by NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller at the Swedish Institute for International Affairs
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER [NATO Deputy Secretary General]: … [inaudible] my friend Ian Anthony and well-acquainted with the work at SIPRI of course, so, in general, it is good to be back in Stockholm, where there is so much work going on that is of interest to me in the world of arms control, non-proliferation and international security. And Gudrun, we haven’t had a chance to meet each other before, but I welcome this opportunity to be on the same podium with you as well today and look forward to hearing your comments.
I thought, to begin talking about a new phase for arms control, it’s really a good thing to remind ourselves that arms control is not a good in and of itself, but because it contributes to our security. The security – in my new hat, not so new hat now, but three-years-old hat, of Deputy Secretary General of NATO – I can also say, the security of NATO countries. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation should complement security and defence. Indeed, it’s my very firm view that arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation are part of a continuum of security and defence. With verifiable and reciprocal restraint measures, we can enhance mutual predictability, strengthen confidence in our defence capabilities, avoid arms racing and sustain strategic stability – all to everyone’s benefit. But the key to success is a firm and shared commitment to verifiability and reciprocity. The value of arms control disarmament and non-proliferation dissipates if one party abandons that commitment.
So, with the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the INF Treaty, on precisely that basis, the Russians abandoned their commitments, where do we go from here? We all acknowledge that this moment is a very difficult one for classic arms control, at least as we’ve known it from the early 1970s until the entry into force of New START in February 2011. And now with almost, well, we’re at eight years of implementation of New START.
But even as we entered into the negotiation of the New START Treaty in 2009, I really thought that we were too stuck in the past. We were not taking advantage or attempting to take into account of the benefits accruing from the information revolution. Those who are engaged in non-military control procedures, such as preventing smuggling of endangered materials, endangered species and natural resources have long been using digitised monitoring, control and record keeping. Why are arms control inspectors stuck with using rulers and pads of paper to record and sketch? Why do they have to leave their laptops at home when they go on inspections? Partially, that’s the way it’s always been done, but also there are legitimate security concerns about digital recording devices that would and will have to be addressed in future arms control negotiations. But, mostly, it was because the difficulties of negotiating new verification measures incorporating some of these new information technologies, I think, has seemed too daunting. But it’s high time that we do do some serious thinking about this and I argue that it should not be all that challenging. After all, I mentioned the way that natural resources controls have been run, for now almost two decades, much incorporating the revolution of the information space for things like tracking fisheries resources. So, should it be all that hard to track submarines? Well, we’ll talk about that some more in a moment.
So, I think this moment, as difficult as it is, is a time to truly consider what we might be able to accomplish in future arms control agreements. It is a moment of historic transition and we should open our minds and take full advantage of it. I am optimistic and I will give you three reasons why.
First, problems that we thought were insurmountable 30 years ago are now amenable to resolution. The prime example here is monitoring of warheads on delivery vehicles. When the INF Treaty entered into force, it banned all ground-launched intermediate- range missiles, whether nuclear or conventional, because we could not verify the difference between nuclear and conventional warheads on the front ends of such missiles. So, although it was called the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, it bans all nuclear and conventional weapons in that range.
Today, we are in a much better position, both technically and in policy terms, to do so. And we’ve been trying this out through the re-entry vehicle onsite inspections, that have been carried out now, as I said, for about eight years, under the New START Treaty. We are beginning, I think, to prove the principle very well that it is, indeed, possible to discern the difference between nuclear and conventional objects on the front ends of missiles.
I, personally, am in no doubt that if somehow we got to the negotiating table today to negotiate a new INF Treaty, perhaps bringing the Chinese, perhaps bringing others who are deploying these missiles into the negotiations, we could institute a ban on nuclear-only ground-launched missiles. It’s what I call ‘putting the ‘N’ back into INF’, because we would be able to verify a ban on nuclear intermediate-range ground-launched missiles.
Alternatively, we could even impose a limit, although those of you who have worked on arms control verification over the years will recognise that implementing a limit and being assured that a limit is being abided by is much more complicated than implementing a ban, because a ban, it’s simply a green light, red light – is there any nuclear object or not? And a limit is much more difficult, you have to count the warheads. So, first reason. We are beginning to solve some problems that we thought were insurmountable 30 years ago.
Second, concepts that have been tried and proven true over 40-plus years of arms control regimes are still available to us, and we should not think we have to throw everything out and reinvent the wheel at this moment. I want to underscore this point, because there’s been a great deal of pessimism about where we are in the regimes, and people are throwing up their hands and saying, ‘We need to throw out the baby with the bathwater.’ I don’t think that is the case at all. A fine example here is the concept of ‘freedom to mix’ – wherein a party to an arms control treaty is given the opportunity to decide just how many weapons systems of a certain type he wants to deploy, within a certain negotiated ceiling, choosing not to deploy other systems.
Looking to the future, one might consider whether controls on hypersonic glide vehicles, for example, might be incorporated into a freedom of mix approach. If the Russian launch vehicles are existing types of intercontinental ballistic missiles, as I believe they are, for example, then Russia would have to decide what normal ICBMs it would forgo deploying to have a certain number of HGVs in its arsenal. The same goes, by the way, for several of the new kinds of nuclear systems that President Putin advertised in March of 2018. If they would be brought under the constraints of the New START Treaty through the new kinds provisions of the treaty, then Russia would have to decide, through a freedom to mix approach, what part of their established arsenal of traditional ICBMs they were going to hold onto and what part of that arsenal would now become populated by these new kinds of systems.
Third, and finally, I would make the case that what we need to do is take a good, hard look at the information revolution and what it has done for monitoring and sensing. Already, much is being done with commercial satellite imagery and, again, I give a lot of credit to SIPRI for some of the work it’s been doing in this area. The easy example all of us can get our arms around is the work that’s being done to monitor developments in the DPRK missile programme, a lot of work being done with commercial satellite imagery and data nowadays. In addition to which, we are all concerned today about ubiquitous sensing – what could be done to deprive us of our privacy of free movement, free association and free expression.
At the same time, I have been arguing for some years that ubiquitous sensing can improve our verification capabilities. The ideas are controversial, but some of them are already in play, again, in the environmental arena. For years, the notion of engaging citizen volunteers has been widely used in environmental monitoring. I think a good example here is the way Japanese citizen volunteers improve the radiation detection in range of the Fukushima power plant, by using apps on their mobile phones, apps designed to detect radiation. If we are all worried about strengthening the ban on chemical weapons use, the ban that is inherent in the Chemical Weapons Convention, should we not be empowering those who are living with the threat of chlorine attacks to be able to report rapidly and accurately when such attacks occur? This might be done through disperse sensing mechanisms.
I think these ideas are worth debating and worth developing. And I think, again, this is an area that shows some promise. So I’m going to take a hopeful note in this part of my presentation and say, I grasp that we are in a difficult moment with regard to conventional . . . I would say, not conventional, that’s a little confusing, but the arms control treaties and agreements as they have existed up to this point. But I think we should regard this moment as one of opportunity to look at the future and consider what we should be doing differently to improve the verifiability of the treaties of the future. We’ve had enough problems with non-compliance that the Reaganesque adage of, ‘trust but verify’ needs to be embraced now as never before. I think Sweden, frankly, is getting on with it, about which I will say more in a moment.
So where do we go from here? As we look ahead, the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference next year is an important milestone to engage all relevant actors. Sweden is doing a great deal to rebuild trust and confidence in arms control and global disarmament in the run-up to the 2020 conference. I am very much welcoming Sweden’s stepping stones approach. This is an effort to bring together a group of countries, including NPT parties and non-parties, Ban Treaty supporters and opponents, to work together on a positive agenda, to support the Review Conference. And it’s a wonderful example of Sweden playing their historic role in building bridges toward disarmament.
The stepping stone approach complements a US initiative called Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament or CEND – C.E.N.D, pronounced ‘send’ in English. CEND brings together a diverse group of nations, inside and outside the NPT, to work together to further nuclear disarmament. Both initiatives seek to reduce risks and improve disarmament verification capabilities. They are complementary and help create the energy and enthusiasm that can buoy the 2020 NPT Review Conference and lead to its success.
Beyond the Review Conference, we will need to use our combined positive momentum to build on the opportunities we have in Geneva, in New York, in Vienna and in Brussels and in all of our capitals, including Washington and Moscow – also Beijing – to engage.
We can do even more. NATO Allies are developing positive agendas across the entire arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation spectrum. They are revitalising their support for the Chemical Weapons Convention. Following the lead of the French, we will support a positive agenda in the Biological Weapons Convention this year. We are looking at possibilities to improve the governance of space. And we are considering what we can do together in arms control and non-proliferation to address growing global and regional missile threats. We can also do more to contribute to other global initiatives, such as the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership, another Swedish-supported initiative, together with Norway, the UK and the United States. NATO has a rich history and experience, as well as technical expertise to contribute.
So there is much that we can achieve working together on practical and inclusive efforts. I want to hear from you this afternoon, what you think about these ideas. I’d like to hear more, indeed, about how we can work together, Sweden and NATO, to make the world a safer place.
To conclude. A new phase of arms control is not an easy one. But I am optimistic. You will recall that the 80s weren’t a particularly easy time either, with long periods of hiatus in the negotiation of important treaties, the START treaty itself, the first START treaty and the INF Treaty, long periods of high hiatus leading up to, practically, a decade to complete negotiation of the START treaty and a little more than half that time to accomplish INF. Yet, we managed to negotiate agreements that made the world a safer place. We can and must do more to support global arms control efforts, because arms control is not a good in and of itself. As I said in my opening remarks, it is a contribution to our security. And security, of course, is in our mutual interest. So thank you very much for your attention. I look forward to our discussion. And, again, I look forward to the comments of my colleagues up here on the podium. Thank you.
MODERATOR: Thank you very much, Deputy Secretary General. I would now like to give the floor to … [inaudible].
IAN ANTHONY: Okay. Well, thank you so much for the opportunity. It’s always a pleasure to listen to Rose because she combines this sense of what needs to be done with a pragmatic sense of what’s possible. So, I think it’s always the right place to begin. I would say, I would, I would of course agree with, with much of what Rose was getting at. First, the point about continuity and change. There are certain elements of the security environment which are kind of enduring. If we think about approaches to deterrence, for example, the idea of conditional response. When we suffered the strategic shock in 2014, I think the immediate response was a sense of lack of preparedness. We weren’t actually ready to deal with the events as they were unfolding. I think this sense that we have to get to a situation where states feel confident that they have the capacity to respond to events … [inaudible] is necessary … [inaudible]. Another enduring feature is accepting a degree of mutual vulnerability, but also putting that vulnerability within acceptable parameters. I think this is also an enduring feature of the sort of strategic environment. But, of course, there are also very significant changes that have to be taken into account. In comparison with the past, we are now thinking about a much wider spectrum of contingencies. So when we say, ‘conditional response’, the response has to be to a range from what could be public order issues, the agenda around so-called hybrid threats, right through to a spectrum of conflict between peer adversaries. But not only conflict of global scale, but also limited contingencies at a regional or subregional level. So the strategic environment is also being changed. I think it’s now recognised by an accelerating pace of change, not least in the area of technology, which is bringing with it serious communication challenges. And in comparison with the past where, if there was a crisis, it was possible to establish communication channels that would be both secure and private, a lot of what’s happening now is played out in the public domain with interventions from civil society, from media, from various points of the political spectrum, which poses a great communication challenge in actually managing contingencies as they arise. So we have a very complicated environment to deal with. If we bring this back, I suppose, to the topic of today, the arms control perspective. Against that background, in the short term, from a European perspective, I think we’re in a period of organising our thinking. Organising our thinking around the different challenges that we’re going to have to deal with, whether it’s the question of global, regional, subregional approaches, whether it’s the question of different types of technology which need to be included. The . . . really organising our thinking is . . . is the phase that we’re in now. That has to go alongside the implementation of the plans that have already been made for capability development. There are going to be more resources to spend for European countries. How are we going to spend them in an environment where we still have very wide differences between European countries? We have those which are determined, I think, to try and stay close to the leading edge of technology development in the military sphere. And there are those which are essentially using their resources to buy legacy systems, refurbished Cold War equipment. And so we have to manage a very broad spectrum of different types of country in this intergovernmental process of thinking about the future security environment. But that doesn’t mean that we can’t also think about whether there are things that could be done today. I must admit, the idea of putting the ‘N’ back into INF is a very attractive one. I would actually say, if possible, we should consider not only ground-launched, but also extending a ban on nuclear intermediate range forces out to sea. I think it would be worthwhile, if we think about some of the contingencies that we might come up against in the coming years. For example, the recreation of the US Navy as a . . . as a strike force. The Second Fleet was very active in BALTOPS. It is going to be present, more and more, in this European environment, both in the Baltic and in the High North. If we have ambiguity around whether anti-ship cruise missiles on . . . on ships and submarines are nuclear or not nuclear – and at least in the public literature, many of them are described as dual use – but there could be risks associated with that. I can’t see, if you’re the Commander of a task force, that you would be willing to take a risk that the anti-ship missiles on an adversary are conventionally armed, you would have to assume, for planning purposes, that they’re nuclear armed. And that means essentially those nuclear armed missiles are going to have to be eliminated before they come to their firing stations. So, I think for purposes of stability it would be worth considering whether you could extend a ban on nuclear . . . ground-launched nuclear intermediate range forces out to sea. So, I think there are certain things that would be worth discussing in the period while we’re trying to organise our thinking. Just one final note. I think, of course, the Europeans will have their own opportunities to intervene also in the discussions and participate in the discussions that are taking place in NATO. And I think there are still a lot of relevant insights from the comprehensive approach to arms control that NATO’s developed in the late 80s. So, I agree with what Rose said, really, that it’s worth looking at what’s already in existence and what’s already been done, to see how we can take advantage of good ideas. The relevant insights, I would say, from the ’89 comprehensive concept include making sure that there isn’t a differentiation between capability development and thinking about arms control. That this is seen in an integrated way, both when thinking about which new capabilities need to be added and should be added, and the potential consequences of different arms control approaches. Just to give an example, to perhaps make it clearer: if it was possible to reach an agreement on certain limitations on conventional weapons, but the side effect of that was to displace activity into the development of new types of cyber capability, would we actually have gained anything in terms of security? So, thinking in an integrated way about how different types of capability impact one another was very much part of the comprehensive approach to arms control in the 80s and we shouldn’t lose that. It would be a mistake to see things in isolation, even if negotiating forums have to be separate for practical reasons or for other reasons. Another clear insight from the 80s comprehensive concept was the need to minimise surprise and increase predictability. And in the very complicated and fast-changing strategic environment that I was describing before, with all of the challenges of communication between leaders in a crisis, it seems to me that this, doing whatever we can to reduce the risk of surprise, or the perception of surprise, is also an important insight that needs to be preserved from . . . from past work. So, I think I agree completely that we probably don’t expect to see major breakthroughs in arms control in the coming years. But we have a lot of potential for organising our thinking, developing the tools that will become relevant at some point. There will come a time when restraint measures reassert themselves in a more balanced way against active measures. And we should use this time and in the most productive way that we can.
MODERATOR: Thank you very much … [inaudible]. Then I would like to give the floor to Gudrun Persson.
GUDRUN PERSSON: Right. Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to sort of lay out the . . . the Russian perspective on . . . on these issues. I’m also very excited to be on the same panel as Rose, because even though you don’t know me, I know you … [inaudible]. So, just . . . just . . . I thought I’d try to address three points here. First, reactions in Moscow about the termination INF Treaty. Secondly, the current nuclear doctrine. And finally, some current discussion on nuclear arms control in view of New START and NPT Review Conference. First, however it’s absolutely clear that Russia has wanted to get out of the INF Treaty for years. And the reason is that they link this consistently with their objection to the US missile defence. Already, in February 2007, both President Putin and the then-Chief of the General Staff, Yuri Baluyevsky, said that the INF Treaty was no longer in Russia’s interests. Furthermore, in 2017, 10 years later . . . 10 years later, Putin referred to the INF Treaty and said, ‘Our Chief Engineer committed suicide, because he believed it was a betrayal of his country. It’s a tragic story. Let us change it now.’ So, as to the reactions in Moscow at this . . . the official political and military leadership put all the blame on the United States. The President links it to the US walking away from the ABM Treaty in 2001. And in February this year, he also said that using medium range target missiles and deploying launchers in Romania and Poland that are fit for launching Tomahawk cruise missiles, The US has openly violated the treaty. Now, regarding the Russian violations of the treaty, Putin just wipes it off as a far-fetched pretext. And this is in spite of the fact that Russia has been developing a land based cruise missile, in violation of the treaty. At the same time, there are experts in the Russian community, also military ones, who do not agree with the political leadership of Russia and refute the US missile defence deployment close to Russian western borders and say that it doesn’t pose a threat to the Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles. The problem is that their analysis is met with distrust by the current political leadership. And this brings me in, just very briefly, on the decision-making process regarding these issues, arms control and treaties. In Russia, there are some peculiarities: these issues, they don’t necessarily lie within the realms of the Foreign Ministry, but, above all, the Presidential administration, The Security Council, including the general staff. Decision-making in this area is marked by, of course, secrecy, closed decision-making process, lack of opposition in Parliament. But it is different from Soviet times. There is an expert community, civilians and military. But, as I said, the problem is that any dissenting views are not listened to or taken seriously, but it’s tolerated. Now, regarding the current doctrine. First of all, I should point out the obvious: namely that the role of nuclear weapons in Russian foreign and military policy has increased since 2011 and 2012. The current military doctrine keeps the same wording as the previous one, which stipulates that the Russian Federation reserves the right to utilise nuclear weapons, when the very existence of the state is under threat. Now, in later years the discussion about a possible preventive use of nuclear weapons has sparked controversy both in Russia and the West. Some of the military thinkers in Russia have argued for a change in the military doctrine that would explicitly regulate Russia’s possible use of a preventive nuclear strike. Last year, Putin and intervened in this debate and, sort of, wanted to clarify the situation. He was emphatic, stating that, ‘Our nuclear weapons doctrine does not provide for a pre-emptive strike. Our concept,’ he said, is based on a Launch on Warning strike.’ And he then described the Russian missile attack early warning system, so that there would be time when they had this indication. However, it’s not clear whether this means that the current military doctrine’s first use of nuclear weapons has been altered. So, in this area the ambiguity prevails. The point here is that the termination of the INF Treaty and the possible deployment of new US medium range missiles in Europe and in Asia, this is, in the Russian debate, will undermine the concept of Launch on Warning doctrine. There will simply be no time to react. In that case, according to an influential military commander, General Viktor Yesin, for those of you who know him, has stated that nothing remains for us but to change our doctrine from a Launch on Warning to the concept of pre-emptive nuclear strike. Regarding, briefly, the current discussion on … [inaudible] nuclear arms control. We should understand that in . . . in Russian doctrine and foreign military policy, strategic deterrence is the foundation. And this is what they are, sort of, trying to protect. The US and Russia has, for the past eight years, as far as I’m aware at least, discussed … [inaudible]. And this is a very long pause, for decades for such talks, and Rose, you might know exactly how many years. I’ve seen the figure 50, but I’m not sure. Again, at the top political level, Putin has made clear that the collapse of the INF Treaty also threatens the foundation of the global security architecture including START and NPT. And in the Russian debate, and among scholars and my academic colleagues, it is clear that those changes are in jeopardy. And, again, the President has said that we will not knock on a locked door anymore, we will wait until our partners are ready and become aware of the need for dialogue on this matter. And here I also agree with . . . with Rose, that it’s important not to throw everything away. And Alexei Arbatov, well-known Russian academic in the field, recently said, when I was in Moscow, that the most stupid thing you can do if you want to renovate a house is to blow away the foundation. And finally in . . . in Russia, in this debate on nuclear arms control, there is a strong trend that Alexei Arbatov calls ‘the revisionists’. They advised politicians that there is no need for treaties. We are better off without them. And this trend has strengthened over the past 10 years. And this, of course, is potentially very dangerous for the arms control architecture. And I think I’m just going to end there.
MODERATOR: … [inaudible] for the very interesting interventions that you have made. And I have just a few questions that I would like raise, and, of course, after that there will be questions also from the audience … [inaudible]. Since also, Deputy Secretary General, you have . . . you have long experience from arms control negotiations, and I just wonder, if you can look at the INF Treaty, and that experience with its negotiation and … [inaudible] operation and the … [inaudible] in the beginning of August, are there any particular lessons we should take with us from the INF experience, if we’re going to move onto another … [inaudible] negotiation?
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: My top lesson is: don’t close down a verification regime, you know, because it was a ban, it was a ban on all intermediate-range ground-launched systems. Once the process of elimination of those systems was completed, in December of 2009, the verification regime of INF came to a close. We should have sustained suspect site inspections of some form under the treaty, we should never have closed down the verification regime of New START. We could have called the Russians much earlier than we did. I mean, notably it was the flight test series that first raised questions, but we could have also, under INF, begun the process of raising with them some of the concerns with the flight test programme, but most significant, particularly as they began to move into operational deployment, would be suspect site inspection. So, that would be my advice going forward: if you’ve got a good inspection regime, hang onto it no matter what.
MODERATOR: Thank you, I also have a question, well, perhaps for you … [inaudible] since you’re focusing also on the European side of things, because the demise of the INF Treaty, in a way you get a flashback from the 1980s, when there was this debate about the… [inaudible] of weapons systems in Europe and so on, have you been giving any thought to what the Europeans should do now, when it comes to the new situation? I mean, perhaps nothing will happen in the short run, but in the long run, things may happen also in Europe. And I wonder if you had thought about that?
IAN ANTHONY: I have a view on it, of course, but I’m not going to be making the decision. Some of the immediate responses will have to depend on the United States, because we simply don’t have the capabilities in Europe. But I was mentioning that we . . . we have this perspective after 2030, where we expect to have more resources available for spending on defence. And I wonder if we don’t need to think very seriously about creating a European strike capability, based around conventional intermediate range forces, integrated fully into NATO command systems so that it’s clear that this is not a separate endeavour, that it’s integrated into a Euro-Atlantic response. A significant part of the US response is probably going to be at sea. That’s the indication. In an environment where it’s clear that the US has very important priorities in Asia, the deployment patterns of the ships might mean that the wrong ship is in the wrong place at the wrong time. I think a European capability would also be a strong signal that Europe is not going to depend excessively on the United States in perpetuity, but it’s going to take more responsibility itself. So, I think one of the things we should look at seriously, when we think about the next generation of European air power, is the development of a European intermediate range conventionally armed strike force.
MODERATOR: Thank you very much, … [inaudible] given the . . . I mean, you know very much about the Russian forces … [inaudible] because you’re … [inaudible] authors of the … [inaudible] is it every second year or . . . ?
GUDRUN PERSSON: Every third.
MODERATOR: Third year.
GUDRUN PERSSON: Yeah, we have a new one coming out.
MODERATOR: A new one coming, yes. I mean, given the fact that the Russian Navy has demonstrated in Syria a capacity to, with its ships, send off cruise missiles into targets, do you have any thought about the reason why Russia has sort of purposefully developed this land-based cruise missile, this 9M729 missile? Since they of course have the capacity … [inaudible] to strike European targets.
GUDRUN PERSSON: That’s a . . . that’s a very good question. To my mind, the development of this land-based missile probably started earlier, and that they wanted something, because of all the grievances it felt towards the West in general, and the US in particular. So, in essence what I’m saying is: they did it because they could.
MODERATOR: Yes, Rose?
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: I have a slightly different view of this and Putin himself has talked about it. I think the Russians saw the proliferation of intermediate-range ground-launched systems across Eurasia and decided that they needed them, not so much for the NATO market, so to say, but for developments they saw in Asia. And Putin has been, from time to time, quite explicit about this. He has said publicly that they are concerned about – when asked this question by journalists – they’re concerned about DPRK, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, all developing these missiles. That points toward a Eurasian rationale, rather than a narrowly anti-NATO or anti-Europe rationale. So that’s, that’s my view.
GUDRUN PERSSON: But the other one doesn’t exclude. They are . . . they are not mutually exclusive . . .
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: No, no. By no means.
GUDRUN PERSSON: By no means, right.
MODERATOR: Yes, thank you. I was a bit struck by the optimist tone of your keynote speech. I mean, I’ve been working with nuclear issues for quite some time, and I don’t really feel over-optimistic when I look upon the world right now, because I think so many things are happening. And last week we had … [inaudible] you know, from the State Department was here, and talked about the NPT, and he was also very optimistic. Because, in a way, if you look from a sort of … [inaudible] perspective now, you have several things happening at the same time, but you don’t really know how they will play out against each other. We have the Iran deal, which is now more or less in limbo; the INF who . . . passed away on the 2nd August; we have the NPT Review Conference coming up now in 2020; and, of course, the question of New START if it will be extended … [inaudible] 2021. And some commentators have also raised the sort of spectre that we will sort of enter into an era of under regulated nuclear stockpiles. Does the panel have any view of whether this a realistic scenario that we will end up in a situation where nuclear weapons will not be governed by . . . by the treaties, international law, binding under international law?
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: I don’t see any sign that the NPT is in danger of going away. So there is multilateral, international regulation of the sort inherent in the NPT; it implies that those states who have taken disarmament steps, which have been significant since the late 1960s, and the entry into force of the NPT should not reverse those steps, going forward. I do agree, however, that we are, potentially, depending on what happens to the New START Treaty, looking at a period where, for the first time in well, SALTs entered into force in the early 70s. So, yes, well, my, 50 years, almost 50 years, since we’ve had some form of bilateral Soviet-US, Russian-US limitation or reduction going on. I don’t welcome that potential or possibility. I cannot tell you now how real is the possibility. I will say, as far as the extension of New START is concerned, that I’ve been really underscoring, you know, a significant message which is: the way Article 14 of the Treaty is written is very simple. It’s meant to allow the two sides – and this was written at the time when START I went out of force in December of 2009, and we were not able to complete the New START Treaty in time. So there was concern, you know, looking forward at that time that, ‘Oh my lord,’ you know, ‘START is out of force, we don’t have New START yet, what’s going to happen? Are the two countries going to go haywire and suddenly start building up?’ It didn’t happen. That was December of 2009 and New START did not enter into force until February of 2011. That’s cold comfort, I know. But we have faced . . . we have, in the past, had a period where there were no negotiated treaties in place between the United States and Russia regulating strategic nuclear forces. But we did agree at that time that we would not take steps that would undermine the spirit of either Start or the, we hoped, upcoming New START Treaty and continued to behave in a responsible manner, I would say. Again, I’m not recommending this course, but I’m just saying people were throwing up their hands and really succumbing to the notion that suddenly they’ll just be unleashed this enormous arms race. And I think both the United States and Russian Federation are also mindful of their responsibilities under the NPT, which is to continue the process of disarmament.
Let me just further say about New START extension, because I’ve been really advising don’t overload the process. It was written very simply, Article 14 of the Treaty, New START can be extended by a simple exchange of diplomatic notes, it can be done overnight, assuming Washington and Moscow agree. There is no reason to load up that process with all kinds of negotiations for other things that each party may want. So just, just bear that in mind. The actual technical procedure is a very, very simple one.
And the other point I’d like to make is that there’s some kind of worry sometimes among those who are concerned about being stuck with New START for another five years, that somehow the critique you hear, ‘We’re going to be stuck with this treaty which we think is less than perfect for five years.’ It’s not the point. Again, the article is written so that it may be extended for five years, or until it is superseded by a new treaty. So my message has been consistently: go ahead, please, negotiate a new and better treaty, delightful if, you know, it gets across the finish line. And at that point New START would be superseded, no problem. So I think those are important points to bear in mind.
MODERATOR: … [inaudible] do you have any comments on the question of the … [inaudible] international nuclear regime?
IAN ANTHONY: I think it would go back to the common denominator about the need to see these things in an integrated way. Not only thinking about health of the nuclear regime, but also looking back to the strains that are emerging in the Chemical Weapons Convention, the difficulties we have in the discussion of conventional arms control. The, let’s face it, long term neglect of issues around biological weapons and especially technology development in the field of life sciences and their potential implications. It’s why I emphasise this comprehensive concept of arms control, which was very much the way that these things were approached in the past and finding our way back to looking at these things in an integrated way.
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: I wonder if the Chair would allow me to ask Gudrun a question?
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: I’m very interested in this, and I’ve never been able to figure it out for myself, perhaps you have a view of it, Gudrun? And that is: why did the Russians decide to go this convoluted route of . . . of cheating on the treaty? Why didn’t they just use the withdrawal mechanism that’s in the INF Treaty? If they felt so seriously about this, why try to cheat? They were going to get caught!
GUDRUN PERSSON: Right, again, a very good question. To my mind, this is taking a long view of a Russian Foreign and Security Policy, and the notions of treaties from when the Soviet Union was a superpower is . . . has been very important. So, to my mind, why . . . why take this step to break it? Or leave the treaty? It doesn’t reflect . . . it doesn’t look good. So it it’s better than . . . so when the US finally said, ‘We’re going to withdraw,’ to me it seemed like there had been a chicken race, and the US blinked. So now, Russia can say, ‘Well it was the US who left it.’ And, and if, if Russia had decided to play by the book and say, ‘We’re now leaving this treaty,’ it would have exposed Russia to international criticism that they simply didn’t want.
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Interesting. Thank you.
GUDRUN PERSSON: That, that’s my . . . but, again, I can, I can only guess. I have a question for you, if the Chair allows me to . . . for Rose.
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Sure.
GUDRUN PERSSON: Would you say, with all your experience and in hindsight, that there is no legitimate . . . legitimacy at all to these Russian worries about the missile defence? Could, could that have been incorporated somehow in earlier treaties?
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Well, I have never quite understood why Russia has so overreacted to national missile defence as it has been developed in the United States since the demise of Star Wars. Yes, the Reagan-era programme could have undermined the nuclear offensive deterrent of the, at that time, Soviet Union, because it was a huge and, in theory, very capable system. Although Reagan himself said, ‘No, no, no, we’re going to have a cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union. We’re going to somehow develop this together to protect us all.’ So, he had in his mind that it also would not threaten the strategic offensive deterrent of the Russian Federation per se. But there was a very interesting decision that was made at the time of Star Wars and that was by the then- . . . well, they were dying in rapid order at that point, but Andropov was the Chief of the Politburo and the Leader of the country and he said, ‘We’re not going to overreact to this system, we are going to develop very capable counter-measures to ensure the penetration capability of our ICBM force’. First the ICBMs, I think only later SLBMs as they became more sophisticated. And you’ve seen that trajectory pursued now for 36 years, that they’ve been developing very, very capable counter-measures loaded on the front end of their ballistic missile force. They have, in my mind, through these kinds of counter-measures ensured the penetration capability of their . . . of their ballistic missile force. So I keep asking, ‘Why are you so worried?’ I mean, honestly speaking it does make me puzzled, I have to say. I do understand that’s the way the rhetoric runs and it’s very consistent. We’ve heard it in the New START negotiations. But my view is, after all the work they have done since Yuri Andropov started this ball rolling in 1983, they should have confidence in the penetration capability of their ballistic missile force.
GUDRUN PERSSON: Thank you, interesting.
IAN ANTHONY: Yeah, I think this question of why Russia didn’t simply do the same as the United States with the ABM Treaty and say, ‘We’ve made our assessment, we no longer feel this is in our interests, we’re going to make use of the clause in the treaty to withdraw,’ rather than taking a different approach. And I think this is a really interesting question. And I wonder if it . . . it’s illustrative of two things. One is the need to put these things into the broader context, not just of arms control and development in military security, but wider political developments. It seems to me that internal discussion in Russia was taking place at exactly the same time that there was an attempt to bring European countries back together after the Georgia war. And at a time when there was a new administration which had, in the United States, which had a different perspective on the potential for relations with Russia. So there were also wider considerations that probably were factors. And it also makes me wonder how much information flow and knowledge there is within the Russian system of what was happening in the kind of military-technical area.
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Good point.
IAN ANTHONY: And leading on from that second point is: have we actually lost over time, from a European perspective at least, the capacity to make really good analyses of what’s happening with Russian … [inaudible]. Is there a case for a much stronger collective European effort to understand what Russian perspectives are and what Russian activities really mean? We talk a lot about the need for a military to military contact with Russia, but we probably also have a gap there in terms of intra-European discussions of these issues, not least in a cognitive approach to thinking about arms control possibilities. So, I think it’s wider perspective, in terms of the chronology is probably … [inaudible].
MODERATOR: Yes, thank you very much. Just one question in relation to the issue that has surfaced lately, and that is the question of whether or not China should be … [inaudible] future discussion on arms control and disarmament. And I was wondering if you had any views on sort of changing and bilateral negotiation relationships with China, and perhaps … [inaudible] while you are it, why not multilateral and the rest of the … [inaudible] states? I wondered if you had any views on that?
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Do you want to start with me?
MODERATOR: Yes please.
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: The reality of the situation is that, still, the United States and Russian Federation have way more operationally deployed warheads and warheads in reserve than China. And while there is that enormous disparity in capability, it’s difficult to see how you would structure a reduction negotiation, and the Chinese have conveyed that message very, very clearly. I, however, do believe that it is time to draw China into the discussion. I have watched with great interest in the past several years the evolution of the so-called P5 process, wherein China, Russia, UK, France and the United States are getting together three or four times a year and have now launched discussions in that setting on strategic stability. I welcome that. To me it’s a kind of early way to begin to talk about the advantages of restraint to the Chinese and to begin to draw them into the discussion. But I take the view that this is a long game. And as long as the Russian Federation and the United States have so many more warheads than China, it’s going to be very difficult to structure any kind of reduction negotiation involving them, just on the face of it - never mind what, what Chinese interests are, just the negotiability of the other thing, I don’t see, as a negotiator.
MODERATOR: Okay, I have now run out of questions, and I will now open up to questions and comments from the floor. And I would kindly ask you to be brief … [inaudible].
QUESTION: Just coming back to the optimism that you showed, Deputy Secretary General, in the beginning when talking about verifiability. There are a couple of people in the audience here, Ambassador … [inaudible] and others, who were involved in the very early negotiations here in Stockholm in 1983-84, trying to open up for a dialogue. And we have a fantastic book, that I’ve brought with me . . .
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Ah, excellent.
QUESTION: by … [inaudible].
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Oh yes.
QUESTION: . . . and Ambassador … [inaudible] from … [inaudible] negotiating, who were literally told by … [inaudible] when he went to him to explain what he was up to in Stockholm, he was told by … [inaudible] that everything that the Soviet Union was saying at the time, in terms of the … [inaudible] of nuclear weapons, et cetera, no surprise attacks – all of that was wrong. It was a total mis— . . . he had a total misunderstanding of what was the actual policy of the country that he was representing, here in Stockholm. So, my question to you, and partly also to Gudrun is: do we have less of a . . . we know much more now in terms of verification, but do we actually have a less of a distance now between the declared … [inaudible] and the real policies? Do we actually know what the main actors actually are planning to do in … [inaudible]? Because, actually, the name of the game for us, I mean, for most of us here, is to prevent a nuclear war, to prevent a war. So that, for me, is an essential question.
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Do you want . . . okay. I will let Gudrun take up the doctrinal, policy side of the question. But just in terms of the experience we have accumulated with the Soviets and Russians since that time, in not only negotiating, but also implementing arms control treaties and agreements, I think has accumulated into a certain pragmatic ability to work together and to accomplish real results, despite the political overlay that may be there.
The brief example I’ll offer is that when the Russian Federation seized Crimea a few years ago I, at that time, was in the Department of State. I was very concerned about the implications for New START, because we always believed that reduction, continued reduction of nuclear weapons is an existential good and should continue and we really wanted to focus on that. So I called my counterpart in Russia, got the confirmation very shortly that the US government desired that, in fact, they were continuing without interruption to implement the New START Treaty. And then, what we saw in the field with the inspectors. Never a word about the severe differences that developed rather quickly between Russia and NATO countries, Russia and Washington, over what they were doing in seizing Ukrainian territory and destabilising the Donbass. So the inspectors just went about their business and continued to implement the New START Treaty. Again, to my mind, several people might argue with this, you know, no, we should have somehow halted implementation of New START. And we were concerned the Russians might do so. But I think it is an existential good to continue to reduce and eliminate, no matter what. That this supersedes other concerns we may have. We continue to call them and continue to press them and sanction them, when they do things like seize Crimea. But we need to continue to work to reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction. And here I see a pragmatism and a willingness to work together, that probably had not yet had its proof of principle back in 1983.
GUDRUN PERSSON: All right. So, regarding the Launch on Warning strike that Putin was talking about. To me, that is the strategic level. That is the strategic deterrence, to protect that at any cost. In other words, to protect the strategic level and then to have . . . have possibilities at the lower level, which brings me into the non-strategic nuclear weapons and the arsenal, the Russian arsenal is, as far as we know, the biggest in the world. We know they exercise regularly with non-nuclear weapons. So that’s . . . that’s one thing. I . . . my understanding of it, I, I wouldn’t want to exaggerate the risk of a, by mistake, a nuclear war. On . . . at least that’s my take on, on the Russian side. This is very much regulated and, and according to the military doctrine, it is the President who will say okay to use nuclear weapons. So I wouldn’t exaggerate that part. Besides, taking Ian’s point, we have to see things in a context. These days there are conventional weapons, which have also a very high destructive power. And in . . . to that end, the Russian military doctrine also talk about the importance of having a non-nuclear deterrent capability, other weapon systems. Also, just if I may, regarding Ian’s point about the West not taking into account Russia’s concern, or the knowledge. I mean, I could give a special seminar on this: how since –. . . I’ve been around for too long, I think – but having seen all the knowledge centres of the West, not least in the US, being totally dismantled, my American colleagues were in despair at times. And it leads me to one of my . . . my points that regardless of the weather in security policy, we in the West should always have a capability to analyse Russians. So I . . . I do think that we have still quite a bit to walk towards that end, what it used to be in, the 80s to, to get the understanding. And . . . and sometimes today you can hear Russian politicians saying that the West has a complete wrongful view of Russia. They don’t specify exactly what is wrong with it. But the more the merrier in the Russian Studies field.
MODERATOR: Thank you, and I’ll give the floor to the gentleman … [inaudible].
QUESTION: Rose made, I think, a really helpful, well-justified argument, the optimism, especially when it comes to technology, mentioning the verification … [inaudible] and the new methods. She also mentioned the role of citizens, and Ian kind of built on that a little bit. But I think it brings in the issue of … [inaudible] if you think of climate or if you think of the Hong Kong protests, it’s not controlled, so it has its own dynamic and impact on the political leadership. And if you combine that with, okay, we’ve got a technology that increases our confidence in the facts, I’m curious as to the panel’s thoughts about how you sustain political local backbone, even when the facts. Because we saw with … [inaudible] a lack of will, of political leadership to . . . to say what was true. And I wouldn’t expect Rose to comment on this, but I want her to reflect on NATO’s nuclear participating nations, and their lack the desire to communicate that importance to their public. So, well, I think we’ve got . . . I think it’s … [inaudible] a great point about the optimism for the tools going forward, how does that relate to how we can improve the political backbone to sustain commitment for climate as opposed to weather?
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Do you want to start with that one?
IAN ANTHONY: I mean, it’s, I think almost the most important question when we think about risk reduction, what’s going to be governments’ approach when bad things happen. And we’ve seen this already with incidents, you know, you’ll have something which occurs, maybe two ships, or, a ship or an aircraft in the high seas, within five minutes a senior decision-maker has a journalist with a microphone under their nose saying, ‘What are you going to do?’ You have some other part of the political establishment saying, ‘We must be strong, we can’t cave, we must react.’ The whole dynamic of managing problems requires a new governance structure which we don’t have today, we still work through intergovernmental processes within institutions, which require, sometimes, consensus to take an action. So we have this huge mismatch between the need to respond in a very dynamic and complicated environment and the governance structures that are available for dealing with this. And I think there are a lot of risks just around that: what’s going to the governance. And this is only going to get worse. When you think about the introduction of technologies which may, at least, bring to the table of decision-makers potential options and solutions, which were generated without human intervention, you might find that you’re in a situation where people are having to take decisions at the point where the issue has already resolved itself, so to speak. Now, things have already moved beyond the point where they’re trying to make a decision, at the point where they have to actually decide. So I think designing governance structures that reduce risk, this is . . . this is a very, very important area. It’s not arms control as we’ve kind of traditionally defined it, but I think we have to pay very close attention to these risk reduction structures. Some of which will . . . some of which are already discussed: how do you kind of slow things down, increase reaction times, create secure frameworks for communication? And some of this is already thought about. I think it’s much more developed in bilateral US-Russian contexts than it is in any other context. I think, again, this is an area where, collectively, Europeans have not really invested very much in thinking about crisis management and risk reduction. So I think this really . . . the governance of complicated problems in a changing environment is probably a more accurate reflection of what we need to be doing in the next couple of years than arms control as we’ve classically defined it.
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: I entirely subscribe to Ian’s answer, but the other point I would just add, in commenting about NATO’s nuclear participating nations. I think throughout NATO – and this is a very long-term, long-horizon goal – but I think throughout NATO, we need to be educating publics more on nuclear weapons policy, on the threats, on the challenges, on the issues and on the stabilising aspects, also, of NATO nuclear policy and how we work together to ensure through, for example, resilience: how we work together to ensure that the stability of the nuclear mission, as it exists within NATO, can be sustained in even the most harrowing circumstances. But that’s, it’s a long-term horizon. It’s not something that can be done overnight and it has been woefully neglected since the demise of the . . . the fall of the Wall, the end of the Cold War.
MODERATOR: Thank you very much.
QUESTION: Thank you, sir. … [inaudible] Treaty Association. And my question to the panel is: that I read about concerns cyber weapons could be used to target command and control system. And I’m wondering if you believe that this could be discussed in future arms control talks, thank you.
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Well, I’ll give my answer, which is: I think that we’ve been lucky in the 50-plus years of arms control efforts in that we’ve had hardware to regulate. But when you get to the software of cyber capabilities, you have a much different problem and a more complicated problem. That’s why I don’t believe that you can pattern-match beyond what’s been done in arms control over the past 70 years to constraints and restraint in the cyber arena. And I think that requires additional thought. There’s been a lot of thought put into it over the years and in the world of the UNGGEs, the groups of government experts in other settings. I don’t think it’s hopeless to regulate, to develop rules of the road, to have some confidence-building measures. Perhaps technology will even deliver potential for restraint in some way in future years. I can’t envision it right now. But the only thing I will say is: we’ve made progress in this area, including in the legal arena, but there is a huge amount of work to be done and we’re chasing a rapidly-moving target, because of the evolution of cyber technology which continues to be very rapid. So, I think here it’s not going to be so easy, but I will say that it’s a good challenge for our younger generation to take on – not that we’re going to give up on it.
GUDRUN PERSSON: Okay, just, just a footnote if you will, on the issue of information security, you’re well aware that Russia is in favour of regulating information security in the UN, and China has given its support to it, and no one in the West has. Mainly because, according to this idea, the regulation … inaudible] also involved content of the messages, which is where the West turns away from it, so just to put that.
MODERATOR: Thank you.
QUESTION: Thank you. I’ve got three points on Russian policies that I want to make. One is a sort of a recollection when, sometime in 99 or 2000, together with our then-First Minister, I visited the … [inaudible] Academy in Moscow, and at the end of the briefings, I asked the Colonel General, ‘What about nuclear weapons?’ And then he said, ‘Well, as to tactical nuclear weapons, that’s my business … [inaudible] with that, that’s a part of our weaponry … [inaudible] as to strategic nuclear weapons, I don’t have a clue, that’s for the big boys in the Kremlin, Mr Yeltsin and so on, or Putin.’ He made a very clear division there, whether he was sincere or not, I can’t say. But I do think, I have a concern myself about tactical nuclear weapons, they’re not very much regulated, and Russians do have tactical nuclear weapons on their territory, the United States and NATO have them on . . . in some places in Europe. And I wonder whether there are some talks, or contacts, or discussions that you see going on, that would be of interest. Of course, the difference between tactical nuclear weapons and advanced conventional precision weapons is … [inaudible] and that’s the problem. But then coming to another issue, namely: why did not the Russians themselves pull out of the INF Treaty, if they didn’t like it? I would say partly the answer is that there is this strain of … [inaudible], there’s always been this strain of, strong strain of … [inaudible] in Soviet and Russian thinking. You know, ‘If you have a treaty and that should be respected, we will not be the first to withdraw.’ And I don’t think there’s any . . . I can’t think of any example of when they have left a treaty that they have themselves signed. Yes, they may cheat, … [inaudible], but they try to cheat under an aspect of deniability, if possible. They would never drop out. The American tradition is … [inaudible] ‘Oh we don’t like this, … [inaudible] just leave it.’ So there are differences. I think that’s . . . that’s interesting. And what was the third point? Oh never mind.
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: The current administration Washington has proposed to the Russians that the next negotiation should incorporate non-strategic nuclear weapons, so that has been proposed and we’ll see what happens. That’s a very interesting point. And I remember the convoluted way they dealt with their ceasing to implement their commitments under the CFE Treaty. If you remember reading that - the legal analysis they did, which was wrapping themselves in circles to give themselves a legal rationale when it was completely absent from the treaty. It was completely absent from the treaty, any possibility of suspending your obligations under the treaty. So it’s quite right what you say that they have this legalistic streak that sometimes manifests itself in very bizarre ways. I don’t think this is just an American perspective to say, if you are steadily cheating on a treaty over the years, somehow you are severely undermining international law. But, well hey, anyway, thank you for that insight.
QUESTION: Can I add my third comment, and that was about missile defence. Rose said that you couldn’t understand why the Russians made such a fuss, because they have a, sort of, a second strike capability, a reaction force, and that’s all very true. And one concern they’ve said, and I’ve tended to believe them in the end, that was a couple of years ago when … [inaudible] was very active, and the prospect of building an ABM or an anti-missile defence installation in north eastern Poland, why there? Why so near Russian border, and Kaliningrad border, when the supposed reason was that we should prevent some Iranian missiles from flying and attacking the United States, and very difficult to grasp, for a layman, why did the US have to put that installation exactly there? At least they used that argument, and I think, you know, there was something to that argument. That was my point.
GUDRUN PERSSON: Okay, regarding the sub-strategic nuclear weapons. To my mind, I mean if you enter into a negotiation on, on arms control, the end goal is security for everyone and there must be a strategic balance between the parties, so to speak, both must win. So my question to Rose, then, would be why would Russia want to agree to negotiate in an area where they have supremacy in the world?
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Well, my view of that, historically, has been that where the Russians possess superiority in non-strategic nuclear warheads, the US has superiority on the strategic side. So a deal could be worked out on that basis. That was always my view. You’re quite right though.
MODERATOR: Yes, thank you very much.
QUESTION: Yes, … [inaudible] from SIPRI, and my first question is a bit technical, I know if you’re able to answer it, it’s for Rose Goettemoeller, about the Russian violation, because according to, at least, the US media has suggested that the tests that the . . . that Russia did on the INF … [inaudible] prohibited INF Treaty … [inaudible] missiles were done … [inaudible] and doesn’t that implicate or imply that Kazakhstan was involved in the violation? Because I’ve heard that when you test missiles from that site, to those ranges, they would need to land in Kazakhstan. So, that’s my first question and then related to the previous question about the potential costs and motivations for developing these controversial cruise missiles. Do you think it’s possible that it could have been partly motivated by Russian concerns about missile defence? Like, rightly or wrongly, I think . . . or, whether you think Russian claims or concerns makes sense? They have obviously been concerned about it. And in 2011, Medvedev said if the dispute over missile defence couldn’t be solved then Russia would ensure the ability to take out missile defences in Europe. And in that connection, he referred to Iskander missiles. But do you think the INF missiles of … [inaudible] INF missiles would have some value from this perspective. And, if I may add a third part to the question, related to what Ian said about the need to integrate different aspects in arms control negotiations. Do you think it would be time to talk about missile defences and advanced conventional weapons alongside nuclear weapons reductions, considering that even if China is not part of the next round of arms control negotiations, China also has huge concerns about the same things as . . . as Russia?
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: I guess all of those were to me. I guess all of those were to me. I don’t actually know. I’ve never looked at the range bands, you know, where the missiles would have to land, so I can’t answer the first question. In any event, I don’t believe that Kazakhstan would necessarily be implicated in the violation, because I don’t know what the treaty arrangements are between Kazakhstan and Russia, in terms of the test site and where the missiles land, whether there’s some agreement that Russia gives notification every time they’re testing. I’m sure they give some notification about exactly what they’re testing and, you know . . . so, I think . . . I think I’d have a lot of questions about your first question, whether or not Kazakhstan could ever be implicated in that case, I just don’t know.
The second point. My view is – and this is about negotiations and where, you know, different weapons fit in negotiations – my view is the way you succeed is to keep them as simple as possible. If you’ve got enormous, multiple baskets of issues that you’re trying to bring together, it’s really difficult to get to ‘yes’. And so nuclear reductions, let’s focus on nuclear reductions. And if you’re thinking about non-strategic nuclear weapons, then perhaps you bring in the other warheads on the US side to try to reach some balanced arrangement that would satisfy the interests of both sides. But I wouldn’t pile a lot of issues from other, you know, from other places on a negotiation of that kind.
I do think it’s worthwhile to look at long-range precision strike now. We are already facing this threat in NATO. You were asking about whether the 9M729 could be used as a missile defence killer – they have already loaded up Kaliningrad with Iskander missiles. We’ve already been facing highly, in NATO, highly accurate dual-capable missiles in . . . now not only in Kaliningrad, but now also in Crimea for some time. So, as far as I’m concerned, if they want to kill missile defences they’ve got it already. So I don’t see the 9M729 as being a particular contributor in that regard.
MODERATOR: Yes, Ian?
IAN ANTHONY: Yes, just on the missile defence point. The . . . the chronology of the investments in Europe and the explanations given to Russia have simply never been accepted by the Russian side. But they were explained repeatedly and in great detail. The decisions to have the sites in Europe were connected with the expansion . . . not expansion, but the change of emphasis in missile defence from exclusively protecting the US homeland to protecting Allies in the context of continuous investment in missile forces in the Middle East. So the rationale was . . . was rather clear and was continuously explained to the Russian colleagues, they simply never believed it. So I’m not quite sure how one gets around that. It goes back to this continuous erosion of . . . of trust. When you, when you explain clearly why you do things and the other side simply doesn’t . . . I’m not sure how you solve that problem. But I don’t think it was a lack of information or explanation. The rationales for the different missile defence programmes have been explained exhaustively and continuously.
QUESTION: Can I . . . sorry, I was talking about the global missile defences, not just Europe but the whole . . . I mean, I think both China and Russia see it from that perspective, Europe is just … [inaudible].
IAN ANTHONY: Yeah, sorry, I was linking it to your point about the rationale for developing the intermediate range forces. That would have been . . . because the intermediate range forces would have no impact on missile defences on the US homeland, so I don’t think it’s a very convincing argument to be quite honest.
MODERATOR: So, ladies and gentlemen, the time is up. We’ve had a very interesting discussion here. I would like to thank the panellists, in particular Secretary General Rose Goettemoeller for taking the time.
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Deputy Secretary General.
MODERATOR: Sorry, Deputy Secretary General. For taking your time to come here today to visit us at the Swedish Institute for International Affairs. And I would also like to thank Ian Anthony … [inaudible] for taking the time to join us here in the panel today, and I think we will thank them with a round of applause, thank you very much.