Speech

President Bush, President Gorbachev, Minister Bernini, Minister Fisichella, other members of the Italiangovernment, Mr. Pico, distinguished officials, ladiesand gentlemen,

It gives me great pleasure to address the distinguished Pio Manzu forum, which has contributed so much to our understanding of global political and economic issues, and especially to find myself in the company of men and women who have done so much to make the waning years of the second millennium so much more hopeful than the era of world war and totalitarianism from which we have so recently emerged. This year's Pio Manzu honorees, Hanan Ashrawi and George Bush, symbolize the twin pillars of the international order we are striving to achieve, namely justice and peace. Mrs. Ashrawi has devoted herself to the pursuit of justice for her people and respect for the human rights of all peoples, which is the only foundation upon which to build a stable and lasting peace in the Middle East. And President Bush devoted his leadership to achieving a global structure of peace based upon the freedom of all states from external domination and aggression. Together, the record of both honorees transcends the interests of a single people, a single nation or a single political system. Rather, they have served the interests of what President Gorbachev called universal values, the defence of which is key to our hopes of a new millennium for humankind.

The year 2000, dividing the old millennium from the new, is a natural milestone. It provides an opportunity for taking stock of what has been achieved and tempts us to speculate on the shape of things to come in the new century. What I would like to do today is first to define the security goals we seek by the year 2000, and then discuss the role I believe NATO can play in this period of change and transition. Of course, such crystal ball gazing is risky. It reminds me of the local newspaper which told its readers that the horoscope section had to be cancelled "due to unforeseen circumstances". But I will try nevertheless.

First: What are NATO's goals? The simple answer is: to sustain the unprecedented period of security, peace and prosperity enjoyed by Western Europe for the past forty years and more. But today that is not enough. We need to extend these same blessings to the new democracies to our east. Building the wider security community is a primary goal of the Euro-Atlantic democracies. Achieving it will be the security milestone of this fin du siecle.

How to achieve this, however, is the challenge.

If security policy during the Cold War was perceived mainly as maintaining the status quo, even maintaining a balance of terror, so security policy in the post-Cold War era is about the management of change. In short, we are attempting to stabilise the processes of political transformation -- processes that resulted in large measure from the inspired leadership of the two distinguished former Presidents in attendance here today, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev.

But it would be wrong to assume that helping to stabilize the process of integrating the wider Europe is a fundamentally new task for the Alliance. The fact is that even during its first four decades of existence NATO served as more than just a shield against an external threat; it was a shield behind which Western European nations which had been enemies for the better part of the past millennium were able to transcend their history and build the institutions of political and economic union. Their militaries were no longer arrayed against each other, but rather integrated in a single and unified structure. And the US troop presence was a guarantee to weak nations that they need not fear the strong, and to strong nations that they need not fear each other.

In other words, NATO helped to bring an end not to history itself, of course, but to Western Europe's history of great power rivalry and balance of power politics. It is precisely this mission which the Alliance is now called upon to play in the wider Europe, reconciling former enemies and underpinning the process of pan-European integration.

Thankfully, we do not face an enemy as before, but we are nevertheless confronted with persisting threats from Europe's darker past -- conflict in the Balkans; the general fracturing of multi-ethnic societies along irredentist lines; the re-emergence of xenophobia, intolerance and extreme forms of nationalism, and the fragility of newly democratic societies to our east. We must also confront a worsening situation along the southern rim of the Mediterranean, as well as the growing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this context, NATO is needed more than ever to underpin Allied security, to project stability in the wider Europe, and to carry out new missions in crisis management and peacekeeping.

Let me buttress this point by explaining how the Alliance has changed in the past five years.

• First, NATO has developed a broad, political approach to security. This has fostered cooperative relationships with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, through the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and, most recently, the Partnership for Peace. This evolution will eventually result in the addition of new members to the Alliance.
• Second, NATO has taken on the new task of crisis management by offering support to CSCE and United Nations peacekeeping operations. NATO's involvement in former Yugoslavia exemplifies this new mission. We have also created new force structures suited to these new tasks.
• Third, NATO is giving greater responsibility to the European Allies for the security and defence of Europe, both through adaptations within the Alliance and through a closer relationship with the Western European Union.

These changes, still underway, are fundamental and irreversible; they have signalled the Alliance's political response to the new security environment.

Perhaps the most visible example of NATO's contribution to a wider Euro-Atlantic security architecture is the Partnership for Peace, which has gotten off to a very rapid start. Twenty-three countries, including both neutral states and former members of the Warsaw Pact, have joined the programme thus far, and more may sign. We are now developing individual work programmes with our Partners to allow each country to draw closer to the Alliance at a pace and in areas of its own choosing.

Our principal aim with PfP is to build the familiarity, trust and habits of cooperation which the Allies have developed among themselves for many decades.

We also hope to promote democratic control over military establishments, and to develop a force planning system of the kind that has underpinned NATO's own integrated military structure. Together, with partners, we will develop common ideas and approaches for peacekeeping and humanitarian support operations to which their forces may be assigned, thereby greatly increasing the pool of trained and NATO- compatible assets which we may draw upon in future Bosnia- type contingencies. Thus, it is clear that PfP is a two-way street, with the Alliance as well as our Partners deriving benefits.

One point I should make clear. Partnership for Peace is not a substitute for NATO membership. At the January Summit, the Allies made clear they expect and would welcome enlargement. Our next task is to begin to examine internally the way ahead, so that we can prepare the Alliance to accept new members in a way which enhances European security. This implies, first of all, that the enlargement debate must not be conducted in terms of a "zero-sum game", where membership for some would translate into a net loss for others. Expanding our Alliance must be recognised for what it is: the enlargement of a community of values, not an exercise in exclusion or isolation. It also requires that NATO develop a close and special partnership with Russia in the interests of European and global stability.

Indeed, it is a fact that Russia will remain the strongest military power in Europe. Its active participation in building a new security architecture in Europe is thus absolutely vital. We cannot build such a structure without Russia, much less against her. This has only been reaffirmed by the developments in Bosnia. We will treat each other as equal and sovereign partners, without any veto or droit de regard.

Since Russia joined the Partnership last June, we have been working out an Individual Partnership Programme to foster cooperation in the security field. We will further strengthen our relations through the development of a far- reaching dialogue and cooperation between NATO and Russia, outside the PfP framework, in areas where Russia has unique and important contributions to make, commensurate with its weight and responsibility as a major European and international power.

Partnership for Peace is an example of what NATO is doing to create cooperative security relations between countries in Europe. Its effects will be felt over time in terms of greater trust and fewer misunderstandings. The Alliance, however, has to be ready also to deal with crises which happen when trust breaks down and conflict erupts.

NATO is currently playing, as you know, an important role in Bosnia. We are imposing a No-fly Zone, and have basically prevented the use of air power as an instrument of war. We are enforcing trade and weapons embargoes -- and let me make clear that, whatever the impact of Congressional legislation on US participation, NATO will continue to enforce fully and totally all the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, including both embargoes. We are also ready to authorise air strikes in response to attacks against safe areas or against UNPROFOR. I should add that none of these operations would be possible without the support and cooperation of Italy. In fact, Italy has always been one of the staunchest and most loyal members of the Alliance, and never more so than in periods of danger and crisis.

One point should be clear about NATO's involvement in former Yugoslavia, and that is that we are not acting independently, but rather in support of the United Nations, in order to underpin the efforts of the international community to achieve a negotiated settlement. We do not have the lead in former Yugoslavia, but we are attempting to impress upon the UN the need to use NATO air power in credible and effective ways. I believe that, within the inherent limits of our mandate, we have accomplished a lot. The embargo has certainly encouraged Belgrade to accept the Contact Group's peace plan and isolate the Bosnian Serbs; and the threat - and occasional use - of our air power has provided virtually the only protection to the people of the Safe Areas, as well as help deter attacks against UNPROFOR. Of course, cooperation between NATO and the UN -- two very different organisations, with different structures and bureaucratic "cultures" -- has been a learning experience.

But I believe we are setting the stage for more fruitful cooperation in the future, as well as for eventual NATO support to CSCE - sponsored peacekeeping operations.

Another task ahead is to continue adapting NATO's structures to deal with the new security challenges of today and tomorrow. At our Summit last January NATO's support for the European Security and Defence Identity was given a practical dimension. The Alliance stands ready to make collective assets available for WEU operations in which the United States and Canada choose not to participate, and it will adapt further its military structures in order to create Combined Joint Task Forces.

This practical initiative is an emphatic demonstration that there is no rivalry between Atlantic and European approaches to security. They are complementary, and equally necessary in any case. We cannot expect the United States to take the lead in each and every crisis. We need to develop the flexibility to be able to respond either through the Alliance or through the Western European Union, according to the nature of a crisis. The Combined Joint Task Forces Concept, if properly implemented, should provide us with this flexibility.

An additional task that lies ahead is to sharpen our focus on the Mediterranean. The Alliance includes five Mediterranean members which enjoy a security guarantee under Article V of the Washington Treaty. To be sure, the end of the East-West confrontation has had a positive impact in the Mediterranean region, as can be seen most clearly in the Middle East peace process. Nonetheless, this good news is matched in the headlines by stories about potentially destabilising developments along the Mediterranean's southern rim. Thanks to an initiative by the Italian government, the issue of stability in the Mediterranean region was placed on the agenda of the Brussels Summit, and this will be an area of increasing priority for the Alliance in the years to come.

Yet another challenge that we must pursue in order to enhance security and stability in the Mediterranean and elsewhere is a common policy on proliferation issues. The spread of weapons of mass destruction could well become a key security challenge of the coming millennium. This is why at the January Summit we agreed on a policy framework on non-proliferation. NATO will support, and not duplicate, work already underway in other international fora. But we will also consult regularly on proliferation threats, both "at 16" and within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

Of course, we also must be prepared should our efforts at prevention fail. For this reason, we will also examine how our defence capabilities can be improved and how NATO's defence posture can support or influence diplomatic efforts to block the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

As times changes, so do alliances. They redefine their missions, they readjust their structures, they welcome new members. But fundamentals stay the same. As we approach a new millennium we must remain aware of what constitutes the essence of our success: the transatlantic link. NATO remains the ultimate embodiment of this link since it commits the United States and Canada to the maintenance of stability in Europe. The Atlantic Alliance has proven that it is possible to create a community of values that transcends the narrow focus of the nation-state. It is this achievement that gives us the confidence that we can indeed widen the Atlantic Community for the benefit of all of Europe as we approach the new millennium.