The way forward in Afghanistan

Hikmet Çetin analyses the evolution of NATO's engagement in Afghanistan and the importance of elections to the country's future.

Following the successful outcome of the Berlin Conference on Afghanistan, which took place at the end of March and beginning of April, NATO's attention in this country has been focused on supporting the electoral process and expanding the Alliance's geographical presence beyond Kabul. These twin tasks, as subsequently set out by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, reflect the Alliance's ongoing and enduring commitment to Afghanistan and to the stabilisation process that is leading the country towards a more prosperous future, after three decades of turmoil.

At present, the Alliance enjoys strong support across a wide spectrum of Afghan society. The population at large sees NATO, through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that it has been leading since August last year, both as a guarantor of peace and stability and as an impartial force capable of creating the conditions necessary for effective implementation of the stabilisation process that was set in motion at the Bonn Conference of December 2001. In the run-up to general elections, one of the key milestones on the road to stability, expectations are inevitably extremely high.

In cooperation with other international and national security forces, NATO is in a position through ISAF to play an important role in neutralising many of the threats that might otherwise undermine the prospects for a new, post-Taliban political era. We must, nevertheless, bear in mind at all times that this process is as much national as it is international. Increasingly, therefore, Afghans should assume ownership both for it and for the future of their country. But until they are able to do this, NATO must ensure that it has the right resources to back the commitments it has made. This is especially critical as we expand our presence beyond Kabul and prepare to support the voter registration and electoral process.

The creation of additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will gradually enable NATO to expand its presence in Afghanistan. However, it will clearly take some time for new PRTs to consolidate their position and build their profile on the ground. Moreover, in the immediate future, they will not be able to cover the entire country. While support for the voter registration and electoral processes and the PRT-driven expansion represent two complementary efforts, there is an immediate need for a meaningful security presence throughout the country during the electoral period because of the historical significance of the Afghan elections. Although Afghans need to retain ownership of the overall process, realistically, ownership cannot simply be off-loaded on them in the absence of a comprehensive assistance package from the international community, including NATO.

With general elections scheduled for September, there are concerns over the ability of the government of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan to ensure their fairness and transparency. After all, the government is still in the process of developing a national identity and does not currently have representations throughout the country. There is, however, no serious alternative to the poll. Moreover, elections should lead to two important developments. They should legitimise the elected government in both Afghan and international eyes and they should reinforce that government's authority vis-à-vis other actors competing for power.

Elections always carry the risk of increased tension in ethnically divided countries that are emerging from years of war and are prone to sectarian violence. In Afghanistan, longstanding grievances risk spilling over into the political arena. Hence fears that the electoral process might lead to a polarisation of politics rather than an enhancement of the political dialogue. Moreover, the contours of a future power-sharing agreement able to balance the legitimate interests of the country's many ethnic groups remain unclear.

From a political perspective, as we move towards the September elections and the conclusion of the Bonn process, it is important to remember that responsibility for Afghanistan does not lie solely with the international community, but also with the Afghans. They will, therefore, have to take charge in many areas, if they are to build a better future for themselves and their country.

Firstly, they will have to establish a proper nation-wide political system. This will clearly be a major undertaking requiring time and effort. Secondly, they will have to ensure that the political process is governed according to principles of transparency and accountability. At present, many of the leading figures who participated in the jihad against Soviet rule and then waged a bitter campaign against the Taliban, appear to believe that their historical records give them the right to behave as if above the law and to flout the rules and regulations set out in the newly approved law on political parties. Thirdly, the political parties themselves must overcome the stigma with which they are associated in the minds of many ordinary Afghans, as a result of the disruptive influence that they have played in the country's recent past.

These longer-term challenges are at present overshadowed by the need to achieve widespread voter registration and free and fair polling, since the potential political return from success in this historic endeavour is enormous. A transparent and fair electoral process should help meet the hopes of ordinary Afghans that their vote will herald a new political era, following the collapse of the Taliban regime and the completion of the transitional phase of post-Taliban governance. Successful elections that meet both Afghan and international criteria of legitimacy would facilitate the expansion of central authority and serve as a catalyst for reintegrating communities into an inclusive political mainstream.

The legitimacy of the electoral process is, however, already threatened by several factors. Chief among these is the enduring influence of warlords and military commanders who continue to operate in many parts of the country with total disregard for central authority. And only if all Afghanistan's ethnic communities perceive the elections to have been legitimate will they truly have been a success.

The stakes are extremely high. Helping ensure that the electoral process is legitimate and that it is seen to be legitimate will be a test of credibility and resolve for NATO. But the potential benefits of successful elections – in terms of promoting stability, enhancing the standing of Afghan institutions and bolstering good governance – are such that the Alliance and the wider international community have a vested interest in making the necessary investment now, before it is too late. Moreover, a successful outcome should help create the conditions in which NATO would be able to develop an effective exit strategy, as well as consolidate Afghan responsibility for the stabilisation process and popular support for the government.

The Afghan year 1383, which corresponds to 2004-2005 in our calendar, will be critical in the history of the new Afghanistan. In the course of this year, Afghans will be electing both a president and a parliament. Meaningful support from NATO at this critical time will assist them to stand on their own feet and, in time, to claim their rightful place in the family of nations contributing to international peace and security.

Hikmet Çetin is NATO's Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan.