Speech

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Barely a month ago, on April 12, NATO entered a new era. That was the day when the Atlantic Alliance began enforcing the UN-mandated no-fly zone over Bosnia. For the first time in its history, the Alliance embarked on an action that could lead it into an actual combat situation.

What an irony! An organisation created to deal with the military challenge of the Cold War, and which survived that Cold War and succeeded without firing a shot, now has to contemplate seriously the use of force - after the Cold War has ended, and outside of what was traditionally called the NATO treaty area.

Of course, we could have stood aside. An institution dealing predominantly with the defence of its member countries could have made the case that what happened in former Yugoslavia was outside its political and geographical mandate.

But NATO did not stand aside. We wanted to react to the United Nations' resolution because we felt that if the positive achievements of the last few years were to made durable, we had to make our contribution to the efforts by the international community to stop the fighting in the heart of Europe. We reacted because we felt that turning our back on the hotspots in Europe is not an answer. Violent nationalism in Yugoslavia may not threaten NATO territory; but left to fester it can only expand insecurity and instability across Europe. If we do not want the current transition phase of Europe to become a violent historical epoch in its own right, we had to act.

NATO is a unique position to act. After all, it is the essential foundation on which any future Euro-Atlantic security order will have to rest:

The Alliance couples Europe and North America, the two largest centres of democracy and market economy. Transatlantic solidarity and recognition of shared fundamental interests between Europe and America remain the precondition for managing security today. Neither can prevent disorder in Europe without the other. NATO is still the only instrument that enables Europe and America to consult and, where necessary, to act together, sharing leadership and burdens. NATO is thus the basic model of the way in which the industrial democracies must operate to uphold stability in a world of multidimensional risks and limited national means.

Second, of all international organisations the Alliance remains the only one that can virtually guarantee the security of its members. Only NATO possesses the prerequisite network of bases, equipment and infrastructure. It also possesses a unique array of politico-military tools for crisis management.

These simple facts explain the coherence of the Alliance even after the end of the Cold War. It also explains why so many countries in Central and Eastern Europe have stated their interest in joining our Alliance one day.

For the last three years we have prepared our Alliance for an entirely new strategic environment.

In the military domain, this is reflected in the adaptation of NATO's force posture to new security requirements. This adaptation is making good progress. Based on our Strategic Concept that we agreed at our Rome Summit in 1991, our forces are becoming more flexible and mobile. A Rapid Reaction Corps Headquarters has been established and the Corps should be available on target in 1995. Our Strategic Concept also provides for more multinational formations, even at corps level. Thereby NATO is also promoting the military integration of its European members and helping to lay the basis for a European identity in security and defence.

A new Command Structure has been agreed, including in the Southern Region, where, as you know, there have been some problems in the past. Moreover, we are currently streamlining the armaments cooperation process within NATO, and we are devising ways of military cooperation with non-NATO states.

So for NATO, the shifts in the international system have indeed resulted in the most fundamental transformation in its history, a transformation that has culminated in the adoption of two new major tasks for our Alliance.

First, we are projecting stability into Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia through close cooperation with our former adversaries in the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

Second, we are making our Alliance's unique military and political capabilities available for crisis management and peacekeeping.

Allow me to elaborate on these two new tasks.

During the Cold War there was a clear fault line running through Central Europe. It seemed so durable that even our vocabulary adapted to it: "Central Europe" became "Eastern Europe", and Central Asia was simply seen as a part of the Soviet Union. This fault line has disappeared. We now have to face the challenge not only of establishing a close cooperation with these states in the political and economic fields, but to help them reorganise their security policies as well. As the only functioning collective defence organisation we bear a special security responsibility for these young democracies.

Nothing could express better this responsibility than the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, where we meet with our cooperation partners. If someone had predicted only three years ago that the foreign ministers of, say, Russia, Ukraine and Latvia would ever come together in Brussels under my chairmanship, I would have recommended he receive medical treatment immediately. Today, it has become almost a regular feature of our security dialogue. By giving these partners a common security anchor in our Western structures, we have helped to prevent the formation of competing alliances in Central and Eastern Europe. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council has given the countries of Central and Eastern Europe an instrument for addressing their security concerns and for identifying multilateral solutions. We have supplemented consultations within the NACC by a diverse programme of practical cooperation activities designed to help our partners in areas where we have special competence and expertise.

A new and important element is that NATO will initiate consultations with our NACC partners on peacekeeping, leading to cooperation between the Alliance and interested NACC members. We will seek to share experience and expertise in the planning of peacekeeping missions, training and consideration of possible joint peacekeeping exercises. Increasingly, therefore, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council will be able to assist NATO with its two new missions of crisis management and projection of stability.

The NACC has therefore proved to be a dynamic process. We will develop it further by making our programmes more responsive to the individual needs of cooperation partners. Through the NACC the Alliance is contributing to the emergence of a security culture in Europe, wherein security is improved through cooperation.

Let me now turn to the second task, crisis management and peacekeeping.

The territorial defence of Western Europe is fundamental to our security, but no longer the most urgent call on our resources. As projecting stability is now a major task for the Alliance, NATO must also play a vital part in peacekeeping. This means that NATO's political and military potential can be made available not only for territorial self- defence but also to deal with the new security challenges in Europe. Given the instability in many parts of Europe today, we would be foolish to leave the Alliance on the sidelines and its potential under-utilised. The Alliance is not only needed as a unique source of peacekeeping capabilities; its consultations can also serve to generate necessary political momentum, for instance in enforcing sanctions.

We all would wish that diplomatic means alone would succeed. But diplomacy needs to be backed up with a determination to use force if it is to be credible. If the international community were perceived as ruling out the use of military force under all circumstances, any aggressor could easily call our bluff. As Frederick the Great used to say: "Diplomacy without the sword is like music without instruments". We should heed his advice even today, when we are dealing with crisis management. Military force must be clearly available through all stages of crisis management in order to ensure that non-military approaches work.

For this reason, one of our main tasks right now is to further strengthen the Alliance's coordination in peacekeeping and to develop practical measures to enhance NATO's contribution in this area. We have initiated the necessary planning for the integrated military structure in order to ensure that the required capabilities for peacekeeping will be available to the Alliance.

This task is everything but easy. The experience in former Yugoslavia already shows the changing nature of peace- keeping operations. The lines between "peacekeeping" and "peacemaking" are becoming increasingly blurred. Whereas in the past it would suffice to deploy a few hundred "blue helmets" between two parties who had agreed not to fight, today's environment might require far more than such a symbolic presence. The new tasks differ significantly from the old ones: we may not always be able to count on the agreement of the warring factions, and the degree of military complexity far exceeds the capabilities of a small, international UN force. Wherever you deal with military operations on a bigger scale you need trained units operating according to agreed procedures and with standardized equipment. In short: you need NATO. The United Nations are overstretched and underfunded. They need the support of regional organisations in coping with the challenge of crisis management. This is why they overcame their initial hesitation towards cooperating with NATO. Now we have to build on this new relationship. We have already proved that we have something to offer to the UN and that reservations against UN-NATO cooperation belong to the past.

For instance, in the conflict in former Yugoslavia, NATO is supporting with its ships in the Adriatic, the UN in the enforcement of the embargo. We are helping in protecting the humanitarian efforts. We have supplied the UNPROFOR with elements of a headquarters from NORTHAG. And we are finally enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia. We have also supplied the UN with contingency planning as regards the implementation of a UN peace plan. I am quite confident that if we were called upon, we are ready to respond positively to support further initiatives by the United Nations Security Council. Do these recent developments mean that NATO is becoming a "peacekeeping-agency" of the United Nations? Certainly not. Collective defence remains the core of our Alliance. It is NATO's capability to provide for the security of its member states that creates the political power enabling us to shape political change. NATO's role as a major political factor would vanish if we were unable to maintain strong, collective defence capabilities. The spectrum of peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions requires fewer forces than during the Cold War but, in many respects, more flexible forces. So investment in defence is still the basis of our security. In this respect the conventional force reductions of Allies are greater than expected. This could have implications for the composition and size of NATO's main defence forces. Collective planning in the Alliance can help to optimise the output of reduced defence budgets, but nations must make the appropriate effort if they, and by extension NATO, are not to lose credibility.

So I do not want to join those who think that collective defence is over and collective security is the new fashion of the day. With the future being less predictable than ever, no-one can say that an Ally will never again need to request the help of the Alliance against intimidation or threat. And yet an effective defence cannot be improvised on the spur of the moment. The very coherence that NATO gives to Western security arrangements will continue to exercise an important deterrent function.

Another key task of our Alliance in the coming years will be to maintain an active American role and presence in Europe, and, at the same time, rebalance the Alliance in order to increase the weight and influence of its European dimension. This is an essential feature of NATO's transformation, and even a condition of its long-term future. The construction of an effective European security and defence identity closely linked to the Alliance therefore remains at the top of our political agenda. As all European Alliance members are now connected with the WEU in one form or another, the WEU is now more of a truly representative European pillar of the Alliance. NATO has put forward proposals to ensure transparency and complementarity in its working relations with the WEU. We are now discussing these with the WEU and hope to reach agreement on an effective 'modus operandi' shortly. Certainly relations are becoming closer. The WEU has moved to Brussels a few months ago. In the future, we will aim to establish contacts and cooperation on a very pragmatic basis.

What is our objective? We want a pragmatic division of labour with the WEU that ensures that we use our political and military resources in the most cost-effective and efficient way. The organisation that can best act, and which can achieve consensus to act, should take the lead. Rivalry and duplication are wasteful at best and positively counter- productive at worst.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it may have become a platitude to state that the international system has shifted and that we require other ways and means of managing the new political geography. But even platitudes are true.

A new Euro-Atlantic security system cannot be built overnight. Yet we must not let the difficult security challenges become an excuse for inaction. Moreover, I believe that today we have options and instruments for dealing with these conflicts that our predecessors lacked. Compared with the beginning of our century, today's conditions are undoubtedly better, our capabilities to deal with the difficulties are much more developed and - above all - we have institutions and instruments in place, which did not exist at the beginning of the century. This is especially true for the two most successful and dynamic models of international cooperation - NATO and the EC. It is also true for a reinvigorated United Nations and a reinforced CSCE.

But for all these institutions to work requires the political will and determination of the nations involved. Any alliance is only as good as the sum of its parts. Italy has a key role to play both as regards the organisation of the naval embargo in the Adriatic as well as of the enforcement of the no-fly-zone over Bosnia. Also, Italy's current WEU presidency has given it additional responsibility for the shaping of a European Defence and Security Identity. All these efforts underline once again the importance of NATO's Mediterranean dimension. It is reassuring to know that the Alliance can count on Italy to fulfil these demanding tasks. We will do our utmost to ensure that Italy, in turn, can count on the Alliance: By maintaining a proper balance of long-term political vision, sound military strategy and a constant process of internal reform, the Alliance will continue to demonstrate that it is the best way of organising the security of our Western democracies.