Weekly Press Briefing

JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesperson): Friends, thank you for coming. It's a very nice day so I will try to be brief. Let me just run through the NAC agenda for you and try to pull out some of the highlights.

First was a farewell to the Permanent Representative of Hungary, Ambassador Martinusz. He will be moving to the European Union, but that was a ceremonial if very important event for us.

Secondly, a discussion of operations and missions. A review of ongoing operations in Afghanistan. I'd like to pull out just two things from that briefing which otherwise just described the current state of play of ongoing operations.

One was to note that based on... sorry, let me phrase this more carefully. This part does not come from the discussion in the council - thank you - but from a separate briefing that I got this morning comparing the months January to March 2008 to January to March 2009. Civilian deaths in Afghanistan are down 40 percent, 39 percent to be more precise, which I think is at least in some part a reflection of the many steps taken by Commander ISAF to reduce the civilian casualties that are the result of NATO-ISAF operations, including of course very much increased co-ordination with Afghan authorities and the tactical directive which you know which has imposed a more careful approach to military operations where they might cause civilian casualties. This is only ISAF.

That same data set indicated - and this is based on the revised civilian casualty tracking cell in which we have I have to say quite some confidence - that in that same period 81 percent of the civilian deaths have been caused by the Taliban and other insurgents. So 19 percent of the total caused by international forces. Let me stress international forces. But for ISAF.... sorry, overall civilian deaths are down 39 percent.

Let me pre-empt the obvious question. What are the numbers? I don't have the precise numbers, so I can't give them to you.

Q: (Inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: I doubt it based on what I have seen.

Q: The figures you're giving out... totals, not just ones caused by international forces?

APPATHURAI: No, it's not only caused by international forces. As far as we can see it is overall civilian deaths.

Q: Does this not include Enduring Freedom?

APPATHURAI: Let me check it and get back to you. So hold off on this. Let me check that and get back to you.

Q: We can't hear the -

APPATHURAI: Sorry, yeah, yeah. It's whether or not this includes Enduring Freedom. Sorry... how would it include...? I mean its civilian deaths caused by... you mean civilian deaths caused by... no, it does include -

Q: But you said just ISAF you said.

APPATHURAI: No, no. Sorry. Let me start again. This is for international forces.

Q: All international forces in Afghanistan?

APPATHURAI: Yes. This includes all international forces in Afghanistan. But when you say "this includes" it includes... its all civilian deaths and overall they are down 40 percent and it is I think at least, in part, a reflection of the increased activity or the increased effort by international forces to reduce them.

I think it's important to stress this because there was a great concern about civilian casualties in Afghanistan and rightly so. But it is important then to note that despite the increase in international forces, efforts to reduce the numbers of civilian casualties are having an effect and that is something that I think we shouldn't forget.

Q: Does this mean that the civilian deaths caused by the Taliban are down in numbers too?

APPATHURAI: I have no way of tracking the civilian deaths caused by the Taliban obviously. I don't know.

Q: Still with the same subject. I seem to remember NATO, maybe yourself, saying that the Taliban were responsible for the vast majority -

APPATHURAI: 81 percent.

Q: 81 percent. So if overall figures are down 40 percent, they must also have -

APPATHURAI: Well not necessarily. It doesn't necessarily break down that way, but I don't have a breakdown of it -

(SPEAKERS OVERLAP)

APPATHURAI: Okay. This is not the most pleasant briefing. Alright. Let me come back to this issue at the end. I'll go through the whole briefing and we'll start again.

The second point I was going to make on Afghanistan and we'll come back to this issue at the end is that by mid-summer NATO and Afghan security forces will have established about three dozen joint co-ordination centres throughout the country - and that is Afghan Army, Afghan Police and Afghan Interior Ministry, as well as NATO-ISAF and I don't in this case have information about coalition forces - for coordinating military support and security support for the upcoming elections. These centres will be set up in all regions of the country in basically an equal proportion based on the map that I have seen. That was from this morning's briefing by the way.

Secondly on the Balkans. While there was a briefing on Kosovo, there's not much to tell you about the briefing. The security situation remains the (break in transmission). KFOR continues to do what it has to do.

There was an extensive discussion on piracy - this will of course come as no surprise to you - and on the future of the NATO anti-piracy mission that is currently as we speak in the Gulf of Aden.

Thank you.

The Ambassadors have been discussing over the past days and certainly yesterday, again today, the future of the mission. The Secretary General, while very satisfied with the work that our military personnel are carrying out given the mission and the authorities that they have; is not satisfied with the mission that they have, nor is he happy with the authorities they have been given, or in particular that they have not been given with regard to, for example, detention of pirates that have been captured as a result of NATO operations.

He is stimulating within NATO, with the North Atlantic Council, a discussion with an aim as quickly as possible to decisions on the future of the mission, in particular a long-term role or including - let me put it that way - including a long-term role for NATO in combatting piracy. And as a second element, a discussion of the authorities that the NATO anti-piracy mission has, including of course when it comes to detaining pirates that have been captured as a result of NATO operations.

You know the current situation, which is that at the moment of detention, it is the national laws of the ship of the country from which the ship is provided which apply when NATO ships are involved or ships under NATO command are involved in detention and this is something the Secretary General, and of course I think the NAC as a whole, wants to look at as quickly as possible to address. We have seen recent incidents both with the Dutch and the Canadians I think where they were forced to release pirates that had been detained and stripped of their weapons.

This is not seen as satisfactory I think within the North Atlantic Council. Let me be clear. This is implying no criticism of the military personnel, who did what they were supposed to do with the authorities that they had, but I think there are many around the North Atlantic Council who would like to see those authorities strengthened and the Secretary General, as the Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, is certainly amongst them. So that was a major element of discussion today. It will be a continuing topic of discussion through the day and in the coming days to see what more can be done.

The Secretary General has also said last night in that context and I think it's worth repeating that the United Nations has to have an important role here. There is a contact group on piracy which I believe is chaired by Denmark, which has an important role to play. There is discussion in many circles of some kind of UN tribunal that might be created to deal with pirates that had been detained as a result of counter-piracy missions. But we will... and we'll have to see... that's a UN discussion. We will have to look within NATO I think a bit more quickly than that at the authorities that our military personnel have.

Finally in terms of operations, there was a discussion of Iraq and the Secretary General updated them as I will update you on his visit to Baghdad which took place on the 8th and 9th of April. It was a productive visit. I was along for the ride.

As of course Iraq assumes more authorities for security within its own country, NATO and Iraq have to be in discussion about the NATO training mission in Iraq and its continuing presence there. Its continuing presence there is of great interest to the Iraqi authorities precisely because it does training and it trains in two areas where Iraq is in need; as it assumes greater security responsibility throughout the country and this is for senior officers and for what we would call I think Europe carabinieri - paramilitary police forces. And I use the word carabinieri deliberately in that the Italian government and the Italian carabinieri are playing a leading role in the training mission.

This training mission is turning out thousands of trained Iraqi security forces, both senior officers and carabinieri-type personnel every year and the Iraqi government is very interested in ensuring that it continues to play a role there into the future and we want to continue to provide that kind of support. The Secretary General and the Minister of Defence signed a memorandum of understanding clarifying as the legal and political framework changes in Iraq, defining the roles and activities of the training mission. That was successful.

What we are looking to now, amongst other things, is a more structured co-operation framework with Iraq that will provide even more opportunities for co-operation and that seems to be... those discussions seem to be going well. The Secretary General met with the President, with the Prime Minister et cetera.

So that was Iraq. Let me mention two more things. One thing that may be of interest to you - no it's here - well, first in chronological order... Tomorrow and the next day the Secretary General will go to Bulgaria and Romania. He will first, tomorrow, go to Bulgaria for a state visit, meet with the Prime Minister Mr. Stanishev at 15:30. He will have a meeting with the President Mr. Parvanov. He will receive, from any Bulgarians among us, the Stara Planina Order. I don't know exactly what it represents, but I'm sure it is extremely distinguished. There will be a joint press conference at the Presidency 17:15. Then he will have a working dinner with the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Kalfin.

The next day in Bucharest meeting with the Romanian Foreign Minister whose name I would not do justice to if I tried to pronounce it, with the Romanian Minister of Defence. He will receive an honorary doctorate at the Romanian University and Law School. Then over to the Presidential Palace to meet with President Basescu; joint press conference at 12:40; working lunch and then back home.

Second thing that may be of interest to you. On the 29th of April as part of NATO's overall efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, NATO will host a CBRN - a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear - defence demonstrating at Belgium's joint CBRN Centre. It is Jambes (like your leg, but with an s)... Jambes, near Namur.

There will be high level defence experts from NATO member states, from partners, from Mediterranean Dialogue and ICI participating states. I don't have a precise list yet and I don't think it is finalized. As to who exactly will be coming, as well as other partners like Australia and Japan, representatives from EU, the WHO, are also expected to participate. The aim of the event to exchange views and share best practices on CBRN defence capability development; to discuss ways to improve civil and military co-operation in crisis management operations. They will focus on NATO's CBRN defence capabilities, which include warning and reporting, command and control in CBRN incidents, detection, identification and monitoring, hazard management, and they will be briefed on the work of our... what we call the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre.

There will be live demonstrations of CBRN defence capabilities. I believe that will include a live demonstration of a response to a fictitious CBRN attack. For example, and I don't know that this is exactly what it will be, but for example a CBRN attack inside a metro subway. As well as sort of mobile field testing of CBRN... potential CBRN activities.

Q: (Inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: I have no comment on which metro. It would be a fictitious metro, as well as a fictitious attack. I'm sure there's a metro in Jambes. This event will be open to the media. We will put out a media advisory on it. But yeah, so we'll put out a media advisory on it when it's finalized which will have all the contact information in a timely manner.

Now the final point which we have to come back to again, but I suspect I'm not going to be able to give you a satisfactory answer is that the statistics which I saw this morning showed an overall 39 percent decline in civilian casualties in Afghanistan. The first three months of this year compared to the first three months of last year.

We know, because we know the statistics for ISAF; that this is at least in part due to a decline in the number of civilian casualties caused by ISAF operations because those we track using a civilian casualties tracking cell that we have had. I have not seen the numbers for January, February, March. I had seen them for December, November and October of last year. And for example, according to our statistics in, I believe it was November, it was zero. In December it was three. These numbers have gone down dramatically from and ISAF point of view.

I can't however answer the questions what is the breakdown between what had been caused by international forces and what has been caused by Taliban. At least I can't now. So I will go back and dig to what the breakdown is between those and I don't have the raw figures as well. Those were not provided to me yet.

So that is where we are.

Q: (Inaudible)

APPATHURAI: 81 percent versus 19 percent figure is 81 percent cause by insurgent forces, principally Taliban, 19 percent by international forces, and that is NATO and coalition. Those figures we do stand by, but I can't break down the figures for you because I just don't have them.

Q: (Inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: 81 percent, 19 percent, and an overall 39 percent decline. What else can I tell you?

Q: (Inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: The 19 percent would be ISAF and international forces.

Q: Also for January (inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: Yes, that's also for January to March of this year.

Q: 34 percent is the international...?

APPATHURAI: There's no 34 percent.

Q: The overall number?

APPATHURAI: 39, 39. Yes, yes, international forces. Leaving aside the breakdown issue which I just don't have in terms of raw figures, the political point I want to make which I think is an important point to pass back to Afghans more than anyone else is that civilian casualties are going down and going down quite dramatically. An almost 40 percent reduction is something I think - and let's put it this way - regardless of who is responsible, a 40 percent reduction is something that Afghans should know about and I think should take some satisfaction from because it shows... well basically an improvement on an issue where they have every right to be and are very, very sensitive.

Q: But what was figure for the same period for last year? If you don't have it... you must go by something, 40 percent of -

APPATHURAI: Yeah I know I understand. I can't give you the baseline figures. Those were not provided to me. So I can't give them to you. I can't give you the raw numbers because I don't have the raw numbers. So... I know.  You can do with it what you want, but that's the best I can do.

Q: Can we just go back to piracy. Can you remind us of the current patrol schedule of the fleet that's in the Gulf of Aden? If I recall they're taking a break at one point and then returning for another brief tour at the end of June at which point that will be it. And so following on that, does the Secretary General want to extend this mission? You spoke of a discussion of a longer term role. Does he concretely want the current anti-piracy mission or one like it to be prolonged?

APPATHURAI: Yeah... the way in which NATO has approached the anti-piracy issue is different than that of the European Union. The European Union has a dedicated force for I believe it's an initial one-year period in the region. NATO has, in essence, diverted its standing maritime groups which had been due to do other things to also conduct operations as much as possible in this region, but they had other duties. These included military port visits to other areas. And while the port visits had been reduced significantly both in number and in duration, the current planning as of right now at this moment is for these ships to break-off tomorrow and proceed with abbreviated port visits before returning, as you pointed out, in essence for the last two weeks of July... June, June to take-up once again anti-piracy operations.

The discussion that Ambassadors are now having is whether to and if so how to modify that schedule to take account of what is clearly a worsening problem with piracy. Worsening in a number of ways; worsening in terms of intensity, worsening in terms of the number of attacks and worsening in terms of the area in which these attacks are taking place. So the original planning took place in a slightly different context. They will have this discussion today and tomorrow.

They will also be discussing as a separate but related issue a longer term presence, not necessarily tied to the deployment schedules of the standing maritime groups. And they will be discussing as a third clearly related element to both the immediate short term and the longer term counter piracy operations the authorities that they have. So that will be in essence what this discussion is about.

Do you want to follow up?

Q: (Inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: Let me not prejudice the discussion, but the way they refer to it is as a longer term counter-piracy and I presume the implication is dedicated to that.

Q: On that. I think the Somalian government is interested in getting funding internationally for coast guard capabilities. I wonder what NATO thinks of that. And on the issue of rules on detention, it is a national issue at the moment; what can NATO actually do to circumvent that? I mean can you have... would NATO authority actually take precedence over national authority? I mean how can you actually do that?

APPATHURAI: Sorry. Can you repeat the question?

Q: Well on a legal basis -

APPATHURAI: Yeah.

Q: If the legal restriction is what's allowed under national law, what can NATO do to do away with that?

APPATHURAI: Well certainly let's be clear. NATO has no intention of doing away with national authorities and national laws and nothing that NATO would do would ever be in contravention of national laws. But if the 28 NATO countries come together to agree a policy on... a NATO policy or a NATO approach for this operation, NATO rules of engagement and authorities, which provide a common approach and let us say a more robust approach across the Alliance and for this mission with regards to in particular detention, that is perfectly within their authority to do that. As I say, nothing would contravene national law, but if they take the decision to have a common policy, that policy will apply.

Q: Wouldn't it require changes in national legislation presumably and then take an awfully long time?

APPATHURAI: I doubt it. I think in the case of many... let me now do this part on background because I am not a legal expert. In fact let me do it off the record. Off the record.

Q: Well first of all let me tell you that you pronounced the name of the Bulgarian Order almost perfectly.

APPATHURAI: Thank you.

Q: And concerning the visit of the Secretary General to Bulgaria, will it be essentially a courtesy visit or will he discuss some more substantial questions?

APPATHURAI: Secretary General first of all, and I don't say this as an offhand remark, he never makes just courtesy visits. He doesn't have the time for it and it's not his inclination. If he goes it's to do business. There is a huge list of issues which need to be discussed with all of the Allies.

If you go to Bulgaria and Romania, I can imagine that the situation in the Balkans first with regard to Kosovo, second with regard to the integration, Euro-Atlantic integration, of a number of states in the Balkans who have to a greater or lesser extent indicated they wish to do that. That will certainly be on the agenda.

Afghanistan and the future of that mission will certainly be on the agenda, including how we prepare for the elections. And as part of that, how we provide forces for election support. We need the battalions; I think we're going to get them. We need to provide the mentoring and liaison teams. He will wish to discuss contributions to the mission with each and every one of the 28 countries which he visits.

He will bee soon launching the process to (break in transmission) strategic concept which was tasked at the summit in Strasbourg and Kehl. I'm quite there will be some interest in an exchange of views on that subject as well.

I could go on, but bottom line is he's not going just to get nice medals.

Q: How big is the loss after the Russians said no to the meeting on the military level for May 7th?

APPATHURAI: Thank you for raising that. My understanding is that the Russians have indicated that they wish to restart formal relations of the NRC first in the political framework at the end of April at Ambassadorial level and then again I think, according to current planning, in the last two weeks of May. The thinking is that there will be a Foreign Ministers meeting. If that's the way they wish to do it, then that is the way it will be done. We of course continue to hold open the invitation for the Chiefs of Defence meeting which will take place at the beginning of next month, but if they choose not to attend that and restart relations, formal relations, at the Ambassadors meeting on the political level that's okay too.

Q: Regarding those exercises in Georgia, what kind of exercises will there be exactly? What will you do?

APPATHURAI: Well in essence they're going to have two parts. You have what they call Cooperative Longbow 09 followed by Cooperative Lancer 09, and no, I did not name these. During the period 6th of May to 1st of June they will be in Georgia. As you know the planning of these exercises began in spring 2008. The aim is to improve interoperability between NATO and partner countries. It is within the framework of Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue and ICI programs. You have 20 nations participating. Well at least 20 nations are expected to participate. I have seen press comments from Kazakhstan, but as far as I'm aware we haven't received any official confirmation that they would not participate.

Cooperative Longbow, that's the first part, is a command post exercise that focuses on training and exercising basically staff skills and procedures. So as I say, command post tabletop exercise. It's about improving interoperability between NATO and partner nations for crisis response operations. The exercise will be conducted, this tabletop exercise, will be conducted in Tbilisi with some 600, 650 personnel from all of the for now 20 participating states. Just east of Tbilisi.

The scenario is based on a fictitious UN mandated NATO-led crisis response operation and there will be a Spanish General from the Allied Land Component Command Madrid in command.

Cooperative Longbow will be followed by a field training exercise. This is Cooperative Lancer 09, which is basically designed to provide basic training on peace support operations. Again, a fictitious exercise, I believe defending against a terrorist attack in a peace operation. It will take place again just east of Tbilisi from 18 May to 01 June. It will involve approximately 400 to 450 troops. These are part of the PFP program. They are... basically allowing partner countries to build their relationship with NATO.

I think that's everything I know. Follow up? Please.

Q: It's a follow up on (inaudible)... exercises. So in Georgian media I have... reports that Russia on some stage was invited to participate in these exercises. So can you confirm and could I ask what was the Russian answer? Thank you.

APPATHURAI: My understanding is that all NATO partners were invited to participate. Russia did not take up that invitation. Russia did not also choose to come to the planning conferences which are necessary for participation. But Russia was, as a NATO partner, kept fully informed at all stages of the planning of what this exercise was. And as I say, this has been in the planning stages since spring of 2008. I might add that if Russia chooses to send observers that is something that I think the Alliance would look on quite positively.

As a way of diminishing any possible misunderstandings or concerns about this, as I say, we're talking about 400 to 450 troops training to defend against a terrorist attack in a peace operation. This should be I think clearly no threat to anybody.

Q: (Inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: Well I have no information on that. I don't see that it's a live fire exercise anyway.

Q: James you said that there was a briefing on the security situation in Kosovo. From whom? And if situation is quiet, does this lead to the situation where NATO will decide to downsize its number of troops in Kosovo because members states are still coming out saying that they plan to reduce even though there is no decision within NATO about that. ? And last week President of Serbia visited Kosovo. He was escorted by NATO, by carabinieri. Is there any rule within KFOR how to protect and support the foreign leaders who visit Kosovo? Do you deal with the Kosovo authority on that or how the decision are taken to bring somebody from outside to visit a spot in Kosovo?

APPATHURAI: To answer the first question - well of course the briefing was by our military authorities. I think we can expect that by the summer our military authorities could be in a position to provide their assessment of a possible way forward for the KFOR mission in terms of its size or posture, but that advice is not yet developed. There has been neither discussion nor decision within the Alliance on any possible changes to KFOR's size, posture or structure. I cannot anticipate when there would be that discussion, but it is true that we are pleased that not least because of A, the work by KFOR and other international actors on the ground, but also the restraint of the people in Kosovo. Despite the political challenges that are clearly being faced the security situation has remained calm and that is a very good thing.

In terms of the visits of international officials to Kosovo, the decision to provide protection is one that KFOR takes in consultation with all the authorities in Kosovo and that includes very much representatives of other international bodies like the ICO. I won't discuss who requested what, but it is NATO's job, KFOR's job, to provide a secure and safe environment within Kosovo. They consult with the appropriate authorities and if that includes providing security escort for visiting residents, they will do it.

Q: James sorry, back to Afghanistan numbers. You said that 19 percent of the casualties were caused by international forces and 81 by insurgent forces. How does that compare with previous seasons, the rough balance between our side/their side? How does that compare?

APPATHURAI: Compared to all of last year because I need to put this in the right context. It was basically only about... my colleague sending me more messages of support which I appreciate it. I see... okay. Yes, indeed.

Over all of 2008 it was about 20/80; 20 percent, 80 percent. So in essence that proportion remains. Yes and my colleague stresses the 39 percent reduction is this three month period versus that three month period. So the proportion remains about 20/80.

Q: On the training mission in Iraq -

APPATHURAI: Yes?

Q: How many NATO trainers are involved and is there any idea to expand the mission, to increase the numbers, if you can give us some figures? Thank you.

APPATHURAI: I believe the number is 170 NATO personnel in the training mission. That number fluctuates up and down, but it's around that now. Between 140 and 170 at any given period. That includes the carabinieri personnel and it reflects already an expansion because NATO started with simply senior officers. It then expanded to include non-commissioned officers and then expanded again to include gendarmerie training. So it has already been beefed up quite substantially.

There was no discussion as far as I am aware of further expanding it at present. Right now we're trying to establish the future of the legal framework and the political relationship between NATO and Iraq in a broader sense, but I would not be surprised to see it strengthen. I say this not just as simple speculation, but because there was clearly a very strong desire by the Iraqi government to see the NTM-I... stay to see the NTM-I do as much as possible. They will more and more need training as they take on more and more responsibility for security. So I think this is potentially a growth area of co-operation for NATO and Iraq.

We'll go back there.

Q: Back to Russia if I may. Last week (inaudible) Rogozin sent a letter to General Secretary on the exercise.

APPATHURAI: Yes.

Q: When can we expect the answer and if it will be also official answer that we can be aware of and know the text?

Thank you.

APPATHURAI: Well we don't generally make public whether we answer letters or if so, the content of the letters. The Secretary General has certainly seen it now. There was some confusion I think as to who it had been sent to, but in the end we in this building, on in the NATO building, saw it. The Secretary General of course has seen it and taken good note of it. The bottom line is that the exercise will go forward. It is a long-planned exercise. We think it's perfectly legitimate. It is perfectly legitimate and it serves a valuable function and that function is improving interoperability between NATO and its partner nations.

As I said, if Russia wishes to send observers to it, I think that would be looked upon very favourably by NATO. But bottom line is the exercise will take place and we believe very firmly that Russia should see and if it sends observers will see, that in terms of the numbers of soldiers on the ground, in terms of what they are doing, in terms of training, this is doing nothing but contributing to international security.

Q: James back to Somalia if I may. The United Nations tribunal which you said might be established there. Is that something that NATO would actively encourage in the sense that would it perhaps help NATO partners actually establish common rules of engagement if there were such a tribunal? And how quickly would you like that to happen?

APPATHURAI: Well what I'd like is not really relevant. The idea of a tribunal as far as I'm aware is little more than an idea now, but something that certainly makes sense in the context of the UN's leading role in discussion a comprehensive approach to the piracy problem. And of course we know, as I mentioned, that the UN has a contact group on piracy which will be looking at all aspects related to this issue, including legal aspects.

Would it help if there was such a tribunal? Yes, I think it' undeniable that it would help not just NATO, but all the various actors that are engaged in this if there were to be a UN tribunal that could deal with this issue. But as I say, that is as far as I am aware, not an imminent decision. The Secretary General raised it yesterday as something which he considered to be of value or potentially of value, but we're simply not there yet. We have an immediate problem today, tomorrow and the next day and I say we in the broadest sense - that's the international community - in dealing with this within the Alliance. We will be having, and that is happening right now, a discussion about how to deal with this in the context where there is not yet an international tribunal of any kind.

Q: James back to the Georgia... exercises in Georgia. There was some media reports also about not only Kazakhstan, but some Baltic States refused to send like units to Georgia for these exercises. Have you some confirmation of that or maybe some explanations of them?

APPATHURAI: First we have, as far as I am aware and as of this morning, received no formal notification from anyone from any country that they are withdrawing from this exercise. If it is the case, in future you will be notified.

Q: This whole question of the legal status and the detention pirates. Was this overlooked at the initiation of Allied Protector or was it a deliberate decision not to have common rules for that? And secondly, you said that today, tomorrow, the council will talk about this issue and about the longer term role of NATO; do you expect any decisions this week on that?

APPATHURAI: On the first question certainly nothing was overlooked in the legal aspects.  You could not overlook them. They are quite clear. At the time when Allied Protector... the decision was taken to launch Allied Protector, it was deemed by the Allies that the system that is currently in place - precisely that detention - when a ship which is part of a NATO force detains anyone the detention then is a matter for the national authorities. Let me get the wording right. That was deemed at the time to be sufficient.

The Secretary General believes and I think he's not alone, that this is no longer sufficient. I think not least because the situation has worsened and because we have seen I think quite starkly in the last couple of days that it isn't sufficient. So in that context he certainly believe that we need something more than we have.

Q: Do you expect any decisions this week?

APPATHURAI: Decisions this week? I would not expect a decision on the longer term role this week and I would not necessarily expect a decision let's say by tomorrow on the authorities that our military personnel have. But on the deployment of the current mission they are certainly working as fast as possible to decide if the deployment should be modified with regard to the other missions that they had been assigned... port visits. I would not be surprised if a decision was taken one way or the other, i.e. to... that the political reasons and military reasons for which the port visits had been included remain valid and that they should continue to do that or if there should be some modification. That I think you would probably expect in the coming days if not this week then early next week.

Q: As the situation is now Allied Protector will interrupt operations tomorrow.

APPATHURAI: Yes, yes. So they are, I can tell you, discussing urgently today.

Q: (Inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: If there is a change I'll make sure you know.

Q: (Inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: Formally now there's four.

Q: (Inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: I don't know if it's public information or not.

Q: If you sail into a port, everybody will see it.

APPATHURAI: Yes but if they don't sail into that port because a decision has been made not to go to that port, then they won't see it. (Laughs) So I think I won't say that now because I don't know if it's public or not.

Q: (Inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: It might well have been, but I can't remember if it was published a month ago.

Q: (Inaudible)... Karachi, Singapore and Perth...

APPATHURAI: Okay, it's Karachi, Singapore and Perth. I say that off the record, but it's Karachi, Singapore and Perth. Since you know it, I have no reason to hide it.

Q: (Inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: I'm sorry?

Q: How many NATO members are involved in this?

APPATHURAI: Well right now there are four ships in SNMG 1 formally under the NATO command. As you know, Germany detached its ship to Atalanta, but you have Portugal, Canada, the Netherlands and Spain. And as I say, Germany operating under Atalanta mandate, but also there.

Q: In Afghanistan, do we know when to expect extra election forces -

APPATHURAI: Well the planning has already begun for their deployment because that has to happen relatively soon. Certainly by summer they need to be in place. So mid-summer is the planning time for the deployment to begin and they will stay through... the planning is for them to stay through a possible second round in case there's a run-off in early October. The run-off would have to take place after Ramadan. So you'd have a break and the planning is for them to stay through that period.

Q: (Inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: Total number that we have in place right now? In ISAF? It's about 56,000.

Q: (Inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: Well I wouldn't say that it's 5,000, but I would say it's supposed to be four battalions and this is four battalions above what we have.