Press Briefing

MR. BACON: Hello. I'm Ken Bacon and this is Walter Slocombe, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. We'll be joined in a few minutes by Robert Hunter, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO. This is on the record and Walt will start with a brief statement, and then we'll take your questions.
MR. SLOCOMBE: The meetings here are focused on a number of fronts where NATO is moving forward. The first is the enlargement process; the second is the NATO-Russia dialogue; and the third is the adaptation of the Alliance to deal with the problems of the post-Cold War world. And there is, of course, a fourth element, which is Bosnia. Let me discuss briefly each of those. But first, to anticipate what I suspect may be on a number of people's minds, we, at least on the United States delegation, do not expect that we will resolve the question of the command relationships in AFSOUTH at this meeting. That is not an agenda item. It will not hold up work on other matters. We expect it will be eventually resolved but we do not anticipate its resolution today or tomorrow.

In the areas where we do expect and, indeed, in the morning have already achieved some important progress and expect more in the further meetings which will take place in the rest of the session. First of all, with respect to Bosnia, this afternoon the defense ministers will take the step of approving what, in NATO terminology, is called the Activation Order. that is the Execute Order that will actually establish and send forward the Stabilization Force for Bosnia. The Operations Plan, the Rules of Engagement, were approved by the NAC in permanent session yesterday after consultation and discussion with the Russians and with other non-NATO troop contributing countries. In that connection, it's important to underscore that the 18-month period for SFOR seems like a long time now, but it will be a short time as it goes forward. There will be a number of problems that SFOR will have to cope with, but the Alliance will also have to be thinking about ways to make sure that the non-military aspects of implementation are in a position to take over. That includes steps to bolster the police and steps for enhanced activity on the civil and economic reconstruction front.

With respect to the enlargement process, preparations are being made so that decisions can be taken by heads of government at the summit to be held this July. Meanwhile, the Alliance -- defense ministers -- will approve steps to enhance the Partnership for Peace. The Partnership for Peace has been remarkably successful in getting itself up and running in a short time of only a couple of years, and it is now ready to move on to the next stage, where it will address a broader range of subjects, for example, moving from peacekeeping in the traditional sense, to peace enforcement, and in the more active sense, what's going on in Bosnia. For example, this will mean more demanding exercises, more involvement by Partner countries in contingency planning and in the NATO planning process.

The ministers, with respect to the NATO-Russia relationship, will be discussing at the lunch -- which started, I guess, six minutes ago -- What they will be saying with Minister of Defense Rodionov tomorrow, and I think basically rather than anticipate that we'll address that after it happens.

With respect to internal adaptation, and as an example of the proposition that we are able to move forward, although we're not able to resolve the command structure issues in detail, the ministers will approve the military program for the implementation of a Combined Joint Task Force concept so that these task force headquarters will be set up in the course of the next year, and initial trials or exercises will take place.

With respect, more specifically, to what was done this morning in the DPC meeting -- that is, the Defense Planning Council -- first in the context of discussion of NATO's force planning goals, they agreed to A set of force planning goals for the Alliance which IS focused on counterproliferation.

They agreed that the proliferation, especially of chemical and biological weapons, is a growing potential problem, that it will be increasingly important for the Alliance's military forces to be able to operate if necessary in a chemical and biological warfare environment, and that it is essential to take steps to increase their capability to do so. In that connection, they approved a series of specific force goals on things ranging from improved capabilities for intelligence and for detection of agents, for availability of vaccines, and for direct defense measures, particularly taking into account the fact that a large number of countries may be developing missiles which would be capable of delivering chemical and biological weapons. This is a so-called out-of-cycle force goal, which means that it has been established ahead of the regular planning process, and as you know, the way the NATO defense planning system works is that the Alliance gets together and agrees on certain quite specific steps that members of the Alliance are supposed to take to enhance capability, then different countries agree to take specific steps so that the overall capability of the Alliance meets the requirement. And that is what is now being done in this area, so that, for example, different countries will invest in sensors and surveillance, in strategic intelligence, and in missile defense.

At the meeting this afternoon, there will also be a briefing on some information which is developed by UNSCOM, which is the UN monitoring group in Iraq, regarding the Iraqi BW program during the Gulf War.

The second session this morning was the Nuclear Planning Group, which considered a range of nuclear issues. Reliance on nuclear weapons has substantially diminished, very greatly diminished, since the end of the Cold War. NATO's theater nuclear force deployments have been reduced by some 90 percent compared from what they were in the past, but nuclear issues still remain important.

Secretary Perry briefed the Allies on our efforts to move forward the Russian process of Start II ratification, our thoughts about how this can be done, both in the context of Russian concerns directly about Start II, and the broader concerns about how this fits into the current discussion of NATO enlargement and other European security issues.

And also in that context, at the request of the Alliance at the previous NPG meeting, the United States presented a briefing on the state of Russian non-strategic nuclear forces, that is, the tactical and theater nuclear forces. That's referred to in the communique, which makes the point that it is extremely important that ... the fact is that Russia still retains a large number of tactical nuclear weapons, that pursuant to informal agreements reached in the early 90s, those are to be reduced, and it's important that that process go forward, that a number of NATO countries have provided assistance in that effort, but that the problem of theater nuclear weapons, which got some attention last week in connection with the so-called "three no's" statement by the foreign ministers ... also there's a Russian dimension to that, as well.

They also took note of the fact, which is an important step forward, that with the completion of the removal of nuclear warheads on ICBMs, in Belarus, the commitment made at Lisbon four years ago in 1992, that the nuclear weapons which were left behind in Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine should be removed, has now been fully completed, and that is an extremely important step.

Subject to whatever Ambassador Hunter wants to add, that's my statement and I'm ready for questions.

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: Just to say that I think we should not underestimate the historic nature of last week's and this week's meetings. Except for ministerial meetings, which will take place just before the summit next summer, this is the moment in which the fundamental decisions have been taken and ratified that are going to lead NATO confidently into the future in every single area that we have been working on. In terms of opening the door to new members and promising there will be more, in terms of having created -- or in the process of creating -- the Atlantic Partnership Council, strongly reinforcing Partnership for Peace for countries who will join and those who will not join, at least not at first, of moving towards a positive relationship with Russia in the military and in the political field, and in launching the follow-on to IFOR with SFOR. What we promised at the 1994 summit, we are now delivering. And that will be ratified at the summit next July.

MR. BACON: Now we'll take questions. Jonathan Marcus, if you could identify yourselves when you ask your question, it would be helpful.

QUESTION: Jonathan Marcus, BBC World Service. Two questions. (inaudible) [Questions were about issues NATO can move forward on; and a nuclear biological and chemical weapons briefing.]

MR. SLOCOMBE: To answer the second part of the question, it's a briefing on the state of the Iraqi program during the Gulf War. With respect to the earlier -- the first question, the CJTF decision will be taken. That's a very important part of NATO adaptation. However, decisions on the overall command structure -- reorganization -- although a good deal of work has been done on that in terms of what regional commands will exist, what sub-regional commands will exist and how they will be structured, those will have to be taken as a package. And also the role of the Deputy SACEUR with respect to the restructured command arrangements.

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: It is clear that the work on the Long Term Study will continue to go forward. In any event, even if it were not for the dispute over the command in the Southern region, it would be difficult to work out the third level of command arrangements because all the Allies, in one form or another, are involved in that. So the work will go forward. It is our hope that it will be completed successfully at 16, and it is certainly our determination to reach that result.

MR. BACON: The gentleman from Reuters.

QUESTION: I'd like to ask Undersecretary Slocombe, what -- the Secretary [Perry] said essentially last night what you've said, that you're optimistic that this will be settled. What makes you so optimistic? The United States says that it will not back down; France insists that a European commander be put in charge of AFSOUTH. Where's the break going to come?

SLOCOMBE: I don't think I can say anything more than just to repeat what the Secretary said. We do not expect this issue to be resolved today. We expect it to be resolved in time.

QUESTION: Would you expect France to give in?

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: Let me underscore a couple of things. We have said, as the United States -- and on this we have the broad backing of most of the Allies -- that it is essential for us in terms of American engagement here and the weight of American strategic power that in the restructuring of commands we retain the command in AFSOUTH. However, in terms of meeting the desires expressed by a number of European countries, including France, for a greater role for Europeans, greater responsibility, more command slots going to Europeans, greater visibility, all of this is in strict conformance with what we would like to do, as well. And we are pleased to discuss a wide range of alternatives with regard to that. And on that basis, I suspect we'll find a way to move this to conclusion.

QUESTION: Yes, sir. Georgy Foris, Hungarian News Agency. On (inaudible) [Question was on requirements for NATO membership.]

MR. SLOCOMBE: I expect it'll be mentioned in the final communique because we think it is important that that go forward so that that analysis is ready when decisions are made on which countries to invite. So I guess the answer is yes.

QUESTION: I have (inaudible) discussion on how concrete this study should be? I mean, how close it should be to the concrete criterias? What's the American position on that?

MR. SLOCOMBE: The American position is that we need to understand the military implications of enlargement, and we need to be sure that the prospective members understand the obligations that they would be assuming by becoming members of the Alliance. The level of detail will vary according to different subjects, and it's also important to recognize that what's going to happen at the summit in July is not the final decision on all of the detailed steps necessary for accession, but essentially a political decision to issue an invitation. You need to know the basic military implications, but all of the details will then be worked out in subsequent accession negotiations. And, as you know, the target for the completion of the accession process, at least for the United States and I believe for the Alliance as a whole, is to have it done in 1999 by the time of the Alliance's 50th anniversary.

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: It is important to understand that an added reason for going through this process of analysis is because prior to the issuing of invitations in July, parliaments will want to know exactly what the stated conditions are of individual countries that are applying for membership. So this will help in the later ratification process by demonstrating to parliaments that the countries who have applied and whom we invite do take seriously the requirements of NATO membership, including its Article V responsibilities.

QUESTION: You mentioned the military implications and, in fact, in the communique (inaudible) it was stated very clearly, it was in the communique last week, that there was no intention to move nuclear weapons forward. There is presumably also, or at least is it possible that you would say that there will be no intention to move other matters forward? Conventional troops, for instance? It would also be interesting to know what you do, in fact, intend to move forward, in a sense. Communications, for instance, or infrastructure elements. Are these things known yet, or are these decisions which are liable to be taken today or tomorrow?

MR. SLOCOMBE: I don't think decisions on these issues will be taken today, but you're right to identify them as important issues, and they are, in part, what would come out of this analysis with the military implications. As you know, and as your question implies, both countries in Central Europe and the Russians have raised questions about what changes in NATO's -- and the countries in the Alliance have raised questions -- about what changes in NATO's military dispositions would be required as a consequence of enlargement. It is certainly the position of the Alliance, going back to the enlargement study that we would not envisage re-establishing a layer-cake type defense with large stationed forces. On the other hand, there will obviously be headquarters, there will be training, there will be exercises, there will be the presence of NATO in new member countries. But one of the issues to be discussed in detail is exactly what that means and, to some degree, how -- what kinds of statements the Alliance will make either at the summit or beforehand about that. But no, I would not anticipate any statement on that subject at this time.

QUESTION: (inaudible) What's the function of this military study, of military consequences? (inaudible) consequences to the decision of enlargement itself?

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: Each individual country in the Alliance, the 16, will make its own judgements based upon its own sense of the commitments it wishes to make to candidate members. I suspect for many if not all of them, the analysis of the willingness and ability of countries to play a full role as Allies will figure in that calculation. But each individual government will make that for reasons known only to itself.

QUESTION: (inaudible) If you could tell us about Bosnia. (inaudible)

MR. SLOCOMBE: The American forces will be in essentially the same area they've been in in the past. We will maintain -- or IFOR will -- the IFOR arrangement of three divisional areas will continue under SFOR. So that all of the NATO forces which are there, and, indeed, the non-NATO forces and the Russian forces, will be responsible for continuing to see to the implementation of the military terms of the agreement. I think the kinds of challenges which will be faced will be different from those of the first year. In the first year, it was necessary to put a great deal of effort into demarcating the inter-entity boundary line, establishing the zones of separation, getting heavy weapons into cantonments, getting the military forces of the factions from a war state to a demobilized state where they were in garrison. That function will continue, but because a great deal has already been accomplished, it will be a less demanding requirement. Meanwhile, there will be other things going on. There will be a process of political construction, presumably we'll hold the municipal elections, which are now scheduled to be held in the late spring. There will be the continuing work on the establishment both of the federation and of the country as a whole with the Presidency working together. There will be continued civil reconstruction issues. There will be continued attention to the issue of war criminals. And all of these things, SFOR will have a role in, but it will be definitely a supporting role and with fewer forces. In general, SFOR will be less active in these areas than IFOR with larger forces was. This is to be a time of transition to a more civilian, civil-centered reconstruction process in the country.

I want to make the point: this is important because one of the things which was done yesterday was to approve the Rules of Engagement. The force will continue to be heavily armed. It will continue to have a full range of authority and capability both to protect itself and if and as it becomes necessary, to act decisively against violations of the military provisions of the agreement.

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: A key reason for choosing an 18-month time period now was to underscore the importance of the non- military activities in helping the peace process succeed, particularly on the civilian side, particularly in economic reconstruction, including return of refugees and the like. These are not NATO functions, not SFOR functions, but if, indeed, this is going to succeed, the responsibility of the local parties has to be fulfilled and the responsibilities of the international community on the non-military side. That's going to be the proof of the pudding, not, we expect, what SFOR will do, if, indeed, it continues in the fine tradition that IFOR, in its highly successful year, achieved.

QUESTION: My name is (inaudible) of Japan. Now on Bosnia again, are we expecting an activation order or an order to act to be issued in this Council meeting this afternoon?

MR. SLOCOMBE: Yes.

QUESTION: Does this mean, then, OPLAN, if I remember correctly, 1046, itself, will be activated earlier than scheduled?

MR. SLOCOMBE: Yes.

QUESTION: It is something of a preparatory stage for the activation of the OPLAN, or OPLAN is (inaudible)?

MR. SLOCOMBE: This is what we would refer to in U.S. parlance as the Execute Order. The OPLAN, which is the plan, was approved yesterday after extensive discussion, and what will be done today is the order actually to execute the plan, so that on the 20th, which is three days from now, SFOR will come into existence under the provisions of the OPLAN as approved yesterday by the NAC.

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: To put it to you in simpler [terms], let's go.

QUESTION: I have just a brief one. Is Secretary Perry going to meet with Millon?

MR. SLOCOMBE: Yes.

QUESTION: He is? Could you tell us when? Today? Or --?

MR. SLOCOMBE: I think it's still --

MR. BACON: -- still being scheduled, but there's a request from the French for a meeting.

MR. SLOCOMBE: There are gaps in the schedule, so it will certainly be set up. It's just a question of when.

QUESTION: Do you expect it'll be today?

MR. SLOCOMBE: I expect it'll be today or tomorrow.

MR. BACON: We have time for one more question. Okay. Thank you very much.