Final Communiqué

  • 24 Oct. 1989 - 25 Oct. 1989
  • |
  • Last updated: 04 Nov. 2008 21:02

<p>Political declaration and Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament adopted at May 1989 Summit Meeting - Status of NATO's nuclear forces - Encouraging changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe but continuing offensive capability of Wa

  1. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) met in Ministerial session in Almansil, Portugal, on 24th and 25th October, 1989. Iceland attended as an observer.
  2. Our meeting took place against the background of the 29th and 30th May Summit meeting of Heads of State and Government and the adoption of a political declaration and a comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament. We recalled the far-reaching agenda they set out which emphasized the Alliance's determination to shape a more stable and peaceful international environment by further developing the complementary and mutually reinforcing approaches described in the Harmel Report . They also reaffirmed the Alliance strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to be kept up-to-date where necessary; and that where nuclear forces are concerned, land-, sea-, and air-based systems, including ground-based missiles, in the present circumstances and as far as can be foreseen will be needed in Europe.
  3. We reviewed the status of NATO's nuclear forces and discussed a wide range of security issues related to nuclear planning. We were encouraged by the changes underway in the Soviet Union and some of its allies. Nevertheless, we recognized the continuing capability of the forces of the Warsaw Pact for offensive military action. We confirmed our long-standing commitment to keep NATO's nuclear forces responsive, survivable and effective across the required spectrum of ranges and to maintain our forces at the lowest possible level consistent with our security requirements.
  4. We received a briefing on the continued improvement and expansion of the Soviet Union's substantial capabilities to provide space-based support to its terrestrial military forces and to reinforce its military space-based assets at short notice, as well as its ability, unmatched by the West, to conduct anti- satellite operations. In our discussions, we noted the continuing momentum of Soviet nuclear force modernization. For instance, the Soviet Union continues to modernize its heavy Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force with the introduction of the SS-18 MOD 5, and to deploy SS-24 and SS-25 mobile ICBMs. Soviet programmes for the modernization of their short-range nuclear forces have also led to significant improvements of capabilities over the past few years. We welcomed the announced Warsaw Pact unilateral force reductions, and looked forward to their full implementation. We noted, how- ever, that this would have little effect on the Warsaw Pact's nuclear capability and, in particular, on their continuing massive superiority in short-range nuclear missile systems. We therefore called again on the Soviet Union to reduce unilaterally its short-range missile systems to current NATO levels. We recalled that the number of NATO's land-based nuclear warheads in Western Europe has been reduced by more than one third since 1979 to its lowest level in over 20 years.
  5. We also received a briefing on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and were informed on the status of the modernization of the United States strategic forces. We expressed our appreciation for the efforts of both the United States and the United Kingdom to maintain the effectiveness of their strategic deterrent capabilities. We noted that strategic nuclear systems continue to be an essential element of the Alliance's deterrent posture.
  6. We received a number of reports on the work of countries and NATO bodies aimed at maintaining the effectiveness of NATO's nuclear forces. We welcomed the progress being made and provided guidance for further work, including a conceptual examination of the implications for NATO's nuclear forces of an agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) based on Western proposals. In this context, we recalled the agreement by Heads of State and Government that the removal of the imbalance in conventional forces would provide scope for further reductions in the sub-strategic nuclear forces of NATO, though it would not obviate the need for such forces. We also reiterated our support for the efforts of member countries concerned to meet identified requirements to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent posture.
  7. We were briefed on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, Defence and Space Talks, and Nuclear Testing Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. We welcomed the progress achieved in these negotiations, expressed our full support for the United States efforts towards their early conclusion and noted the more co-operative attitude of the Soviet Union. We underlined the central importance of full compliance with arms control agreements; in that regard we welcomed the Soviet public announcement of their intention to dismantle completely the radar at Krasnoyarsk and looked forward to the prompt and full implementation of this commitment. Finally, we noted that verifiable arms control agreements aimed at enhanced security and stability at a lower balanced level of forces and armaments are an integral part of our security policy.
  8. We accepted with pleasure the invitation of the Canadian Government to hold our next NPG Ministerial meeting in Canada in Spring 1990.