Weekly press briefing

Appathurai: Friends and colleagues, thank you for coming. I have just a few quick points and then I'm happy to take any of your questions. Though there is a new request to do Bratislava. Perhaps I'll do that at the end.

First, let me draw your attention to the statement the Secretary General released this morning in response to the bombing and the attacks in Kabul. As he said, this was an attack against people who are working very clearly to help the Afghan people build a better life. And targeting them was a clear demonstration that the Taliban does not have the interests of the Afghan people in mind.

He, of course, offered his condolences to the families of those international and Afghans who lost their lives, and his sympathies to the UN more in general.

I think it's also worth noting that the United States has lost a very high number of people in the last three days. If I count correctly 22 servicemen and 2 civilians. We did not release a statement, but I think it is worth noting that the United States is bearing an enormous burden in Afghanistan and paying a very high price for a mission which is preserving the security of the entire international community, and very much of the NATO allies. It sometimes goes unnoticed because the Americans are very stoic about what they do. But I do think that particularly when we see weeks like this, and months like this, because the United States has suffered very high levels of casualties month after month, that we should note and respect what it is that the United States does for all of us in Afghanistan.

Some scheduling notes. Right now the Secretary General and the entire North Atlantic Council are in the air on their way to the United Arab Emirates. They will participate in an international conference on NATO-UAE, United Arab Emirates, relations and the way forward in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. This is taking place at the Emirates Palace in Abu Dhabi. It is co-organized by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the UAE and NATO, the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. There'll be about 300 participants. Of course, the Secretary General, the permanent representatives, the DSG, the Deputy Secretary General, the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, other high level NATO officials, along with government representatives, opinion leaders, academics and scholars from countries in the Gulf region that have been invited to the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

And in essence, it is aiming to promote better mutual understanding between NATO and ICI invited countries, and to look at the issues, the security challenges, which we all face, and to work out common approaches to solving them. I can think of terrorism and proliferation as being two principal shared challenges.

The Secretary General will hold bilateral meetings with the Prime Minister, Vice President of the UAE, the Minister of Defence, and the rule of Dubai, and with the Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, as well as the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

There will be a signing, in the presence of the Secretary General, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, of an agreement on the security of information between NATO and UAE. This is, in essence, to allow for the exchange of classified or confidential information which will, of course, help to strengthen our cooperation on a day-to-day basis.

On the 6th of November he will go to Oslo for a bilateral visit. He will meet with the Prime Minister, the President of the Parliament. He will meet with the Committee on Foreign Policy and Defence Affairs. He will have a working lunch with Mr. Store, the Foreign Minister. And I think there is the possibility of an audience with His Majesty, King Harald V.

Then on the 13th of November there will be the next Strategic Concept seminar, imaginatively called Strategic Concept Seminar 2: NATO's engagement in an era of globalization. It will take place in Slovenia, at the Brdo, B-R-D-O—I'm sure I'm millions pronouncing that, so my apologies—seminar centre, and it will be hosted by Slovenia in cooperation with RUSI, the U.K. Royal United Services Institute.

The Secretary General will participate in it. Madeleine Albright will be there, and she, Mr. Rasmussen and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia will kick it off. That part will be open. Then there will be a number of seminars and some concluding remarks.

For the moment I don't see any press opportunities but that, I think, is still under discussion.

Finally, in terms of scheduling, I can confirm the Secretary General will visit Moscow from the 15th to the 17th of December. The schedule is still being worked out, but I think in the planning, certainly from our point of view, but I think more in general in the planning, he will meet with the President, with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Defence Minister. Again, this is at the planning stages. And a number of other activities will be programmed in around that.

The purpose of the visit is to take forward the NATO-Russia relationship. In other words, it is not simply a courtesy call. The intent on the part of the Secretary General is to deepen the relationship with Russia in those areas where we have common interests, where we face common challenges and where cooperation is of mutual interest to all of the 29 countries in the NATO-Russia Council.

Cooperation to help build security in Afghanistan is one obvious area. Countering terrorism. Countering proliferation. Dealing with piracy. These are all areas that have been identified as possibilities for furthering and deepening cooperation. And the Secretary General certainly intends to make this a practical visit and not simply, as I said, a courtesy call.

Let me also welcome the decision by the European Union Council yesterday. Its action plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are a number of elements which I think correspond very closely to NATO's approach. First, of course, the decision by the EU to strengthen its action in, its engagement with Afghanistan and Pakistan. The political commitment given by the European Union that it intends to step up its support for Afghanistan and Pakistan is very, very welcome. As NATO is discussing stepping up... further stepping up our support we think that that's very important.

We agree with many of the findings in the EU final plan, including that progress cannot be achieved by military means alone. That developed effective state institutions, improving governance, the rule of law and human rights, fighting corruption, all these are essential elements to building lasting stability in Afghanistan. And as you've heard the Secretary General say, we believe that the only way to counter terrorism effectively in Afghanistan is for the insurgency also to be effectively countered.

We share the view that the only durable solution will have to be Afghan-led and that improving governance is an essential part of that, and of course the regional element is also very, very important.

Finally, the EU action plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan says that the formation of a new government will provide a new opportunity to frame a new agenda and new contract with the Afghan people. The Secretary General believes that the initiative by three European leaders to... and that's U.K., France and Germany, to call for a conference, a UN-led conference, which I think now is being planned for early next year, is a valuable one, precisely for this reason. Because it will be an opportunity to establish a new contract between the international community and the new Afghan government.

We have, and continue to invest an enormous amount in Afghanistan as a international community. We have the right... we have earned the right to insist that the Afghan government also raises its game and takes active visible measures to improve governance, fight corruption, because in the end the best way to suck the oxygen away from the insurgency is for the Afghan people to see a government in which they can trust. So we support that initiative very much as well.

Let me stop here. I'll see if you have questions, which I could answer. We'll go here first, and then we'll come back.

Q: James, I wonder how can NATO be able to assure the Afghani people to participate in the next elections, which in a few days, with two horrible attacks this morning, not anywhere but in Kabul?

James Appathurai: Well, first, we cannot, alone, NATO cannot alone, assure security throughout Afghanistan. If we could we wouldn't have the challenge that we do. But what we can say is that the last round of elections, which were, let us say, equally threatened by the Taliban, were from a security point of view, generally successful. Ninety percent of the polling stations that had originally been planned to open did open. Only three percent of the polling stations came under attack. And even within that three percent I think much less... a much lower percentage came under direct attack or any kind of sustained attack.

So our assessment is, in the first round, from a security point of view, the Afghan people had the opportunity to vote, in general, and in sufficient number for it to be representative.

This is a different round, but we have the forces in place to play our part, third tier security. You know the Afghan Police provide security closest to the polling station or at the polling station, then the Afghan Army provides perimeter security and NATO's providing support. We're also providing logistical support.

And of course, we have always planned for the possibility of a second round. So yes, this morning's incidents will... or are intended by the Taliban, let me put it this way, are intended by the Taliban to send a chill through the international community and through the Afghan people. Our challenge is not to let them have the effect that they are trying to achieve.

Kai Eide released a statement this morning that was very clear; that the UN is not going to back down and will carry out its mission. That is equally true about NATO. And we can only appeal to the Afghan people to exercise their hard-won democratic right to choose their own leadership, because it is a very precious thing, they have fought very hard to get it, and we will do our part to help them exercise that right.

Q: Yes, two questions if I may. On NATO-Russia, I'm wondering in which areas of shared interest would it be easiest to get cooperation going? I mean, in concrete terms. Could we reasonably expect that to express itself on joint cooperation on piracy, for instance? Or is it something else? Not the political stuff, but the concrete.

The same thing NATO-UAE. I'm wondering what the crossover of the of the common interest is here on terrorism and proliferation. Would concrete cooperation be the exchange of intel, thus your security agreement, or joint inspections of shipping? What are we talking about here other than joint political statements?

James Appathurai: Thanks. I think there are two elements on NATO-Russia which I could name as relatively obviously offering a fruitful way forward. One is Afghanistan. Russia has offered, and we have accepted, land transit for non-lethal military goods, as you know. I think there is certainly the possibility of expanding the transit agreement.

There is the possibility of stepping up training of counternarcotics officials. There is the possibility of Russian support for equipping the Afghan Security Forces. The possibility potentially not in the country and outside of the country of offering other kinds of training and other ideas are circulation. So I think on Afghanistan there is a clear prospect for stepping up cooperation, and I might add that it is supported by, sorry to make a political statement here, it is supported by a clear shared interest. Russia has no more desire to see terrorism, extremism and drugs flow out of Afghanistan than any of us, not least because Russia is geographically, after Central Asia, first in line to receive the terrorism, the extremism and the drugs.

So for all these reasons I think there is the real possibility of stepping up our cooperation and I can tell you Ambassador Rogozin has been very active in proposing areas where we could consider doing more together.

Q: (inaudible...) NATO would be Russian... those would be Russian donations and not Russia using the trust fund to sell.

James Appathurai: The mechanics are, of course, to be discussed, but as you know very well the Afghan Security Forces use, in many cases, even though they're shifting over, Russian standard, Soviet standard equipment. So there's, I think, a real possibility for them to support. I might mention logistical support as well, in terms of lift.

Piracy is another area where initial discussions have met with an initial positive response. Where we could work on a more structured cooperation to counter piracy. So I think those two points you have mentioned well.

The cooperation that NATO has with ICI countries is actually more developed than you might think it. And actually the website is a useful place to go to. NATO has, in essence, made available to the ICI countries a menu of activities, where they can say well, we have an interest in this, and not in that. I'll give you one example. De-mining, where NATO has an expertise. Securing borders. How would they secure their borders? What do we do... what are the best practices for dealing with possible proliferation or movement of illegal weapons.

So is there a possibility of practical cooperation? Yes, there is. There actually is already practical cooperation, but it takes place at the pace and according to the priorities of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative country. And it is not in any way multilateral from their point of view. It is purely bilateral. NATO-them.

I think there was somebody... no? Wow, this is a quiet group today, yeah? We'll take these two together.

Q: Yes, concerning the trip to Oslo for Mr. Fogh Rasmussen, what will be on the agenda? Will he ask the Norwegians for more troops to Afghanistan?

James Appathurai: (Laughs). The issues that I think are likely to be of interest, and now I'm getting ahead of myself, because I haven't seen any particular checklist, but let me guess. I will guess the first and foremost Afghanistan of course. We are in the middle of a strategy review that will have resource implications. I have no doubt that the Secretary General will wish to discuss with his Norwegian interlocutors where we should be going and how we should get there. First point.

The second will be NATO-Russia, which is obviously an issue of great interest in Norway. And I think you know the issues on the agenda. How do we... what steps should we take to put this relationship on a more practical footing, which will then put it on a more trusting footing? And I think that's very important.

Minister Store has been a strong advocate of discussing the High North. And the Secretary General is a strong advocate of discussing the security implications of climate change. I don't know whether they will raise it, but I would be surprised if they didn't. And to be clear, the Secretary General shares Minister Store's view, High North, low tension, that that must be a priority. Not militarization of the North. On the contrary to see how we can cooperate to keep it a peaceful area. Despite what will be greater complications as climate change diminishes the polar icecap, as shipping up there increases, as the Northwest Passage opens, as energy resources become more accessible. The challenge is precisely as Minister Store puts it, to maintain... to ensure that it remains low tension.

So these, off the top of my head, may be the three issues that come up.

Q: In relation to today's incidents in Kabul, the European Union is still adamant in holding this international conference in Kabul. Do you think that is realistic, to think about that, given the situation? What would be the role of NATO in that conference? Would it be a nightmare to protect so many important delegates, plus the press, because is obviously made for the press, do you think? Thank you.

James Appathurai: Has the EU... sorry, has the EU confirmed?

Q: No no, not confirmed, but they have been adamant in holding...

James Appathurai: They said they wanted to do...

Q: ...(inaudible...).

James Appathurai: Even yesterday they said that? Yeah?

Q: Plenty of Ministers are asking for Kabul.

James Appathurai: I see. Obviously no decision has been taken on where this will take place. And the way in which it takes place is also something, I think, that has been discussed. I don't know what happened at the EU, but I have heard, for example, discussions of a lower level meeting in Kabul and then a ministerial meeting outside of Kabul. I don't know whether this will happen or not.

Obviously security considerations are an issue. I think it's equally clear that if a conference like that were to take place in Kabul ISAF would play its full part to ensure the necessary security would be provided.

Q: James, your message concerning the future Moscow visit sounds quite optimistic. I'm just curious if there will arise some other issues concerning the differences still existing to NATO and Russia, or maybe there are no such differences no more?

James Appathurai: (Laughs). Yeah. Well, I think the Secretary General has been very clear, and I will be equally clear, that of course differences remain. And NATO has no intention of bending when it comes to core principles. Those core principles include the open door, NATO's open door; it's commitment to European democracies, that they have the right to join NATO if and when they meet the standards, and if they so desire. That includes Ukraine, to be very specific. Nor on Georgia will NATO bend with regard to principle.

The Secretary General's position, and I think it's a position shared by all allies, is only that we cannot allow these issues of difference to overshadow or hijack everything else. And indeed, by moving forward in the areas where we can cooperate, we create a better climate for addressing the issues where we don't see eye-to-eye.

So I think that is the general thrust of the visit. No compromise on core principles, but a strong push to build better practical cooperation, because that has a halo effect across a wide spectrum of other issues.

Q: James, since the South Waziristan operation has started in Pakistan, NATO have withdrawn seven posts along the northern Waziristan-Afghanistan-Pakistan borders. Is it tactical, strategic, because this particular move of NATO withdrawing seven posts from the northern Waziristan area is being criticized in Pakistan heavy.

James Appathurai: Thank you for the question. From what I understand, ISAF is, indeed, closing some small company-sized facilities, but I can only confirm two, not seven. So I don't know where the seven number comes from. Two. And I stress again, company-size in Nuristan and Kunar provinces. As you quite rightly say, across from North Waziristan. They are all in... both in remote and isolated areas, originally designed to expand the ISAF presence, which would, in turn, allow for Afghan border and Afghan Army and National Police basing. They are being closed, as you know, as a matter of prioritization. NATO can't be... or ISAF can't be everywhere. And in essence NATO is slightly re-prioritizing, or ISAF is, to move soldiers closer to population centres.

But in the context of the current operations taking place in Pakistan, I think your point was a critical one. The Pakistani operation's big push is in South Waziristan. NATO has not closed facilities, as far as I am aware, and I checked this morning, across from where these operations are taking place. So the criticism in the Pakistani press I think is a little misplaced, because simply geographically this is a different part of the border area.

I might also point out that NATO has, over the last 18 months, flowed, I think, over 10,000 troops precisely into Southern Afghanistan and we have very good coordination with the Pakistani authorities, and indeed I know that coordination includes a high level meeting today in Islamabad between ISAF officials and Pakistani military, precisely to discuss coordination with Pakistani military.

Q: Yes, James, tell us what's going on with the NATO AWACS which are supposed to fly over Afghanistan. Do they fly? If not, why? And is there any progress since Bratislava?

James Appathurai: They are not yet flying, but there was progress at Bratislava in that the point of principle was agreed that they should fly, and in essence the budgetary issues have to 99 percent been worked out. There are some last, and I mean really last budgetary issues to be resolved. In other words, to very simply decide and agree what's in and what's out in terms of common funding. And they are down to, I can tell you, relatively small figures. A resolution will be found and found very quickly, I would guess in the coming days, if not weeks. And then they will fly.

But my strong sense is that Bratislava moved the (inaudible) very far forward and we are now basically at end game when it comes to resolving all the necessary issues that need to be resolved, and they will fly.

Q: (Inaudible...)?

James Appathurai: Yes, all the issues have been worked out, except the final budgetary issues. Those are being discussed, I believe, even today. So this will not be long now.

Q: About the Strategic Concept seminar in November, I heard that there will be also the concept... representative from the contact countries.

James Appathurai: A this seminar?

Q: Yes. No?

James Appathurai: That's an interesting question. I don't know the answer to it.

Q: I see.

James Appathurai: But I can check it.

Q: Yeah, I'd like to know the (inaudible) of the input from these countries.

James Appathurai: I can say this. The Secretary General has been very clear that he wants participation in the Strategic Concept seminars from contact countries. And not just contact countries. From our Mediterranean partners, from ICI partners, from our European partners, and as well from what we call contact countries. So I don't know whether it will start here, but I know that he is determined to do it, so it may well start here as well. But I will check it for you.

Q: In light of today's incident, how do you look upon the process of letting the Afghan government take the main responsibility for security in Afghanistan?

James Appathurai: The Afghan government took lead security responsibility about 18 month ago, I think, almost two years ago, for Kabul—18 months ago?—for Kabul City and the surrounding provinces. Through this period, including until now, it has been a success and I quantify it this way. Security incidents overall have gone down 40 percent during the time that they have had lead security responsibility, despite the fact that frankly everywhere else in the country hasn't necessarily been going down 40 percent.

So our general view has been that it has been a success. Now, there will occasionally be spectacular incidents. It's going to happen. It doesn't necessarily mean that they have not had success in doing that. It also doesn't necessarily mean that had we had lead security responsibility this wouldn't have happened. Let's be very frank. It is not an easy thing to do.

What we should not do is draw strategic conclusions from one event. This was a very bad day. It was an attack against a very prominent international facility, but the trend over the past 18 months has been a positive one. That's the first point.

The second point is this: We will not hand over lead security responsibility to the Afghans except when and where they are ready to take it over. Does it mean that security will be perfect once we do hand over lead security responsibility to them? Of course not. This is Afghanistan in a very difficult situation. But again, it doesn't mean that it shouldn't happen. It just means that sometimes there will be setbacks, and sad ones.

The third point is this: It has to happen. The future of Afghanistan is one where Afghans are in the lead for their own security. We cannot perpetually have international security forces in the lead. The Afghans don't want it. We don't want it. It's just a question of creating the conditions as quickly as possible to allow for handover in a sustainable way. Yes, I think those are the three points I would make on that issue.

Q: On that issue, I assume that ISAF played a role this morning in the events in Kabul. Secondly, obviously what's happening tied into the elections. There seems to be an obvious theme to that. With the American deaths do you see any sort of driving force behind that series of attacks this week? There seems to have been far more deaths among American troops over the last few days, at least in terms of news reports. Do you see a trend? Why?

James Appathurai: Do I see a trend? I have no... to answer the second question first, I have got no indications from the military of a trend. I think this was just a very bad couple of days. Maybe there will be a trend, but I haven't seen it.

It is true that overall the level of violence in Afghanistan has risen this year. The number of insurgents' attacks has arisen. It's also, and I don't use this in any way as spin, but it is important to remember that there are tens of thousands more Americans and more troops in general in Afghanistan and as a result you have more people on the ground, casualty figures can, in terms of raw numbers go up. I haven't done an analysis of statistically or proportionately whether it's higher or not, but actually I'm going to go and look now to see. So I don't know the answer to that. I suspect proportionately it's up as well, but anyway. It is not to forget that there are now many, many, many more troops on the ground.

What was your first question?

Q: ISAF involvement (inaudible...).

James Appathurai: Honestly, I don't know. I don't know if my colleagues... I don't know the answer. If there was role it was clearly not a lead role, that I can say. But I don't know the answer. We can check it if you really want to know.

Q: Bratislava briefing, I have a question about the Ministers... We were told during briefings prior to the Ministers' meeting that one of the things which it was hoped would be agreed was to give more resource flexibility to ISAF commanders.

James Appathurai: Really?

Q: More flexibility for them to use resources for operational needs. A lot of political discussion on things financial in Bratislava. Can you elucidate us about things there?

James Appathurai: Sure. I'll start with the financial issues, which I think interest you the most. There was a discussion at dinner on NATO budgets and financing. And in essence the point is this: The operational requirements for NATO have risen dramatically, for obvious reasons, and so have the requirement to provide supporting capabilities. As a result the NATO military budget is being very squeezed.

What does that mean? It means we have to look for savings, prioritize what we do, and then draw conclusions, potentially for an increase once those two things, first two steps have been done. That was the essence of the discussion. There was... but it was not intended to draw conclusions, except that the Secretary General appointed what they call the Senior Officials Group from capitals, led by him, which will very quickly in the coming few months analyze this, draw conclusions with regard to priorities and then there will be another discussion about how to prioritize, where to cut, if necessary, where to find savings and then they will have to discuss whether the current budget that we have is sufficient, even after that process has been completed.

But there were no discussions that I heard about giving increased flexibility to the ISAF commander. That's a level below, I think, what the Ministers would have addressed in a dinner like that. That's more for the military to discuss.

The Afghanistan takeaways I think you know. There was a general shared view that the approach set out in the McChrystal report of the resource request of the approach was the right one, because all of the allies around the table agreed that the only way to make Afghanistan resistant to being a possible host of terrorism was to make Afghanistan resistant to the insurgency. That you could not separate in the Afghan context counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.

So general endorsement for that. A general shared view that transition was something in which the allies and partners need to invest more. And what does that mean from a security point of view? It means fully, and that means fully, resourcing in terms of personnel and money the NATO training mission in Afghanistan.

But it also means a lot on the civilian side, which is why the EU action plan, I think that's what it's called, is so welcome, because we cannot do this by ourselves. There is no military solution alone to the problems in Afghanistan.

Finally, on missile defence. Secretary Gates briefed on missile defence, and very specifically he briefed on the NATO context of U.S. missile defence plans. The Ministers welcomed the new U.S. approach because it puts U.S. missile defence plans much more in a NATO context. It puts European missile defence much more in a NATO context. And there was discussion of a specific way forward, with an eye to the Lisbon Summit, which should take place at the end of next year, and the Secretary General hopes that decisions will be made at Lisbon to bring European missile defence fully into NATO.

Now, exactly what that means I couldn't tell you now, but the discussions will happen from now on.

I think that's basically the summary of Bratislava.

Please, and I think I'll make that the last one because I've got to get back.

Q: Yes, James, could you give us as bit of more details of what ISAF troops are going to do to give more protection to the civilians? Because it seems that when they are getting closer to the population they are bringing risks as well, especially terrorist attack risks.

Appathurai: Well, you raise an important point, but it's something, of course, which the commanders and the Afghans are perfectly well aware of. So the essence of the strategy is to bring our forces into a position where they can better protect, not each and every individual Afghan by walking down to the street next to them. That's not the point. But to protect the places where most Afghans live, the population centres.

And of course, the commander of ISAF and every single NATO soldier is perfectly well aware that they do not want to put, and do not intend to put, Afghan civilians any more at risk than they would normally be, because of the proximity of NATO forces. So they will design and do design the way in which they place their forces, and move their forces in order to offer the maximum protection without bringing to the maximum extent possible any undue risk.

You would not be surprised that I will not discuss and could not discuss in public the precision of this for reasons which you could understand.

But the principle we understand very clearly. The commanders are perfectly well aware of it and they design what they will do, as I say, not to put civilians any more at risk, but precisely to protect population centres in the best possible way.

My friends, thank you.