Speech

Mesdames, Messieurs,

C'est un grand plaisir pour moi de m'adresser à votre Assemblée ce matin, ici à Athènes.

Ayant moi-même été, pendant de longues années, Ministre et membre des Cortes en Espagne, je suis fermement convaincu que l'Alliance doit répondre de son action devant les opinions et les Parlements de ses pays membres. C'est pourquoi les liens étroits de l'OTAN avec l'Assemblée ont, à mes yeux, une grande valeur. Seul forum qui rassemble effectivement des parlementaires d'Amérique du Nord et d'Europe pour qu'ils puissent discuter de questions de sécurité essentielles, votre Assemblée joue un rôle irremplaçable pour une meilleure compréhension des buts et de la mission de l'OTAN. Elle est indispensable pour que l'Alliance fonctionne dans la transparence rende compte de ses actes autant que possible.

Pour moi, notre rencontre d'aujourd'hui vient à un moment opportun puisque j'ai pu, ces derniers mois, me rendre dans presque tous les pays membres et dans 12 pays partenaires. Je suis aussi allé quatre fois en Bosnie pour voir par moi-même comment la Force de mise en oeuvre dirigée par l'OTAN remplit ses tâches. Ce matin, je voudrais vous faire part de mes impressions.

Les événements de ces derniers mois me convainquent qu'il y a eu un changement fondamental de l'atmosphère de sécurité. L'Europe d'aujourd'hui est marquée par un niveau sans précédent de coopération authentique. Les pays perçoivent de plus en plus que la coopération n'est pas seulement dans leur intérêt économique général, mais dans l'intérêt stratégique de l'Europe tout entière. C'est là un fait nouveau et historiquement significatif sur ce continent, et il faut poursuivre pour que toutes les potentialités de cette évolution puissent se réaliser.

Permettez-moi de le souligner : la coopération n'est pas une formule creuse. Il y a un désir certain d'oeuvrer ensemble à la résolution de problèmes communs. Nous en voyons la preuve, non pas simplement dans la réponse au Partenariat pour la paix, mais de façon tout à fait évidente dans l'IFOR. En Bosnie, sur le terrain, nous voyons s'exercer une coopération pratique réelle entre Alliés et Partenaires. Ce sont maintenant 32 pays qui s'emploient ensemble, au sein d'une coalition pour la paix, à mettre en oeuvre les aspects militaires de l'Accord de paix de Paris.

Il y a même quatre pays extérieurs à la région euro-atlantique qui participent à l'IFOR, dont trois prennent part à notre dialogue méditerranéen. J'ai été très impressionné par le degré de coopération militaire des composantes de l'IFOR et par leur efficacité sur le terrain. La brigade nordique est formée de contingents scandinaves, baltes et polonais. Des soldats russes et américains effectuent régulièrement des patrouilles communes. L'IFOR montre avec quelle efficacité nous pouvons opérer ensemble au service d'une cause commune.

Il y a aussi une coopération et une coordination étroites de l'IFOR avec les agences civiles et d'autres institutions. Avec ces liens, nous voyons s'appliquer dans les faits un concept dont nous avons parlé sur un plan théorique. En Bosnie, il y a véritablement des institutions et des organisations qui se renforcent mutuellement: l'Union européenne, l'OSCE, le HCR, le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge, le Conseil de l'Europe, les Nations Unies et l'UEO, et bien entendu l'Alliance atlantique. Si nous avons pu parvenir aussi vite à un tel niveau d'interopérabilité fonctionnelle, cela tient à une raison primordiale : les années de consultation politique et de coopération militaire pratique dans le cadre du CCNA, et spécialement depuis deux ans au sein du Partenariat pour la paix. Le sentiment d'unité qui sous-tend l'IFOR constitue une base positive sur laquelle bâtir pour une nouvelle architecture de sécurité européenne. Il est important que nous tirions parti de cette capacité opérationnelle conjointe effective et que nous ne la laissions pas s'évanouir une fois que l'IFOR sera arrivée au terme de son mandat. Cela plaide à la fois pour une intensification du Partenariat pour la paix et pour l'application des enseignements de l'IFOR à nos programmes de travail du PfP.

Now let me say a few words on the future, especially the next few months in Bosnia. As you know, the major time lines on the military side have passed. IFOR has organised the separation of forces, and a major demobilisation is underway. As a result, the possibility of a major, whole scale outbreak of conflict is becoming less and less likely. Currently, IFOR is engaged in what SACEUR calls "the transition to peace". In this stage, IFOR is consolidating the gains made on the military side, while the work of the civil agencies under the coordination of the High Representative, Carl Bildt, is picking up momentum.

With the major military milestones behind it, IFOR will have greater scope for assisting the civilian agencies in their work. We are already providing various kinds of support to the Office of the High Representative and to other agencies in the field. We have come to an agreement with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on how to support them in their tasks.

We will continue to consider how else we can contribute, particularly to the conduct of elections, as long as such assistance is compatible with IFOR's primary mission. The holding of free and fair elections in September will show how far Bosnia has moved from war to peace.

I wish to make a strong appeal to the Bosnian people. The elections are their chance, at last, to have their say. It is their chance to affirm that they wish to see Bosnia develop positively and peacefully. IFOR can help create the conditions for them to vote in a stable and safe environment - but it is the Bosnians themselves who have to decide what kind of country they want to live in. The choices they make will make a difference. This election will determine whether Bosnia moves ahead peacefully and steadily to a future worth living in; or whether Bosnia stagnates in endless and sterile antagonism.

The focus within IFOR at present is firmly on providing security for the critical time ahead. We will review progress at the meetings of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers in Berlin and Brussels in June and at the Review Conference, to be held in Florence in mid-June, at what will be the half-way point of the IFOR mission. IFOR has major tasks still to accomplish between now and the elections. We need to concentrate on the challenges ahead and remain flexible in our thinking and planning.

Let me turn now to another important contribution to European security - NATO enlargement. My recent visits to Central and Eastern Europe have convinced me that the course that the Alliance is taking - steady, deliberate and measured progress towards our enlargement - is the right one, and that we must continue down this path.

This year we are pursuing intensive individual dialogues with interested Partners. These dialogues are in full swing. 15 Partners have expressed their interest in participating in these dialogues, even though some are not seeking NATO membership. These dialogues serve a two-fold purpose: Partners are learning more about the specifics of membership, and the Allies are learning more about the abilities and potential contributions of the prospective members. NATO Foreign Ministers will, at their Autumn meeting in Brussels, assess the progress and consider the way forward.

I want to register clearly several points about the enlargement process. The first and foremost is this: NATO enlargement will happen. The free choice of alignment must be the very basis on which any post-Yalta Europe must be built. It is also in our fundamental security interest to ensure that the new democracies continue to develop in a positive direction and participate in all aspects of the construction of Europe. For over four decades political and military cooperation in NATO has resulted in a degree of transparency and trust that has created a historically unique zone of stability among its members. It should be our goal to extend this zone of stability by giving our neighbours an opportunity to become part of this unique security culture.

My second point: those who join will be full members with all the benefits and obligations that membership implies. NATO is not interested in semi-detached members, and we are certainly not interested in ideas for political but not military membership of NATO. All those who join will be covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty , and all those who join will have to be capable of fulfilling their obligations on behalf of others.

Does this suggest an undue emphasis on military aspects of enlargement? I do not think so. Whether through NATO, through the EU or other frameworks, what we are expanding is a European, indeed Atlantic, civic space. I deliberately include our military arrangements into this definition of civic space . The postwar experience in Western Europe suggests that political and economic progress and security integration are closely linked. Once their security is taken care of, countries can devote themselves with more confidence to their longer-term evolution. And a responsible military, firmly embedded in our democratic societies and under civil control, is part and parcel of that civic space, as are military structures that are transparent, defensive, and multinational. These are eminently political achievements we want to preserve and extend.

My third point about enlargement: we need to get it right. So before we can identify specific candidates for membership, we need to conduct a dialogue with interested parties. This dialogue is currently taking place and will keep us busy for the remainder of this year. Indeed, there is a lot to be discussed. We have to explain the roles and responsibilities of membership, its costs and as well as its benefits. The current NATO Allies must thoroughly assess how new members will impact on the political and military structures of the Alliance. And those aspiring to become members must carefully consider the implications NATO membership will have for them: how it will affect their political and military environment and how they see themselves contributing to our overall security. In my view, this is a matter that must not be confined to expert circles, but to a broader public debate.

So NATO's enlargement is on track. Those who still argue that the EU should enlarge, for it is a political association, whereas NATO should not, for it is a military one, have not grasped the true significance of what Europe is about. Our idea of Europe is not limited to economic well-being but reflects a broader set of values -- values which unite us with the democracies of North America. After 1945, when Western Europe was given another chance, it was given an Atlantic chance. The same chance, not a lesser imitation of it, should now be given to the new democracies to NATO's East.

My visit to Russia in March allowed me to discuss in detail the reaction of Russian leaders, officials and parliamentarians to the enlargement process. No one should doubt or underestimate the extent of current Russian opposition to NATO enlargement. Their fear is that a NATO with new members means a new division of Europe and a new isolation of Russia. I emphasised that we reject both results categorically. Rather, our purpose is the opposite: to enhance the security of the whole of Europe, not create new dividing lines, and strengthen Russia's integration in a Euro-Atlantic security system.

Moreover, not to enlarge NATO would be to encourage a different division of Europe: on the one side, a self-confident, secure West; and on the other side, an uncertain, insecure East. From the enlargement, first of NATO, then of the EU, there will result a wider zone of stability and security in Europe. This surely is in Russia's interest as well as Europe's as a whole.

One point that keeps being raised by Russia is a fear that NATO will deploy nuclear weapons eastward once we enlarge. This is not true. We see no need and have no plans to change our current nuclear deployment. NATO has reduced its nuclear forces in Europe by 80% since the end of the Cold War. We no longer have nuclear missiles in Europe. We have no intention of reversing that trend.

We recognise that Russia is at a critical point in its transformation. I believe that an imaginative, sympathetic response is necessary - both by NATO and other institutions - to ensure that Russia has a real place in the European security architecture, in keeping with its size and status as an important contributor to European security. NATO is fully committed to a strong, stable and enduring partnership with Russia, and we are awaiting Russia's responses to specific offers we have made.

Today we are ready to fulfil the mandate given to us by Allied Heads of State and Government at the 1994 Brussels Summit: to further adapt the Alliance to the new security environment of post-Cold War Europe. Two areas of our adaptation deserve your attention. First, NATO Ministers in June are expected to endorse the results of an intensive two-year work programme to re-orient Alliance policy, planning and resources to meet the risks posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: one of the major future challenges to Alliance security. The work that we are doing now will help us to meet this challenge in the future.

Second, we have developed the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), which will make us better prepared to respond to future crisis management challenges, as well as facilitate actions led by European Allies. We will be submitting to Foreign and Defence Ministers at their June meetings a detailed framework for implementing the CJTF concept. This is a step in a larger adaptation. Most of us would agree that the Alliance's command structure, as a whole, should be rendered more flexible and affordable. Bosnia has shown that the management of a fast-moving crisis requires short and responsive lines of command and communication.

A significant additional objective in the process of Alliance adaptation is to support the development of a European component within the Alliance. As I see it, the adaptation of NATO's military structures and procedures is not an aim in itself, driven merely by budgetary considerations or discrete political objectives. Rather, our aim should be to make this Alliance stronger and suitably adapted to the challenges of tomorrow. I welcome France's decision to help build a European capability within, rather than outside, the Alliance. I believe that this is a positive sign that the adaptation process can move ahead effectively, with all 16 Allies involved fully in the decision-taking.

In adapting the Alliance, we have to take account of two fundamental concerns. First, to meet European aspirations to assume greater defence responsibilities, and secondly, to satisfy American desires for more equitable defence burden-sharing across the Atlantic. At the end of the day, we should still have a single and strong Alliance - one which is capable of responding to the whole gamut of challenges facing the transatlantic security community. We must do nothing which undermines or fragments our proven and successful military structures.

Finally, let me say that, as Secretary General of NATO, my foremost concern must always be about the health of the transatlantic link.

The overriding reason why Europe has evolved so positively since end of Cold War has been the strength of the transatlantic link between Europe and North America. American presence and involvement in European security prevents a return to outdated notions of security such as concepts of balance of power or spheres of interest. Our Alliance combines the dynamism and influence of North America with the unity and stability of an integrating Europe. The transatlantic link is a most valuable asset which must be treasured and strengthened.

Nor must we become complacent about it. Before IFOR, Bosnia pointed to its possible fragility, when at times it appeared all too often that Americans and Europeans were working against each other, not with each other.

The 1995 EU Madrid Summit, in which I was heavily involved, is a sign of a broadening relationship. There the EU and the United States agreed on an action plan, which points the way to a partnership between Europe and the United States that goes beyond security affairs in Europe, to include a whole range of economic and indeed political social issues, which reach beyond Europe.

But a broader US-Europe partnership can only develop on the basis of a strong and coherent Alliance here in Europe where our common interest remains to prevent war and create stability. Only a strong and coherent Alliance can reach out and provide the basis of an intensified Partnership for Peace, and undertake new peacekeeping and crisis management missions in the wider Europe. Only a strong and coherent Alliance can guard our members against future threats, such as those posed by he proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on NATO's periphery.

Here it is to you - parliamentarians and members of the North Atlantic Assembly - to whom we turn for support and encouragement. It is ultimately the elected governments and parliaments of our countries who will authorise the resources to keep NATO sound and ready to meet the security challenges of the future, while adapting to new realities. In one of the most important adaptations to come - the opening to new members - it is our parliaments which will have to ratify the accession of new members.
I have every confidence that you - and Allied publics and parliamentarians alike - will provide the resources and support necessary for such changes - just as you have backed one of the most important and far-reaching developments to date in post-Cold War crisis management: the Implementation Force in Bosnia.

For your past, present and continued support, I thank you very much.