Final Communiqué
Chairman: Lord Carrington.
Status of nuclear forces - Arms control negotiations in Geneva - Consultations on SDI - Support for US research programme - Allied concern over long-standing Soviet efforts in the strategic defence field - Continuing build up of Soviet nuclear forces - R
- The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) met in Ministerial Session in Luxembourg on 26th and 27th March 1985. Spain attended as an observer.
- On the basis of a comprehensive briefing by the United States Secretary of Defence we reviewed the status of nuclear forces including all aspects of the negotiations which recently began in Geneva and the United States strategic modernisation programme. NATO's strategic forces are the ultimate deterrent to preserve security, peace and freedom. Therefore we support the United States and United Kingdom efforts to maintain the credibility of their strategic nuclear deterrent capabilities.
- We welcome the opportunity offered by the negotiations which started in Geneva on 12th March, encompassing defence and space systems, strategic nuclear forces and intermediate-range nuclear forces. We discussed the prospects for progress in each of these areas stressing that continued close consultation among the Alliance partners was essential. We noted that these negotiations would be difficult, long and complex. We strongly support the United States approach to these negotiations and call on the Soviet Union to participate constructively in them.
- We have continued the comprehensive consultations on the political and strategic implications of the United States Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). This is designed to establish whether recent advances in technologies could offer the prospect of significantly more effective defence against ballistic missiles. We support the United States research programme into these technologies, the aim of which is to enhance stability and deterrence at reduced levels of offensive nuclear forces. This research, conducted within the terms of the ABM Treaty, is in NATO's security interest and should continue. In this context, we welcome the United States invitation for Allies to consider participation in the research programme.
- We noted with concern the extensive and long-standing efforts in the strategic defence field by the Soviet Union which already deploys the world's only ABM and anti-satellite systems. The United States strategic defence research programme is prudent in the light of these Soviet activities and is also clearly influenced by the treaty violations reported by the President of the United States.
- We are concerned about the continuing build-up of Soviet nuclear forces. We note that they are completing development and testing of a wide range of new strategic systems, including two Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), a new Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), and a new bomber. A new generation of ground-, air- and sea-launched cruise missiles is beginning to enter operational service. The current SS-20 force is composed of 414 SS-20 launchers with 1,242 warheads. The Soviet Union continues to update and improve its shorter-range nuclear forces.
- In contrast to the growth of Soviet nuclear forces at all levels, it is NATO's policy to maintain only the minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary for deterrence. At Montebello in 1983 , we decided to withdraw 1,400 warheads over the next five or six years. SACEUR presented his plan to achieve this by the end of 1988. SACEUR's plan embraces reductions in a variety of warheads. Taken together with the withdrawal of the 1,OOO warheads following the 1979 dual-track decision, the total number of warheads removed from Europe since 1979 will be 2,400, resulting in the lowest NATO stockpile level in 20 years. In addition, since one further warhead is being removed from the stockpile for each Pershing II or Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) deployed, the NATO stockpile level will not be affected by deployment of Longer-Range INF (LRINF).
- In the context of the reductions agreed at Montebello, we also agreed to undertake the necessary actions to improve our forces across the spectrum of capabilities to ensure a continuing credible deterrent. Accordingly, SACEUR was tasked to develop recommendations. As part of this process, we received a report from SACEUR on the improvement aspects of the Montebello Decision for the maintenance of a survivable, responsive and effective nuclear force structure in support of flexible response. We agreed to consider SACEUR's recommendations in detail and to continue close consultations on the implementation of his improvement proposals. At the same time we reiterated our determination to continue the process of improving NATO's conventional defence capabilities.
- We noted that the progress made on LRINF deployments by NATO nations and the fact that negotiations on INF systems are under way again. We reviewed, in particular, prospects for these negotiations and expressed support for the United States negotiating position developed in close consultation with its Allies. We emphasised NATO's determination to continue the deployment of LRINF missiles as scheduled in the absence of a concrete negotiated result with the Soviet Union obviating the need for such deployment. At the same time, we reiterated our willingness to reverse, halt or modify the LRINF deployment - including the removal and dismantling of missiles already deployed - upon achievement of a balanced, equitable and verifiable agreement calling for such action.
- Greece expressed its-views in a statement included in the minutes. Denmark reserved its position on the INF part.