Transcript of Press Conferencegiven by the Foreign Secretary

Foreign Secretary: As I am sure you are aware, one of the consequences of this particular meeting will be to fix a date for the NATO Summit, now likely to take place in Madrid next July, and that will be an historic occasion which will have a number of fundamental policy objectives.
First of all the invitation that will be issued at that summit to a number of countries, at this stage no decision has been reached exactly whom, but a decision will be reached at that summit to invite a number of countries to begin negotiations for the enlargement of NATO. That is not a unique situation, NATO has enlarged on several occasions over the years, but I believe that that process will begin the enlargement negotiations during the course of next year.

The second requirement of course will be also to identify a proper relationship between NATO and a wider group of countries, and there is a specific new proposal under consideration at the present time, and that is the suggestion of subsuming the Partnership for Peace and the NACC structure into a new Atlantic Partnership Council. It is a proposal which we have examined and we believe it to be a sensible and desirable proposal. I think the single most important aspect of this change, if it is implemented, will be not only to simplify the arrangements but also to include the partner countries more in the decision-making process. At the moment with Partnership for Peace we have an initiative which essentially is a NATO initiative, offered to others, which they have to a large extent accepted. The Atlantic Partnership Council has more of the structure of a joint operation, a joint initiative, which we hope will emerge from this particular meeting.

The third dimension that I would refer to is the need for NATO to continue to develop its relationship with Russia. Mr. Primakov will be here tomorrow. The relationship with Russia is not simply a consequence of enlargement, it is something which, regardless of the issue of enlargement, is desirable in itself. NATO should have a strategic relationship with Russia, there is active interest in the concept of a charter, or a treaty, between Russia and NATO. Russia cannot simply have a relationship based on Partnership for Peace, its nuclear status, its involvement in non-proliferation matters, its other wider interests indicate a strategic relationship and that is something on which further work is going to be done.

And of course the fourth ingredient of this period that we are going through, leading up to the summit next year, will be the continuing work on NATO adaptation, taking into account not only the end of the Cold War, but the desire of both France and Spain to achieve full integration, full military integration, with NATO.

So it is quite a heavy programme of work that is now available, but it is all part of the overall radical reassessment of NATO's role, thereby ensuring that it continues with its primary purpose - the collective security of its member states - but also makes a more positive contribution that ever before to the overall security of Europe itself.

Question: Can you say anything about what kind of substance you would expect to see in a charter or treaty? Is it a question of any matters that would be subject to decision-making at 17, as opposed to consultation? Can you just say how in this confusing institutional geography the frontiers will be drawn between the new Atlantic Partnership and the OSCE?

Foreign Secretary: First of all, I believe that the question of the nature of a NATO/Russia Treaty, that is clearly still to be all discussed and negotiated. I can say that from the United Kingdom's point of view, we believe that while it will primarily involve areas of consultation, it will go beyond that. For example, we want to see more of what is happening at the moment in Bosnia. At the moment you have the joint action of the Russian military, and NATO military, working together for a common purpose, the first time it has ever happened. It has been very successful, it has been a very positive development, but Bosnia should not be an exception., it should become increasingly common for Russian military and NATO military to work together, whether on peace keeping or on other related activities.

I believe there is also a possibility of some areas of co-decision making between Russia and NATO. The most obvious example is NATO/Russian relations themselves, that these should be a matter for joint decision-making through this process, but there could be other areas. That is something we wish to keep open minded on.

Question: Will this be a successor to OSCE?

Foreign Secretary: I don't think to go into details of options because frankly the work hasn't been done yet. What I do say is that we would not wish to in any way dilute the fundamental ability of NATO to carry out its treaty obligations. The obligation of collective security for its member states, that is something which has to be within the power of NATO and must not be subjected to any external controls or vetoes or prohibitions. So I do not suggest that there can be a general relationship of co-decision between NATO and Russia, but there may be certain specific areas where it would make sense and that is something we are prepared to look at in a positive spirit if the arguments can be presented in that way.

You asked about the link between the Atlantic Partnership Council and the OSCE. I believe that OSCE has a much wider relationship. It first of all covers for more countries. There are a number of countries that have not felt able to join PfP but which are active in OSCE, and I believe that OSCE in any event, as we saw in Lisbon last week, has a much wider remit that the NATO-related activities that we are currently considering.

Question: On the matter of the new force in Bosnia, we have been told that there was a lot of discussion this morning about the need to go further on the issue of war crimes. Are there any particular areas where you think that there is scope for tougher action? People obviously want to do more? And do you think that S4 might have an enhanced role in this area ever?

Foreign Secretary: You will recall, Mark, that last week at the London Conference part of the conclusions indicated some extra resources for the tribunal to enable it to have its own independent source of information-gathering and assessment within Bosnia, and therefore that I am sure will be an enhancement to the work of the tribunal and has already been very much welcomed by them.

So far as other matters are concerned, there already is an obligation on all the authorities within Bosnia. If the opportunity presents itself to arrest indicted war criminals, then they should carry out that obligation. We hope to see that facility utilised whenever the opportunity arises.

Question: I wonder whether S4 might have any greater role, or enhanced role, in it because I know that some of the countries talked very strongly about saying this is something that will have to be dealt with fairly quickly. So how can you make something happen fairly quickly?

Foreign Secretary: I am not aware of any specific new powers that have been given to S4 that aren't available for IFOR. It is not primarily a role for the military, but that does not mean that the military cannot facilitate an arrest if the opportunity presents itself. It is not a military task, law enforcement of this kind, but the obligations that exist more generally, if IFOR or S4 find an opportunity to arrest an indicted war criminal then I hope very much they will use that opportunity.

Question:... your government is renowned for being opposed to institution building just for the sake on institution building, so presumably you would not have spoken benignly of this new body if you were not intending to give it real ... than those already carried out by the NACC and PfP. Could you tell us ...

Foreign Secretary: First of all refer to the well known prejudice of the British Government. That prejudice includes to one organisation replacing two. I would not for a moment claim that was the only advantage, but given the way in which you presented your question, that is my initial response. But its goes beyond that. I think there is an attraction in bringing together the NACC and Partnership for Peace, they started off with slightly different remits, these have become increasingly close and intertwined and therefore I think it does simplify the situation, it should some of the administrative costs, that is obviously a useful benefit. But I think the main benefit is the one I alluded to in my opening comments, that the Atlantic Partnership Council will not be, I hope, simply something that NATO offers and others receive, but it will involve an area of enhanced cooperation where the way in which it operates will be decided jointly. At the moment, if you take for example Partnership for Peace, it is NATO who decides whether to have enhanced Partnership for Peace, and in what form or fashion, and although it goes in for consultation the decision essentially is a NATO decision. I think what is being considered in this area, through the Atlantic Partnership Council, is more joint decision-making of the responsibilities of the Council so that all those countries that are part of the process play a part in the decision-making.

Question: No majority voting?

Foreign Secretary: You know the way NATO operates and NATO has never been seduced by majority voting, and as NATO is the most successful alliance of its kind in the history of mankind, that perhaps is a precedent that ought to be followed by others - perhaps.

Question: At the NATO Summit next year, is it likely that the summit will identify more potential countries than the first wave, that you might identify another group of countries that would come in separately?

Foreign Secretary: I believe that the decision that will actually be taken at the July summit will be which countries to invite to start negotiations as of then. I don't know what the number will be, but I think that will be the decision. That will not rule out the possibility that there will be further countries joining NATO at some future date, but I believe that will be decisions to be taken at a future date. I don't think NATO next July will say well we will have the first wave of X, Y and Z and then two years later there will be A, B and C. I think it will identify the countries for whom the time has come to start negotiations. I do not expect that to be the end of the process, I am sure there is a dynamic at work, I am sure those countries that are not involved in negotiations at the initial stage, many of them will be involved subsequently, but that will be for subsequent decision.

Question: Do you expect all of those countries identified next June to start negotiations to join all at the same time?

Foreign Secretary: That will be an inference of the negotiations but it is not a necessity because to actually join requires both the completion of the negotiations and ratification by the member states. It may all happen simultaneously but there is no necessity for it to do so.

Question: We understand that this communiqué is going to involve some sort of undertaking by NATO not to station nuclear weapons on the soil of the successful candidates. Is this a permanent undertaking under any circumstances and do you think it should also be extended in some sort of way given Russia's reservations to conventional forces?

Foreign Secretary: First of all, it won't be an undertaking, it will be a unilateral statement and there is a very important distinction. We are not giving a promise or meeting a requirement, we are simply saying that NATO does not have any intention of acting in this way. We are very conscious of the fact that this is a matter which Russia attaches importance to and that is why it is timely to make that position clear but it is not an undertaking; an undertaking implies giving a commitment in exchange for some benefit. That is not the nature of the relationship which we have. NATO cannot subordinate its judgement to external considerations but it so happens that NATO has no desire to act in this way. That is a matter of some importance we understand in Russia and therefore it must be sensible to make that point clear.

Conventional forces are of course covered by the CFE treaty and in Lisbon last week at the OSCE Summit I was very pleased to see that agreement was reached on the launching of new negotiations next year on the CFE treaty. This is something which I think is very important and in which there is an indirect link to enlargement because the original CFE treaty was a treaty not between countries, it was between blocs, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and of course the Warsaw Pact has ceased to exist and therefore in that sense some revision or some reconsideration of the treaty makes sense.

It also was part of the original CFE treaty that if any member states leaves one bloc and joins another that is legitimate grounds for opening up some of these questions and that is in effect what is happening. A number of countries that were once part of the Warsaw Pact are now likely to be members of NATO so we recognise the legitimacy of the CFE being looked at in the light of these developments and that is why we were very willingly to support the decision taken at the OSCE summit last week.

Question: To what extent, if any, will the success or failure of negotiations with Russia affect the timetable of the enlargement process?

Foreign Secretary: They won't affect it. There was a suggestion at one stage that the two should not only go forward in parallel but that completion of one should be dependent on completion of the other, that obviously had some attractions to certain countries but it is not attractive to NATO nor acceptable because in effect it would be giving a veto because if the one was conditional on the other, then one could prevent enlargement happening simply by finding ways of preventing progress on the other so for obvious reasons that is not a procedure which commends itself and it will not occur.

We are taking forward these discussion in parallel. It is entirely possible that they will reach conclusions in a comparable time-scale. We have no objection to that happening but I stress that the one cannot be dependent on the other because otherwise we would be into an external veto situation.

Question: Is there any recipe or plan for the Baltic States because the Baltic States are ..... at the moment?

Foreign Secretary: First of all, can I emphasis that no decision is going to be taken on which countries with whom we will start negotiations until next July so we will have to wait until July to know for certain countries which are included and which countries are not in any first wave.

You asked about the Baltics and what I have just said covers them of course as it does other countries.

There is an additional fact to bear in mind as well: security is being enhanced for all applicants, not just through membership of NATO but also for many of them through their potential membership of the European Union not because the European Union is a security organisation which it is not but nevertheless membership of it does enhance security. Finland, for example, which is not a member of NATO has become a full member of the European Union and I have not the slightest doubt has enhanced its security as a consequence because aggression and Finland would now be aggression against a member of the European Union and involve a far heavier price to pay so I think that on the question of security for those countries anxious to enhance security enlargement is one way in which they can advance that but there are additional ways was well and the European Union does offer some importance in that respect.

Question: Could you comment on a report that there has been some discussion between certain Americans and certain Europeans about balancing NATO expansion into some countries and expanding the EU into the Baltics?

Foreign Secretary: All I can say is that we have not been involved in any such discussion. The question of EU enlargement is for the EU to decide just as NATO enlargement is for NATO to decide. I am sure our American friends are aware of the kind of point I just made to . What I can say to you is that if the Commission say that the Baltic States are ready to have negotiations then we will endorse that view and we will support that view.