Press Briefingby Nicholas Burns, Spokesman

MR. BURNS: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Nicholas Burns and I am the Spokesman of the Department of State. What I propose to do is to let you know how the morning session went from our perspective, the perspective of the United States Delegation, and let you know what Secretary Christopher said on the subjects of Bosnia and also the evolution of NATO, and then to take your questions after that very brief, I hope, summary.
First of all, I should tell you that Secretary of State Christopher met with Minister Kinkel this morning and also with Minister Rifkind separately, in bilateral meetings. And I can go into either of those meetings should you wish. Essentially, what they were doing this morning was talking about the communique that will be issued later on today by Secretary General Solana. They were negotiating some last-minute issues in that communique. They also took the opportunity, Secretary Rifkind and Secretary Christopher, to talk about Bosnia in some detail, about Zaire, and about a variety of other issues that are of interest to both countries.

As you know, Secretary Christopher is participating in his ninth North Atlantic Council session, the ninth since he took office nearly four years ago. And essentially, the American view -- and this will be in contrast to some of the reporting that we have seen here in Europe and in the United States over the last couple of days -- the American view is that NATO is evolving in a very positive direction. Secretary Christopher in his comments today took pains to describe what he felt was the status of NATO four or five years ago versus the status of NATO today. Today there is no question that NATO has a defining mission in the post-Cold War order. You only have to look at Bosnia and see the role that IFOR has played under NATO leadership to understand that that new mission has led to a new departure for NATO.

You also need, of course, to look at the historic 1994 summit in Brussels where the NATO leaders laid out their vision of the 21st century, which is a Europe and an Atlantic community which is truly unified for the first time in history. It is essentially that vision that is being worked on today in Brussels, and it is that vision that will be the essential subject of the NATO summit meeting, which is to be held, as you know, next July.

In 1994, NATO set out its vision. In 1995, by embarking on the operation to stop the Bosnian war and to stabilize the peace, NATO set out a new mission. In 1996 France and Spain are now coming into full military integration into NATO for the first time -- in the case of France, in a very long time, and for the first time for Spain in its history. These, in our view, are positive developments, and I must say, when you ask questions in a minute I would very much like to talk, and even to debate this notion that I saw in the European press this morning, and that I have also seen in the American press, that somehow NATO is a troubled institution. We could not disagree more with that assessment by some of the people who are writing for major newspapers today.

Today's meeting is important because it follows the Lisbon summit and it precedes the Defense Ministers meeting, which will be held next week, and it precedes the U.S.-EU summit. Four very important meetings this month, December 1996, to shape the future of United States' relations with Europe.

So I say that all as background.

Now, for this morning's session, the leaders focused first on Bosnia, and there was quite a lot of discussion. Mr. Bildt was there, the High Representative. The United States believes that Carl Bildt has done an excellent job -- now that we are one year past Dayton -- an excellent job in leading us to implement the strategy that was set forth at Dayton. Mr. Bildt said that he felt that Dayton had to be considered an unqualified success 12 months after the initialing of the Dayton Accords. He talked a good deal about the implementation and challenges for 1997, particularly in the economic area.

Secretary Christopher said that we certainly were achieving our objectives in Bosnia, but he felt that the parties, meaning the Bosnians, the Serbs and the Croats, had to do a much better job on a number of areas. Let me just list them for you: on freedom of the press; on freedom of movement for refugees; on war crimes; and on elections. As you know, we have had a great deal of difficulty with the Bosnian Serbs in agreeing that the OSCE should manage the 1997 municipal elections. They have now agreed to that, but after a very long disagreement and argument with NATO.

Secretary Christopher emphasized the war crimes issue, and said that all of us must explore new and effective measures to make sure that those individuals indicted for war crimes are, in fact, delivered to The Hague for prosecution over the next year. And that was a very important emphasis that he made. He also emphasized the issue, as did several other speakers, of democracy and the importance of trying to help these countries in the Balkans proceed toward some kind of democratic foundation, and he noted in this respect, as did Secretary Rifkind, as did Carl Bildt, the absence of democracy in Serbia, which is quite apparent these days -- over the last several weeks -- because of the fact that the Serbian government stole the November 17th municipal elections from the Serbian people. I think as you look toward this afternoon's communique and the press conferences to be held by Secretary General Solana and Secretary Christopher and others, you can expect a very clear, very strong, very forceful NATO denunciation of the actions of the Serbian government. I think that NATO will certainly deplore in many respects the actions of the Serbian government over the last several weeks.

Now, after the discussion of Bosnia, they then began a discussion of the NATO issues, the internal adaptation issues as well as enlargement. Minister de Charette spoke, Secretary Rifkind spoke, and Secretary Christopher spoke. As I left to come to join you, Minister Dini was speaking. That conversation will continue after the lunch break and will comprise the majority of this afternoon's conversation. When you see the communique later on today, you will get a very good sense of that issue, but I will be glad to go into it should you like.

Let me just take you through the main points of Secretary Christopher's intervention on that issue. Secretary Christopher said, to start, that there is no question, based on what NATO had done over the last three or four years to define itself in the post-Cold War era, no question that the United States would be staying in Europe, and that the United States would remain a European power. He said there was also no question that the central organizing institutions of the new Europe in the 21st century would be NATO, the European Union, and the OSCE. NATO, he felt, would continue to be the central guarantor of the security of all European countries, and, of course, of the North American countries, as well.

He said specifically that he felt it was very important that NATO's European members should play and will play a more visible role within NATO itself. He said that another consequence of the meeting today was the formal approval of the follow-on security force, SFOR, in Bosnia for 1997. Also the major enhancement of the Partnership for Peace. That concerns, of course, the idea by the United States for an Atlantic Partnership Council and that is being discussed here today.

Secretary Christopher also said, on the issue of enlargement and the future of enlargement and how it will be carried out, that we would declare that in today's Europe NATO has no intention, no plan, and no need to station nuclear weapons on the territory of any new members of NATO, once countries are taken into NATO membership. And he said that NATO would reaffirm, as well, that no NATO nuclear forces are presently on alert, and that NATO is signaling its readiness to exchange liaison offices with Russia at the major military commands. You know that there is a liaison office at SHAPE, where the Russian Federation and several other countries from the former East Bloc have offices, but now we are proposing that that kind of liaison actually take place at the military commands themselves. The best possible liaison, of course, is the one that we have right now in Tuzla, where Russia and the United States are working together in the same sector. I think General Montgomery may have stated the other day, that we are now at the point in Russia-NATO cooperation where an attack on Russian forces in Bosnia is identical to an attack on American forces or French forces or British forces, and that is a major, major advance in what NATO has been able to do working together in Bosnia.

Secretary Christopher also said, of course, that our leaders would be meeting in a head-of-state summit in July of 1997, and it was at that summit that we would invite some of our partners from the East to participate in negotiations for membership. He said further to that, expecting a summit of leaders in 1999, which as you know is the 50th anniversary of the founding of NATO, that he felt that those decisions obviously should be made by that time, or at least the inclusion of the new members should be made by that time.

I should also tell you that -- and I say this with all degree of modesty on behalf of Secretary Christopher -- I think every speaker today, going around the table, had something kind to say reflecting upon Secretary Christopher's involvement in these sessions over the last four years, and that was led by Secretary Rifkind, Minister Kinkel, and Minister Tansu Ciller from Turkey. And when Secretary Christopher concluded his statement, he just said how pleased he was to be, in essence, to use a word from another secretary of state, present at the creation of a new Europe, present at the creation of a Europe for the 21st century. And he was quite sure that his successor, if the U.S. Senate agrees to confirm her, Madeline Albright, would carry on this fundamental American dedication to the new Europe, to NATO enlargement, to adaptation, and, of course, to vigorous involvement in Bosnia. Secretary Christopher noted that Madeline Albright is a product of a divided Europe, that she grew up in a divided Europe, and that she fervently believes that Europe ought to be unified in the 21st century. He even quoted President Havel. President Havel's description of Madeline Albright as a true American of fine origins, which was, Secretary Christopher thought, an appropriate way to drive home the point that Europe and America are truly united as we approach the 21st century.

So those are the highlights, at least as we saw them, from this morning's session. And with that, I will be glad to take your questions.

Yes, sir.
QUESTION: I would like to ask you whether you would anticipate that the results of the discussion on the war criminals, the Bosnian problems, there might be an attempt made to modulate either the mandate for SFOR or the rules of engagement to allow it to play a more vigorous support role with those concerned with the arrest and transfer of war criminals. Secondly, if I could very briefly ask you to characterize how serious on adaptation the remaining differences on Southern Command structure questions still are between the United States and France?

MR. BURNS: On the first question, I think it remains to be seen exactly what the rules of engagement will be for the European and American forces and the others in SFOR, the follow-on security force. Needless to say, the United States is signaling both in Secretary Christopher's statement, also in some remarks made by our new National Security Advisor-designate, Sandy Berger, over the weekend, that we believe, based on the experience of the last year, that new and effective measures have to be found to strengthen the war crimes effort. Now that speaks to several different issues. The support given to the tribunal in The Hague, and we have to see continuing support by all countries, European and North American, to that effort. Secondly to the commitment -- or I should say the lack thereof -- by the parties to the Dayton Accords to the war crimes provisions, which of course are one of the more important provisions. If you had to grade them, I guess you would say that Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs have been by far the greatest offenders here. They have not in any way, shape or form carried out their commitments to the Tribunal or to the war crimes provisions that they initialed in Dayton and signed in Paris. The Croatians have had some major problems in compliance with some exceptions. By and large the Bosnian government has done a very good job in complying. You know that the Bosnian government turned over a Moslem citizen to the war crimes tribunal. So I think we are talking here very generally about a variety of things that have to be done to strengthen the war crimes provision.

On the second question, there is no question that we have had a disagreement between the United States and France over the issue of who should have the command in Naples. The Naples command, AFSOUTH, has always been an American commander, most notably because there is a major strategic asset of the United States, the Sixth Fleet, that is commanded from Naples. That strategic asset not only has NATO responsibilities, it has bilateral responsibilities for the United States, not only in the Mediterranean but in the Middle East. It is a very important asset of the United States.

Secretary Christopher said today that we believe that Europe will play a larger role in the command structure. That is where this discussion in NATO is heading. We believe that, over the last year, we have been able to engage in actually quite good discussions about a reformulation of some of these command structures. We have gone most of the way in agreeing on what should be done. We do have this small but well known disagreement here, and we are sure that, one way or another, it can be resolved. I can tell you this: the United States is not inclined to compromise on this issue of the command in Naples. Now there may be other ways to give the Europeans a more prevalent face and a stronger role in the command structures. But AFSOUTH is not the place to start, and you have heard our President, President Clinton, speak about that very plainly, as well as our Secretary of State, our Secretary of Defense, and almost all of our major military commanders. I think that point is well understood.

But I would like to put the accent on the positive here, and say that we think that we are going to be able to achieve a solution to this overall problem. If you look at the NATO maps, and I am sure you can get this from the NATO public affairs office, if you look at the flag map, which shows where all the individual commands, both the strategic and tactical commands, are -- I am not kidding, and I am not being facetious when I say, sometimes when you look at it, you have to look for the American flags. Now there is no question with SACEUR and SACLANT and AFSOUTH that the major strategic commands continue to be American. But there are many European commands in NATO, will continue to be, and I would expect that that would increase over the years.

QUESTION: There is some brief reference to Croatia in complaints about Serbia that I hear. Could you expand and tell us what it is about Croatia that disturbs the Allies and Christopher? And this reference to Ukraine along with Russia so far as having a new relationship. You have a proposal for Russia. What is the proposal for Ukraine? Or is there one yet?

MR. BURNS: Thank you, Barry. Very quickly, on the first question, which I suppose pertains to war crimes -- ?

QUESTION: No, not just war crimes. In the section criticizing Milosevic -- democracy, on the democracy issue, I suppose war crimes is part of the complaint, but what is the complaint with Croatia on democracy?

MR. BURNS: Well, first, I want to speak to the war crimes issue. I understand that General Blaskvic, who was instrumental in the Croatian military offensive in August of 1995, was given a medal by the Croatian government. His wife had to accept it on his behalf because he is currently in The Hague. He was transferred to The Hague as an indicted war criminal by the Croatian government. It was a positive step that the Croatians agreed to transport him to The Hague. We do not believe it was appropriate at all, as an indicted war criminal, that this man should have been given a medal for his performance in Bosnia.

Second, Barry, I do not have a lot to say, frankly, about the Croatian government here. It has not been a focus of the meetings here. We have spoken in the past. There are some problems that the United States and I think many European countries have pointed out about democracy in Croatia, but I do not wish that to be the focus of my remarks today.

Now on your second question, I was remiss in not mentioning two things from Secretary Christopher's formal intervention this morning. I just gave you the highlights. We will be giving you the text itself, but among the highlights, the Secretary said that there should be a charter between Russia and NATO. There has been quite a lot of emphasis on that, because along with enlargement, we want to have a new NATO-Russia relationship so that Russia can participate in the security life of Europe. Along with that, we believe that Ukraine ought to be in the mainstream of Europe, as well, and that is why we have decided to move forward to define formally in negotiations between NATO and Ukraine, an enhanced NATO-Ukraine relationship that would look very much like the NATO-Russia relationship. The two are separate. Ukraine is an independent country. It ought to be treated as an independent country. I think the NATO countries all agree on that.

Steve.

QUESTION: You mentioned that the Secretary of State discussed war crimes provisions (inaudible) what specifically might that be?

MR. BURNS: Well, the war crimes provisions of the Dayton Accords are a collective enterprise. The primary responsibility is with the parties to the Dayton Accords. All the members of IFOR have an interest in seeing that the responsibilities are met, so I cannot speak individually here. We are calling for greater support for the Tribunal and greater support for the idea that greater pressure has got to be put upon these countries to comply with them, and to turn these people over to The Hague for prosecution.

QUESTION: Nick, has the Greek government objected to a strong condemnation of the Serbian actions of the last three weeks?

MR. BURNS: I am not aware of any kind of disagreement in NATO, and I believe quite confidently that by the end of today you will see a unified NATO statement that forcefully deplores the actions of the Milosevic government.

This gentleman was next, then I will be glad to go to you.

QUESTION: (inaudible)

MR. BURNS: I do not want to get into the specifics because none of this has been decided and there is currently quite a lot of discussion about this, so I think we will keep that discussion private until we are ready to take it public. But just to say, you know, I think Secretary Christopher said very clearly to his European colleagues this morning that we believe that the European role should increase, and we mean that quite seriously. AFSOUTH in Naples is not the place to start for the reasons that I have enumerated in the first question.

QUESTION: On the relationship with Russia, one of the suggestions I understand is some new form the Russians had planned of equal powers of decisionmaking, (inaudible). Could you expand a little on that idea? You say that Ukraine is going to be offered a place in that sort of forum similar to Russia. Would you say that you have any sign from Russia that they are finally ready now to begin seriously negotiating with NATO to try and get this charter underway (inaudible)?

MR. BURNS: Well, I am afraid I cannot be too helpful in the first couple of questions that you had because NATO has not begun formally negotiating a charter or some kind of treaty relationship with Russia. We believe those negotiations are ahead of us. We hope that they are ahead of us in the near future. We hope that Russia will accept this offer made by NATO to formally negotiate. So I cannot anticipate the specific agreements or issues that may be raised there. I can say the following: NATO will continue to make its own decisions about its future and no country will have a veto on NATO decisionmaking. And as we look towards July of this next year, July 1997, NATO will make its decisions and make its offers as you know, by July, 1997, in terms of enlargement and which countries will be invited to participate in negotiations for new membership. We would hope very much that it might be possible, if the NATO-Russia negotiations can proceed very quickly, to agree simultaneously, or roughly simultaneously, to a new NATO-Russia relationship. But if that is not the case, if the negotiations between Russia and NATO do not proceed quickly, that will not delay the deliberations and the decisions for July, 1997. And that is a very important point. So, as Secretary of State Christopher said to some of your colleagues yesterday, this is really Russia's choice here. Russia can have, by mid-1997, a new security relationship with NATO. If it chooses not to have one by July 1997, NATO will proceed with its enlargement decisions and with its historic summit in July of next year.

QUESTION: Germany has written at the level of spokesman, it has actually officially endorsed the idea of a 17-member quorum. In other words, the 16 NATO members plus Russia, which would take decisions on certain issues. Is that something that, at this stage, the United States approves, disapproves, is considering?

MR. BURNS: Well, you know, I want to be clear here. We already have a 16-plus-1 forum. In fact, it is meeting tomorrow morning and has met for a number of years, and that is the Russian Foreign Minister with his NATO colleagues. And that will continue and it is a very important forum. As to what we might do formally in defining the new Russia-NATO relationship, I just choose not to get ahead of the formal process that the NATO Secretary General and others will be leading as we negotiate.

QUESTION: Will you be ready to sign with Russia legal documents stating that no nuclear weapons will be stationed in Eastern Europe?

MR. BURNS: Well, I do not know if there will be any legal documents but I think you have now, on the part of many NATO countries and this morning on the part of the American Secretary of State, a formal, clear pledge that we have no intention and no plans to station nuclear weapons on the soil of any new members in the East. We mean that. It is clear. And that will be the case. I am not sure there is an absolute need for a legal document, but I also cannot anticipate what course these discussions between Russia and NATO will take.

QUESTION: (inaudible)

MR. BURNS: Well, as I said, I think the NATO leadership is clear that we have no intention and no plan to position, to station, nuclear weapons on the soil of any prospective new members. But you know that any NATO member, present or future, of course, is dedicated to the security of all other NATO members, and that includes the United States, with its own arsenal, which is dedicated to the security of all NATO members. Whenever new countries do come into NATO, they of course will have the full rights, as well as the full responsibilities, of NATO membership, and they will enjoy the protection that comes with that.

QUESTION: What about conventional forces? Will you be making any comment on whether you will have a similar role about stationing conventional forces on (inaudible)?

MR. BURNS: No, we have made no statements this morning about conventional weaponry or conventional forces, and I think that just remains to be seen. I do not want to anticipate all the decisions that have to be made by NATO as we seek to take in new members. But we have made no such commitment, as you know.

QUESTION: Mr. Burns, could you (inaudible)?

MR. BURNS: I am sorry, I cannot, because I think I would be getting ahead of one of my superiors, the NATO Secretary General, and also the President of the United States. He is another one of my superiors. So I think I will respect my superiors and allow them to do that. But I think this will be very clear by the end of the day. Nothing I have seen in most of the reporting would surprise me, I guess, as we look towards that announcement.

QUESTION: There was a mention by the Honorary President, the Canadian, this morning that if the Baltic states are left out the first round of announcement, there should be active engagement from NATO side. Could you elaborate what that would mean for the Baltic states? My second question, is there now support for this Atlantic Partnership Council from the other 15 countries?

MR. BURNS: Well, on your second question first, the United States has been explaining its initiative for an Atlantic Partnership Council. Essentially, what this is is an attempt to modernize our relations with NATO's partners. Essentially to integrate the Partnership for Peace, which has been a huge success; I believe 16 exercises in 1996, 25 planned for 1997. To integrate Partnership for Peace and the NACC. The NACC, we believe, is really a relic of an earlier time, the early 1990s, when we were just emerging from the end of the Cold War and entering this new phase. So our concept is for a broader, more vigorous institution that would allow our Partners to the East, especially those that do not come in in the first tranche, to have a relationship with NATO that is truly meaningful.

On the first question, President Clinton said it best when he met with the three Baltic leaders a couple of months ago. He said the first shall not be the last. As you know, the United States has never excluded as possible members any country -- the Baltic states, Russia, Ukraine, any country, theoretically -- from membership. Obviously, some countries -- a very limited number -- will get in first. We want to have good relations with those who do not qualify, or who do not participate in that first round.

I would say one more word here. The United States, in the course of the Clinton Administration, has been very vigorously involved in the effort to try to promote the independence of the Baltic countries, along with Sweden, particularly with Sweden. In 1993 and 1994, President Clinton and Carl Bildt were able to work productively with President Yeltsin to secure the withdrawal of Russian military forces from Estonia and Latvia. We have been a very active supporter of the Baltic Battalion. They have trained in Louisiana. They are participating with us in the American, as you know, in the American sector in Bosnia. We will continue to be very interested in the true security, true independence, of three countries that are obviously facing Westward, as they should, after having regained their independence.

QUESTION: Sir, Russia would like to get the charter in a legally binding form. Are you ready to do it for them?

MR. BURNS: President Clinton said in January of 1994, nearly three years ago, that he thought that Russia and the United States should negotiate some kind of treaty or charter. That was nearly three years ago. Frankly, we have been waiting for the Russians since then, and we are very pleased that we may be on the verge of having an agreement to go forward now. We have been ready for three years. We are ready to negotiate over the course of the next six months, and we will pursue this very seriously.

Thank you very much.