Weekly Press briefing

JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesperson): Friends, thank you for coming. The incoming Secretary General, I have learned, is extremely punctual, so I'm going to start being extremely punctual as well. The meeting, our discussion today, shouldn't take too long. I have issues to raise with you, two to do with scheduling, and one just to discuss a little bit Ambassador Holbrooke's visit yesterday. First scheduling for tomorrow. As expected and on schedule, the Secretary General is back on his feet, and he will be coming to NATO Headquarters for his final day in the Headquarters tomorrow morning. The schedule will be as follows: he will arrive at eleven o'clock, he will be met by the Deputy Secretary General Claudio Bisogniero, the Chairman of the Military Committee Admiral Di Paola, and the Dean of the Council, who is the longest-serving Ambassador, Ambassador Poulsen-Hansen. He will be accompanied by Madame De Hoop Scheffer. They will… this will be a photo-op open to visual media. Just to be clear, he's not going to stop and make a statement, but anyone who wants to send a pool can do that. The pool should remain there, because at 11:25 he will lay flowers on the monuments right at the front entrance, on the monument to those who have fallen in NATO operations, and there will be all the Ambassadors there. There will be the NATO, or the SHAPE I think band playing the appropriate music. So anyone who wants to come is invited. We will send out a press release to tell you exactly how to do it. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer's tenure as NATO Secretary General will come to an end on the 31st of July. That is on Friday, and as you know he will be succeeded by Mr. Anders Fogh – and I should stress it's pronounced FO, I learned, and not FOG – Fogh Rasmussen. It used to be easy with George Robertson and Jamie Shea, but we don't make it easy for you anymore. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, as you well know former Prime Minister of Denmark, who takes the baton on August 1st. His first day in the actual Headquarters as NATO Secretary General will be on Monday the 3rd of August. He will arrive at 8:30 in the morning. And knowing him a little bit now, I think that's the latest he's going to arrive at the office, it's going to get earlier after that, unfortunately for his staff. He will be again greeted by the Deputy Secretary General, by Ambassador Poulsen-Hansen, and by the Chairman of the Military Committee Admiral Di Paola. He will not make a statement on the way in. At least my intention, or the current planning is that he will not make a statement on the way in. That will be done, but of course a pool, a visual pool, anyone who wants to come is very welcome. He will make his opening statement at a press conference at 11:30 that will be in the Luns Press Theatre where he will lay out his priorities for the next… for the coming years. It will be broadcast live on the CCTV network, it will be streamed live to the website, it will be available on EBU world feed via Eurovision Geneva, so we will do our best to get it to you.

And on Tuesday at 9:30, he will chair his first North Atlantic Council meeting. Admiral Stavridis, who is the Supreme Allied Commander, and General McChrystal, the Commander of the ISAF mission will both be there to brief the Council. We will have a – unfortunately – restricted pool for anyone who wants to film it should be in touch with my office. This will also be in the media advisory. Restricted because as you know we have space restrictions in the Council room. So that is basically the calendar for the next few days of transition from one Secretary General to another.

My final points, I just want to mention, give you a little debrief on Ambassador Holbrooke's visit. He met with the Deputy Secretary General in a bilateral meeting, and then with the NATO Ambassadors not in a formal NAC, but in an informal setting to discuss of course his views on a number of issues, principally of course Afghanistan, but also Pakistan. Elections were a principal subject of discussion between Ambassador Holbrooke and the NATO Ambassadors. All agreed I think with Ambassador Holbrooke's assessment that it is very important that these elections be credible in the eyes of the Afghan people. That is the goal. Credible in the eyes of the Afghan people so that the government that follows has legitimacy in their eyes, and can use that legitimacy as a platform to make further reforms, including in the fight against corruption, etc.

So what is NATO doing? NATO has already been supporting the transport of election materials, has been where possible and in an impartial way been providing transport for presidential candidates, so that everybody gets to the extent possible equal access to the voters, or at least certainly equal access to NATO transport, where we can, to meet their electorate, the electorate, and of course NATO is providing and will continue to provide third line security for the polling stations, of which there are many thousands across Afghanistan, or there will be many thousands across Afghanistan, on election day. The second issue he mentioned was the conduct, or he discussed, was the conduct of operations. He had just come from Afghanistan. He noted what we have all noted in NATO headquarters, that the past month, two months have been very of course active in terms of NATO operations. They have been very difficult in terms of the levels of casualties that have been taken, but they have been successful in clearing ground in areas that had long been Taleban strongholds that have created the space for tens of thousands of people who would not otherwise have had the opportunity to vote to be able to vote, and that these operations have been conducted along the principles laid out by General McChrystal in the tactical directive that he issued in early June. And that has meant a severely diminished use of close air support, greater care in avoiding civilian casualties in all operations, and that has had its effect, and I think if you go through the media reports from the last couple of months you will see for yourself that even the concerns about possible civilian casualty incidents have been dramatically reduced despite the extremely intensive operations, and by the way the high levels of casualties on the NATO side. The bottom line is this tactical directive is having its effect, and its effect is very clearly stated in its opening line, and I think you can see that in the public version of the document, that the purpose of our operations is to protect civilians, and that is what is the philosophy running through the operation since the General issued his tactical directive. That… final point, of course there was a discussion of Pakistan, an exchange of views on what is happening on the other side of the border. Clearly the Pakistani government is serious about its operations, it's making great efforts to deal with extremism within its borders, which is important for NATO because of course extremism is not limited to one side of the border. There needs to be efforts on both sides to be able to stem what is a cross-border problem. I don't want to comment any further, because of course Pakistan is outside of the NATO area of operations.

That is all I had to say. I am happy to take questions on any subjects. Please.

Q: Yes, James. Speaking about Holbrooke. According to some Italian sources, apparently Holbrooke came here launching an idea of a reconstruction plan for Afghanistan, just to implemented him (sic) after the election, after the 20 August. And they call actually the 100 days of reconstruction plan. So I am wondering if you know something about that and… yeah.

JAMES APPATHURAI: I don't know about that, but it may well have been something that was raised at the European Union, and not at NATO, but I did not hear that, I'll be very honest. David, and then we'll go back?

Q: Where were we with the 60 day review now?

JAMES APPATHURAI: Well we're in the middle of the 60 day review. The 60 days runs out in the middle of August. My expectation is that General McChrystal will take his 60 days to make his review. So it's middle of August.

Q: …can you tell us the findings of that review? What's the mechanics of, if anything's released?

JAMES APPATHURAI: What will happen in terms of process as far as I understand now, is that the 60 day review will be passed up the two chains of command that are relevant here. Both NATO and the US Secretary of Defense, the NATO Secretary General and the US Secretary of Defense together asked General McChrystal to conduct this review. He will pass that review back to both of those who have asked him for it. Then there will be the question of public release, and we are… obviously the whole thing will not be made public. I think that's safe to say. But we are already working to ensure that there is a public version, where the conclusions can be brought to you as much as possible.

Q: (Inaudible)

JAMES APPATHURAI: We will certainly have our own. There will be no difference as far as I know between the two reviews. It will be one review. So we will work with Washington to make sure that certainly we will do it; I guess Washington will also do it, but we'll make sure it's one. There shouldn't be two. Please go ahead, then come over here.

Q: James for… for next Tuesday, you said he will chair his first NAC?

JAMES APPATHURAI: Yeah.

Q: There will be documents available? His speech to the NAC? Who will be present from the ISAF mission? I didn't get the name exactly.

JAMES APPATHURAI: Present from the ISAF mission will be the Commander of the ISAF mission, that's General McChrystal. I have no information that he intends to make his remarks to the NATO Ambassadors public. So for the moment I think the only public statement will be his press conference statement. I don't expect anything from the NAC, but I'll check.

Q: Thanks James. The first one is… I'm not too updated on this review. If you can tell me what's the aim, and I understand that then it's going to be a double process between US and then NATO on its own site. And then another question, regarding the new tactical directive – I don't know if you can tell us the main differences between the one that was just previously issued, because there seems to be a very short time between one and the other, so maybe what's the main differences. And then also related is Mr… well President Karzai has been asking to reach an agreement, a framework agreement with the international troops… you know, to… between the two of them work out like… until where do international operations go or not? So if there are any contacts already? Are you both working on this, or…? Thank you.

JAMES APPATHURAI: Thank you. On the 60 day review, it's quite simple. General McChrystal when he went in to Afghanistan as the ISAF Commander was asked at the same time both by Secretary Gates and by Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer to take 60 days to take a top to bottom look at the situation, and then make an assessment of what might need to change in terms of conduct of operations, in terms of level of resources, and that is exactly what he's doing. He will provide the same report to the two who asked him to provide it. So it is a clean slate look at what the situation is and what he thinks needs to be done. General McChrystal's tactical directive I think was in the same spirit as General McKiernan's but took it a step further. I think the philosophical change was the one that I mentioned. And that was he says very explicitly protection of civilians is the main effort. And that is a shift away from going after the bad guys to protecting civilians. And building on that philosophical shift General McChrystal has, and I have to say General McKiernan also made great efforts in this regard, gone even further in placing restrictions on the use of both close air support and indirect fire where there is any chance that civilians might be involved. In civilian areas, civilian compounds, he has also further tightened again what General McKiernan started, and that is ensuring that ISAF forces involve to the greatest possible extent Afghan forces, and in particular where that might involve conduct of operations that would be offensive to Afghan society. And that includes of course very much house searches, compound searches.

Q: (Inaudible)

JAMES APPATHURAI: Indeed, but the extent, the extent to which he puts restrictions on it is greater than had been there in the past. But to me the two critical areas… these are the three critical areas: the philosophical change, the much greater restriction on the use of close air support, and the greater emphasis on having Afghan forces conduct those operations that might be culturally sensitive. Shall we go back there? Oh-oh, I'll come back.

Q: From China Radio International, and… The Assistant Secretary of the United States Philip Gordon said Russia can join NATO if it meets the requirements. Can you have any… some comments on it?

JAMES APPATHURAI: Sure. I think the bottom line is this: Russia has never demonstrated any serious interest of which I am aware in joining the Alliance. I don't think it is on the agenda today. I don't think it will be on the agenda tomorrow. We have a very good partnership system in place for working together with Russia. It has not come close to meeting its full potential for political reasons I think that we all understand. I think from the NATO point of view, Russian membership in the Alliance is not let's say, on the horizon. What is an immediate piece of work is to make the NRC work better. And that is where we are focusing our efforts.

Q: Yeah, James. Just two questions. First, if in that informal NAC with Holbrooke there was any discussion of the ideas that were presented to NATO by David Miliband? And in particular about reconciliation with so-called moderate insurgents, and on this idea that greater burden should be placed on the Afghan authorities. And secondly just in terms of housekeeping, is there only you in these days, or is Carmen back, and if on Monday access is for non-accredited NATO people or not?

JAMES APPATHURAI: Thanks. To answer the first question on Miliband. I think the ideas that Secretary Miliband put into his speech are certainly ideas that in many ways are shared by NATO in general. And the two that you mentioned are shared by NATO in general. One that engaging with those elements of the insurgency who are willing to abide by the constitution of the country will have to be part of a solution to the overall problems that Afghanistan faces. Nobody disagrees with that. There is no exclusively military solution to this. There will have to be a political solution, and that involves talking to those insurgents who are willing to as I say, abide by the laws of the country.

Also, there is a shared view in NATO, which I think… There is a shared view in NATO that another essential element of the solution is better Afghan, or improvements in the Afghan fight against corruption, improvement in the capacity of the Afghan government to services to its people. And we intend I think as an alliance both to support those reforms and to encourage them once the elections of course are completed.

I think that was that. You asked, oh yes, and let me answer this one question that I hadn't answered before. The idea of some kind of arrangement that President Karzai has once again put on the table is some kind of arrangement governing the presence of foreign forces is something that has come up before. We have as ISAF a UN mandate, which is of course a full legal basis, and we're there on the invitation of the… of the Afghan government. General Wardak I think well over a year ago sent a letter with some ideas for how we might discuss some kind of further institutionalization of the presence of international forces in Afghanistan. That is a discussion NATO is very much willing to have. And we have made that point to the Afghan government. It has not really gone very far forward, but NATO is very willing to have that discussion when the Afghan government wishes to have it.

Q: You said the new Secretary General's a punctual man, and a NATO official said we should perhaps expect an aggressive media strategy. I know you won’t want to pre-empt what he's going to say Monday at the same time. I imagine this weekend, Monday certainly we'll be doing some curtain-raiser style papers. Could you perhaps tell us a bit more about what we should expect from the new Secretary General?

JAMES APPATHURAI: Well I don't think it's a good idea for a new spokesman, which I will be again on Monday, to preview his political priorities. That's not my job. But what I can say – let me think what I can say – what I can say is you're quite right about one thing, and that is he is determined that NATO should be as transparent an organisation as possible. And he will devote a lot of his time to that, both in terms of our public diplomacy – and that is something we look forward to – but also in terms of the more substantive areas of policy, and I think specifically of the Strategic Concept. I think you will see him announce on Monday the most transparent, the most inclusive process of public consultation certainly that NATO has ever had. I suspect, and I'm no expert on this, but I suspect it's more transparent and more inclusive than any international organisation has ever had in developing its guiding documents. There will be I believe extensive public consultation in NATO countries, and maybe even beyond. There will be discussion fora on the NATO web site that will be not only monitored, but I expect that the conclusions or the comments that people make will not just be responded to but will be fed into the decision-makers who are drafting the documents. So from a public engagement point of view, you are absolutely right. Mr. Rasmussen intends to make NATO more transparent and more consultative certainly than it has ever been before.

Q: Will that extend to military (inaudible)?

JAMES APPATHURAI: Will they be more? Well, you'll have to ask the Military Committee and SHAPE. (LAUGHTER) They have their own spokespeople. Please. I'll come back to you.

Q: James, tu as parlé de philosophie tout à l'heure…

JAMES APPATHURAI: Oui.

Q: …à propos de la réduction des bombardements et le soutien des troupes au sol. Alors j'ai deux questions. Comment ça se fait qu'il ait fallu des années pour en arriver à cette conclusion qu'il était possible de réduire cet appui aérien? Deux: comment ça se fait qu'on dise que c'est possible maintenant sans mettre en danger la vie des soldats, puisque le prétexte ou justification était de ne jamais mettre en danger la vie de nos soldats? Est-ce qu'il y a un changement de priorités?

JAMES APPATHURAI: Merci pour ça. Il faut comprendre quelques changements et quelques choses qui n'ont pas changé. Une chose qui n'a pas changé c'est que la vie de nos soldats est très précieux (sic). Et on ne va… on peut jamais, on ne va jamais mettre en risque leurs vies de façon cavalier. Mais il faut toujours comprendre que si on envoi un soldat en Afghanistan pour combattre des extrémistes extrêmement violents, leurs vies sont en risque. Alors c'est toujours une question de balance des risques. Malheureusement c'est comme ça, et ça demande toujours un jugement militaire: combien de risques on peut accepter à la vie de nos soldats pour avoir un succès dans la mission. C'est devenu clair ces dernières années que le nombre de civils qui perdent leurs vies en Afghanistan, évidemment trop haut. Notre analyse est clair: c'est que les extrémistes, en particulier les Talibans, font tout, et depuis deux, trois années font beaucoup plus pour attirer des frappes aériennes contre les civils pour la réaction… pour que la réaction de la population soit contre les forces internationaux. Et il fallait réagir contre ce tactique, parce que nous sommes évidemment très, très conscient de la vie des civils. Alors prenons en contexte ce tactique, prenons en contexte… prenons en compte pardon le fait que les nombres de pertes civiles était trop haut… trop haut. Je dis encore, selon nous, largement à cause des tactiques assassiniques (sic) des Talibans, General McChrystal a décidé que le moment était venu pour un changement assez clair. Ça ne veut pas dire qu'on a éliminé l'utilisation des frappes aériennes si nécessaire, y compris quand la vie de nos soldats est clairement en danger. Ça reste possible, et ça reste desfois utilisé. Mais voilà. Je pense que j'ai répondu à la question.

Q: (inaudible)… que le nombre était trop, trop haut. Quel est le nombre qui a été des victimes durant… Depuis le début des opérations jusqu'à présent?

JAMES APPATHURAI: Je ne sais pas. Mais je ne sais pas parce que nous avons juste l'année passé mis en œuvre un système qui était plus fiable, mais ça c'est notre système. Il y avait évidemment un système de l'ONU, et même l'ONU il y a UNAMA, il y a UNHCR, il y a beaucoup de chiffres différentes. Et je pense que nos numéros, nos chiffres étaient beaucoup plus bas, vous vous rappeler il y a deux mois, que les chiffres de l'ONU. Alors franchement je ne sais pas le dire. Please, now, they were waiting for awhile.

Q: (inaudible) …. previous question. You did… You placed the fact of the large number of NATO casualties recently in the context of this tactical directive, which does raise the question of the relationship between the two. I mean are you saying that the high number of casualties of NATO forces is related to this change of strategy?

JAMES APPATHURAI: No, I was expecting that question. I want to be very clear: no, I am not saying that. What I am saying is that we have taken an enormous number of casualties over the past month and a half. Despite the high number of casualties, despite the high number of casualties, the restraint in the use of air strikes has remained. And I think that is the point I would like to make.

Q: (inaudible) the large number of casualties being caused by…?

JAMES APPATHURAI: I know. And what I'm trying to say is no. The large number of casualties has not been caused by the restraint in the use of close air support. Where our…

Q: Isn't it logical to expect that…

JAMES APPATHURAI: No, it's not.

Q: …if you have more…

JAMES APPATHURAI: Because – let me…

Q: …ground contact and less air strikes, you're going to have more soldiers getting hit by bullets?

JAMES APPATHURAI: I think that's an easy conclusion, but not the right one. First, because close air support has not been eliminated where the soldiers… where the lives of our soldiers are clearly at risk, there is no alternative, they can still be used. But secondly, because of course many of the casualties that we have taken have been from IEDs. And I would say the vast majority have been from IEDs in an area where NATO forces have I said pushed into new territory that the Taleban had prepared with booby traps in every direction. Hundreds of IEDs hidden in walls, hidden in the ground. This is not relevant to close air support, but… and so I would hope that you would as you write this clearly try to separate the two. They are not linked by definition. But I will give you another example, and you would have read this. There was a number, an incident a little while ago, about a month ago, where a number of fighters went into a building. Later, because of concerns that there were civilians in the building, I think this was in Helmand, there was no strike brought down on the building, the civilians left, dressed in burqas, it turned out later that the Taleban had left dressed in burqas, and they were let go. And they were let go not… they didn't know they were Taleban, but they managed to escape because no air strike was drawn down on the building. That is the kind of calculus that is being made: it is better to let them go in the end if you've tried everything else, than to bring an airstrike down on a building that might be full of civilians. Please.

Q: German Television ZTF. We talked in the last year a lot about the comprehensive approach now with the rise of these military operations in Afghanistan. Does this mean that the comprehensive approach has been set aside, or is just the priority more on the military operations for the moment? And secondly, could you just remind me of the figures in Afghanistan, how many troops are there for the moment, and how many American troops are currently in Afghanistan. Thank you.

JAMES APPATHURAI: Thank you. The comprehensive approach has certainly not been set aside, and it was very much the subject of discussion between Ambassador Holbrooke and the other allies. And I'll give you a perfectly good example. Operation Panther Claw, this is the push that's been taking place in Helmand, has as the British government announced, basically completed its first phase. That's the clear phase. Then you get to the hold and the build phase. And we can hold, but somebody else has to build, that is for the rest of the international community to do. And it is an essential part – it remains an essential part of success in Afghanistan. The EU… Mr. Bildt has I think very publicly said that the European Union would be devoting much more attention to this in the coming months, and we welcome that. It is essential that for NATO and for the success of the overall effort that the increase in the military operation is matched by an increase in the civilian elements of development, of reconstruction, of institution building. All of that needs to happen and more of it needs to happen even as we do more on the military side. Sorry, did you have a second question? Oh yeah, numbers. Yeah, there's about I think now the number is about 64,000 total ISAF troops, about half of which are American, and the number of Americans will go up.

Q: Yes, a single question about Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

JAMES APPATHURAI: Could you be Danish? Are you Danish?

Q: Yeah, I am Danish.

JAMES APPATHURAI: Because you could pronounce it and I can't…

Q: Yeah.

(LAUGHTER)

Q: You will learn, you will learn. After a first couple of days, you have scheduled the first couple of days that he will start, but do you have any information on the official visits, or what his plans are for the rest of August?

JAMES APPATHURAI: I have ideas, but all of it is to be confirmed, and I can't confirm it. They haven't confirmed it to me until Monday. So I won't know until Monday, and I can't announce anything until it's confirmed. (inaudible). So sorry, but I'll have it for you soon.

Q: Hello. Hubert Neubach, German radio. You spoke about the cultural sensitive operations that are supposed to be taken over by more Afghan forces now, but there has been a lot of talk about not being enough… not having enough trained personnel, skilled personnel, reliable personnel. Is there now enough trained people, trained Afghans to take these tasks, or are you simply reducing house searches and things like that?

JAMES APPATHURAI: Well do we have enough overall Afghan forces? No, we don't. I think that's clear to say. We are close to meeting the target that had been set… Well not even that close. The target for the Afghan National Army is 134,000. That's the agreed number, and we're nowhere near that yet. I add that that number might one day also grow, but anyway we're not even at the agreed target that we have. Afghan national police, I think the target is around seventy or eighty thousand. They are closer to that figure. But you quite rightly point out that the level of training and expertise is not necessarily where we would want it to be. So are there shortfalls? Yes. Is this affecting precisely the operations that are of cultural sensitivity? I don't know the answer to that. Does it mean that we don't have enough Afghan forces at the exact spot that we need to do house searches? I don't know. They may well be there. So I can't necessarily make the link. But the overall number is not where… we have not yet reached even the targets that we have now, and those targets may also not yet… not necessarily be sufficient. The Afghans certainly think that those numbers should grow beyond the 134,000 target. Please.

Q: Brooks Tigner, Janes. One thing Holbrooke told us was… there was a lot of worry about the money flows going to the Taleban, including the drug trade as well as other sources, but is it reasonable to assume that if air support is going down and being restricted to the most critical areas, the Taleban logically would start mixing more and more with the mobile laboratories, and the fixed laboratories for the drugs, etc in order to protect these from raids and bombs, etc or am I off the mark there? It seemed to be that you may be looking at another spike in drug-related money flowing to… to the Taleban.

JAMES APPATHURAI: Well… That may… I don't know if that's the case. What I can say is based on the analyses we've gotten in NATO, the most recent operations have netted tons of drugs, and taken if not tens of thousands even more than that out of… of Euros or dollars out of the… out of the hands of… out of – I'm just checking to see if I have the figure here; I don't have the figure here, though I have heard it – out of the hands of the Taleban. So to be honest, our overall assessment since the tactical directive was put in place… And I'm sorry I don't have the figures with you. I should have brought them, but I'll bring them next week. Is… Thousands of tons of drugs have been interdicted and/or destroyed. Dozens of labs have been destroyed. A number of drug dealers, let's use that word, drug lords have been arrested. So the assessment in NATO I have to say is very, very positive when it comes to dealing with the drug issue over the past months. We have taken a lot of drugs and a lot of money out of circulation, or a lot of drugs out of circulation and a lot of money out of the pockets of the Taleban. So I can't say on this issue there is a great concern in NATO. On the contrary, I think we're rather encouraged. Please.

Q: On Kosovo, James. There was some incident a month ago with the Serbian police in Southern Serbia. Has there been… Have there been any developments on that on the NATO side? I think there's some investigation going on, or something like that?

JAMES APPATHURAI: There was… I think if you're referring to the incidents, they were in the Presevo Valley, this is outside of territory where KFOR has the possibility to operate. I know that Serb authorities have expressed concern that support for this might have come from inside of Kosovo. KFOR is not a police service, nor does it have authority to operate in the Presevo Valley, nor does it have any intention to operate in the Presevo Valley. So I don't know beyond that what has happened, but I suspect this is not 100% a KFOR issue. I don't even think it's zero per cent a KFOR issue, unless I'm missing something. Am I missing something that you know of? No? OK, good.

Q: (inaudible) on Kosovo on the levels. Do you… when do you think there could be, because there was already an agreement to drop down troops on KFOR. When do you think the first phase of the reduction might actually…

JAMES APPATHURAI: There… there was a political agreement to move forward. The next step however was political and military analysis. Those political and military analyses I believe are circulating, and I frankly do not doubt that there will be a positive decision to begin moving towards the first gate, as we call it the first phase, relatively soon. But I don't know the timelines on that. What I can say is we are now at the next stage of the process, which is the military and political analyses are with the nations, which would form the basis for their decision to activate the move to the next stage. Please?

Q: Chris Dixon, EDD. I've got some but they're short. The time frame for the draw-down. We heard January of next year. Is that still a possibility? Second question: any idea of the number of Taleban – either active Taleban fighter either in Helmand or in Afghanistan as a whole? And what happened to the AWACS? Are they moving? We were talking about less emphasis on drawing down air strikes. I'm thinking less air traffic. I'm thinking perhaps less need for AWACS.

JAMES APPATHURAI: Are you? (LAUGHTER) Is January still a possibility? Yes. Second, the number of Taleban. I don't know. I… I have seen the same range of figures you have seen. I remember being told in 2004 when I took up this job that there were 450 left in all of Afghanistan. I think that wasn't true. And this, not from the lowest ranked person in the military hierarchy, I can tell you. So it's also I think fair to say that the number of Taleban in Afghanistan is not necessarily the most… or the only question, right? There is an open border. People go across that border back and forth. So in fact it's the question: how many extremists who want to do what they want to do in Afghanistan are there in the region, and I don't know the answer to that question, and I don't know that anybody really knows the answer to that question. It's unfortunately more than we would want. Is there less need for AWACS? No. The skies of Afghanistan are increasingly full of aircraft, both military and civilian. And the US has brought in an entire group of about 100-plus helicopters just into the south, to give you an example, over the past little while. Commercial air traffic is growing substantially. More intelligence assets, ie. or including drones, are being brought in. So the need for better air traffic control has not diminished. Where are we? We are still in discussion with more than one country both about basing, and about overflight. These are technical but very legal discussions as well with regard to the immunities of pilots, etc, or crews and staff. So it doesn't go quite as quickly as we would like, but the… governments with which we are in discussion are I think approaching these discussions with a very positive mindset, understanding the importance of it. So I suspect we will get the deals necessary relatively soon.

Q: James… do you have any concrete information on the ceasefire of the Talebans in the region of Badghis?

JAMES APPATHURAI: Yeah, well I have…

Q: And… Oh, I'm sorry.

JAMES APPATHURAI: Sorry, go ahead, go ahead.

Q: No, another question for tomorrow. Will we have any opportunity to talk to Mr. Scheffer?

JAMES APPATHURAI: The answer to both those questions is no. I don't have any particular information on whether there was a ceasefire, whether it was a real ceasefire, what was the relevance of it. I have no… no information beyond what you have seen, and I have seen many contradictory things. Mr. De Hoop Scheffer has… is not planning for the moment to speak to the media tomorrow – directly to the media. Please.

Q: (inaudible) deploiement des AWACS dans les émirats ou ailleurs. Est-ce qu'il y en a déjà en Turquie?

JAMES APPATHURAI: Est-ce qu'il y a des gens en Turquie?

Q: Est-ce qu'il y a déjà des AWACS?

JAMES APPATHURAI: Si je comprends bien, il n'y a pas de AWACS en Turquie en ce moment. Peut-etre il y a des gens. Mais… il n'y a pas de… pas de… il y a un mot… pas avion, mais un autre mot… De toute façon, tous les avions sont à leurs bases en Allemagne. Please.

Q: Several American media have been reporting that the increase in American troops is likely to be followed by a new increase in the use of private military contractors as well. In other words, mercenaries. Are all Allies comfortable with such an increase, if it should happen in Afghanistan? And is everybody confident that there is sufficient oversight and control of these private contractors?

JAMES APPATHURAI: First, I should say this: private military contractors doesn't equal mercenaries. There is a lot of very important work done by private military contractors in Afghanistan, also in Iraq. We have not had the same complications in Afghanistan that have been seen in Iraq. That's true. But I wouldn't want to sort of denigrate the people who do that work. They're not just mercenaries. They do very difficult and dangerous work with us. President Karzai I think has recently made a comment on private military companies It is for the Afghan government of course also to have a say in what happens, for the Afghan government to have the say in what happens in their own territory. But what I can say from a NATO point of view is we have had no problems of which I am aware with regard to the conduct of private military companies in Afghanistan that work with ISAF. I cannot speak for any other body but NATO. I am not aware of any problems, either disciplinary or in the conduct of their operations, of private military companies in Afghanistan who work with us. Does that mean that we don't watch? We do watch carefully what is done, but we have had a good experience I have to say until now.

Q: Fukushima, Mainichi News. A Belgian Senator Philippe Mahoux is going to propose a bill I think in September to ban nuclear arsenals weapons in Belgium, and do you have any comment on that? And I think in the current Strategic Concept of 1999, it said NATO would maintain their nuclear arsenal in Europe at the minimum level. During the course of this… this review, it going to be one of the topics to be debated? (sic)

JAMES APPATHURAI: Thank you. I have no comment, I think you'll understand, on the statement by a Belgian Senator. NATO's policy has not changed, and that is that the Alliance believes that an… a combination of conventional and as you say the minimum necessary level of nuclear capability is an essential mix for the Alliance to provide the security and deterrence for its member states. Will that be discussed as part of the strategic concept review? Obviously I cannot predict. I can say that at the first seminar, which the Secretary General, the current Secretary General held to discuss the strategic concept, he invited Mohamed El-Baradei, this was not a coincidence, to comment and Mohamed El-Baradei made his personal views known on NATO's nuclear policy. I would not be surprised therefore that others might make a similar point, and that it might well be something that is at least discussed in the context. That being said, I have not heard any government hint at any change to NATO's nuclear policy.

Q: (inaudible) nuclear assets?

JAMES APPATHURAI: NATO doesn't have its own nuclear assets, no. The nuclear assets are held by the member states. Nothing under NATO command. We have a Nuclear Planning Group. We… NATO… Allies through NATO contribute to setting standards for the safety of nuclear weapons as they are held, safety standards of them, and contribute too financially and in other expert ways for ensuring their protection, but they are held by the states themselves. This, you can understand, is a question of the non-proliferation treaty. And therefore they are held by the declared nuclear weapons states.

Q: Coming back to the Kosovo issue and the Presevo problems. What’s the exp… When talking about the withdrawal, possible withdrawal of more KFOR troops, what's your expertise on the progress that Kosovan-owned (sic) forces make in terms of policing, in terms of border policing. When we talk about the Presevo Valley, it's very much about like Kosovans (sic) crossing the border possibly. So what's the progress as you… as far as you know the Kosovans' own forces make?

JAMES APPATHURAI: Well there are three elements here, because it's not just Kosovar security capabilities, EULEX is very much a part of this discussion. I think the bottom line is this: the assessment of the NATO military commanders is that the current situation less and less demands the presence of international military forces. This is less and less a question of an international military problem. It is increasingly a question of law and order. Challenges that can be handled by non-military actors. And non-military actors is what is aside from KFOR in Kosovo there is no Kosovar Army. There will not be a Kosovar Army. The Kosovo Security Force is not an army. It is a lightly-armed smallish civilian body. The Kosovo Police Service is increasingly effective. And now with the return of several hundred I understand Serb participants is much more multi-ethnic and more representative than it has been in the past and that's a good thing. And EULEX is now not only deployed throughout Kosovo, but increasingly present and flexing its muscles frankly in the North. And that's a good thing. So the assessment from NATO is the security bodies on the ground there, aside from KFOR, are increasingly capable. There is a diminished requirement for a very large KFOR presence, but let me point out that there is no NATO plan for a total withdrawal. KFOR will remain in Kosovo, even at the end of the move to a deterrent presence, with a substantial military force if necessary for whatever actions are required.

One more, one more. Then I gotta go. Yeah.

Q: James, can you already report on some progress on the reintegration of France in the military structure of NATO?

JAMES APPATHURAI: In what way?

Q: Any way.

JAMES APPATHURAI: Well I think I can…

Q: The division of jobs, and posts and…

JAMES APPATHURAI: All that is very clear. The flags to post, in other words which nation is assigned to which position, has already been agreed. So France knows, like everybody else, exactly which posts it will get in the new integrated, or in the integrated military structure. I think the most prominent one is of course – hang on a second, what time is it? In five minutes, unless something has happened, the… we will have agreement on General Abrial. But I can't confirm that because something might have happened in the last hour, so we'll let you know thirty minutes from now, but it's very likely that General Abrial has been confirmed to be the new Supreme Allied Commander Transformation to replace General Mattis. France is contributing to all the military budgets, like every other ally, except of course the Nuclear Planning Group. They're not a member of that, everything else. So as far as we're concerned, the reintegration is taking place exactly as it should. It is all agreed. It is without controversy, and it is going forward as normal. Thank you.