Remarks by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow

Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It’s not often that I get to share the stage with two Ministers.  It’s both an honour and a pleasure for me to represent NATO at this conference that is specifically devoted to our Alliance.  And through you, Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the Hungarian National Assembly most sincerely for having me. 

NATO will turn 65 next year.  For human beings, that is often the age when they step back and slow down a little bit.  But in the face of a multitude of complex risks and threats to our security – from terrorism, through proliferation, to cyber warfare – slowing down is simply not an option for us in NATO.

Our NATO Summit in the United Kingdom next September will mark the start of a new chapter in the Alliance’s continuing adaptation to a rapidly evolving security landscape.  While the timing of the Summit relates to the transition in Afghanistan, the Summit is, first and foremost, about NATO’s future.  I firmly believe that two issues will be particularly important to keeping NATO fit for the future – and therefore deserve to be high on our Summit agenda.

The first issue is defence capabilities – because we must make sure that we have the right tools to deal with the challenges to our security when many of our nations face serious economic challenges too.  We already know that this key question will be high on the agenda of the European Council next month.  And that EU meeting should be an important stepping stone towards our NATO Summit next year.

The numbers are stark.  In the decade since 2001, the US share of total defence expenditure by NATO Allies has increased from 63% to around 75%.  During the financial crisis of the past three years, all but three NATO Allies have cut their defence budgets.  And the cuts have been particularly severe in some NATO nations, including here in Hungary. 

Every NATO Summit since 1999 has announced initiatives on defence capabilities.  Back in 2006, we also established the benchmark of 2% of GDP to be spent on defence.  But we have not been entirely successful when it comes to delivering on those initiatives.  As a result, we have not just seen the transatlantic capability gap widen, but also a growing imbalance between the defence contributions of a few big European Allies and those of the other, smaller European Allies, including this country.

At our last Summit in Chicago, we set ourselves the goal of “NATO Forces 2020” – modern, tightly connected forces that are equipped, trained, exercised and commanded so they can operate together, and with partner forces, in any environment.  And we agreed two initiatives to achieve that goal.

With “Smart Defence”, nations are encouraged to work together to deliver defence capabilities that would be too expensive for any of them to develop alone.  And with our “Connected Forces Initiative”, we want to preserve and strengthen the operational edge and interoperability that our forces have gained through two decades of practically non-stop operations, once our operational tempo slows down after 2014.

The key components of CFI are expanded education and training, better use of technology, and – perhaps most important -- an increased exercise programme.  We want to make sure that our nations can operate together and with partners to deliver on our core tasks – from high-intensity combat to disaster response and crisis management.  And we want to do that by exercising frequently under demanding and realistic conditions, as we did with our Exercise Steadfast Jazz in the Baltic region earlier this month.

As a matter of fact, since our Chicago Summit, we have seen some good progress not only with “Connected Forces”, but also with “Smart Defence”.  Today, multinational “Smart Defence” projects cover more than thirty capability areas, from protection against improvised explosive devices to air- and sea-lift.  They help Allies to standardise requirements, pool resources, and achieve tangible gains – in terms of operational effectiveness as well as cost efficiency.

It is also encouraging that European NATO Allies are involved in every one of our current “Smart Defence” projects, and leading roughly two-thirds.

This is a good start, but more remains to be done.  What we ultimately need is a new culture of multinational cooperation across the Alliance.  It is clear, though, that such a change in culture will not happen overnight.  And that it will be a big challenge especially for European nations to work together to deliver concrete capabilities – either within NATO, the European Union, or smaller, regional groupings like the Višegrad-4. In this regard, I am encouraged by Hungary's efforts, as this year's Chairman, to expand V-4 defence cooperation to areas like capability development, defence planning, and training and exercises, in addition to making the Visegrad EU Battlegroup combat ready.  

At NATO, ahead of our next Summit, we are looking to make progress especially in three major capability areas: joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; missile defence; and for the longer term, future heavy-lift transport helicopters.  In all three areas, there will be a strong emphasis on European efforts.  If successful, they would bring significant improvements – both in terms of capabilities and a fairer sharing of responsibility for transatlantic defence.

But let me be clear.  Multilateral cooperation – Smart Defence or Pooling and Sharing – can help a lot in delivering “more bang for the Euro,” but will not solve the problem by itself.  To make a meaningful, effective and sustained contribution to  security, Europeans must hold the line on further cuts in defence spending, and gradually increase it again as their economies recover.  This will strengthen Europe.  It will strengthen the transatlantic link.  And it will strengthen the ability of Europe and North America to act together to meet the challenges of the future.

The European Council on Defence next month will be an early opportunity for EU member countries to step up for the security of this continent.  And we will be looking for further, concrete evidence at our NATO Summit next year that our European Allies are prepared to take on more responsibility for their own and our shared security.

The second issue that should be high on our Summit agenda next year is NATO’s partnerships.  For well over two decades, partners have become increasingly central to how NATO does its business.  By engaging in dialogue and cooperation with countries all over the world, we have been able to spread stability both within and beyond Europe.

I firmly believe this cooperative approach to security will also be critical to NATO’s continued success, and that we should strengthen the Alliance’s role as the hub of a security network that can project stability, help fragile states and other organisations to build up their security capacity, and respond to crises when prevention fails. 

As we deepen and broaden our partnerships, we must acknowledge that we have different types of partners, with different concerns, and different requirements.

Partnership and cooperation will remain an important instrument, first of all, to help countries in transition.  We are able to offer these countries not only a forum for political dialogue, but also a unique menu of activities that can help them with the restructuring of their defence sectors and other reforms.  And we should continue to do so. 

At the same time, we also have a number of advanced, highly interoperable partner countries, both here in Europe and halfway around the world, who have worked closely with us in operations.  We must continue to engage these partners politically, but also to further strengthen the connectivity between our forces, so we can work together effectively again in the future if we are called upon to act. 

In addition, here on this continent, we also have several partners, especially in the Western Balkans region, but also Georgia, who are keen to move from partnership with NATO to membership in NATO – just as Hungary did almost fifteen years ago.  And they deserve our particular attention.

Just like our partnership policy, the process of NATO enlargement has been critical in bringing Europe together, and making it more stable and secure.  And so it is vital that we keep our NATO door open for countries that are able to meet the responsibilities and obligations of membership;  that we continue to assist countries aspiring to NATO membership  to implement the necessary reforms; and that we keep their progress under active review, judging each on its own merits. There’s been much progress – but there is still work for each of the aspirants to do. 

When it comes to engaging with other countries, I believe that NATO’s biggest challenge is to reach out to the countries of North Africa and the Middle East, many of which are facing a very difficult process of transition.   

NATO has responded positively to the request by the Libyan Prime Minister for advice on the development of Libya’s  security architecture .  We have set up an experts’ team to help the Libyans build effective defense and security institutions.  This is part of the broader international effort, led by the United Nations, and complements the efforts of many of our nations.

I believe that more of our southern neighbours could benefit from NATO’s unique experience and expertise, especially with the reform of their defence sectors and in building up their capacity to manage crises in their own regions.

Moreover, in addition to helping individual countries, I also see scope for closer cooperation between NATO and regional organisations, such as the African Union, the Arab League, and the Gulf Cooperation Council.  We already provide limited, logistical support to the African Union.  But I believe we can do more to help these organisations to promote regional security.  And I hope we can make progress there as well ahead of our next NATO Summit.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

As I said at the beginning of my remarks, slowing down is not an option for NATO.  Next year we will complete our ISAF mission in Afghanistan, which has been our longest and biggest operation.  But we will also continue our preparations for a new and different mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces after 2014.  And we all have work to do to keep NATO strong beyond our engagement in Afghanistan.

Talks are underway between the United States and the European Union to conclude a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership that would give a real boost to the economic links between America and Europe.  With our NATO Summit next year, we have a real opportunity to revitalise the Transatlantic security partnership as well.

So, as we look to the September 2014 Summit, we have an excellent basis to build on.  With our transatlantic foundation, integrated command structure, unrivalled military capabilities, tried and tested forces and procedures, and extensive network of partnerships, NATO is already the most successful alliance in history.  The challenge for our next Summit will be to build on those unique attributes to make the Alliance an even stronger anchor for our common security.  I have no doubt that, with your help, we will meet that challenge.

Thank you.