Weekly press briefing

JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman): Thank you all for coming at this slightly early hour. My apologies for my late arrival. Let me get right to five or six points.

First, today there was a visit to NATO by the Georgian State Minister, Mr. Baramidze, the First Deputy Foreign Minister, First Deputy Defence Minister, and of course, the Ambassador, who met with the Secretary General, then met with the North Atlantic Council, in essence, a NATO-Georgia Commission at ambassadorial level, which had three main aims.

First, to discuss the autumn 2009 assessment of Georgia's first annual national program. The assessment, in essence, was that Georgia is showing progress in many areas, most notably the successful start of a comprehensive review of Georgia's security structure, dialogue on electoral and constitutional reforms. I think the ambassadors were generally positive, but encouraged further progress, which NATO will support.

Secondly, of course, they discussed the political and security situation around the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which remains difficult. And in that context a lot of concern was expressed around the table about recent security incidents in the region. In particular, what seems to have been kidnapping or abduction of Georgian citizens and NATO as an organization is concerned about recent incidents like this, which are raising tensions, and calls on all parties to take steps. And in particular, in this case, the relevant parties, calls on the relevant parties to take the necessary steps to resolve these particular issues.

Third... No, I think that was kind of it with regard to Georgia.

Secondly, there was a briefing by the NATO military authorities on the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan. As you know, in Strasbourg and Kehl, the NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to establish the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan to give greater coherence to, and provide more resources for, the Training Mission.

And the Secretary General attaches great importance to the NATO Training Mission as a very important mechanism for supporting, or for creating the conditions in which transition to Afghan lead, with regard to security, can move forward.

As of today what is the state of play? First, the NATO Training Mission has been established. Initial operating capability was reached on the 20th of October. Lieutenant General William Caldwell will take command within a week.

JAMES APPATHURAI: Sorry? Caldwell? Yes, it's C-A-L-D-W-E-L-L.

JAMES APPATHURAI: William Caldwell, exactly. The staffing for the Headquarters is going very well. I think almost 90 percent of the positions in the Headquarters have been bid upon. In other words, nations have indicated an interest in filling them, so that is going quite well as well.

The main requirement, looking forward, will be for mentoring teams, Mentoring and Liaison Teams, both for the army and for the police. This will be addressed, which brings me to my next point, at a force generation conference which will take place in December.

As you may know a global force generation conference has been long planned for the 23rd of November. And this is a force generation conference at which the requirements for all NATO operations and missions are put on the table and allies see what they can do to fill the requirements.

This year the Global Force Generation Conference will take place in two parts. On the 23rd of November all the NATO operations, operational and mission requirements, except for those related to Afghanistan, will be addressed on the 23rd.

In order to take account of ongoing developments and in order to be able to take into account political discussions on Afghanistan that will take place at the NATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting, and by the way a Foreign Ministers' Meeting which will also include ISAF partners, on the 2nd and 3rd of December. The Afghanistan-related component of the Force Generation Conference will take place in December. The date is not yet clear, but it will take place after the Foreign Ministers' Meeting, in order, as I say, to take into account all the developments that will take place between now and then and the political discussions at Foreign Ministers' level.

The third issue that was discussed today was... excuse me for a moment. The Russian exercises that took place recently. The Russian and Belarussian exercises that took place recently, on which allies were briefed today. I believe they were called Autumn 09, I think it was the Russian name for them.

These were very large exercises. And the general sense around the table today, after the briefing, was of concern about the size of the exercise, which raises questions about compliance with Vienna commitments with regard to the invitation of observers. Observers were not invited by the Russian Federation.

Second, the scenario, which clearly envisioned an attack on Russia as being the trigger from an attack for the West.

And third, and I think more in general, general sense that the political message of the exercise was incongruous with the general improvement in political relations and practical cooperation that is under way between NATO and Russia.

Discussion of this exercise and its implications may continue, likely will continue, within NATO.

Two program issues and then one more point and then I'm happy to take your questions. One is that the Secretary General will leave tomorrow for a one-day visit to Budapest. He will meet with the Speaker of the Parliament. He will open a conference, NATO at 60; meeting with the Prime Minister. I think meet with the President and there may be other activities which we will confirm later in the day. The program is moving very quickly.

Next, Thursday, he will be in Berlin, where he will meet with the president, Mr. Koehler, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chancellor Merkel, and will give a speech around the Brandenburger Tor, which I hope means gate, but I don't know. But we'll send out a media advisory with all the details.

He will then go to Podgorica and Sarajevo. So he will—I'll give you the program—meet in Podgorica with the Speaker of the Parliament, with the President, with the Prime Minister; then go to Sarajevo, meet with the members of the presidency, senior politicians, Council of Ministers, etc. etc. and then home.

Final point, and then I'm happy to take your questions. I see increasingly, and we see increasingly, a tendency in media to translate the expression transition to Afghan lead into another expression, which we did not use, which is exit strategy. And I think we need to be very clear.

At NATO we say what we mean. Transition means transition. It means transition to Afghan lead and a different role, not no role, a different role, for international forces. A supporting role.

Now would that mean, where it happens and when it happens, less risk for ISAF forces? Probably, and we certainly hope so. And at a certain stage, eventually, Afghan forces will be in a position to stand on their own feet without significant international support.

But we have to be absolutely realistic about what we're talking about. Transition to Afghan lead will happen slowly. It will happen where conditions permit and we will accelerate our efforts to create those conditions, but we have to create those conditions. We cannot do this too fast because to do it too fast would be to stumble before the finishing line and we cannot afford to do that.

So there needs to be two things. One, realism in the pace at which transition can take place. It will be steady, but it will be slow. Secondly, there need to be realism about what transition means. It does not mean that where conditions allow for transfer of lead security responsibility international forces immediately get to go home in those areas. No. They move into a supporting role.

And third, we need to be realistic about how long this will take. The reasons why international forces were deployed to Afghanistan remain. Or have not gone away. There is still a significant threat of terrorism and extremism in Afghanistan, from Afghanistan, towards its region and towards the international community. And until Afghanistan is able to provide for its own security we must support it in doing so. That is in our own self-interest.

That's what I wanted to say, and I'm happy to take any questions that you might have.

Q: Just on the force generation, December, presumably this will include whatever Obama decides to do?

JAMES APPATHURAI: As I said, it should take into account everything that comes before, and of course, whatever President Obama announces will be very relevant to the Force Generation Conference.

But, the Secretary General has been very clear. This is not Obama's war alone. It is very important that the European allies make their own effort, their own increased effort, to, if not match, at least to move forward as the Americans move forward as well.

He has said publicly that this is an important moment for transatlantic relations; that the United States is making an enormous effort, an enormous sacrifice already. Whatever President Obama announces that will remain true. It may be even more true. And what Europe contributes to this operation, and what more it can find to contribute will be watched carefully in Washington and will be an important demonstration of solidarity within the Alliance.

So the Secretary General, I can tell you, not only wants to see more from Europe, but will be working actively in the coming days to encourage that.

Q: Yes, on the same subject, there's no date for this December.

JAMES APPATHURAI: I think it'll be clear within the next couple of days. There's two dates being juggled, so I can't give them yet.

Q: And you always talk about how the ministerial meetings are not force generation meetings, but this will clearly make the December meeting such a meeting?

JAMES APPATHURAI: No, indeed, it won't. That's why we have put the force generation meeting after that. This will be a political discussion. And I hope... how to put this. I understand why you think that. I know many people will think that, but I have to try to make it clear. There are a number of steps. I am confident that before the force generation meeting the United States will make its announcement, not only on troop levels, but very much in a broader context, on approach and strategy.

There will be a discussion on approach and strategy amongst Foreign Ministers. These are not Defence Ministers. Even if they were it wouldn't be a force generation conference. But these are Foreign Ministers. They're going to discuss approach and strategy.

Now, I would not be surprised if a number of nations were to make public any increases that they were considering in the run-up to that meeting, or at that meeting. That sometimes happens. But the aim is to have the force generation discussion at the Force Generation Conference.

It's also worth noting that we have already seen a number of... or at least a few countries, make announcements, public announcements just in the past few weeks. The United Kingdom announced a possible increase of 500, the conditions for which appear to be increasingly likely to be met. Slovakia announced yesterday a doubling of its commitment, and Georgia, not a NATO ally, but an important partner, is deploying, I think it is right about now, a 173 forces to work with the French, and an entire battalion will be going to the south, without caveats. I might add the Slovaks also removed the caveats on their forces. So you're getting already... you can already see just in the past few weeks that's a significant increase from the non-U.S. allies.

We hope to see more of that.

Q: Follow-up. Do you expect then Obama to make his decision... well, you're saying he's definitely going to make the decision before, sometime in December, right?

JAMES APPATHURAI: Mm-mmm.

Q: But do you think it will be before the Foreign Ministers, or after the Foreign Ministers?

JAMES APPATHURAI: He has said in the coming weeks, the Secretary General has said in the coming weeks. I think it's not wise for me to say anything different than in the coming weeks.

Q: Yes, the day before yesterday there was this informal session, EU informal session...

JAMES APPATHURAI: Yes, yes.

Q: ...on (inaudible) management and the Secretary General was present. And one of the main issues were Afghanistan. At the same time there is this EU mission for training.

JAMES APPATHURAI: Yes, the police, EU, yes.

Q: And when you are talking now about a new... this new mission which will give training for both military and security troops. It is not a sort of...

JAMES APPATHURAI: Competition?

Q: Not competition, but doubling the work? As the same... and if I may add...?

JAMES APPATHURAI: Please.

Q: Certainly NATO had already made plans for this mission, so when we talk about training exactly how much troops we have in mind, how many trainers and for this training mission, for how long it will take, because this is also important?

JAMES APPATHURAI: Yes, absolutely. There is no duplication between what the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan is doing and what the EUPOL and the European Gendarmerie Force are doing. In fact, they do slightly different things, and of course the planning for NTMA has taken into account what EUPOL and the European Gendarmerie Force does to ensure that we precisely don't do what they do, which would be duplicative, and we don't have enough resources for that.

So this has a, let's say, a mutually reinforcing effect, because it allows us to offset and do different things with the resources that we have.

NTMA, the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, will have deployed Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams, both for the police and for the army. Neither EUPOL nor the European Gendarmerie Force will be doing that. Certainly in any significant number. And NTMA is orders of magnitude bigger in terms of budget, in terms of its overall effort, but it will have a role in generating, preparing for deployment, and then fielding these Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams, as well as training all through the country again, whereas the EUPOL, right now anyways, is generally focused on Kabul, and does, I think, relatively high level train the trainers work, which is not the aim, not the principal aim, of NTMA.

Bottom line, and that was reinforced again in the briefing today, these are mutually reinforcing efforts, and because they're doing certain things, we can divert resources to other things, and that's good. And they coordinate very, very well. That was, again, what was pointed out today.

Yes, we have very precise ideas of what the resource requirements are. To be very honest I'm not sure if those are public. So I will check on that and then happy to get back to you.

Q: So what exactly will the first Force Generation Conference be dealing with, the one in five days? Which topics? And can we presume then that it's certain that Obama will not make his announcement by November 23rd?

JAMES APPATHURAI: To answer the second question first, I honestly don't have the slightest idea of when he will announce. He said in the coming weeks, that's all I know.

To answer the first question, there are a number of other operational requirements we have: the training mission in Iraq, there is the Kosovo operation, there is the piracy mission, there is Operation Active Endeavour. All of those on an annual basis have to have their requirements filled. I don't expect, and I don't think we expect any difficulty.

Sorry?

Q: (Inaudible...).

JAMES APPATHURAI: No, Active Endeavour is the Mediterranean mission and then there is Ocean Shield, which is the piracy mission.

So all of this needs to be addressed, with Afghanistan separate.

Q: Can I have a follow-up?

JAMES APPATHURAI: Yes, of course.

Q: Nothing to do with this. Can you just give us the state of play since the Secretary General is going to Podgorica and Sarajevo, what's the state of play on their membership applications, their MAPs, and there's some talk that NATO will wait to induct them together into the Alliance, rather than maybe separately.

JAMES APPATHURAI: Okay. The basic principle is this: All the allies believe, and the Secretary General believes, that the most effective tool for promoting peace and security in the Balkans is Euro-Atlantic integration, and to be more specific, to bring these countries into NATO and the EU.

Both countries have applied for Membership Action Plan. The allies welcomed both of those applications. In the principle... or in the context of that desire to see Euro-Atlantic integration for all countries in the Balkans, the Foreign Ministers will, I believe, make decisions on MAP for these two countries. There are active discussions under way now amongst allies about whether now is the time to bring them into the MAP process, to answer positively their MAP applications.

But one point is very important, NATO judges each application on the basis of the individual merits of the individual country. There is absolutely no linkage between these two countries when it comes to their MAP applications.

I think I should take a couple of other people. We should go back there. Oh, yes, sorry.

Q: Once they get into MAP how long will it normally take to gain full membership?

JAMES APPATHURAI: There is absolutely no timeline. Some countries it has been very quick. Others it has taken a long time. It really depends on the conditions. I'm not trying to be too difficult, but there really is no timeline for this.

Q: Okay, James, I have several questions, if I may. First of all, just a clarification. Can you please repeat on which level was the briefing about Russian...

JAMES APPATHURAI: Ambassadorial level, NAC.

Q: Ambassadorial level, NAC. And who gave it?

JAMES APPATHURAI: That's not...

Q: Russian ambassador?

JAMES APPATHURAI: No, no. This is internal.

Q: It was not an... internal discussion.

JAMES APPATHURAI: It was not an NRC meeting. It was a NAC meeting.

Q: I see. Okay. So again you said it was a briefing so I assumed that it was some information from Russian side there?

JAMES APPATHURAI: I'm not going to discuss the sources of information.

Q: (Laughs). Next one. Please, James, you said about the forces that Georgia is intended to send into Afghanistan.

JAMES APPATHURAI: Yes.

Q: Could you please clarify, do we know the terms, when it will be sent, where, and how many?

JAMES APPATHURAI: What has been announced publicly is the following: About 170 Georgian forces to work with the French contingent, and then at a certain stage in the coming months, a battalion. I think the number is around between 700 to 800, which will go to the south, to Helmand province, and will be without caveats.

Q: Two more please. So again, on Georgia and Ukraine, when do we expect the next assessment of the process that the two countries made towards Membership Action Plan?

JAMES APPATHURAI: I expect that there will be both a NATO-Georgia Commission and a NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting at the Foreign Ministers' level in early December, where of course all issues will be discussed.

Q: And just last one, about the creation, or the desire to create a joint brigade between Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania. Is NATO playing any role in this and what's NATO's opinion on this project?

JAMES APPATHURAI: To answer the second question, no, NATO is playing no role of which I am aware in creating this. That being said, joint multinational, military formations are a very common thing. They are fully within the sovereignty rights of nations to create. There are examples, I believe in the Nordic context of NATO nations and non-NATO nations, the Nordic countries, creating joint military capabilities. This has been a complete success, and without any political problems for NATO.

And if it does, in fact, create more capability and I believe this was the stated intention, to deploy on NATO or other EU, UN or other missions then that's something, I think, NATO would welcome.

Q: On the force generation meeting, what format is this going to be? NATO format, or ISAF format or what?

JAMES APPATHURAI: ISAF.

Q: And at which level?

JAMES APPATHURAI: It's at the normal level. It takes place at SHAPE in Mons. It's at the military level. I don't know... nations can send whomsoever they please to a force generation meeting, and I've seen nations send generals and I've seen them send captains or lieutenants, so it's up to the nation.

Q: Okay, another question. On Russian exercise, are you planning any action to convey the message of your concern to Russians?

JAMES APPATHURAI: Well I've just conveyed a message of concern and for the moment that's it.

Q: Yes, and I was a little bit late, so I don't know if the question has already been asked, but the German government said yesterday it shouldn't extend the mandate of the German crews flying with the AWACS. Does it mean that there is no prospect of deploying those planes above Afghanistan?

JAMES APPATHURAI: I saw the comments by Minister zu Guttenberg and what he said was, indeed as you characterized it, but there was a little bit more, where he said that if conditions change and the deployment becomes possible they're very supportive of the overall mission. And I think the idea of extension of the mandate is a very German... how do I put this? They have particular requirements with regard to Parliament, which make it necessary to have very formal extensions of mandates or non-mandates.

Minister zu Guttenberg is absolutely right that we have not had success until now, and in negotiating the necessary arrangements for the AWACS to be deployed operationally into theatre for air traffic control purpose. We're working very hard on that. I can't say that we are pleased with the time that it has taken, but it is beyond our control. We have to respect the needs and desires of our partners, and hopefully this will happen as soon as possible. If and when it does I'm quite sure Germany will look again, based on Minister zu Guttenberg's comments at deploying its personnel.

Am I holding you guys up from something else?

Q: James, I would like to know if NATO will ask some clarifications about this exercise, the Russian, Belarussian, yes? In their exercise from Mr. Rogozin? Thank you.

JAMES APPATHURAI: I would not exclude a discussion that includes the Russian Federation on this issue.

Q: My follow-up, yes, sort of the same subject, and I'll try and ask the question without getting zapped like my colleague did.

You talk about the exercises and that they're going to be discussed in the future and their implications. What sort of implications have exercises generated in the past, what sort of reaction have they bought from NATO? What type of thing have you done? Can you do?

JAMES APPATHURAI: Well, that's a good question. I'm not sure I know the answer. This is, as far as I'm aware, the biggest exercise since the end of the Cold War, by the Russian Federation, and it had a particular scenario attached to it. So it may not be like previous exercises that we have seen at least since the end of the Cold War. I'm not sure the context is a 100 percent relevant. That's all I'll say. Anyway, I don't know, as the second part of that answer, but don't print that.

Q: A question for (inaudible) News. Recently the German Foreign Minister, Mr. Westerwelle made an issue of the nuclear deterrence with the Secretary General...

JAMES APPATHURAI: Yes.

Q: ...and Mr. Westerwelle, I think, said his intention to coordinate with there NATO countries, as well as with NATO. This issue will be raised... are there any possibilities that this issue will be raised at the Foreign Ministers' meetings? Thank you.

JAMES APPATHURAI: The issue of NATO's nuclear posture is not formally on the agenda for the Foreign Ministers' Meeting. Of course, any Minister can raise whatever they want. I do think it is more likely that the issue of NATO's nuclear posture could potentially come up in the context of the Strategic Concept discussions, where I think it may be more appropriate... well, no no, sorry, that's wrong. It may come up... I can't say it's more appropriate. It's appropriate wherever a Minister chooses to make it appropriate. But I think it is more likely that it comes up in that context.

The Secretary General's view is exactly the same Foreign Minister Westerwelle and that is, of course, this discussion and any discussion can come up, but this discussion is not the least of those that should very much take place in a NATO context, and without any unilateral moves Foreign Minister Westerwelle was very clear when he spoke to the Secretary General that Germany, if and when it takes forward this discussion, will do it in a spirit of solidarity.

Q: Okay, James, yet another one on the exercises. Sorry. Ambassador Rogozin claimed that NATO nations have received all the necessary information about these exercise beforehand, so can you confirm this, or comment on the (inaudible)?

JAMES APPATHURAI: I have no such information, which doesn't mean it's not true, but I have not seen that. Nor have I been informed of that.

There was concern expressed around the table that despite the size of the exercise, no observers were invited by Moscow to come and observe the exercise, which would have been relevant in the context of Vienna commitments.

But in terms of what information was passed to NATO nations beforehand, I don't know... I have not heard that anything was done. It may well have been done. I'm not trying to quietly citizen or call into question what he said. I just have no information.

Q: I have two questions. One about the Russian exercises and one about Afghanistan... with Russia.

Can you give us any detail about what is the size of the exercise, and second, I didn't understand clearly what you said in the beginning about the political message of the exercise?

JAMES APPATHURAI: My understanding, that it was a... if you put the total number of forces together, it was 13,000. Thirteen. One, three.

Secondly, that the political message sent by an exercise of this size and this... with the scenario that this one was carrying out, was incongruous... do you know this word? Incongru? Incongruous with the progress that is being made in terms of political dialogue and practical cooperation between NATO and Russia.

Q: About Afghanistan, it looks like NATO is expecting that... or President Obama is going to announce a troop increase in the level of the number of troops that some days ago the American ambassador in Kabul expressed his view against it. Do you think some European countries are reluctant to increase their troop levels. Do you think this apparently lack of unity in the Obama administration could be... give some kind of base to these European countries to refuse to increase their troops?

JAMES APPATHURAI: I would say two things. One is, it's important to look at what... first, we've only seen press reports of a leaked cable. Point one. Point two, even the press reports of the leaked cable went a little bit farther than what the general coverage was. What I understood was to be in the memo, again, from the media, was General Eikenberry expressing concern about deploying more forces until progress had been made in fighting corruption.

So he's supporting the idea, from what I read, of having more forces in the field. It was a question of timing and what else needs to be done.

Now, President Karzai will give his inauguration speech tomorrow and there's a general expectation that commitments will be made in terms of improving governance and fighting corruption. And in fact the Afghan government has just established, I think, two separate, but related structures precisely to fight corruption. And the announcement was made on that a couple of days ago. So that's already progress, and I think, we hope and expect to see more progress in terms of fighting corruption.

The final point is this: It is totally normal to have different exchanges, different points of view, on a very, very complicated subject like this. What is not normal is that cables and documents are leaked. Which doesn't allow for an open discussion between the people who need to have open discussions. The corrosive effect on decision making of regular leaks should not be underestimated. Nobody's doing the decision making process any favours by selectively airing this or that piece because it makes it very hard for officials to give their honest views to the people who have to decide if they can't write it down on paper, and can only say it over the phone or write it on a yellow Post-it® note, which is, I can tell you, something that has happened in many countries as a result of these kinds of things.

So all this to say it is normal that they have exchanges of views, and I hope... My final point is this: Internal U.S. discussions are internal U.S. discussion. But a decision will be made, and it is in everybody's interest that A, we contribute more to this operation, and B, that it is done in a balanced way across the Atlantic, for reasons of solidarity, for reasons of effectiveness, we should see not just the Americans stepping up to do more than they are already doing, and that is a substantial amount.