Follow-on to the 1993 Athens Report on Cooperation in Peacekeeping

Introduction

1. In his "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace",
based on the lessons learned since "An Agenda for Peace"
was published, the United Nations Secretary-General notes
the significant changes that have recently taken place "in
both the volume and the nature of the United Nations
activities in the field of peace and security". Since the
1993 Athens Report on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, many of
us have found ourselves involved in a number of what the
UN Secretary General has called "multifunctional
peacekeeping operations". These operations have been
based on a broader understanding of peacekeeping and have
often been carried out in the context of evolving crises,
where it has been more difficult to maintain the consent
of the parties and hence to implement the mandate. While
the priority of the UN Security Council is to resolve the
dispute by peaceful means, including the use of
"provisional measures" referred to in Article 40 of the UN
Charter, under these circumstances, the UNSC has
occasionally authorised enforcement measures in order for
the mandate to be fully implemented. This has involved
greater risks to the peacekeeping forces and other
personnel involved in the operations.

2. In its continuing endeavour to share experiences
and learn lessons from peacekeeping operations, the
Political Military Steering Committee/Ad Hoc Group on
Cooperation in Peacekeeping has become aware of the need
to elaborate on the principles contained in the Athens
Report better to reflect recent operations. This
Supplement is, therefore, intended to be read in
conjuction with the Athens Report, which remains a basic
working document, and to enhance our common understanding
of developments in peacekeeping, so that we are better
able to cooperate jointly in peacekeeping operations. It
therefore provides a conceptual frame of reference for
principal aspects of peacekeeping operations that are
multifunctional in character, with a view to encouraging
and facilitating peacekeeping contributions by NACC/PfP
members, on a case-by-case basis, and in accordance with
the provisions of the UN Charter and with national
decision-making procedures. This document does not seek
to determine the nature of future peacekeeping operations.

3. We remain committed to the principle of the
peaceful settlement of disputes. Recent peacekeeping
operations have evolved from traditional peacekeeping
operations, which still have their place in the peaceful
settlement of international disputes. The underlying
principles of all peacekeeping operations remain the same:
they are based on the UN Charter and, as appropriate, in
the case of OSCE-mandated operations, on relevant OSCE
documents; they are aimed at creating favourable
conditions for parties to the conflict to reach mutually-acceptable
agreement, which remains the only way to
guarantee firm and durable settlements to crises; they are
directed at supporting peace efforts and at moderating
conflicts, as the situation requires; and they do not aim
to impose political solutions to such conflicts.

General Characteristics

4. These recent multifunctional peacekeeping
operations encompass both elements of traditional
peacekeeping and new tasks. These include:

- control and verification of compliance with
ceasefire agreements or armistice;
- assistance to fulfilment of agreements on
peaceful settlement of the conflict;
- preventive troop presence;
- guarantee and denial of movement;
- mineclearing;
- demobilisation operations, including those
involving foreign military personnel;
- humanitarian relief and assistance for civilian
populations, including refugees;
- development assistance;
- human rights monitoring, protection and
restoration;
- assisting in election organisation and
monitoring;
- the maintenance or restoration of civil order
and the rule of law; and
- coordination of activities supporting economic
rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Such operations may be undertaken in a hostile
environment, sometimes within a state where factions or
irregular forces not controlled by the government may be
operating.

5. Peacekeeping operations are carried out by the
UN or, as appropriate, by the OSCE, with the consent of
the principal parties to a conflict. However, this
consent, which should always exist at the
strategic/political level, may not always have the full
support of local authorities or forces. These operations
may require the application of a range of measures,
including, where appropriate, a determined use of force in
conformity with the relevant Resolutions of the UN
Security Council, in order to allow for the mandate to be
fully implemented. As a consequence, the UNSC would
authorise a multifunctional peacekeeping operation under
Chapter VI; but for some elements of certain UN
operations, the authorisation of the UNSC can also be
given for use of force in accordance with Chapter VII. An
operation, however, is not under any circumstances to
become a peace enforcement operation without specific
authorisation from the UN Security Council.

6. Principles and Criteria. The following
refinement of principles and criteria normally associated
with peacekeeping reflects the complex, multifunctional
nature of recent peacekeeping operations:

- Clear and Precise Mandate. The Athens Report states
that "the basis for any mission is a clear and
precise mandate of the UN or the CSCE, developed
through consultations with contributing States and
organisations and/or interested parties, covering all
of the essential elements of the operation to be
performed". Mandates for peacekeeping operations
should be achievable and realistic, and linked to
clear political goals. It is particularly important
in multifunctional peacekeeping operations that clear
mission guidance aimed at achieving political
objectives on the basis of the principle of the
peaceful settlement of the dispute be translated to
Commanders on the ground, who can find themselves
working in extremely complicated local situations.
The mandate in such cases should be carefully crafted
so as to permit a range of measures in response to
evolving conditions on the ground, while not leading
to an escalation of the operation. Appropriate
advance contingency planning, including appropriate
military and civilian advice on operational
feasibility, would be useful as a support to the
initial drafting of mandates. When operating
environments change substantially, mandates should be
changed or, alternatively, missions ended. As well
as when the mandate is first drafted, troop
contributing states should also be consulted at times
of:

- extension of the mandate, or its revision;
- a fundamental change of the situation in the
mission area, which could negatively affect the
implementation of the mandate;
- consideration of partial or complete termination
of the mission.

- Consent of the Parties. According to the Athens
Report, "consent and cooperation of the parties to
the conflict are essential prerequisites for a UN
peacekeeping operation based on Chapter VI of the UN
Charter or for a CSCE peacekeeping operation.
Exceptions are only possible if an operation has been
based on Chapter VII of the Charter by the UN
Security Council". Therefore, the principle of
consent remains crucial for any peacekeeping
operation under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. In
this case, overall strategic/political consent for
the mission and its objectives is an essential
element that underwrites peacekeeping, even though it
cannot always be guaranteed at the local level. Loss
of consent can have a negative impact on the
relationship between the peacekeepers and the parties
to the conflict, subject peacekeeping forces and
other personnel involved in the operation to serious
threats to life and property, and can jeopardise the
achievement of the mandate. Once a peacekeeping
operation is underway, the loss of overall
strategic/political consent would render its
continuation as a peacekeeping mission impossible and
would result in the need for the mandating body to
bring the mission to an end. An important aim in a
peacekeeping operation, along with the diplomatic
process aimed at peaceful settlement of the dispute,
is therefore to maintain and consolidate consent for
the mission and its objectives by all parties
involved. Commanders should strive, to the extent
possible consistent with the mandate, to retain local
consent, though this may be difficult because of the
complex nature of the situation.

- Impartiality. As NACC Ministers agreed in Athens,
"all aspects of an operation need to be conducted
impartially, in a manner compatible with the nature
of the operation, as defined by its mandate".
Impartiality signifies that peacekeeping forces and
other personnel involved in a multifunctional
peacekeeping operation do not take a side or part in
a conflict. Impartiality means the even-handed
treatment of the parties under the terms of the
mandate; several measures in accordance with the UN
Charter, including, as appropriate, the use of force,
can be applied against one or another of the parties.
The use of these measures shall be without prejudice
to the rights, claims or positions of the parties
concerned. Such measures must be balanced against
the need not to compromise the perception by the
parties at the strategic/political level of the
impartiality of the peacekeeping force, thereby
risking a loss of consent at this level. It is
important that peacekeeping is not only impartial but
is seen to be impartial.

- Use of Force and Force Configuration. As stated in
the Athens Report, "in all types of operations, the
extent to which force can be used needs to be clearly
defined either in the mandate or in the terms of
reference. If authorised, use of force must be
carefully controlled, flexible and at the lowest
level consistent with the execution of the mandate.
Forces involved in any operation retain the inherent
right of self-defence at all times". The force
should be equipped and configured to be able to
protect itself, to ensure that the mandate can be
properly implemented, to discourage and to resist
forceable attempts to prevent it from implementing
the mandate, and, if required by the mandate, to
prevent human rights violations, bearing in mind the
possibility of a deterioration of the situation on
the ground. In all cases, the use of force in any
peacekeeping operation shall be in accordance with
the provisions of the UN Charter and the rules of
international law; only the minimum force necessary
should be used.

- Rules of Engagement. Rules of Engagement (ROEs)
should reflect the United Nations/OSCE formal
political and legal directives and provide guidance
to commanders at all levels, thus governing the use
of force. ROEs are to be based strictly on the
mandate and relevant UNSC Resolutions and other
appropriate documents and developed in consultation
with troop contributing nations. ROEs should be
agreed and distributed early to ensure effective
preparation by troop contributors and could be made
known, where appropriate, to the parties.

- Participation. According to the Athens Report, "The
choice of contributors should take account of
cultural, historical and political sensitivities and
provide for multinationality of an operation".
Therefore, it is desirable to seek wide participation
in the forces carrying out peacekeeping operations.
Moreover, multinational composition of the
peacekeeping force can improve the perception of its
impartiality in the eyes of the parties to the
conflict.

- Safety of Personnel. All personnel involved in an
operation should be trained and equipped in such a
manner as to maximise their safety while carrying out
their task. The safety of personnel is an important
priority of the United Nations, as reflected by the
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel, and should be respected by the
parties to the conflict.

- Conditions for Terminating the Operation. The
mandating body must define the desired end-state of
the operation. Advance contingency planning must
include an end-state analysis in the original concept
of the operation, to include criteria for judging
success and terminating the operation, as well as
modalities for eventual withdrawal of forces. An
exit strategy should include planning for withdrawal
in all of the circumstances in which a peacekeeping
operation might be brought to an end.

- Coordination and Liaison. The Athens Report pointed
out that, "to be fully effective and efficient, there
should be close coordination of all aspects of an
operation, including political, civilian,
administrative, legal, humanitarian and military".
The timely and effective coordination of the work of
troop contributing nations and the agencies and
organisations involved in a mission is essential for
achieving its objectives. In order to ensure
transparency and coherence, coordination arrangements
should encompass all the political, military,
diplomatic, administrative and humanitarian
organisations concerned, and take into account that
some humanitarian organisations (including UNHCR,
ICRC, UNICEF and WFP) have permanent mandates of
their own. Whenever necessary, and if required by
the nature of the mission, this coordination may
include Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and
Private Voluntary Organisations (PVOs). These
coordinating arrangements should be supported by
extensive liaison with all the agencies and
organisations involved. Relations between the
military component of an operation and non-military
agencies should be based on mutual respect,
communication and standardisation of support in order
to ensure that one does not undermine the efforts of
the other, that unnecessary overlap is avoided and
that common efforts are concentrated on prevention or
peaceful resolution of conflicts.