SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO MR MANFRED WORNER TO THE IISS IN BRUSSELS

SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO
MR MANFRED WORNER

TO

THE IISS IN BRUSSELS
FRIDAY, 10 SEPTEMBER 1993

SECRETARY GENERAL WORNER: "THE SLOGAN 'OUT-OF-AREA' OR 'OUT-OF-
BUSINESS' IS OUT OF DATE. WE ARE ACTING OUT-OF-AREA AND WE VERY
MUCH ARE IN BUSINESS."

BRUSSELS: The Secretary General of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO), Mr. Manfred Worner, said on Friday
that "NATO represents a state-of-the-art model." Addressing the
1993 annual conference of the International Institute of
Strategic Studies, he said that NATO had "drawn the lessons from
the changes in the security environment ... This Alliance has
changed more than any other international institution in the last
few years." At the same time, the Secretary General spoke of the
need to "further adapt the Alliance to play its r"le in
stabilizing Europe."

In this respect, Mr. Worner highlighted his view that
"the time has come to open a more concrete perspective to those
countries of Central and Eastern Europe which want to join NATO
and which we may consider eligible for future membership ... Even
if there are no IMMEDIATE plans to enlarge NATO, such a move
would increase the stability of the whole of Europe and be in the
interest of all nations, including Russia and Ukraine." Mr.
Worner added that this would be "one of the major subjects of the
forthcoming NATO summit" and said that NATO sought "to build
bridges and not barriers. Nobody will be isolated. We shall
intensify our security partnership with Russia, Ukraine and other
co-operation partners."

The Secretary General also told his audience that it
had become "fashionable to blame NATO for the failure of the
international community to solve the Bosnian conflict" but that
"this allegation is not borne out by the facts". Indeed "no one
asked NATO to take over" and any proposal along these lines would
have "met with fierce resistance by non-NATO nations as well as
some of our own members ... There were very good reasons for
turning to the United Nations." Mr. Worner pointed out that
"NATO has offered its support to the United Nations and it has
done everything the UN has asked." It had done so "with the
professionalism and dedication you expect from this Alliance ...
In many respects, NATO's involvement justifies our claim that a
streamlined defence organisation can deliver when necessary."

The Secretary General drew the lesson from the Yugoslav
conflict that "effective crisis management will frequently depend
on close co-operation between major international organisations -
especially the UN and NATO, at least for the wider European
region." At the same time, he stressed that "NATO cannot be
regarded as an instrument or as a military sub-contractor to the
United Nations. Nor do we expect that the United Nations should
accept NATO's leadership. Both must maintain the possibility to
act independently ... What counts is that both organisations co-
operate more closely in trying to overcome the mismatch between
the mandates and means of our two institutions." Mr. Worner was
equally clear that "diplomacy is doomed to fail if it is not
backed by a powerful politico-military instrument. Of course,
NATO needs the political will of its members to act. However,
once the political will to act is there, what other effective
instrument for implementation do we have, except NATO ? Which
other institution can offer the integrated structure and the
politico-military consultation mechanisms ?"

Finally, Mr. Worner outlined the requirements that had
to be met if NATO were to fulfil its new r"le in support of
crisis management, peace-making and peace-keeping successfully.
He emphasized in particular "a clear and unambiguous mandate ...
a clear and unitary chain of command which can also allow the
participation of non-NATO countries in the operation ... and a
clear demarcation of responsibilities and competences, especially
if two organisations co-operate." NATO'S contribution
nonetheless depended on its ability to maintain "a significant
level of well trained and well equipped armed forces ... In
handling any crisis, what you have available very much determines
what options you have: the fewer deployable forces, then the
fewer options for decision-makers - and the less credibility
accorded subsequent actions."

The full text of Mr. Worner's speech follows:

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______________________________________________________________

SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO
TO THE IISS, BRUSSELS,
10 SEPTEMBER 1993

The collapse of Soviet communism has left us with a
paradox: there is less threat, but also less peace.

The means we have been willing to employ, and the risks
we have been willing to take, still fall short of what is needed
to stop aggression or create the basis for a lasting peace. A
gap has consequently emerged between our vision of a new peaceful
order in Europe and our appreciation of the price we must pay to
bring it about. This gap not only produces instability, but it
also undermines our democratic values and the credibility of the
post-war institutions which have done so much to end the Cold
War. So soon after the triumph of both those values and
institutions, disorder and a crisis of confidence are once again
dominating our European agenda.

What is the consequence of the failure of the
international community to deal successfully with a major crisis,
such as ex-Yugoslavia? Shall we abandon our objective of
building a new international order based on human rights, the
rule of law and democracy? Shall we renounce our goal of a new,
more democratic, just and peaceful European order? Shall we give
up our concept of interlocking institutions before we have even
had a chance to implement it fully? Shall we just leave the
world to the forces of disorder and limit ourselves to
safeguarding our own national borders and security, or at most,
to attempting to contain the crisis spots so as to prevent them
from spreading?

My answers are clearly no. We simply cannot afford
such passivity, not only because it goes against our principles
and morals, but also because it goes against our national self-
interests. In the world of today you simply cannot live in
security surrounded by chaos. We should draw the lessons of our
failures and resolve to do better.
Some of the lessons are obvious:

- First, political solutions and diplomatic efforts will
only work if backed by the necessary military power
and the credible resolve to use it against an
aggressor;

- Second, if you cannot or do not want to help the
victim of aggression, enable him to help himself;

- Third, the purpose of intervention is not necessarily
to win a war, but to influence the behaviour of the
party concerned. We need to have limited military
options for limited political or diplomatic
objectives. It is wrong to think only in categories
of all or nothing;

- Fourth, threaten only if you are determined to
implement the threat;

- Fifth, define the strategic objectives of your actions
as early and as clearly as possible;

- Sixth, crisis prevention, like deterrence, will work
only if your resolve to prevent conflict is credible
and accompanied by firm action;

- Seventh, avoid situations in which your own troops
become hostages;

- Finally, the most important lesson is, of course:
that no international organisation can work
efficiently without the political will and unity of
its member nations. This is true as much for the
United Nations as for the EC or NATO.

In the future, nevertheless, effective crisis
management will also frequently depend on close cooperation
between major international organisations -- especially the UN
and NATO, at least for the wider European region. The UN and NATO
can complement each other to the benefit of both. The United
Nations lacks the forces, the infrastructure, the logistics, and
the command and control facilities for major military operations.

Only NATO can offer these assets. For NATO, in turn, cooperation
with the UN facilitates the Alliance's new role in crisis
management; it puts our efforts in a broad, internationally
accepted context. Moreover, it also increases public awareness
and acceptance of crisis management. So the future may well see
frequent and close cooperation between the UN and NATO.

Of course, every institution keeps its specific and
autonomous character. NATO cannot be regarded as an instrument
or as a military sub-contractor to the United Nations. Nor do
we expect that the United Nations should accept NATO's
leadership. Both must retain the possibility to act
independently. This is not only obvious for the United Nations,
but it also applies to NATO, even in crisis management, acting,
for example, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. We
need to develop a true partnership between both organisations.
We have successfully started to do so. That will help to chart
a course that maximises the strengths of both organisations. Of
course, an appreciation of the different structures, missions,
approaches and memberships highlights that such a partnership
will not be an easy one. NATO is not a global organisation and
will not act as such. What counts is that both organisations
cooperate more closely in trying to overcome the mismatch between
the mandates and means of our security institutions.

It has become fashionable to blame NATO for the failure
of the international community to solve the Bosnian conflict.
This allegation is not borne out by the facts.

When the Yugoslav crisis erupted, it was quickly
declared the "Hour of Europe". When it was clear that the
European Community's efforts would not stop the war, the
responsibility was taken over by the United Nations and has
remained there since. No one asked NATO to take over, certainly
none of today's critics. Quite the contrary, any proposal to do
so would have met with fierce resistance by non-NATO nations as
well as some of our own members. And indeed there were very good
reasons for turning to the United Nations: its renewed authority
after the end of the Cold War stalemate; the need for broad
international legitimacy under the UN Charter for any outside
intervention; and the prospect of gaining the support of the non-
Western world, including Russia. By and large, these reasons
still prevail. Even when NATO finally took the initiative to
threaten air strikes to relieve the strangulation of Sarajevo and
other safe areas, the final authorisation to employ air power was
vested in the Secretary General of the United Nations. So, it
is not a specious argument to state that NATO was and is not in
charge.

It is true: NATO has offered its support to the United
Nations and it has done everything the UN has asked, and has done
so efficiently. We are enforcing the embargo at sea and the no-
fly zone in the air. We have supplied UNPROFOR with command and
control equipment and we have coordinated our military planning
with the United Nations. We have also offered the UN our
protective air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR and we
are prepared to use air strikes, if necessary, to relieve
strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas. All of these tasks
are being performed with the professionalism and dedication you
expect from this Alliance. These missions are thus a
demonstration of NATO's vitality rather than of its irrelevance.
In fact, in many respects, NATO's involvement justifies our claim
that a streamlined defence organisation can deliver when
necessary. Thus, I am not prepared to accept the blame where we
do not have the responsibility.

Despite the fact that NATO has acted only in support
and under the authority of the United Nations, the fact remains
that its relevance is being questioned from several quarters.
Many critics maintain that the Alliance, as it stands today, is
ill-suited to deal with the new security challenges of the post-
Cold War. Ironically, when it comes to policy advice, they
frequently draw opposing conclusions. According to one group,
NATO should stick to its traditional task of collective defence.
They argue that the Alliance has never been intended to play the
role of a "policeman" or a "crusader". This, I would call the
minimalist position. The maximalists, on the other hand,
recommend a policy agenda that ranges from immediately accepting
new members to assertive interventionism.

I do not believe in "make-or-break" proposals, wherever
they originate. But certainly NATO will not be kept alive solely
by nostalgic memories of past historic achievements, nor by
purely philosophical reflections on common values and destinies.
Either NATO is needed to meet the concrete requirements of its
members, or it will wither away. The decisive question remains,
therefore, whether NATO is needed and able to address the new
security challenges in our emerging strategic environment.

What, then, are the major security challenges for our
Atlantic community?

We must provide security and stability in a world that
has become more unstable;

We must prevent, manage and resolve crises and
conflicts;

We must prevent Europe from sliding back into re-
nationalisation and fragmentation and into the destructive logic
of alliances and counter-alliances;

We must keep transatlantic relations working smoothly
and effectively; and

We must face the new kinds of risks emerging from the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, from mass migration
and from extremism.

None of these challenges can be met by our countries
without the Alliance.
First, the transatlantic relationship is the most
stable geopolitical asset on this globe. It brings together the
world's two principal centres of democracy and liberalism. These
are also the two regions with the greatest global outreach and
sense of global responsibilities. How could we seriously hope
to achieve a more stable world without a strategic alliance of
these two power centres? The countries of Central and Eastern
Europe turn to NATO because of their appreciation that NATO can
provide the stability they need. And if we, in turn, have made
the projection of stability to these countries a major new
mission, it is because no one else could do it. By its very
existence, NATO exerts a stabilising influence around its
periphery. The end of NATO would increase the risks of conflict
in Europe dramatically.

Second, regarding the need for effective management of
major conflicts, it is clear that diplomacy is doomed to fail if
it is not backed by a powerful politico-military instrument. Of
course, NATO needs the political will of its members to act.
However, once the political will to act is there, what other
effective instrument for implementation do we have, except NATO?
Which other institution can offer the integrated structure and
the politico-military consultation mechanisms?

Third, one of the greatest achievements of the Atlantic
Alliance has been to put an end to the bad habits of European
power politics. Once NATO provided an Atlantic framework, there
was simply no need for secret pacts and cordial or not-so-cordial
ententes. The American presence provided for a stable balance
between former rivals and enemies. This framework even made it
possible to bring about German unification without a major crisis
in West European politics.

By contrast, the dissolution of the Alliance and the
disengagement of the United States from Europe could undermine
the European integration process. This would be damaging not
only for Western Europe and the United States. It would also
gravely affect the political and economic transition of the
countries of Central Eastern Europe, which urgently look for
links to the political, economic and military institutions of the
West.

Fourth, NATO provides us with the key forum for
coordinating and harmonising transatlantic policies in the
broadest sense. The United States continues to play an important
leadership role in pulling the international community together
behind a certain course of action. It also provides the unique
military capabilities that still make the difference between
success and failure.

Lasting links require institutional anchoring beyond
transatlantic economic interdependence. NATO provides this
political and military anchor. It makes Europe and North America
aware of each other's concerns, and thus provides an element of
predictability in transatlantic relations. In times of
increasing economic competition, we should appreciate those
channels even more.

Fifth and finally, how could North America and Europe
ever hope to deal with the new challenges, if not in common?
These challenges far exceed the capabilities of any single
nation. Who, to put it bluntly, is going to pay the bill for the
elaborate surveillance capabilities or for the logistics required
for future crisis management operations? What good are export
controls on arms, if they are not coordinated among the major
industrial democracies?

So NATO represents a state-of-the-art model. We have
drawn the lessons from the changes in the security environment
and we have done our homework. This Alliance has changed more
than any other international institution in the last few years.
We have adopted a new strategy and force posture. We have
started to strengthen our European pillar. We have established
close relations with our former adversaries through the NACC and
we have started participating in crisis management beyond our
borders. So the slogan, "out-of-area -- or out-of-business" is
out-of-date. We ARE acting out-of-area and we very much are in
business. Still, we need to further adapt the Alliance to play
its role in stabilising Europe. Let me list four main areas to
be addressed:

First, we have to FURTHER DEVELOP THE ALLIANCE'S
CAPABILITIES, FORCES, STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES FOR CRISIS
MANAGEMENT, PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING. There are some
requirements to be met in future operations:

- The first and most important requirement is a clear
and unambiguous mandate.

- The next requirement is the will of all participating
nations to execute the mandate and implement the
declared principles.

- A clear definition of the mission at the outset is
imperative. Humanitarian missions may, under certain
circumstances, exclude peacemaking missions. If both
are envisaged, they have to be carefully coordinated
from the outset, as Somalia shows.

- A clear demarcation of responsibilities and
competencies, especially if two organisations
cooperate.

- A clear and unitary chain of command which can also
allow the participation of non-NATO countries in the
operation.

Second, a major, and perhaps the primary, future
mission of NATO will be TO PROJECT STABILITY TO THE EAST. We
have made concrete and successful first steps by creating the
NACC. It should be our task to enhance the security of Europe
as a whole, through consultation and cooperation in the NACC
framework, especially in areas such as peacekeeping.

In addition, I think we should now consider further
steps. NATO is not a closed shop. We have always said that the
option of membership is open. In my view, the time has come to
open a more concrete perspective to those countries of Central
and Eastern Europe which want to join NATO and which we may
consider eligible for future membership. This should be one of
the major subjects of the forthcoming NATO Summit. Even if there
are no IMMEDIATE plans to enlarge NATO, such a move would
increase the stability of the whole of Europe and be in the
interest of all nations, including Russia and Ukraine. I am
happy that President Yeltsin also sees it this way. We intend
to build bridges and not barriers. Nobody will be isolated. We
shall intensify our security partnership with Russia, Ukraine and
our other Cooperation Partners.

My third area concerns the need to RE-BALANCE THE
ALLIANCE SO THAT EUROPE ASSUMES ITS FAIR SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY.

We must act now to prepare the future. The end of the Cold War
has not only changed fundamentally the nature of what we once
called East-West relations but of transatlantic relations as
well. As Secretary of State Christopher has emphasised, the
choice cannot be between unilateral American action and no action
at all. Public opinion in the United States will not be
indifferent to what it perceives as the failure of Europe to
defend its own interests. The result can only be a more
reluctant US leadership and less involvement of the United
States.

Indeed, far from being a threat to NATO's survival, a
greater European role is the precondition of its longer-term
vitality. The old quarrel between Europeanists and Atlanticists
- the one believing that only a Europe separate from America
would have credibility, the other seeing greater European
cohesion as a threat to the Alliance - today makes even less
sense than before. The security of Europe and the cohesion of
the Western world require both a strong Alliance and a Europe
that is more united and more capable of action. The two
processes -- transatlantic cooperation and European integration -
- have been and will remain inter-dependent.

The WEU has an important role to play in this process.
Through its enlargement and its granting of associate or observer
status to other European Allies, the WEU now reflects an emerging
European Defence Identity. We actively support the evolution of
the WEU into the European pillar of the Alliance. The decision
of France and Germany to make available their Eurocorps to both
NATO and the WEU is a good example of the way ahead. An even
more active and full participation of France inside the
structures of the Alliance -- which does not imply re-integration
-- would very much enhance that evolution.

The fourth area is MAINTAINING A SIGNIFICANT LEVEL OF
WELL-TRAINED AND WELL-EQUIPPED ARMED FORCES. The stabilisation
of defence budgets, which NATO Defence Ministers agreed to last
May, is now urgent if we are to avoid a kind of free-fall,
structural disarmament which would rapidly deprive our member
nations of meaningful military capabilities for many years to
come and weaken seriously our conventional deterrence posture.
Our military commanders never forget to point out that in
peacekeeping, if they send a battalion, they need a brigade; if
they send a brigade, they need a division: otherwise, it will
be difficult to sustain the mission for long. In handling any
crisis, what you have available very much determines what options
you have: the fewer deployable forces, then the fewer options
for decision-makers, and the less credibility accorded subsequent
actions.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is not beyond the capacity of
our Western democracies to uphold security and peace in Europe.
It is a question of leadership and of having a clear sense of
what we can and should do and what we should not do. If there
is one lesson from history, it is that the sooner one stands up
to a bully the less the force required and the fewer the risks
encountered. To the extent that our democracies prove their
resolve, they are less likely to be challenged.

If we develop NATO along the lines I have outlined, the
Alliance of tomorrow will not only be able to protect its own
members, but also to meet the security challenges of the future.
It will be able to pave the way towards a more stable security
order for the whole of Europe. And that still remains our
paramount goal.