Adapting NATO in an Unpredictable World

Thank you very much, General, for that warm welcome.

Officers, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlement, I’m really honoured to be able to speak here at the École Militaire, and this is really a place which is so famous, and I’m told that this academy was established by Louis the Fifteenth, and also that Napoleon himself studied here.

So I feel that I am really at a historic location, both for the French military, but actually also for NATO, because the original seat of the NATO Defense College, which was established by the first Supreme Military Commander of NATO, Dwight D. Eisenhower—that was also located here at this academy. So this is a historic place for France, but actually also a historic place for NATO and the transatlantic Alliance.

I will say some words and then I will be more than ready and happy to answer your questions after my speech.

And I know that among those who are in the audience now there are of course French officers, but also officers from different NATO allied countries and partner countries, too.

This is just one example of the many different valuable contributions that France is making to the Alliance.

France has long inspired the world, with your ideas, your culture, and your willingness to change the way things are done.

After the Second World War, France was at the forefront of the creation of our international institutions, including our Transatlantic Alliance.

And today, France is playing a crucial role in helping to modernise NATO.

In my meeting earlier today with President Macron, we agreed that our Alliance must continue to adapt to changing times, particularly as we look ahead to next year’s Summit of NATO leaders in Brussels in July.

Our history has taught us that our ability to adapt is crucial to our success.

Again and again, faced with a changing world, the Alliance has evolved.

As you know, NATO was created back in 1949. For forty years, the Alliance focused on collective defence in Europe, and kept our nations safe without a shot being fired, allowing our nations to recover, to integrate and flourish after the Second World War.

Then, in 1989, the Berlin Wall came down, and the world changed.

NATO’s focus shifted away from collective defence to managing conflicts beyond our borders, helping to end two wars in the Balkans, and fighting terrorism in Afghanistan.

2014 was another pivotal year for our security.

The world changed again.

Russia illegally annexed Crimea, the only time since the Second World War that one European country has seized part of another by force.

And Daesh captured Mosul and Raqqa.
Declaring them part of its so-called caliphate.

As a result, NATO has to both strengthen our collective defence at home and manage crises beyond our borders at the same time.

Since 2014, Allies have implemented the largest reinforcement of our deterrence and defence since the Cold War.

We have tripled the size of the NATO Response Force to 40,000 troops, including a high-readiness force, ready to move within days.

We have also stepped up our military exercises and enhanced our air policing in the Baltic and Black Sea regions.

We have deployed almost 5000 troops in four multinational battlegroups to the east of the Alliance, and earlier this year I met the highly professional French soldiers serving in one of the battlegroups in Estonia.

We continue to increase defence spending, ensuring we have the capabilities we need.

We have strengthened cyber defences, and our defences against missile attacks.

At the same time, we have a robust nuclear deterrent to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression, and we are committed to arms control and disarmament.

The NATO Command Structure is being updated and modernised to enable us to move forces more quickly across Europe and to keep the sea lanes of communication across the Atlantic free and open. General Mercier, one of our two Supreme Allied Commanders, is playing a key role in our transformation.

NATO’s actions are defensive, proportionate and in line with our international commitments. Our aim is not to provoke conflict, but to prevent conflict.

We don’t want a new Cold War, and we don’t want a new arms race.

Russia is our neighbour. That is why our approach to Russia combines strong defence with meaningful dialogue, and we are making progress.

After two years without any meetings of the NATO-Russia Council, since 2016 we have had six meetings in the NATO-Russia Council, and France has had an influential voice in this dialogue with Russia.

We have addressed the situation in Ukraine, and the need for transparency and risk reduction. We have initiated actions on air safety in the Baltic Sea region and discussed Afghanistan.

From my own experience as a Norwegian politician, I know that dialogue with Russia is not always easy, but that is exactly why dialogue with Russia is important.

We have worked hard since 2014 to bolster European security. That security isn’t just about what we do inside our borders, but also beyond our borders, too.

And we have stepped up our efforts to project stability in our neighbourhood and to fight terrorism.

Since 9/11, NATO Allies have stood together in solidarity against terrorism.

And as Secretary General, I marched here in Paris in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attack, and we have responded in many different places, in many different ways.

In Afghanistan we have transitioned from combat operations, to the training and advising of local Afghan forces. But we are now increasing the number of troops serving in our mission to 16,000 NATO soldiers in the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan.

NATO is also a full part of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, or Daesh.
We provide support with our AWACS surveillance planes and with the training of Iraqi officers, and we are helping to build the defence institutions of other partners in the Middle East and North Africa, such as Jordan and Tunisia.

France makes a major contribution to the fight against terrorism as a major partner in the Global Coalition and through your operations in the Sahel region. And we highly value the French contributions to the fight against terrorism.

So NATO is strengthening its collective defence and, at the same time, projecting stability in its neighbourhood.

Both of those are more effective when NATO and the European Union work together.

We are natural partners. 94% of the EU’s population live in a NATO country. We share common values and common challenges.

That is why, last year, President Tusk, President Juncker and I signed a Joint Declaration on how we can strengthen NATO-EU cooperation.

We called for a ‘new impetus and new substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership.’ Since then, we have made unprecedented progress in strengthening the NATO-EU cooperation.

We have boosted our cooperation on cyber defence, maritime security, fighting terrorism, and countering hybrid warfare, among many other things.

Federica Mogherini, the High Representative/Vice President, and I inaugurated The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki a few weeks ago, and NATO’s maritime presence in the Aegean Sea is helping to implement the EU-Turkey agreement on migration by supporting FRONTEX and the Greek and Turkish Coastguards.

Neither NATO nor the European Union have all the tools to tackle the challenges alone, but together we are a formidable force for good.

And France, as a founding member of both NATO and the European Union, has a key role to play to ensure the coherence of our efforts.

My country, Norway, is not a member of the European Union, but I feel very European. Actually, I fought hard for Norway to join the European Union, but we lost the referendum in 1994. Actually, we have lost twice, because Norway is the only country in the world that has applied for membership in the European Union, negotiated an accession protocol, and then voted it down in a referendum two times. So I don’t know when we’ll try for a third time. That’s a risky project.

But I strongly support European defence. I make this clear every time I address the European Council, as I did last week.

I am convinced a strong European defence is good for the European Union, it is good for Europe and it is good for NATO, as long as it respects three key principles.

First, it needs to focus on building the necessary capabilities: spending more and spending better.

That means, for instance, tackling the fragmentation of the European defence industry.

Let me give you a few examples which the European Commission, President Juncker, has focused on many, many times, related to the fragmentation of the European defence industry.

The US has one type of main battle tank, while Europe has 17 different types.

The US has four types of frigates and destroyers; Europe has 29.
The US has six types of fighter planes; Europe has 20.

That doesn’t mean that everything needs to come from one single supplier, but think what it means for our ability to work and fight together and the unnecessary costs involved.
Second, a stronger European defence also needs to involve non-EU Allies to the fullest possible extent, of course respecting the autonomy and integrity of the European Union.

NATO has members who are not in the European Union but who make significant contributions to European security.

NATO as a transatlantic alliance is responsible for the collective defence of our European Allies.

That role is, and will continue to be, irreplaceable.

Our Allies on both sides of the Atlantic continue to be engaged in European security.

For the first time in years, the United States and Canada are increasing their military presence on our continent. And, after Brexit, non-EU Allies will account for 80% of NATO defence spending, and 3 of the 4 battlegroups in the eastern part of the Alliance will be led by non-EU Allies. So there is no way the European Union can replace NATO. The European Union can strengthen NATO, strengthen the European pillar inside NATO, but not replace NATO.

Third, a stronger European defence needs to complement, not duplicate, NATO’s own efforts, and that is a view clearly expressed by European leaders.

On duplications, for instance, NATO already has a well-established defence planning process. We’ve had it for decades, and as part of that process, we identify in detail the capabilities that each Ally needs to deliver to ensure the Alliance has the tools it needs to do its job.

It would be a mistake for the EU to duplicate that process. Capitals should not be faced with two conflicting lists for capability requirements.

I’m absolutely certain that France, Germany, Italy, many other Allies who are members, both of NATO and the European Union, they don’t want to end up with two European institutions, or NATO and the EU, presenting different conflicting force requirements to the same nations.

When it comes to complementing each other, national forces and capabilities generated by the EU need to be available for NATO use, too, because the nations which are part of both the EU and NATO simply cannot afford two sets of forces and capabilities.

We share 22 members, so to compete would be like competing with ourselves. That makes no sense.

Our roles are distinct but mutually reinforcing. We must work together in a coherent way.

Ladies and Gentlemen, among you here in this room are many of France’s future military leaders, and Allied leaders, too.

In the years to come, I know that I can rely on you to use your energy, commitment and creativity to help guide the Alliance, to achieve the changes we need in a changing world.

So with that, I’m looking forward to your questions and to interact with you after this speech. Thank you so much for your attention.