Final Communiqué

  • 30 Nov. 1982
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  • Last updated: 04 Nov. 2008 18:03

Purpose of deterrence - Importance of triad - Status of strategic forces - Continuity of United States nuclear policy - MX basing decision - Review of START - Overall improvements to the Soviet nuclear arsenal - NATOs INF modernisation programme - Review

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) held its thirty-second Ministerial meeting at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 30th November, 1982. Ministers addressed a wide range of security matters including the trends in the balance of nuclear forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the preparations for NATO's Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) missile deployments and the status of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear forces and on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

Ministers reaffirmed that the purpose of deterrence is to preserve security, peace and freedom by conveying to a potential adversary that the cost of any aggression against NATO would far exceed any conceivable gains. To do this successfully, NATO must possess a spectrum of forces to demonstrate that it has both the will and the ability to defend itself. For its strategy to be credible, the Alliance must maintain an interlocking triad of forces: strategic nuclear forces, intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces and conventional forces. No one part of the NATO triad can be a substitute for another. In this context, Ministers reiterated the importance of maintaining adequate nuclear forces as an essential part of NATO's deterrent.

The United States Secretary of Defense led a discussion on the status of strategic nuclear forces. Ministers noted the consistency and continuity of the United States nuclear policy designed to enable the Alliance to carry out its deterrence strategy more effectively. In the face of a significantly increased Soviet threat, Ministers stressed the importance of maintaining the effectiveness of NATO's strategic nuclear forces from the standpoint of deterrence and stability. From this standpoint the significance of the recent decision on MX basing which was designed to enhance the survivability of NATO's strategic nuclear forces was emphasized. Ministers recognized that stability would be further enhanced and that the security of all countries concerned would be greatly improved by an equitable and verifiable agreement which would substantially reduce strategic nuclear systems and ballistic missile warheads, as the United States had proposed at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in Geneva. They welcomed the recent United States proposals to negotiate with the Soviet Union expanded nuclear confidence-building measures aimed at further enhancing international safeguards in this area.

Ministers noted with concern that the Soviet Union continues to improve the entire spectrum of its nuclear forces from strategic to short-range. These overall improvements to the Soviet nuclear arsenal, particularly in the field of longer-range INF, have taken place in spite of the decade of restraint shown by the Alliance.

Since the publication by NATO of"NATO and the Warsaw Pact - Force Comparisons" in May 1982, more SS-20 missiles have become operational. The Soviet Union now has 324 SS-20 launchers deployed and operational world-wide, comprising 972 warheads; when these are combined with the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles still operational, the Soviets have more than 1,200 longer-range land-based INF missile warheads compared with none deployed by NATO.

Against this background, NATO's INF modernization programme is moving ahead with development and flight testing of Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II missiles in the United States and preparation for deployment in the European basing countries. Ministers reiterated that, in the absence of a concrete arms control agreement, these deployments would begin according to schedule at the end of 1983.

Ministers discussed the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear forces and welcomed the continuous and close consultation on the progress of the negotiations, particularly in the Special Consultative Group (SCG). They reiterated their strong support for the United States negotiating position, developed in close consultation with the Allies, which calls for the elimination of all existing and planned Soviet and United States longer-range land-based INF missiles, thus resulting in the elimination of an entire category of nuclear weapons. Ministers stressed the importance of a successful outcome to the negotiations; they noted, however, that while there had been some progress in them, the Soviets have not yet made any move on the central issue and are maintaining their position which would permit them to retain their SS-20s while precluding NATO from deploying any longer-range INF missiles. In addition, the Soviets position calls for the withdrawal of almost all United States dual-capable aircraft from NATO Europe, which are an important element in NATO's conventional defence. The result of this position would be to erode seriously the linkage between the United States strategic nuclear deterrent and the defence of NATO Europe and lessen NATO's conventional and nuclear defence capabilities. Ministers again welcomed the fact that the United States remains prepared to give full consideration to any serious Soviet proposals which would enhance chances for effective and verifiable arms control agreements and would take into account legitimate Western security concerns.

Ministers also discussed the progress in the important ongoing work of the High Level Group, which, as a matter of priority and against the background of INF arms control negotiations, is examining the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustments which would be required by longer-range INF deployments as well as the possible implications of these deployments for the balance of roles and systems in NATO's nuclear armoury as a whole.

Ministers reaffirmed that NATO's nuclear posture in no way represented a policy of seeking to fight and win a nuclear war, and underlined their firm commitment to the existing policy of collective deterrence including a nuclear component, designed to prevent war and to protect the territorial integrity and independence of Alliance member countries. Ministers restated that NATO's strategy of deterrence remained unchanged; the Alliance does not threaten anyone and none of its weapons will ever be used except in response to attack.

Greece has expressed its views on the issues discussed in a statement included in the minutes.