"NATO: A Changing Alliance For A Changing World"

SECRETARY GENERAL WORNER: "NATO HAS PROVEN THAT IT CAN DELIVER.
IT CAN INDEED SERVE AS THE CORNERSTONE OF A EUROPE WHICH IS TRULY
WHOLE AND FREE"
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New York: The Secretary General of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), Mr. Manfred Worner, said on Thursday
that "NATO is the basic model for the way in which industrial
democracies can promote their values and interests in a world of
multidimensional risks and limited national means". Addressing
the Foreign Policy Association on the final day of his visit to
the United States, Mr. Worner added that "NATO offers the only
institutionalized basis for uniting the efforts of Europe and
North America in dealing with the security challenges of this
more complex and fragmenting world. If the strategic alliance
of the world's two major power centres were to come apart, how
could we hope acting separately to deal with the threats posed
by weapons poliferation, mass migration and regional aggressors?"

The Secretary General told his audience that "we have
succeeded in transforming what was a successful bulwark of
containment into a flexible instrument that continues to fulfil
the classic missions of the Alliance, and yet also meets the
multifaceted threats of this new era". In particular, Mr. W"rner
stressed that NATO "had abolished the old distinction between in-
area and out-of-area" and was now supporting United Nations
peacekeeping missions. "It is because of NATO's unique
capabilities, particularly in the field of crisis management,
that the United Nations has increasingly looked to the Alliance
as a partner in peace-keeping in recent years", continued the
Secretary General, who also pointed out that "the Yugoslav crisis
has demonstrated not NATO's irrelevance but its unique potential
- indeed a potential which I believe ought to have been exploited
at a much earlier stage in the crisis".

Mr. Worner believed that "the future may well see
frequent and close co-operation between the UN and NATO". At the
same time, he cautioned his audience that "NATO cannot be
regarded as an instrument or as a military sub-contractor to the
UN. This is why it is so important to develop a true partnership
and a more structured relationship between the two
organizations". In this connection, the Secretary General
stressed that "effective support for the UN requires early
consultations in the planning process ... we would like also to
stress the importance of enhanced communications and unity of
command ... both organizations can only profit if there is a
clear mandate, a clear demarcation for responsibilities, and a
clear definition of the mission from the outset".

Mr. Worner said, however, that "NATO itself must be
prepared to demonstrate initiative", citing the Alliance's
decision in early August to threaten air strikes to end the
strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In his view "this example was instructive: it showed that the
US can make a difference, if America's moral and political weight
is brought to bear. It also showed that policy carries more
weight when the US does not go it alone but has its 15 Allies on
board. And it showed that NATO, aside from its unquestionable
military role, can play an essential political role in crisis
management as well".

In concluding, the Secretary General stated his belief
that "NATO has come a long way. But we can and must go further.
That is the purpose of our forthcoming Summit in January".
Looking towards that meeting he said that a key objective would
be "to enhance significantly our ability to project stability to
the East by strengthening the North Atlantic Co-operation Council
and opening a concrete perspective for our Co-operation Partners
on strategic partnership and eventual NATO membership". Mr.
W"rner also underlined the importance of Europe assuming a
greater responsibility: A fairer distribution of burdens and
responsibilities between the two sides of the Atlantic" was in
his view a precondition for the Alliance's longer-term vitality.
Finally, he called also for a strengthening of NATO's peace-
keeping capabilities. These steps were essential for NATO's
future success but, Mr. Worner pointed out, "we must also have
the will - the will to use the instruments at our disposal, one
of which is the Alliance".

"NATO: A CHANGING ALLIANCE FOR A CHANGING WORLD"

SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO
MR. MANFRED WORNER

AT THE

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION
NEW YORK, U.S.A.

7 OCTOBER 1993

EMBARGO: CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY EXPECTED
AT 17:00 LOCAL TIME, 7 OCTOBER 1993

NATO:
A CHANGING ALLIANCE FOR A CHANGING WORLD

SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL
TO THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION
NEW YORK
7TH OCTOBER 1993

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Just a few years ago, we entertained the vision of a
Europe "whole and free", in which relations between peoples
would be based not on ideology or military might but on
tolerance and common democratic values. Now a gap has emerged
between that hopeful vision of a new peaceful order in Europe
and the reality of strife within our midst - a gap that
undermines the credibility of Western institutions that have
helped to inspire change. Today, four years after the fall of
the Berlin Wall, it is not euphoria but increasing disorder and
a crisis of confidence which dominate our European agenda.

Let us be honest. The international community has
failed to deal effectively with the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, and this for a number of reasons:

- We lacked an understanding of the nature of the
problem, with some seeing a civil war fuelled by
ancestral hatreds and others a campaign of territorial
conquest. The result was paralysis.

- Action, when it came, was based on the lowest common
denominator. We turned classical strategy on its
head, signalling to the aggressor that we would do
everything except use force. Our alibi was the
mistaken all-or-nothing philosophy which deprived our
diplomacy of the tools needed to achieve limited
objectives.

- We relied on economic sanctions and an arms embargo,
which did little to deter the aggressor, but
everything to prevent the victim of aggression from
defending himself.

- And we allowed our humanitarian engagement to become
an obstacle to decisive action - as if our purpose
were not to end the suffering, but only to make it
less painful. I say this reluctantly, because the UN
peacekeepers in former Yugoslavia have performed
courageously, and they have my highest respect.

This litany of mistakes has raised a number of
questions about the commitments undertaken by our international
institutions and their ability to carry them out. Should we
abandon our objective of building a new international order
based on human rights, the rule of law and democracy? Should we
renounce our goal of a new, more democratic, just and peaceful
European order? Should we give up our concept of "interlocking
institutions" before we have even had a chance to implement it
fully? Shall we just leave the world to the forces of disorder
and limit ourselves to safeguarding our own national borders, or
at most, to containing the crisis spots in the hope of
preventing them from spreading?

My answer to all of these questions is a resounding
no. The fact of the matter is that Yugoslavia is only the most
violent manifestation of a global slide into disorder. In
Europe, this descent threatens both stability in the former
communist countries and the cohesion of Western societies and
institutions that suddenly find themselves confronted with
problems on all fronts. Thus in this interdependent world it is
an illusion to believe that one can live in security surrounded
by chaos. Recent events in Russia should remind us that also
developments there can cast a shadow over the entire continent.
We have no choice but to draw the necessary lessons from our
failures, and redouble our efforts to construct a new security
architecture to meet the challenges of an unstable and
fragmenting world.

To me, it is axiomatic that in building this new security
architecture in Europe, you must begin with NATO. And so - even
before the outbreak of the Yugoslav crisis - our member nations
set out to transform this Alliance, not because we were looking
artificially for a new mission, but because the circumstances,
and the requirements, of peace and security in Europe had
changed so fundamentally. As a result, during the last three
years NATO has broadened its role geographically as well as
politically. In fact, I firmly believe that the Alliance has
already transformed itself as fast or faster than any other
international organisation to date.

Most importantly, we have agreed to assume two new
important missions, again not because we sought them out, but in
effect because they imposed themselves on us, and because no
other organisation was available or willing to do the job.

Our first new mission is to project stability into
Central and Eastern Europe. Two years ago, we created the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which comprises both
NATO nations and 22 countries of Central and Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union. Through this forum, we are lending
practical support to our Cooperation Partners as they strive to
restructure their armed forces and bring them under democratic
control. We have initiated discussions with these partners
which will lead in due course not only to the sharing of
experiences but also to practical cooperation in training,
planning and exercises. The short-term objective is to make it
possible for our Cooperation Partners and other interested
countries, such as Sweden, Finland or Austria, to interact
efficiently with NATO forces when carrying out joint
peacekeeping activities. The long-term objective is to create a
wider Euro-Atlantic security framework within which our former
adversaries can safely pursue their democratic destinies.

Second, for the first time in history, NATO today is
operating beyond its borders in support of crisis management and
peacekeeping. We have abolished the old distinction between in-
area and out-of-area, and have agreed to make available NATO's
unique military assets for these missions. In former
Yugoslavia, we are enforcing the embargo at sea and the no-fly
zone in the air. We have supplied UNPROFOR with command and
control assets, and we have offered air power in case of attack
against UNPROFOR. We are prepared, if necessary, to use air
strikes to relieve the strangulation of Sarajevo and other safe
areas. And we stand ready, if called upon, to help implement a
peace plan in the former Yugoslavia. In short, the Yugoslav
crisis has demonstrated not NATO's irrelevance but its unique
potential - indeed a potential which I believe ought to have
been exploited at a earlier stage in the crisis.

Third, we developed a new Strategic Concept, and
restructured our armed forces into flexible, multinational
units. Moreover, we are streamlining our command structure, and
strengthening the European pillar within the Alliance.

Thus we have succeeded in transforming what was a
successful Cold War bulwark of containment into a flexible
instrument that continues to fulfil the classic missions of the
Alliance, and yet also meets the multifaceted threats of this
new era.

In terms of NATO's classic missions, one remains
paramount: maintaining the common defence of our member states
and preserving the strategic balance in Europe. To those who
perceive no major threat to NATO territory today, I can only
answer that history moves fast and is full of surprises. If we
do not maintain the Alliance for the purposes of an integrated,
common defence, we would be vulnerable to the emergence of a new
threat from the outside, and to the potentially dangerous
renationalization of defence postures within. We would open the
door to the bad old days of European power politics, and close
the door to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe,
who benefit from the stabilizing influence NATO exercises around
its periphery.

Moreover, NATO offers the only institutionalized basis
for uniting the efforts of Europe and North America in dealing
with the security challenges of this more complex and
fragmenting world. If the strategic alliance of the world's two
major power centres were to come apart, how could we hope acting
separately to deal with the threats pose by weapons
proliferation, mass migration and regional aggressors? Think,
in this regard, about the Gulf War, which could not have been
concluded so quickly and decisively without NATO's
infrastructure, bases standardized procedures and
communications, and the experience of four decades of
cooperation among NATO Allies.

Finally, only NATO possesses a powerful array of
political-military tools needed for crisis management. It
provides the bedrock of "hard" security upon which any new
security order must be based, and the means for turning
political declarations into effective action. In short, NATO is
the basic model of the way in which industrial democracies can
promote their values and interests in a world of
multidimensional risks and limited national means.

It is because of NATO's unique capabilities,
particularly in the field of crisis management, that the
United Nations has increasingly looked to the Alliance as a
partner in peacekeeping in recent years. The UN is fulfilling
an extremely important and indispensable role, but it is
overburdened and underfunded, today handling no less than 17
missions worldwide with over 80,000 troops at a price tag of
over $3.6 billion. Under the able leadership of Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who enjoys my admiration, the UN
has set the stage for the development of an emerging
international consensus toward a broader notion of security that
includes the concept of intervention for humanitarian purposes.
But even the most extraordinary dedication cannot
solve the basic problem that the UN lacks the infrastructure,
the logistics, and the command and control facilities for major
military operations. Only NATO can offer these assets, at least
in the European theatre. For NATO, in turn, cooperation with
the UN facilitates the Alliance's new role in crisis management;
it places our efforts in a broad, internationally accepted
context. Moreover, it also increases public awareness and
acceptance of crisis management. So the future may well see
frequent and close cooperation between the UN and NATO.

At the same time, every institution must preserve its
own character and independence. NATO cannot be regarded as an
instrument or as a military sub-contractor to the United
Nations. This is why it is so important to develop a true
partnership and a more structured relationship between the two
organisations. We are discussing possible improvements in this
regard.

One important idea derived from our Yugoslav
experience is that effective support for the UN requires early
consultations in the planning process. Such consultations will
speed up this process and help clarify what military options are
feasible. We would also like to stress the importance of
enhanced communications and unity of command. Complex
peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in the dangerous and
rapidly changing circumstances we have seen in places like
Bosnia require no less. These steps are in the interests of
both the UN and NATO. Both organisations can only profit if
there is a clear mandate, a clear demarcation of
responsibilities, and a clear definition of the mission from the
outset.

Moreover, NATO itself must be prepared to demonstrate
initiative, as we did in early August when our threat to conduct
air strikes broke the momentum of the siege of Sarajevo. In
several ways, this example was instructive: it showed that the
US can make a difference, if America's moral and political
weight is brought to bear. It also showed that a policy carries
more weight when the US does not go it alone but has its 15
Allies on board. And it showed that NATO, aside from its
unquestionable military role, can play an essential political
role in crisis management as well.

So I believe that NATO has come a long way. But we
can and must go further. That is the purpose of our forthcoming
Summit in January.

A key objective of the Summit must be to enhance
significantly our ability to project stability to the East by
strengthening the NACC and opening a concrete perspective for
our Cooperation Partners on strategic partnership and eventual
NATO membership. In addition, we must continue to re-balance
the Alliance so that Europe assumes greater responsibility for
its own security and that of others. A fairer distribution of
burdens and responsibilities between the two sides of the
Atlantic and the emergence of the WEU as the European pillar of
the Alliance are pre-conditions for our long-term vitality.
Finally, we must resolve to enhance further our peacekeeping
capabilities by building on our relationship with the UN and
other organisations.

Ladies and Gentlemen, our hopes of building a stable
European security have been dealt a setback, but by no means a
death-blow. If we have the wisdom to learn from our mistakes,
and the courage to change our institutions in the face of the
new demands, we can prevent the slide into disorder in Europe,
and emerge stronger than ever before. But we must also have the
will - the will to use the instruments at our disposal, one of
which is the Alliance. NATO has proven that it can deliver. It
can indeed serve as the cornerstone of a Europe which is truly
whole and true.