Revitalizing the Transatlantic Security Partnership

I’m very glad to participate in my second successive Munich Security Conference Kick-Off here in Berlin, and I’m looking forward to the 50th Security Conference in Munich in 10 days’ time.  Congratulations, MSC, on your Golden Anniversary!

This is a year of many important anniversaries, including the start of World War I.  But one of the most important is the anniversary of what happened here in this city 25 years ago.  That’s when the wall that symbolized Europe’s Cold War division came down, ushering in an extraordinary transformation of the continent and the transatlantic community.  I would like to discuss with you the challenges facing that community, and the North Atlantic Alliance, as we begin a pivotal year, when NATO’s longest-ever military operation comes to an end. 

By working together, America and Europe have long been the world’s greatest force for good.  But some are now starting to question whether we can continue to work together.  And some even suggest that we are drifting apart and shrinking from the challenges that we face – as the title of tonight’s meeting implies (“America in retreat, Europe without ambition?”).

Pessimists highlight the financial crisis that continues to weigh heavily on all Allies, including the United States, and which are causing our publics and governments to turn inward.  They voice concern that, as the United States rebalances to the Asia-Pacific region, it will mean less in the balance for Europe.  And they cite issues such as intelligence gathering as indications that trust has evaporated.  I am not that pessimistic; but I do have some worries.

Discussions over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership highlight the strong economic ties that bind us.  But we are also linked by our history, by our aspirations, and by the common values we share. 

And of course we are linked by the common security challenges that we face:  terrorism; cyber attacks; proliferation; instability beyond our borders.  To deal with these challenges successfully, America and Europe must be ready to act together when necessary – to defend us at home; to project power when necessary; and to protect innocent people when called upon to do so.

To be able to do all that together, we need NATO.  The European Allies need NATO; but so do Canada and the United States.  We all need a proven, permanent framework in which we can discuss these issues, find a common strategy, and act upon the decisions we take.  In short, I believe we all need an Alliance that is ready to deal with anything the future might throw at us. 

But I also believe that the transatlantic security burden needs to fundamentally rebalanced, and that European Allies must do more for their own and for our shared defence.

It simply cannot be the same NATO we have today: an Alliance where the US share of total defence expenditure has risen to around 75%; where some European Allies have cut their defence budgets by up to 40 per cent; and where all European Allies continue to depend too heavily on the United States in a range of key capability areas.

We all realise that transatlantic burden-sharing is about more than just defence budgets.  European Allies, including Germany, continue to make substantial contributions to NATO-led operations, including in Afghanistan and Kosovo.  Several also are making significant contributions to our developing NATO missile defence system.  And there is a lot of good European work going on in NATO “Smart Defence” and EU pooling-and-sharing projects.

But I just don’t think last month’s European Council on defence showed enough urgency, nor enough understanding of the critical need for Europe to be able back up its soft power with hard power if it wants to play a meaningful international role.  And I also believe it did not show enough understanding of the current political climate in Washington which, although it’s not anti-European, was certainly more pro-European in the past, and more favourably inclined toward international engagement than it is today, after a decade of war.

So in the coming year, European nations are really going to have to step up.  European governments must realise that, even though their populations may feel safe, that perceived lack of a threat is self-delusional.  They must make the case to their populations that defence still matters.  They must demonstrate that they are prepared to hold the line on defence cuts, and hopefully increase spending as their economies improve.  And they must show they are serious about working together, about developing long-term procurement and investment programmes, and about ending the fragmentation of their defence industries.

In December EU leaders promised to discuss defence again next year.  But we will have a NATO Summit later this year.  The Wales Summit will be a further, important opportunity for European nations to demonstrate that they are both willing and able to take on more responsibility for their own security and that of the world in which we live.

So let me say a few words about the Summit. 

Afghanistan and the Transatlantic Bond will two of the themes; and capabilities will feature as one of the three building blocks for what will be the main theme at our Summit, “Future NATO”.  We need to take the right decisions on military capabilities so that we have the right tools to do the job.

A second building block for “Future NATO” will be connectivity – between our forces, and with the forces of our partners who have contributed so much to our operations.  We want to learn the right lessons not just from Afghanistan, but from 20 years of NATO missions and operations.  And so we want to put even more emphasis on better military training, education and exercises.

The third building block of “Future NATO” is cooperative security.  Strong partnerships have become as important for NATO as modern military hardware and flexible forces.  And so we want to continue to develop our partnerships on multiple tracks.

We want, first of all, to continue supporting those partners who need our help, including the four countries that aspire to NATO membership.  And we want to strengthen our links with partners who are highly capable and willing to work with us on operations.  This includes European countries like Sweden and Finland, but also key nations in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere, like Australia and South Korea.

We also want to explore ways for doing more with our partners in North Africa and the Middle East.  Here, I believe there is particular scope for helping nations and regional organisations in those regions to develop their own capacity to build security and manage regional crises, complementing the efforts of the UN, the EU and member nations in the capacity-building sphere.

Finally, we will also want to continue to engage with Russia, and to continue to develop our partnership, despite Moscow’s reluctance to engage on potential game-changers like missile defence cooperation or reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons.  But at the same time, we must continue to stand up for the security choices and sovereignty of Russia’s neighbours, such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.  And we must insist that they solve their internal problems without violence, and without outside interference.

So as we approach NATO’s next Summit, we have a demanding and ambitious programme ahead of us.  It will require unity of purpose among all Allies.  It will require stronger leadership by my own country.  And it will also require a stronger determination by European Allies to step up for their own security and for our transatlantic security community.