Speech

SECRETARY GENERAL WORNER: "NATO may have lost an enemy but it has not lost its raison d'ˆtre: which is to be a provider of security and stability".

VENICE: The Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Mr Manfred Worner, said on Monday that "NATO and the UN have been discussing ways of implementing a peace plan in the former Yugoslavia... I have no doubt that if the Alliance is called upon to do more, it will respond positively." Addressing the Annual General Assembly of the International Press Institute, Mr Worner told his audience that at a time when the United Nations were increasingly looking to regional organisations and arrangements to help with peacekeeping tasks "in Europe the obvious choice is NATO... the UN has come to better understand the new r"le of the Alliance; and it has seen that we offer unique assets in accomplishing the tasks that the international community now faces".

Mr Worner, however, cautioned his audience that NATO "cannot commit itself to supporting globally every peacekeeping operation; especially where the conditions for success are absent, where it believes that the mandate and rules of engagement are inadequate, and where it cannot exercise unity of command". The Alliance's primary task would remain "the self-defence of its members." The Secretary General in this respect underlined that NATO's traditional mission had lost none of its importance: "the global threat may have gone but strategic vulnerability is still a fact of life for our democracies... At a time when national defence budgets are being reduced ... the Alliance is becoming even more essential as the basis to maintain a collective defence capability, the existence of which will continue to exercise an important deterrent influence." Nonetheless, Mr Worner acknowledged that "if we maintain NATO only for our defence and do not use its means and assets for crisis management and peacekeeping, its public support will sooner or later wither away". As a result, "it is essential that we get on with the task of developing NATO's peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities."

The Secretary General also emphasized NATO's other new role, namely "to project stability in Central and Eastern Europe.... in that way we can try to defuse tensions before they reach danger point, and build the practice of trust and cooperation among nations that are in a painful process of adjustment in their domestic and foreign policies". Mr Worner said that the Alliance was now moving its cooperation activities "away from the general level and towards concrete projects that address the specific military restructuring challenges of individual cooperation partner countries". One important development was agreement on "a mechanism for involving our cooperation partners in Central and Eastern Europe in peacekeeping operations on a case by case and voluntary basis". It was important that the Alliance not allow "the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to lose momentum.... We must devote to it the necessary political and military resources to convince our cooperation partners that they can obtain tangible security benefits from our Alliance".

Mr Worner believed that "coping with disorder in Europe is inevitably going to be more complicated in future". Nonetheless "the institutions are there ..... our task is to identify the particular merits of each organisation and find a formula for having them interact together harmoniously". This objective was beginning to be realised: "NATO has overcome its old syndrome against so-called out of area operations. It is now contributing its assets and crisis management capabilities to the quest for peace in regional conflicts". Moreover, "the increased authority of the UN and CSCE helps to provide the legitimacy". The Alliance had also encouraged politically the development of the WEU; we have facilitated it in concrete ways as well". But "these essential instruments are to no avail if a credible policy and the political will to implement that policy are lacking".

Finally, Mr Worner stressed that "in a world in which the demand for interventions and peacekeeping is growing all the time, leadership as well as burdens must be more equitably shared between the US and Europe". The Alliance's future vitality depended on "a more politically integrated and action capable Europe". The Alliance's process of transformation "opens up some new perspectives with regard to the sharing of responsibilities, roles and command structures between Americans and Europeans.... Nonetheless as in any organisation influence in the Alliance is determined by three factors: unity, weight and contribution."

EMBARGO: CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY EXPECTED ABOUT 17:00 VENICE TIME ON MONDAY, 10 MAY 1993

The full text of Mr. Worner's speech follows:

SPEECH BY SECRETARY GENERAL TO INTERNATIONAL PRESS INSTITUTE, VENICE, 10TH MAY, 1993

Ladies and Gentlemen,

A few years ago, a famous American commentator achieved notoriety by comparing the end of the Cold War with the end of history. This may have been over-ambitious even in the halcyon circumstances of 1989 and 1990; but there were many who did feel justified in proclaiming that the era of geo-strategy had been superseded by the era of geo-economics. "When the guns are silent", wrote the American columnist, Flora Lewis, "money talks."

Certainly we all hoped then that we had been spared the famous Chinese curse of living in interesting times. Suddenly, and almost miraculously, the sword of Damocles of a major and potentially cataclysmic war was no longer suspended over our heads.

In 1993, however, we must face a grim reality: security, not economics, is still the central issue confronting the Western democracies. War and the threat of war continue to define the most important questions when the leaders of those democracies meet. For it is the use of military force in the former Yugoslavia and in the other regional conflicts that is reshaping the international environment. These conflicts may not pose a direct and palpable threat to our societies in the same manner as Soviet tanks and missiles during the Cold War. Yet, as they proceed unchecked, they are bound to undermine the prospects for peaceful change not only in their immediate regions but across entire continents too.

These ethnic and religious conflicts are not the only urgent security problems we face. Russia is in the grip of a profound political, economic and even environmental crisis while possessing enormous military power, including thousands of nuclear weapons. Looking to the south, threats of a different order are emerging in the shape of religious fanaticism, aspirations for regional hegemony and political and economic resentment towards the West. These factors can be magnified by overarmament financed from oil revenues. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical and ballistic weapons, combined with political cynicism and mounting demography, may confront us with dangers as severe but far more irrational than those once created by the Soviet Union.

In addition to the immediate dangers there are also longer term trends that must make us all thoroughly re-examine our traditional approach to security policy.

For instance, we are witnessing an increased interplay between domestic problems and international security concerns. People, information, technology and resources now cross international borders with increasing ease. The flow of refugees from the Yugoslav conflict has perhaps been the most dramatic illustration of how events in one country can place severe pressures on countries hundreds of miles away. Another example is the way in which the sale of weapons to help remedy difficult economic circumstances in one place can sharply change the military balance of power elsewhere.

A second new challenge is to cope with the return of nationalism which Giuseppe Mazzini once described of as "the curse of Europe". Coping with ethnic conflicts places policy makers in all our Western countries before difficult and even conflicting choices: to intervene or not to intervene? If so, when, where and how? And at what cost? A reluctance to intervene in the internal affairs of foreign states has to be squared with the need to halt a classic campaign of aggression.

A third new feature is the very different political geography of present-day Europe. The old East-West fault line that ran through Central Europe has gone. The number of CSCE participating nations has passed from 35 to the current 53. Two new states, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, have become regional and even, if only temporarily, nuclear powers. We must look at whole parts of the Euro-atlantic area through fresh lenses and come to terms not only with the aspirations of new states, but also with older states whose strategic outlook and foreign policies are wholly different from what we were used to during the Cold War.

Perhaps, however, the most dramatic change resulting from the end of the Cold War has been the change in the way sovereignty is interpreted. Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq is an instance where humanitarian concerns prevailed over the tolerance of a regime's right to mismanage its own subjects with impunity. It is perhaps too early to say whether the international community is moving towards a new precept of the right, and even duty of humanitarian intervention. But there is a distinct feeling that in cases where genocide is being committed, or where the governing structures of the state have collapsed leaving chaos in their wake, as happened recently in Somalia, outside intervention is both necessary and justified.

So how can we reduce the dangers? How can we contribute to stabilising the political scene to the East and to the South? How can we protect ourselves against the shockwaves of instability in the meantime?

The most important response is to preserve and strengthen the few factors of stability that we have at our disposal. On our European continent the two most important are the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance.

NATO may have lost an enemy but it has not lost its raison d'ˆtre: which is to be a provider of security and stability. The days when the Western democracies could provide alone both for their physical security and for the defence of their interests in the wider world have long since passed. The global threat may have gone but strategic vulnerability is still a fact of life for our democracies. Just think in this respect of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that can be carried over ever greater distances. Or of the build-up of sophisticated military power in many countries on the periphery of Europe. The only palliative to strategic vulnerability is the Atlantic Alliance. By uniting the resources of Europe and North America, it provides the military capabilities to deter attack, and also the collective political response that can help to prevent the risks of today from developing into the threats of tomorrow. The international situation can change much faster than a collective defence capability can be generated from scratch in response. So at a time when national defence budgets are being reduced as a result of the disappearance of the old Soviet threat, the Alliance is becoming even more essential as the basis to maintain a collective defence capability, the existence of which will continue to exercise an important deterrent influence.

In a fast moving and uncertain world, NATO's security-providing function is not less important. Rather the task is now to provide security in a different way. No longer by essentially military means and along a fixed line of defence but instead by reacting rapidly, and with a more sophisticated mixture of political and military options, to incipient crisis situations beyond our Alliance borders. The capacity to change has become as important to achieving security as the capacity to be consistent and predictable. Of course, restructuring may carry risks but not to adapt carries far greater risks in the long run.

In the past three years, NATO has undergone a radical transformation. The extent of this transformation is not always appreciated in our member countries, even by informed opinion. Already this process has yielded results. We now have a new NATO strategy with a new command structure and a new force structure. This new strategy places the emphasis on mobility, flexibility and multinational units better suited for crisis management and peacekeeping than the mass mobilisation armies of the Cold War period. Our new force structure comprises a triad of reaction forces, both for immediate and rapid reaction, main defence forces and augmentation forces.

We have also begun to increase weight and influence of Europe within the Alliance. Creating an alliance based on genuine partnership of equals is the precondition of NATO's longer term vitality. The attitude of the United States towards a European security and defence identity and the WEU has changed; as was made clear by Secretary of State Warren Christopher in his speech to the North Atlantic Council last February. As he himself has repeatedly said: "not every crisis need become a choice between inaction and unilateral US intervention." In a world in which the demand for interventions and peacekeeping is growing all the time, leadership as well as burdens must be more equitably shared between the US and Europe.

We have wasted too much time in a sterile debate between "Atlanticists" and "Europeanists"; the first seeing any closer European defence cooperation as a threat to NATO, the second seeming to suggest that a European security and defence policy has to be played against NATO and United States' influence to have any substance and credibility. Both are wrong. A secure Europe and a cohesive Western world need both a strong Alliance and a more politically integrated and action-capable Europe. The two processes - transatlantic cooperation and European integration - have been interdependent in the past and will remain so in the future.

The transformation of the Alliance opens some new perspectives with regard to the sharing of responsibilities, roles and command structures between Americans and Europeans. Nonetheless as in any organisation influence in the Alliance is determined by three factors: unity, weight and contribution. In this respect, the Gulf crisis and now Yugoslavia have shown that Europe's political ambitions in the field of a common security and defence policy run far ahead of reality.

The Western European Union has an essential role to play in this process of rebalancing the Alliance. In view of its recent enlargement and its extension of associate memberships and observer status to the other European allies, it represents not only the European security identity but is also able to develop its complementary role as the European pillar of the Alliance. NATO has not only encouraged politically the development of the WEU; we have facilitated it in concrete ways as well. For instance, by offering to make our Alliance's assets available to the WEU to enable it to act, following consultations. We have taken steps to ensure that the relationship between the WEU and NATO develops smoothly and cooperatively. Over the past few months an effective "modus operandi" between the two organisations has emerged.

What we are aiming for is a relationship based on transparency and complementarity. Neither organisation can be effective if it sees the other as a rival, or if we waste time and effort in debates over institutional prerogatives or in duplicating each other's actions. There is plenty for both NATO and the WEU to do. The future lies in a pragmatic or case by case division of labour that allows our combined political and military assets to be used in the most efficient and cost-effective way.

The Yugoslav crisis is inevitably changing the way we think about peacekeeping and peacemaking. We have seen how difficult it is for the UN to cope with complicated military operations in an environment in which there is no peace to keep. The old approach of sending a few hundred blue helmets whose authority is based more on what they represent than on their military prowess is no longer sufficient.

We are increasingly entering a grey zone between peacekeeping and peacemaking. We see more clearly that peacekeeping covers the entire spectrum of operations from humanitarian and police tasks in a non-hostile environment right up to major enforcement actions under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. This requires troops that are trained not only for classical peacekeeping missions but who have professional expertise in a variety of missions, the agreed procedures and the standardized equipment necessary to cope with dangerous and deteriorating situations.

As peacekeeping changes in nature, so does the way the United Nations are dealing with it. The United Nations will retain the overall authority to deal with regional conflicts and gross violations of international law and norms. It is the only body which has a truly world-wide membership, the authority and means to provide international legitimacy for action. The authority of the UN has increased enormously since the end of the Cold War, which permitted the Security Council to function effectively at long last.

Despite its new-found authority, however, the UN is clearly unable to handle all the problems by itself. It simply lacks the military capabilities and financial wherewithal.

Thus, in my view, we have to develop not only the UN structures but also the capabilities of regional organisations and arrangements, all the more so should the day arrive when the UN cannot achieve consensus to act in a crisis situation.

The UN Security Council has begun already to recognize these constraints and to appeal to regional organisations and arrangements to help it implement its Resolutions. In Europe the obvious choice is NATO. At first there were some reservations in UN circles regarding cooperation with NATO. These have dissipated as the UN has come to better understand the new role of the Alliance; and as it has seen that we offer unique assets in accomplishing the tasks that the international community now faces:

- in the first place, practised political alliance collective defence organisation with the military structure, experience, traditions of training and operating together; and in particular the command and control capacity to ensure success in peacekeeping operations;

- then, the political and military weight of the involvement of 16 allies. I emphasize the number 16, because one of the very significant aspects of the Alliance's preparations for support for UN peacekeeping operations has been the full participation of all 16 allies, including France. We see this as a very positive development;

- next, force and command structures that have been adapted to the post-Cold War environment in a way that enhances flexibility and mobility, characteristics that are essential for peacekeeping;

- finally, a mechanism for involving our cooperation partners in Central and Eastern Europe in peacekeeping operations on a case by case and voluntary basis. We have agreed to share experience and expertise with those cooperation partners in the planning and preparation of peacekeeping missions.

Already the Alliance's value as a partner to the UN is being demonstrated in Yugoslavia. We have helped the UN by providing it with detailed contingency planning on such issues as the supervision of heavy weapons, the protection of UN humanitarian relief operations, the creation of safe areas and the prevention of the spillover of the conflict into Kosovo. NATO and WEU ships are enforcing sanctions in the Adriatic. In recent days we have responded to the UN Resolution 816 and begun the actual implementation of the no-fly-zone. This represents the first time that NATO forces are engaged in a combat mission beyond their borders, and directly in a war zone. NATO command elements are helping the UN Protection Force. Moreover, NATO and the UN have been discussing ways of implementing a peace plan in the former Yugoslavia if it comes about. I have no doubt that if the Alliance is called upon to do more, it will respond positively.

Let me emphasize that these actions in support of the UN do not mean that NATO now sees its role mainly as that of a "sub-contractor" for international peacekeeping duties. The Alliance, in the security interests of its own members, is prepared to assist the UN; but it cannot commit itself to supporting globally every peacekeeping operation; especially where the conditions for success are absent, where it believes that the mandate and rules of engagement are inadequate, and where it cannot exercise unity of command. The Alliance's primary task will remain the self-defence of its members. But, at the same time, if we maintain NATO only for our defence and do not use its means and assets for crisis management and peacekeeping, its public support will sooner or later wither away. The test of NATO's continuing validity will, for the time being, rest on proving its usefulness in dealing with immediate crises and problems. For these reasons, but also because of the need to make the maximum contribution to resolving the serious problems that we face in the Euro-Atlantic area, it is essential that we get on with the task of developing NATO's peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities.

Prevention, however, is always better than cure. Once a conflict has started, it is frequently too late for crisis management. All that is left is damage limitation. So the other new role of the Alliance is to project stability into Central and Eastern Europe. In that way we can try to defuse tensions before they reach danger point, and build the practice of trust and cooperation among nations that are in a painful process of adjustment in their domestic and foreign policies.

The Alliance can serve as a model of how former adversaries can become partners, and as an example of how our understanding of security has evolved from a once strictly national perspective to a truly collective one. After all, NATO has proven that 16 nations widely differing in size, population and culture can form an effective alliance, wherein all members can discuss security matters as equals.

In order to draw the countries of Central and Eastern Europe closer to us, we have established a North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Since then, there have been regular meetings of Foreign and Defence Ministers, Chiefs of Defence Staff and numerous high-ranking experts' groups. Our Co-operation Partners have come to number 22 states. The practice of regular consultations at a working level has also been reinforced through the opening up of NATO Committee meetings to participation by Cooperation Partners, and by an intensive sequence of bilateral visits and exchanges. Conversion of the armaments industry, co-ordination of air traffic or democratization of military structures - there are many areas where the Alliance is offering support and co-operation to the Central and East European states. We are currently moving this cooperation away from the general level and towards concrete projects that address the specific military restructuring challenges of individual cooperation partner countries.

It is important that we do not allow the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to lose momentum. We must devote to it the necessary political and military resources to convince our cooperation partners that they can obtain tangible security benefits from our Alliance without the need, at least for the foreseeable future to become NATO members. Our cooperation can help to secure the progress of democracy and reform and to foster throughout Central and Eastern Europe a degree of reassurance and transparency that will facilitate peaceful solutions to all problems.

Coping with disorder in Europe is inevitably going to be more complicated in future than in the past. Many more instruments are required, all of which have to support each other. The institutions are there. The UN, the CSCE, NATO, the European Community, WEU. Our task is to identify the particular merits of each organisation and find a formula for having them interact together harmoniously. The increased authority of the UN and the CSCE helps to provide the legitimacy. Last but not least, NATO has overcome its old syndrome against so-called out of area operations. It is now contributing its assets and crisis management organisation to the quest for peace in regional conflicts.

But these essential instruments are to no avail if a credible policy and the political will to implement that policy are lacking. Neither the UN, nor a regional organisation such as NATO can be expected to help resolve difficult collective security challenges in which their member nations are unwilling or unable to assume their responsibilities as the enforcers of international will.

Four years after the demise of communism in Central and Eastern Europe only the vaguest contours of what the future European architecture will be perceived. On the other hand, the new security challenges that the Atlantic Alliance will have to overcome if it is to achieve its ultimate vision of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe have imposed themselves with almost brutal clarity. In the shape of the transformed Atlantic Alliance, we have one of the fundamental conceptual and institutional tools to meet these challenges. It will be the task of political leaders to use it in the right way and to the right end.