Statement By Mr. Willy Claes, Deputy Prime Minister And Minister For Foreign Affairs Of Belgium, At The Special Meeting Of The North Atlantic Council In Ministerial Session
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The Cold War was an abnormal state of affairs, but an excellent compass. As much as we may have argued over the right strategy or specific force deployments, we did so within clear demarcation lines.
Today, our security environment is no longer dominated by the Cold War. That does not mean that we are entirely free to choose. But more than ever before, the degree of our security will be the direct result of our actions -- or non-actions. Regarding the transatlantic relationship, this means that it will largely be what we want to make of it.
It would be folly to assume, that the transatlantic relationship should continue unaffected by the end of the Cold War. But it is up to us to determine how much these changes matter in the end. We must therefore seize the opportunity provided by the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the NATO Summit next January to forge a new transatlantic bargain.
What could such a transatlantic bargain look like? Basically, I see two essential elements: First, the Atlantic Alliance must continue to act as the primary forum for consultation and joint action to respond to new security challenges, wherever they originate.Second, we Europeans, must show more willingness to take security responsibilities in those crises which affect first and foremost European interests.
I believe that both parts of this bargain are within our reach. We have made substantial progress. Both NATO and WEU have already proven their relevance for the security and stability in the new Europe: In ex-Yugoslavia, for the first time in its history, NATO has acted outside the territory of its member states in support of a peacekeeping mission and under a direct mandate from the United Nations. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council, in the two years of its existence, has steadily broadened its basis for projecting stability into Central and Eastern Europe, most recently by making peacekeeping a major part of its work; The WEU has also entered a new phase in its evolution through its role in enforcing the embargo in the Adriatic and on the Danube; Only a month ago, the WEU participated in the first meeting of our Ad Hoc Planning Coordination Group, alongside representatives of the UN, UNPROFOR, and the EC Presidency; The Eurocorps has been made available to both NATO and WEU in a way satisfactory to both organisations; The WEU's Forum of Consultation has provided an additional layer of dialogue with countries in Central and Eastern Europe, complementing our efforts in the NACC and those of the CSCE;
NATO and the WEU are thus two viable building blocks in our broader effort to create a new Euro-Atlantic security order. But Yugoslavia reminds us that such a new security order is still a distant goal. Our organisations will have to act on the lessons of this terrible conflict and resolve to do better. To my mind there are seven or eight particularly important lessons to be learned, some of which are obvious: The first lesson is that crisis prevention is always preferable to crisis management. The preventive deployment in Macedonia is a good example of anticipating a crisis instead of reacting only after it has erupted. We should also be able to respond to the situation in the Kosovo; Second, political solutions and diplomatic efforts will only work if backed by the necessary military power and the credible resolve to use it against an aggressor; Third, if you cannot or do not want to help the victim of aggression, enable him to help himself; Fourth, the purpose of intervention is not necessarily to win a war, but to influence the behaviour of the party concerned. We need to have limited military options for limited political or diplomatic objectives. It is wrong to think only in categories of all or nothing; Fifth, threaten only if you are determined to implement the threat; Sixth, define the strategic objectives of your actions as early and as clearly as possible; Seventh, avoid situations in which your own troops become hostages; Finally, the most important lesson is, of course: that no international organisation can work efficiently without the political will and unity of its member nations. This is true as much for the United Nations as for the European Union, the WEU, or NATO.
If we observe these lessons, we can help prevent future Yugoslavias. Even more so since our institutions have considerable potential which has yet to be fully realised. With the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht, the stage is now set for a Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. The role of the WEU as the bridge between NATO and the European Union is thus all the more highlighted by this important event.
Our forthcoming NATO Summit should take the necessary decisions to give clear guidance for our cooperation. The Summit will also serve as an important opportunity to further enhance the development of a European Security and Defence Identity and to reaffirm the transatlantic link. This Summit, to which the WEU will undoubtedly make its distinct contribution, will be central, not only in laying the groundwork for the future relationship between our organisations, but also in defining a new transatlantic bargain between equal partners.
At the core of our efforts lies the question of how to re-balance the Alliance so that Europe assumes a greater share of responsibility for security in Europe and beyond. It is essential that on both sides of the Atlantic a greater European role is not regarded as a threat but as a precondition of NATO's longer-term vitality. The WEU has an important role to play in this regard, and I see it as one of our greatest accomplishments that we have established a close working relationship between our organisations. We are working to improve it further. In the long run, our overall objective is to develop structures that allow us to work efficiently together but also to enable the forces of European Allies to operate under WEU auspices when it is agreed that NATO should not be involved.
We now have to create practical, operationally sound arrangements in this respect. For example, we are currently looking at the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces for peacekeeping and other contingency operations. This concept would provide the Alliance with mobile, multinational, tri-service headquarters, which could be detached from existing command structures for operations under WEU auspices. It could therefore meet the Alliance's new crisis management requirements and provide the basis for "separable but not separate" forces to accommodate the needs of the emerging European Security and Defence Identity. A competing military structure in Western Europe is neither necessary nor possible. No-one can afford such duplication in times of shrinking defence budgets. It could only be built up at the expense of existing structures. I believe that this view is now widely accepted.
It should be said that the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces is yet another indication of the flexibility of our integrated military structure. Events of the past year have clearly demonstrated how well this structure can adapt to the changing security environment. I firmly believe that, given the scope and complexity of operations required in former Yugoslavia, effective multi-national involvement would have been even more difficult without NATO and its integrated structure. Moreover, the unity of command and control which it secures, its responsiveness to a changing political and military situation, and its visible demonstration of Allied solidarity makes NATO's integrated structure an indispensable element of our security, regardless of new arrangements outside or within it.
By the same token, it must remain clear that the central forum for consultation on issues affecting the security of our member states remains NATO. This is not an artificial requirement. Logic simply dictates such an approach, especially since the task forces I have referred to would still have to draw on supporting NATO assets. Clearly, common WEU stances will be increasingly introduced into Alliance consultations. They must, however, remain flexible positions, open for discussion and possible modification in the mutual security interest. If we would give priority to a policy of "fait accompli" over negotiated compromise, we would put the transatlantic relationship at risk. What in the short-term might look like European self-assertion would in the longer term be revealed for what it really was: Europe acting against its self-interest.
Moreover, it would be an illusion to believe that we could neatly categorize security challenges into "American" and "European". The degree of involvement of either side may vary, depending on the nature of the crisis and on the interests at stake, but at its core it will remain a joint effort.
Our experience in Yugoslavia has been a case in point. It has highlighted the magnitude today's crisis management challenges can assume, and the importance of sharing leadership and responsibility in dealing with European security. So Europe and North America remain dependent on one another, and our security arrangements must reflect this interdependence. What matters is that our military structures be shaped to suit the evolving "variable geometry" in crisis management efforts. This includes, of course, future contributions by non-NATO members, for example in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council framework.
We are currently discussing new ways of making our Partners more capable of interacting with NATO member states in a broad range of multinational missions such as peacekeeping and crisis management. For example, the recent proposal by the United States, entitled "Partnership for Peace", envisages a network of bilateral arrangements between individual Partner countries and the Alliance.
This initiative, which has been favourably received in the Alliance, is not an alternative to membership. It will be open to all cooperation partners and possibly to other states in Europe which may be interested. But the extent of cooperation would be largely up to the partner countries themselves and depend on their individual requirements. This would lead to a flexible network of cooperative links within Europe and across the Atlantic, in which nobody would be excluded or isolated.
De meme, il doit etre bien clair que l'instance centrale o_ sont prises les decisions ayant une incidence sur la securite de nos Etats membres reste l'OTAN. Il ne s'agit pas d'une exigence artificielle. C'est tout simplement la logique qui dicte une telle ligne de conduite, d'autant que les forces operationnelles que je mentionnais tout a l'heure devraient toujours etre constituees a partir des moyens mis a disposition par l'OTAN. Il est evident que les prises de position communes de l'UEO trouveront de plus en plus place dans les consultations de l'Alliance. Il faut cependant que ces positions restent souples, ouvertes a la discussion et qu'il soit possible de les modifier en fonction de l'interet que nous portons mutuellement a la securite. Si nous donnions a la politique du fait accompli la priorite sur la negociation et le compromis, nous risquerions de mettre les liens transatlantiques en peril. Ce qui, a court terme, pourrait passer pour une affirmation de l'identite europeenne ne se revelerait etre, a long terme, que ce qu'elle aurait ete en realite : a savoir, une manifestation de l'Europe agissant contre son propre interet.
En outre, ce serait une illusion de croire que nous pourrions classer soigneusement les defis qui se posent sur le plan de la securite en deux categories : "americains" d'une part et "europeens" de l'autre. Le role de chaque partie peut varier - selon la nature de la crise et selon les interets en jeu - mais, pour l'essentiel, il s'agira toujours d'un effort commun.
Notre experience en Yougoslavie constitue un cas typique. Il a mis en lumiere l'ampleur des defis que peut poser aujourd'hui la gestion des crises et a souligne qu'il importe de partager leadership et responsabilites lorsqu'il s'agit de la securite europeenne. Ainsi, l'Europe et l'Amerique du Nord restent dependantes l'une de l'autre, et notre dispositif de securite doit concretiser cette interdependance. Ce qui compte est de faconner nos structures militaires de maniere qu'elles s'adaptent a la nouvelle "geometrie variable" dans la gestion des crises. Cela implique, naturellement, la contribution future de pays non membres de l'OTAN, par exemple dans le cadre du Conseil de cooperation nord-atlantique.
A l'heure actuelle, nous cherchons comment donner a nos Partenaires de nouveaux moyens de mieux agir avec les Etats membres de l'OTAN, dans toute une gamme de missions multinationales concernant notamment le maintien de la paix et la gestion des crises. C'est ainsi que, dans leur recente proposition intitulee "Partenariat pour la paix", les Etats-Unis envisagent un reseau d'arrangements bilateraux entre les divers Partenaires de la cooperation et l'Alliance.
Cette initiative, qui a recu un accueil favorable de l'Alliance, n'est pas un succedane de l'adhesion. Elle sera proposee a tous les Partenaires de la cooperation et, eventuellement, aux autres Etats europeens qui seraient interesses. L'ampleur de la cooperation dependrait toutefois largement des pays partenaires eux-memes et serait fonction des besoins de chacun. On aboutirait ainsi a tout un reseau de liens de cooperation souples au sein meme de l'Europe et par dela l'Atlantique, dans lequel nul ne serait exclu ou isole.
Dans le meme temps, il y a encore a faire, s'agissant des relations entre les Allies, et en particulier des liens entre l'OTAN et l'UEO pour lesquels il faut notamment : definir plus avant les imperatifs structurels concrets d'une formule "separable mais non separee"; renforcer les liens entre la Cellule de planification de l'UEO et le SHAPE; preciser les besoins de l'UEO, afin de pouvoir en tenir compte dans le processus de planification des forces de l'OTAN; enfin, mettre au point des positions compatibles sur l'elargissement futur de nos deux organisations. Comme certains pays de l'Association europeenne de libre echange vont sans doute adherer prochainement a l'Union europeenne et que les nouvelles democraties d'Europe centrale et orientale ont h_te de voir les liens se renforcer, l'OTAN et l'UEO sont toutes deux appelees a elaborer une strategie politique qui permette de prendre en compte ces nouvelles demandes. Je pense que l'ouverture progressive de nos institutions a de nouveaux membres est pour nous un devoir historique. C'est egalement une occasion sans precedent de renforcer la communaute des democraties. Cependant, nous devons, dans nos demarches, etre conscients des implications qui en decoulent pour les autres organisations multinationales.
Ladies and Gentlemen, I said in the beginning that the Cold War has forced a certain discipline on us. We knew that much was at stake and we proceeded carefully so as not to weaken transatlantic relations.
There are some who believe that in a post-Cold War world a loosening of our transatlantic ties would no longer make much of a difference. Let us not succumb to these views. The success story of European integration owes much to the transatlantic framework that NATO provides. If we lose sight of this essential interrelationship, if we take a casual approach to our future, we could quickly find ourselves in the worst of all possible worlds: without a sound trans-atlantic relationship and without a dynamic European integration process. This would be damaging not only for Western Europe and North America. It would also gravely affect the political and economic transition of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, countries which urgently look for links to the political, economic and military institutions of the West for security and stability.
Ladies and Gentlemen, the transatlantic relationship is the most stable geopolitical asset on this globe. It brings together the world's two principal centres of democracy and liberalism. These are also the two regions with the greatest global outreach and sense of global responsibility. How could we hope to achieve a more stable world in the absence of their strategic cooperation?
Lasting links require institutional anchoring beyond economic interdependence. NATO provides this political and military anchor. In times of increasing economic competition, these links assume special relevance.
Finally, how could North America and Europe ever hope to deal with the new challenges, if not in common? The challenges far exceed the capabilities of any single nation. They must be faced collectively - or we will not succeed in facing them at all.
The essential precondition for further successful security cooperation between the Atlantic democracies is a greater European role. This is the key to NATO's future. Smooth and pragmatic cooperation between NATO and the WEU must be our main objective in the months ahead. Not only is this the key to a new transatlantic bargain; it is also essential in projecting stability to our partners in Central and Eastern Europe and in providing the foundation for security in an undivided Europe.