"NATO at the Beginning of the 21st Century"

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a pleasure to be here. Let me begin by thanking the Netherlands Atlantic Association for inviting me to address this gathering. I know that this event, which commemorates the signature of the Washington Treaty, has become something of a tradition in the Netherlands, and indeed in the NATO community. I am happy to be able to participate.

The North Atlantic Alliance was founded in Washington fifty-one years ago -- three years after I myself was founded, in Port Ellen on the Isle of Islay! Since I turned fifty-four years old, I have done some reading on middle-age that I found quite interesting. For example, a recent study from an American University has concluded that the early fifties are the best years of a person's life.

NATO itself has entered this happy period of Golden Age. The threat of a major war in Europe is gone- -- or put another way, our house is finally safe. Instead of the asymmetrical relationship of the past, Europe is now growing into a real partner for North America. And NATO is now able to carry out the agenda it was prevented from carrying out during the Cold War. As Prime Minister Kok put it at last year's Washington Summit, the Alliance is working "to build a stronger and more stable Europe based on the values that our transatlantic community stands for" -- and now, NATO is carrying out this mission right across the Euro-Atlantic area.

So NATO enters the 21st Century in very good shape. The Alliance has taken in three new members, and we are preparing for further invitations. We have built solid institutions for co-operation with Russia and Ukraine. The Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council have provided a framework within which every country in Europe can work together to solve security challenges. We have taken on two major missions in the Balkans, to help bring peace and lasting stability to an area that has, for too long, enjoyed neither. We are improving our military capabilities, to be better able to handle peace operations in future. And NATO remains the principal forum in which Europe and North America preserve our common security interests, and uphold our common values. Altogether, a broad record of achievement in building peace and security.

I believe that the Kosovo operation, in particular, demonstrates just how true this is. Some of you may find this example a little puzzling. After all, the papers these days are full of critiques of this operation. Some commentators are suggesting that we will never succeed in building peace there. Others say that Kosovo ruined relations with the Russians. Still others suggest that the countries surrounding Yugoslavia have suffered too much as a result of NATO's operations. And for a few, Kosovo seems to have driven a small, but growing wedge between Europe and North America.

My analysis of the lessons of Kosovo is just the opposite. I believe that, if anything, Kosovo has totally vindicated NATO's broad agenda, and at the same time, offered us some timely and valuable reminders of where we can do better.

I know the Dutch Government has just presented to Parliament a study of the lessons of the Kosovo operation. Let me follow that model, and offer you my own thoughts on the lessons of Kosovo, and how the operation has affected NATO's wider agenda.

The first lesson, from my perspective, is that we were right to act. It is important not to forget the situation in Kosovo as it was, just over a year ago. By that point, the United Nations has stated clearly, in successive Security Council Resolutions, and in the UN Secretary General's Reports, that there was a clear threat to peace and security. The UN High Commission for Refugees stated that a humanitarian emergency was impending -- and that the victims were overwhelmingly ethnic Albanians. And the international community had evidence that Serb forces were preparing a Spring offensive in Kosovo against those same Albanians, as the OSCE has stated clearly in its recent reports.

The requirement for action was therefore clear. Indeed, the press was full of editorials and commentaries demanding action by the international community. Was diplomacy tried? Of course. Diplomacy was tried -- and tried and tried, by the UN, the Contact Group, the OSCE, and the G-8. When Yugoslavia rejected peace at Rambouillet, and stepped up its repression in Kosovo, it was clear that diplomacy alone was simply not enough.

So with 20-20 hindsight, knowing what we knew then and what we know now, I am proud that NATO took action in Kosovo. It was not only the right thing to do -- it was the only thing to do.

Today, one year later, the situation in Kosovo is still far from perfect. There is still too much violence. We need more international police officers to maintain law and order, as well as more judges and prosecutors. And the international community has to come up with the funding to help build the solid foundations of lasting peace. Very daunting challenges indeed.

But we have to keep this in perspective. It has only been 10 months since KFOR deployed. Dr. Kouchner, the head of the UN mission there, has rightly said that Kosovo is emerging from "forty years of communism, ten years of apartheid, and a year of ethnic cleansing". To expect to create a Switzerland there in less than a year is a trifle unrealistic.

That being said, we can already see the beginnings of a brighter future for Kosovo. Major crimes have declined dramatically in number, to the point where the per-capita murder rate in Kosovo is below that of our own major cities. New institutions have been created, to help the Kosovars govern themselves. The economic situation is picking up. And the United Nations is already planning for free elections by the end of the year.

By any measure, today's situation in almost all of Kosovo is a far cry from the anarchy and lawlessness that many critics predicted when KFOR deployed. A very clear lesson of Kosovo, and also of Bosnia, is that NATO can make a difference for the better, if we have the courage and the determination to take the right action.

A second lesson of the air campaign is the continuing importance of Russia as a security actor in Europe. Our Kosovo operation did indeed put an enormous strain on the NATO-Russia relationship, up to the point where Russia suspended contacts with NATO.

Some analysts and journalists have drawn the wrong lesson from this. According to them, Kosovo proves that Russia and the West will never get along. Some suggest that Russia cannot be trusted; others propose that we should just give up.

They are all off-base. Indeed, the Kosovo operation demonstrates clearly the importance, and the potential, of a strong relationship between Russia and the Alliance. Russia played an important role in the diplomatic process that was supported by NATO's air campaign -- and that ended on terms acceptable to both NATO and Russia. And now Russian forces are working alongside NATO troops in KFOR, and are making an important contribution there.

The PJC is meanwhile re-establishing itself as the venue for dialogue and cooperation. We recently had a frank exchange over NATO's new Strategic Concept and Russia's new National Security Concept. And we addressed critical arms control issues.

So we should not lose sight of the forest for the trees. Russia and NATO have many common interests -- from peacekeeping to nuclear safety to arms control. Kosovo has made it crystal clear that security in the Euro-Atlantic area works best when NATO and Russia work together, and trust one another. We simply must do our best to build this kind of strong relationship. I recently made a visit to Moscow to meet with President Putin, and I was very pleased to hear that he does see Russia very much as belonging to Europe. That is an assessment we share, and an inclination we have to encourage.

Similarly, the relationship between the West and Ukraine is also vital. Why? One look at the map gives us the answer. Ukraine lies at the very heart of Europe, bordering on Russia, two NATO allies, and some of our non-NATO Partners. What happens in Ukraine affects the security of the entire continent, almost by definition.

That is why NATO and Ukraine are deepening the distinctive relationship we already have. NATO is providing support to Ukraine as it continues its process of adaptation, for example by providing advice and technical assistance in the important field of defence reform. And Ukraine, in turn, is building stronger bridges to the rest of Europe, for instance through its contributions to the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.

And if Russia and Ukraine have been important to the Kosovo operation, so have NATO's other Partners across Europe. Indeed, my third lesson from the Kosovo operation is that NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme is definitely a good investment in Euro-Atlantic security.

Through these partnerships, NATO has developed bilateral security relationships with 25 non-NATO countries, including former Warsaw Pact members and neutrals. As a result, the Alliance is not only bringing these countries closer to Western structures, but also helping to create a continent-wide pool of trained and interoperable forces for crisis management.

In Kosovo, the investment paid off for all concerned -- including for most of the countries surrounding Yugoslavia. The Partners in the region offered invaluable political support for the air campaign. Because they are neighbours to Yugoslavia, and because they understood too well what would happen to the region if Milosevic was not stopped, they supported the air campaign unanimously. And now, many of them are contributing troops to the peacekeeping operation itself, to demonstrate firmly their European credentials.

That demonstration has paid for them, as well as for us. Together with the EU, NATO is working hard to promote political, military and economic cooperation in the entire region. This will help build political stability and economic prosperity, and help to bring South-Eastern Europe back into the European mainstream. If anything, the Kosovo crisis has accelerated this vital project.

Kosovo has also accelerated another crucial process -- this time within NATO. The fourth lesson of this crisis, to my eyes, is that we must work harder to ensure that the Allies remain capable of working together, and of sharing burdens fairly. If we do not, Alliance solidarity will inevitably suffer.

The Kosovo air campaign showed us very clearly where we have work to do. During this operation, one ally had to carry a disproportionate share of the burden, and run too many risks, simply because the others didn't have the military capability. This is an unfair and unsustainable division of labour.

Our Defence Capabilities Initiative is designed to address these challenges. It will work to ensure that our forces remain interoperable, and that capabilities are spread equitably across the Alliance, so that burdens can be shared equitably as well.

This principle of fair burden-sharing is at the core of the second adaptation that must take place in the relationship between North America and Europe. I am referring, of course, to the development of Europe's capacities as a security actor, or "ESDI", as it is known in NATO.

Now, to listen to some of the press today, you would think that ESDI is the worst thing that ever happened to transatlantic relations. Some of the more hysterical commentators are suggesting that a stronger Europe will inevitably lead to the discord and division within NATO.

Again, I believe this is simply not true. Indeed, I believe exactly the opposite. Imagine if ESDI was not happening. Imagine a situation in which an ever-richer and more unified Europe still refused to take on its own defence responsibilities. Where Europe continued to make strong statements, but relied on the United States to back those words up with deeds. This was the situation in the air campaign. How long could this unfair security relationship endure? Who imagines that this imbalance is sustainable?

That is why ESDI is good for the transatlantic relationship -- because it means that Europe will be a stronger partner for North America in maintaining security. Where NATO takes the lead, Europe will carry a fairer share of the burden. Where NATO, as a whole, is not engaged, Europe will have the capacity to take the lead. This means that North America won't have to become directly involved, through NATO, in every security crisis in the neighborhood simply because Europe can't handle it. ESDI makes sense - and Kosovo has helped to make that clear, on both sides of the Atlantic.

We are already making progress. In Brussels in 1994, then in Berlin in 1996, all of NATO's members agreed that they would create an ESDI within NATO. And since then, NATO has made very quick progress in making ESDI happen. The Alliance has taken practical steps to provide material support to European-led operations. Our new command structure allows for European-led operations using NATO capabilities and assets. The NATO force planning process takes European requirements into account. And our Defence Capabilities Initiative is improving military capabilities overall.

At the same time, Europe is improving its own capacities as a security actor. By establishing decision-making structures, and by setting ambitious targets for military capability, Europe is taking major steps forward. I intend to hold Europe to its commitments for improved capability, because a stronger Europe enhances our common security.

Of course, as ESDI develops, there are issues to manage. The non-EU members of NATO must be included as fully as possible in any EU-led operations, from planning to the operation itself. We must avoid all unnecessary and inefficient duplication of assets or structures that already exist in NATO. And just as importantly, the EU has to put its money where its mouth is. The EU has set itself a Headline Goal for military capability. For Europe to be credible, this goal must be met, not with empty words, not just with new bureaucratic structures, but with real capability -- even if this capability costs real money. That, in the final analysis, will be the litmus test of ESDI.

These are significant challenges. But I am confident we will manage them, because ESDI is moving forward, and it is moving forward in a spirit of imagination, determination and good-will.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The final lesson of Kosovo, for me, is the most important. Kosovo has demonstrated that together, Europe and North America make up a unique community of nations. A community of nations that share common values, and a determination to take action to uphold them. A community of nations that can be an irresistible power for peace and security, when they work together. Fifty-one years after Washington, in healthy middle age, NATO is still going strong.

Thank you.