Intervention

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is impossible to over-estimate the changes our continent has gone through over the course of this decade. We have witnessed the collapse of communism, the end of the East-West confrontation and the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe. And we have witnessed the emergence of new independent states.

In previous centuries, such a period of fundamental change would have led to major upheaval, even conflict. Yet although our continent's transition has not been free of backlashes and hardships, most nations - old and new - are displaying a remarkable sense of direction and common purpose. Indeed, I would argue that never in this continent's history has there been a stronger cooperative momentum.

This momentum has brought us towards what I would call the end of the post-Cold War era. The trial-and-error that characterised the early 1990s is over. We have a fairly good idea of where we are going: towards a cooperative security architecture that includes a more self-confident, inclusive Europe, a healthy transatlantic link, and a Russia firmly geared to reform and cooperation.

Over the course of this decade, our major institutions all took decisions that put in place the building blocks of this new architecture. Last year was particularly significant, with major NATO decisions emanating from Sintra, Paris, and Madrid, and with the EU's Amsterdam Treaty.

We are now - as the organisers of this meeting correctly imply - in a consolidation phase. But this should not make us complacent. We must use this consolidation phase to complete the projects that have begun so promising. There is still unfinished business.

I would like to suggest four areas which are crucial for Europe's continuing post-Cold War consolidation and which therefore require our constant attention.

Area Number One: creating long-term stability for the Balkans

Current events in Kosovo demonstrate once again that Europe's consolidation will be seriously undermined if the Balkans remain volatile. Without a comprehensive strategy for the Balkans, our continent will not find the tranquility it so urgently needs.

I believe that such a comprehensive strategy can be devised. Since IFOR and SFOR we know we can make a difference. We know we can break the fatal cycle of great powers supporting their respective client-states in the Balkans. And we know that we have the means - through Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council - to involve non-NATO nations in our common search for a solution to regional conflicts.

Of course, the goal of any outside intervention must be to create the conditions for a self-sustaining peace. That point will be reached when all parties realise that their stakes in peace are higher than their possible gains in war.

We are not there yet. But there are signs of progress: refugees returning from overseas, a common currency in circulation, a gradual move to political pluralism and the isolation of political hardliners in favour of more moderate leaders.

These are encouraging signs. They demonstrate that our perseverance is paying off. And we will stay the course. We will leave when the job is done, not sooner.

Sadly, Kosovo has recently vied with Bosnia for pride of place in the headlines. NATO is monitoring events closely. We welcome the lead role played by the Contact Group in developing an action plan for the international community to address the Kosovo situation.

Indeed, the determined reaction by the Contact Group has helped bring to bear concerted international pressure on the Yugoslav authorities. That, in my view, is essential. President Milosevic would be wise to heed these warnings to show restraint and to open a real dialogue with the aim to reestablish Kosovo's autonomy.

At the same time, NATO has consulted with another neighbour of the Kosovo - Albania - at the latter's request. We agreed to speed up our efforts to assist Albania to cope with a difficult situation.

Area Number Two: the enlargement of our key institutions

The enlargement of NATO and EU is part and parcel of Europe's post-Cold War consolidation. We cannot build an open Europe on closed institutions. NATO and EU enlargement are complementary. Both institutions share a common goal: enhancing stability and well-being throughout Europe. The prospect of Monetary Union gives additional momentum to Europe's integration.

Let me underline that NATO enlargement remains a process, not a single event. The first new members will not be the last.

This message of the open door has been understood. Membership aspirants are continuing on their path of political and military reforms. They are also continuing to improve relations with their neighbours (see examples). In short, NATO's enlargement process - like that of the EU - remains a powerful incentive for Europe to get its house in order.

Looking at the stability network accompanying the opening of NATO the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council is of particular importance. It offers considerable potential for consultations on joint crisis management, and for developing new approaches to regional security, defence economic cooperation, or disaster relief. The EAPC represents an innovative approach giving shape to Europe's new security architecture.

Area Number Three: a new relationship with Russia

Some have argued that NATO enlargement and a solid NATO-Russia relationship stand in contradiction. They do not. This point has been brought home clearly by the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the work of the Permanent Joint Council it created.

As you know, I have been intimately involved in negotiating the Founding Act with Minister Primakov. Together we carefully delineated the basic features of a new political relationship - one that seeks to anchor Russia fully in Europe. We are serious in wanting to give Russia a stake in the growing cooperation and consultation that today characterises the European security landscape.

And our efforts are paying off. Little more than six months after the start of our cooperation in the Permanent Joint Council the list of issues we have broached is long, full of substance and growing: peacekeeping, nuclear weapons issues, proliferation, armaments cooperation, officer retraining to name a few.

The new political relationship is clearing the way for a closer military relationship. The excellent cooperation we have achieved in IFOR and SFOR is now being extended across the spectrum of security- and defence-related issues.

Area Number Four: reaffirming our transatlantic relationship

The need for European integration was one major lesson from the tragedies of the first half of this century. The permanent North American involvement in European security was another.

Consolidating Europe thus also means consolidating the transatlantic link. A new bargain must include a Europe willing and able to shoulder more responsibility.

That is why the European integration process is not only relevant for Europe's own identity. It is relevant also for a new and healthy transatlantic relationship.

Clearly, Europe is not yet the strategic actor it wants to be, nor the global Partner the US seeks. These shortcomings do not result from "too much United States," but rather from "too little Europe".

I would argue that NATO has indeed begun to implement this new bargain. It is in NATO where the real, operational future of a European Security and Defence Identity is now taking shape. It is within NATO where political and military responses to the new challenge of proliferation are being developed. And it is within NATO where, I believe, a transatlantic dialogue on re-vitalised arms cooperation and technology-sharing should urgently begin.

Each of these decisions and initiatives constitute elements of the new bargain between North America and Europe. Together, they make up the new parameters of a sound burden-sharing for the next century. Together, they demonstrate that this Alliance remains responsive to the security needs on both sides of the Atlantic.
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have tried to outline three key areas of consolidation, progressing from the regional level to the wider Euro-Atlantic space.

Clearly, there are more areas of consolidation:

the future place of Ukraine in Europe is one example;

another would be the role of the Mediterranean in the new strategic environment.

Nevertheless: if I were asked to draw a balance sheet, I think Europe is doing very well. As I said in the beginning, one only has to look back at previous transition periods in this continent's history to appreciate the progress achieved.

There are many reasons for the progress we have made. But I hope I do not appear immodest when I say that the innovative policies of our major institutions, including NATO, have something to do with it.
Thank You.