties, you then had the rise of the Taliban and the movement rose because they offered some stability and some security and some organization.

(inaudible) with the arrival of the international community and the eviction of the Taliban you've get a complete political vacuum. The effect of all of that is that a number of politically savvy characters realized that by supporting the international community and in a sense acting as their agents in terms of their relationships with Afghan militias but also with the Afghan people that they put themselves in a position of some power and influence.

And of course, what's happened is that those rich and powerful figures are still evident and what they have managed to do is to create political space in which it is challenging for the formal bodies of government to be able to make their way and to connect themselves to the population.

Now much of that, of course, has been caused by money. ... I mean, you bring in the international community in the numbers in which we are now present in Afghanistan as a whole with of course significant budgets.

And I guess that we put around 10 billion dollars per annum into what's going on in Afghanistan at the moment. And when dealing with sums of money like that, in a society where a few Afghani is probably all you needs to live off for a month at a time, you do change the dynamics. And you also change people’s behaviours.

And what of course has happened over the last 8 or 9 years is that behaviour has changed and the powerful political... politically savvy characters who I described earlier have seized the opportunity in certain circumstances.

And of course, the challenge that we've got is to try manage this while at the same time is trying to develop the formal bodies of governance and connect those to the Afghan people.

So I think it's not straightforward to describe it simply by corruption. It's about a political system. And it's about process that's got to be changed. And it can only be changed over time. Over.

Moderator: Thank you General. We have a question in the back.

Q: General, before 2010 started, lots of politicians and also NATO officials, declared 2010 to be the year of the turnaround or something like that. And you are facing lots of difficulties. In Marjah the operation is taking longer than expected. Kandahar, there still lots to do. The Ring Road seems to be a big problem. How do you explain all those delays and difficulties? Has...? I don't know, has the Western community over estimated or under estimated the problems, especially the military problems in Afghanistan? Thanks.

Gen. Nick Carter: When I arrived here this time last year, you might recall what was going on in Southern Afghanistan at that stage... it was confirmed there was going to be a US (surge), that was announced, you recall at the first of December.

And at that stage, when we look at what was going in Southern Afghanistan, it was fairly clear that the insurgency had the initiative. I think looking back, from where we are now, I think I would confidently say that the coalition and the Afghan government has the initiative now and not the Taliban. And that is a significant change.

Whether or not, we've met the expectations in terms of time that others have is a next point, I would say. I think the first point I'd make is that this insurgency unlike other insurgencies that I've been involved in, is an insurgency which is much more in the minds of people.

When you could say that the Afghan population particularly in the South has been in chaos for 30 years. When you consider that they have nothing from their government for 30 years and therefore they've never had certainties that you take for granted. And I take for granted. And trying to change that mindset quickly is frankly impossible.

All we can have to do is to provide with that vacant security and stability and convince them that their government which is growing every day is getting to make a connection with them and to live up for them the sort of stability that we're talking about. And that's really, really challenging. Because Afghan human capacity is governed... is in very short supply in Kandahar and in Helmand. And without Afghan human capacity, it's very difficult to be able to fill structures, institutions as the bits that are going to make the connection with the population. And that wont happen overnight.

But what we will do quickly is we will begin to fill them with the fact that we have the initiative and the insurgency doesn't have the initiative. Over.

Q: Ah yes, Brooks Tigner, Jane's Defence. I have two questions. The Afghan mission network is supposed to deliver two commanders such as yourself , an integrated package of C-4 capabilities. Has it done that yet? And have you found it useful, in your region. That's one question.

And secondly, are you using drones in all of these various missions and have you lost any? Thank you.

Gen. Nick Carter: So I think that's probably the last question if that's OK. The first... And that's your first question the Afghan Mission Network. The object it's a work in progress. It's coming online with as we speak. We've got access to some of its functionality. And it's a great improvement of what we had a year ago. So my sense is this is worth the investment and delivering a much better output than we had before.

In terms of drones or unmanned, unpiloted air vehicles, call it what you will, the answer is that we are using different ISR platforms... intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms. And some of them are flown by pilots. And others are these drones or, unpiloted vehicles.

ISR of course, you will appreciate is about complementary effects. It's about integrating these platforms to achieve an outcome. What might surprise you and is interesting, is that in this campaign it's actually non traditional systems that are of most value to us . And I think we learned a great deal over last year about what you learn if you're prepared to listen to the local population and the Afghans. And you get surprised that most of the best information we get probably comes from conversations or key leader engagements that I or the command team have with Afghans on the ground. It's all about complementary effects. Have I lost any? Not that I remember recently. And I think that's probably enough. Over.

Ben Nemo Going on from the Marjah campaign at the beginning of this year, it was always said that the key to the Marjah campaign would be the follow-up to the military operation rather than the military operation itself. So in that light, are you confident that the follow-up to the military operations upcoming now has been well enough prepared and will be able to do the job once the military operations are over? Thank you.

Gen. Nick Carter: As I said in an answer to a previous question; It's about Afghan human capacity. And what's really, really important in all of these operations is how you get the Afghan political dynamic to work with Afghan human capacity.

The answer is Arghandab, in Zhari and Panjwaye we have three competent district governors who we sense will be able to lead the conversation if it would be necessary to link themselves to the population.

The challenge of course is having the additional human capacity to be able to support them in delivering the services of government. And the answer is that coming online as we speak and I think time will tell how susceptible they'll ever be. (Inaudible) but Marjah will be delivered quickly. Compared Marjah with Nad-e Ali. Nad-e Ali of course was the parent district to Marjah and has a population of around 100,000. Nad-e Ali as a project, was started, broadly speaking about nine months before Marjah. If you go to Nad-e Ali toady you'll find a "shura" that genuinely is a representative of the community. That shura was elected from an electoral college of 600 elders. And that electoral college in turn was elected by several thousand elders. That is a process that took a while to achieve. But it is a process that connects the population in Nad-e Ali to the district governor and the representative governors. And that's what Marjah will have, I guess, (inaudible) In the same way that Nad-e Ali did. These things take time. And if you give it time, there's a supported chance it will prevail. And I think that we'll see the same effect around Kandahar.

But (INAUDIBLE) because you ran out of pop. But in the due course of time, I think we can expect the districts around Kandahar and the city to look a bit like Nad-e AIi I really think that's the last question I've got time for. So I'll say good afternoon to you.

Moderator: Thank you again for taking the time to be with us today. And I appreciate all the work that went into this. And we also appreciate the work that you and all your team is doing down there. And if there is anything we can do for you just let us know.