Weekly press briefing

James Appathurai (NATO Spokesperson): Friends and colleagues thank you for coming. Let me quickly get through what I have to get through, and then I will happily take your questions on any issues of interest to you. Let me start with something you all know, and that is the decision by the United States Secretary of Defence, approved by the President, to nominate Lt-Gen. Stanley McChrystal to be the new COMISAF, and of Lt-Gen. David Rodriguez, who is the former Commander of RC East, Regional Command East, as Deputy US Forces Afghanistan. These nominations have yet to be confirmed by the US Senate. I understand that the intention on the part of the United States is to move relatively quickly with that, ie. weeks rather than months, but that is of course an internal US process. The NATO Secretary-General of course was called by Secretary Gates before the announcement to discuss it. The North Atlantic Council has been fully informed by the US Ambassador. The nominations, as I mentioned, have yet to be confirmed by the US Senate. Let me stress, or note, of course that General McKiernan has done very well from a NATO point of view as COMISAF. He’s very well-respected throughout NATO and I can’t comment any more on General McChrystal until of course he is formally approved by the Senate and takes up his new position.

On Afghanistan, there has been… sorry, let me just make one more point on this. Lt-Gen. Rodriguez, as I mentioned, has been nominated as Deputy Commander for US Forces in Afghanistan with the COMISAF being double-hatted also is commander of US Forces Afghanistan. This is a three-star position. It is, as you know, in line with the increase in the number of US Forces. Gen. Rodriguez will wear a US hat; he will not be part of a NATO command structure. The ISAF and OEF missions remain separate. The ISAF mandate stays as it is. The command structure does not change, just to be clear from that announcement.

On Afghanistan, and I have done this before, I have now got in somewhat more detail a number of statistics on security in Afghanistan which I would like to share with you. And I’d like to put them into context, because of course the newspapers and television screens and web sites have been full of reports of various acts of violence in Afghanistan over the past weeks and months, as they have been of course for Pakistan as well. If you see for example what has happened in Khost (K-H-O-S-T) over the past couple of days - multiple suicide attacks certainly is an unstable situation. But I’d like to point out that even in this context of these attacks, this is nine or ten suicide bombers - coordinated attacks - and in essence they were a failure. A near total failure considering the very limited effect that they had for a very short period of time. And this is not the only attack of its kind in Afghanistan that has indeed failed, and it is the result – from our point of view – of effective, and increasingly effective Afghan security forces that have done very well to defend government buildings against attacks, that have dealt with hostage situations quickly and have brought the hostages out in this case. And if you look at similar attacks in the region over the past year or so, it is worth pointing out how well the Afghan forces have done. And I’ll come back to that in a second because I’d like to put the security situation into a larger context.

The frame of reference is statistics comparing January to April 2009 versus January to April 2008. First, and I’ll just run through these numbers and then we can discuss them afterwards. A 64% increase in insurgent-initiated attacks. So they have gone up. They have not spread. 80% of the attacks still occur in 11%, 12% depending on which one of these numbers I see, but let’s say around 12% of the districts. So more attacks but in the same area. Civilian deaths down 44%. Kidnappings and assassinations down 17%. Fifty of the seventy-nine Afghan battalions are now capable of independent operations. There is a poll, it is done by ANQAR, it’s A-N-Q-A-R, a poll taken regularly by an international polling agency which sub-contracts to a national one. You can Google it if you want. It’s a poll taken of 8,000-plus Afghans in all thirty-four Provinces. This is on Afghan perceptions, taken in March. 35% of Afghans say security is better now than it was six months ago. The last quarter survey results showed 28%. So it’s a 7% increase. Flip side is 13% say security is worse than it was six months ago. The last quarter survey results were 17%. So that has improved.

I’ll keep going, and then we can come back to any of these if you want. There has been an 81% increase in IED events. Now I want to come back and describe “events.” Events includes attacks using IEDs, but it also includes discoveries, so it is both. The total casualties from IEDs were down 9% despite the 81% increase in these events, and it reflects the fact that a high percentage are being found and turned over. Which is not always the same thing, but found and turned over. I might add, sorry, when we come back to civilian deaths being down 44%, this figure confirms what I had briefed you a few weeks ago. Since January ’07 insurgents have caused 80% of civilian deaths, according to NATO-ISAF civilian casualties tracking cell.

Q: (inaudible)

James Appathurai: No, January ’07 to now. That’s January ’07 to now. Counter-narcotics, very… well, to me interesting. Seizures and destructions. First, in 2009 to date, 35 drug labs have been destroyed. In terms of seizures and destructions, and it doesn’t specify which is seizures and which is destructions, but seizure and destruction, I’ll give you the numbers for 2009 to date. 18,000 kilos of opium, compared to 6,000 for all of last year. So this year to date 18,000 kilos of opium have been… Eighteen. 17,935, let’s put it that way. So eighteen tonnes, basically, of opium, compared to six for all of last year. 3,906 kilos, so almost four tonnes of morphine. About four tonnes of hashish. Thirty-two tonnes of poppies… poppy seed. Sorry, thirty-two tonnes. 32,000 kilos of poppy seed. And about 20,000 kilos, twenty tonnes, of chemical precursors which are used to make opium.

The last thing I want to quote to you is from a USAID, basically roads… it’s called the USAID Roads Socio-Economic Impact Assessment, which compares summer ’08 to baseline data collected in ’03. You can look it up, it’s USAID public information. Traffic volumes in Afghanistan are up 58%, i.e. the volume of traffic on the road. Travel times have decreased 74%. The number of businesses up 56%. Gross sales, total sales up 400%. Household income up 40%. Irrigated land up 47%. This is all assessing the impact of roads. It’s not throughout the country, but the impact of road improvements.

I’m going to give one last set of data… and then…

Q: (inaudible)

James Appathurai: Yeah. This is baseline August 2008 compared to August 2003. And an assessment on the impact of road construction. The final thing I’ll give you is on education. These are incremental improvements, not huge, but 2008 over 2007, there are about 2,000 more schools built. Sorry, there are 2,000 more schools in use in 2008 than in 2007. There’s about 9,000 in 2007 and about 11,000 in 2008. Stop me if I’m boring you, but I think it’s of some interest. And the adult literacy rate - there’s no comparison here, this is just the figure now for 2008, so I just give it to you for information’s sake. The adult literacy rate is 28%. Men is 43% and women is 12%, so clearly some work to do in that regard.

Let me mention a couple of other things with regard to Afghanistan. Kabul: less than 1.5% of attacks – kinetic activity as we call it – in Afghanistan are taking place in Kabul or the Kabul region, and that is down 15% since the Afghans took lead security responsibility in Kabul and the surrounding region. I stress, so I say that again, it is down 15% since the Afghans took the lead.

Elections security, from the briefing today in the NAC, planning and preparations are on track. They will open this month all the necessary regional coordination centres for the election. They will get the initial operating capability in other words. This is at the regional level. There will be at sub-regional level many more opening, but the regional level coordination centres will have their initial operating capability by the 15th of May. They bring together all the relevant parties: that is of course the Afghan National Army, the Afghan Police, the relevant other security forces, the Afghan Independent Electoral Commission, the UN, and ISAF - all coordinating together in these regional centres. And they will do the necessary rehearsals as they prepare for full operating capability. With regards to Afghanistan, you have seen reports from yesterday of another attack on a line of communication. Let me make the points we were briefed today. All the lines of communication through Pakistan remain open, as the militaries say, ISAF logistics are green. There is no challenge to providing supplies to our forces in Afghanistan.

Okay, that’s what I wanted to say on Afghanistan. Two more things, and then I’m happy to take your questions, which is two visits. The Secretary General will leave tomorrow to Athens, where he will meet with Prime Minister Karamanlis, Minister Bakoyianni, the President, President Papoulias, and Minister of Defence Meimarakis. On Monday? The 20th? I think it’s Monday? He will go to Luxembourg, meet with Prime Minister Juncker as well as Minister Asselborn, the Minister of Defence Mr. Schiltz, and the Chief of Defence, and that’s... The 20th is Wednesday? Oh, the 20th… indeed you’re right, sorry. But it’ll be on the 20th, so Wednesday. I think that’s all I’ve got. And I’m sure I have raised a number of questions. Please…

Q: Radio Free Europe (Inaudible)… Russia’s announced some sort of an aid for Afghanistan, bypassing NATO and ISAF…

James Appathurai: An aid to Afghanistan bypassing…

Q: To give aid, yeah. Something you…

James Appathurai: On the first question, yeah, obviously I can’t answer that. I would not be able to predict when the Taliban will be defeated, and I don’t think it’s really a question of defeat. As you know our approach in NATO, as part of the international community is to create the conditions for the Afghans to provide for their own security. We don’t have a specific timeline for that, but I do expect that this year will be difficult with regards to Taliban attacks. With regard to overall violence in the country we have brought in a substantial number of forces that will be pushing into areas, particularly in the South, that have had no significant international or Afghan security force presence, and which are being used now as transit routes for insurgents that have come across and do come across the border. So it will be I think inevitable to see an increase, particularly in those areas, in what we call contact between us and them, until our forces are in a position to create the conditions for stability and development and reconstruction. Your second question, sorry, was?

Q: Russia.

James Appathurai: Oh Russia. I have no information on a specific deal between Russia and Afghanistan. That being said, there’s no reason why they wouldn’t. They are two sovereign governments that can come up with whatever arrangements between them that they wish to arrive at. That being said, cooperation between NATO and Russia on Afghanistan is one area that has, I think, successfully been walled-off from the other difficulties that we are having, and on which our dialogue has sometimes been interrupted. Russia has kept the lines to NATO open with regards to support for Afghanistan in two key areas: transit and training for counter-narcotics officials. And we will continue to work with them in that regard.

Q: (Inaudible)… if I may? There is a lot of diplomatic activity to find a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. There was some declarations during President Aliyev’s visit that NATO’s Deputy Secretary General paid a visit to Armenia. There was a meeting in Prague between Aliyev and Sargsian. Could you please elaborate on NATO’s official position in regard to the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?

James Appathurai: Certainly. Thank you. As you know, NATO is not directly involved in the efforts to find a settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, we are concerned by the persistence of this conflict. We want to see it resolved peacefully. We fully support the efforts of the OSCE and its Minsk Group. We believe that their proposals serve as a good basis for the negotiations that are currently underway. We were encouraged by the reports coming from the meeting of the Presidents in Prague last week. And we hope that further progress can be made in the near future. S’il te plait.

Q: Oui, James, est-ce que tu peux nous dire quelles sont les prochaines étapes pour l’OTAN et la Russie maintenant qu’on a annulé la réunion du 19-20 mai?

James Appathurai: Oui. Je réponds en français et puis en anglais pour parce que je n’ai pas assez d’argent pendant cette crise financière de payer aussi la traduction. Je le fais gratuit. Les prochaines étapes. Il y aura des réunions, et j’espère bientôt, certainement au niveau des ambassadeurs, du conseil OTAN-Russie. Et nous, nous avons les vingt-huit pays membres de l’OTAN, l’intention et l’espoir d’avoir une réunion au niveau ministériel aussitôt que possible. Et il y a des discussions déjà entamées, si je comprends bien, avec la Russie, pour trouver une date convenable à la Russie pour que les vingt-neuf membres du NRC puissant se réunir au niveau des ministres… ministériel. Par exemple, au niveau des ministres des affaires étrangères. Je pense, si j’ai bien lu la presse, que c’était l’intention Russe de commencer au niveau ministériel avec une réunion des ministres des affaires étrangères. De toute façon, aussitôt que possible pour nous au niveau ministériel, et je pense dans les prochaines semaines au niveau des ambassadeurs.

Short version of that, when will the next… what will be the future of NATO-Russia cooperation? Sooner rather than later a meeting at ambassadorial level of the NRC and we are in discussions with the Russians to find a date for a ministerial level meeting if… I think the Russians have indicated an interest in doing it at foreign ministers’ level first. But certainly at ministerial level, and we will find a date as soon as possible.

Q: Yes, James. Why all of this data you have given? Is that you have been… about Afghanistan before… you don’t give us by written note?

James Appathurai: I will go through it now.

Q: Because it’s a lot of complex figures…

James Appathurai: I know it’s a lot of data...

Q: Also you have problems to (inaudible)…

James Appathurai: Yeah, I do. I got it… in the last twenty hours, and it was discussed in the North Atlantic council this morning. So it was a little bit of a quick thing, but I will, and my colleagues will go through this, shorten it up, because there is a lot in there that is not obviously for public use. But we’ll put something shorter and more concise up on the web for you as soon as possible. And I’ll send out maybe even an SMS to let you know that it’s there. They’re sending me SMS’s to tell me that they don’t want to do that, I’m sure.

(LAUGHTER)

James Appathurai: Yeah… Yeah, exactly. Please.

Q: James, you said that between January to April 2009…

James Appathurai: Yeah.

Q: …there was an increase of 64% in insurgency in the same area.

James Appathurai: Versus…

(SPEAKERS OVERLAP)

James Appathurai: January 2009 versus January 2008.

Q: So there was an increase?

James Appathurai: Yes, yes.

Q: And in the same area?

James Appathurai: Yes.

Q: So what is NATO doing and why aren’t they, you know, tackling the situation, because in the same area you said?

James Appathurai: Yeah, sorry, what was the question?

Q: Why isn’t NATO doing something about it to stop this?

James Appathurai: Well part of the problem is that NATO is doing something about it. The military is very clear that at least a part of the reason is because there are many more forces in that area than were a year ago. So our forces are more present and more active there. And that by definition means you have more contact with the… the opponents. The second reason they give is that it was a warm winter. And as a result it was easier to transit through the area for those who are making their way through the mountains, et cetera. And the third reason is of course, that the situation across the border is not easier. There’s more instability across the border than there was a year ago, and that has its effects also inside Afghanistan.

Q: James, what about the replacement of the Chief of the Information Bureau of NATO in Moscow and what is procedure of this?

James Appathurai: That’s a good question. The personnel whose accreditation has been withdrawn by the Russian Federation are still, as far as I am aware, in Moscow. No date has been given yet, again as far as I am aware, for their expulsion, and I think there are discussions underway about precisely when that should take place. Then there will have to be a procedure within NATO for their replacement, but that position, that… process has not yet begun. They are still for the moment in the city.

Q: Yeah, you said there was an 81% increase of IED attacks…

James Appathurai: IED Events…

Q: Of IED events and discoveries and that casualties are down by nine per cent?

James Appathurai: Yeah, nine.

Q: Are you referring to civilian casualties or military or both?

James Appathurai: Total. Total. They combine them.

Q: You can’t separate out…

James Appathurai: I don’t have that data. It’s overall.

Q: Uh-huh. One other question on IEDs. NATO has… that’s part of NATO’s defence against terrorism program…

James Appathurai: Yes.

Q: …but I can’t see too many concrete results of that technology group on IEDs out in the Afghan theatre. So what accounts for this decrease?

James Appathurai: Okay. Well I don’t know about the working group on defence against technologies. This is a complicated issue, and actually now that you raise it, I’m going to bring in someone who can brief you on IEDs, because I think it’s interesting. And Allied Command Transformation, as you probably know better than I do – which is usually the case when you’re asking questions – is deeply involved in integrating the new technologies and also improve training techniques and teaching people who go out there. So I’ll try to get someone from over there to brief us and explain. I think there are – from what I have heard – a number of reasons why the casualties are down. A) it is a significantly increased training effort on the part of all of our national militaries, and on the part of NATO, in particular ACT. This has become a major area of training and preparation and sharing of best practices for our forces. Second is improved technologies on the ground, including mine-resistant vehicles, and as you know the United States has shipped as fast as possible a significant number of these MRAPs precisely with better protection against these weapons. The third reason is a particular increase in turn-ins. In other words, what we are seeing – and now I give you anecdotal evidence, not something I can statistically… maybe someone can statistically justify it, but this is what I consistently hear is that after a number of years on the ground, increasingly locals have built trust and relationships with the soldiers who are there, and they see more Afghan soldiers there than they used to as well, and are coming forward to turn over… or to alert, let’s put it that way, alert western forces to the presence of, and Afghan forces to the presence of IEDs. So I know there is an increase in turn-ins, I do not know what statistically it is. But it is ascribed by the soldiers on the ground to after a long, long period of presence and cooperation as sort of an increase in trust. Those are the explanations I’ve got.

Q: James could you… on counter-piracy operations…

James Appathurai: Yeah.

Q: …could you give us an update on what assets are in the area? What are NATO’s plans, the next moves that are planned, and maybe give us a bit of an appreciation of what NATO assets could do there and could not do there?

James Appathurai: Well the current mission continues until the end of June. And I believe it’s still four ships, but Carmen who’s listening will tell me if that’s changed in any way, because she really does know everything and should probably do this briefing. There are discussions now underway in NATO, and I think they are close to achieving, or reaching a next step. There are discussions now underway in NATO about tasking the military to do the planning necessary for a longer-term mission. Beyond the redeployment of the SM… of the Standing Maritime Group. So that would be beyond the end of June. The issues – here it comes – five. Thank you. Spain, a Spanish ship, a Portuguese ship, a Dutch ship, a Canadian ship, and an American Ship. Spain, Portugal, Dutch, Canada, US. The ambassadors are literally now putting the final touches on what’s called the initiating directive, which tasks the military to do the military planning for a longer-term mission, including the necessary legal arrangements. Including for detention. And so this is not an easy issue. So I wouldn’t want to predict, and there would be a final decision on it, but certainly there is activity now, and I mean today, on putting as I say the final touches on the initiating directive. When that is done, the military will immediately begin work to lay out the planning for something that could follow the end of June mission. And that’s where we are.

Q: (Inaudible).

James Appathurai: Well I mean we’re in the middle of the mission and we don’t have yet, as far as I am aware, our lessons learned. But from what I have read and I’m giving you the James Appathurai, not the military assessment, what seems to be the case is this. What we have seen is a significant increase in the number of attacks, despite the increase in the number of ships off the coast of Somalia. There has been a decrease in the effectiveness of those attacks. They are no longer as effective as they used to be in achieving their results. In other words in terms of boarding and taking captive the ship. But since there are so many more of them, the overall result is a significant uptake, and I don’t have it off the top of my head, I had it last week, but the numbers are easy to track down if you go to the International Maritime Bureau. They… you can find the numbers there.

Q: (Inaudible).

James Appathurai: Yeah.

Q: How do you assess the possibilities that the European or the EU members of NATO, the European members of NATO will participate in that upcoming NATO naval task force?

James Appathurai: Let me just finish the assessment and I’ll come to that, because I think it’s important. So what does it mean? It means that A) the international community, and it has to be led by the United Nations, needs to look at two things. One is how we do better at sea, and that means yes a coordinated effort, B) an international framework for dealing with pirates who are detained. That is a very, very big hole right now. It is to a great extent ad hockery when it comes to dealing with pirates at sea. National laws apply, or arrangements such as the EU has with Kenya, but there isn’t an over-arching framework. So that’s one area of work that needs to be addressed, and it is being addressed. For example, there’s a working group on piracy in the UN context which is chaired by the Danes. And they have been, even in the last two days, focused on these issues. NATO participated in that meeting. So there is ongoing work in the UN context. Second, of course the much bigger issue is dealing with the cause and not the symptom, and that’s what happens on the ground. NATO has no role, no intention of having a role (let me be very clear) in dealing with what’s happening on the ground. But in the end, piracy at sea is a symptom of instability and poverty in Somalia, and that needs to be dealt with… somehow, if we are going to effectively solve the problem of piracy as well. I have no doubt that the EU countries who are also in NATO will participate also in the NATO mission. That is very clear politically from the discussions that are taking place now. For example the Dutch will be leading in the Atlanta mission near the end of this year, but are participating actively in the mission, the NATO operation now, and also in shaping, I can tell you with the long-term mission. So there is no schism between the two organizations for the EU members when it comes to piracy.

Last one then I’ve got to run.

Q: (Inaudible): … la position officiel (inaudible) de l’OTAN sur la cours du conflit Nagorno-Karabakh?

James Appathurai: Oui, je viens de le faire, mais je peux le refaire en français. Malheureusement, je dois le traduire de l’anglais ce que j’ai écrit, et ma traduction n’est pas parfaitement dis-on… bon, n’est pas parfaite, mais voilà, j’essaye. L’OTAN n’est pas directement… ne fait pas partie directement des efforts de trouver un accord au conflit de Nagorno-Karabakh. Ceci dit, l’OTAN évidemment est préoccupée de la persistance de ce conflit et aimerait que ça soit résolu de façon paisible. Nous soutenons pleinement les efforts de médiation de l’OSCE et de la (sic) groupe Minsk, et nous pensons que leurs propositions sont une bonne base pour les négociations qui sont en cours. Nous sommes encouragés par les rapports qui viennent des réunions des deux présidents à Prague la semaine passée et nous espérons qu’il y aura du progrès aussi vite que possible. Merci à vous. Merci à vous.