Resilience and Article 3
Each NATO member country needs to be resilient to resist and recover from a major shock such as a natural disaster, failure of critical infrastructure, or a hybrid or armed attack. Resilience is a society’s ability to resist and recover easily and quickly from such shocks and combines both civil preparedness and military capacity. Robust resilience through civil preparedness in Allied countries is essential to NATO’s collective security and defence.
The principle of resilience is firmly anchored in Article 3 of the Alliance’s founding treaty: “In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”
Resilience is first and foremost a national responsibility and each member country needs to be sufficiently robust and adaptable to support the entire spectrum of crises envisaged by the Alliance. In this context, Article 3 complements the collective defence clause set out in Article 5, which stipulates that an attack against one Ally is an attack against all. Allies need to give NATO the means to fulfil its core tasks and, in particular, that of collective defence.
The individual commitment of each and every Ally to maintain and strengthen its resilience reduces the vulnerability of NATO as a whole. Members can strengthen resilience through the development of home defence and niche skills such as cyber defence or medical support combining civilian, economic, commercial and military factors. When Allies are well prepared, they are less vulnerable or less likely to be attacked, making NATO as a whole stronger.
Moreover, military forces, especially those deployed during crises and war, heavily depend on the civilian and commercial sectors for transport, communications and even basic supplies such as food and water, to fulfil their missions. Military efforts to defend Alliance territory and populations therefore need to be complemented by robust civil preparedness. However, civil capabilities can be vulnerable to disruption and attack in both peacetime and during war. By reducing these vulnerabilities, NATO reduces the risk of a potential attack. A high level of resilience is therefore an essential aspect of credible deterrence and defence.
Vulnerabilities in a changing security environment
Today’s security environment is unpredictable. Threats can come from state and non-state actors, including terrorism and other asymmetrical threats, cyber attacks and hybrid warfare, which blur the lines between conventional and unconventional forms of conflict. They can also come from natural disasters such as floods, fires and earthquakes, and from biohazards such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The challenge of adapting and responding to these different types of threats is compounded by trends that have radically transformed the security environment.
Falling defence budgets since the end of the Cold War have gradually increased the overall reliance on civil and commercial assets and capabilities. As a consequence, civil resources and critical infrastructure are now, in many areas, owned and operated by the private sector. A few figures illustrate the extent of this: around 90 per cent of military transport for large military operations is chartered or requisitioned from the commercial sector; on average, over 30 per cent of satellite communications used for defence purposes are provided by the commercial sector; and some 75 per cent of host nation support to NATO operations is sourced from local commercial infrastructure and services.
Driven by the objective of maximising efficiency and making profits, the private sector has eliminated most redundancies, which are costly for business. However, these redundancies are critical for governments to maintain continuity of government and essential services and for use as an emergency back-up in times of crises. During the Cold War for instance, there were territorial defence mechanisms and capabilities in place ready to support a war effort, but they no longer exist.
In sum, with the reduction in military investment and the privatisation of previously government-owned assets, a heavy reliance on civilian enablers, bound by commercial practices, has developed.
Moreover with the widespread use of new technologies, our societies have become interconnected and interdependent in the economic, financial, information and cyber domains. Such interdependence has been a great strength and of significant benefit to our societies, but it can also be a weakness, making Allies vulnerable to the implications of rapid change in these domains.
The vulnerabilities Allies have to contend with are numerous, complex and multidirectional. NATO’s work to improve resilience is not specific to any single vulnerability. It contributes to protecting citizens from all potential hazards. At the 2016 Summit in Warsaw, Allied leaders decided to boost NATO’s resilience to the full spectrum of threats and continue developing individual and collective capacity to resist any form of armed attack. They agreed seven baseline requirements for national resilience against which member states can measure their level of preparedness. These requirements reflect the core functions of continuity of government, essential services to the population and civil support to the military, which must be maintained under the most demanding circumstances. They are all connected, which means if one area is impacted, another may suffer as a result:
- Assured continuity of government and critical government services: for instance the ability to make decisions, communicate them and enforce them in a crisis;
- Resilient energy supplies: back-up plans and power grids, internally and across borders;
- Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people, and to de-conflict these movements from NATO’s military deployments;
- Resilient food and water resources: ensuring these supplies are safe from disruption or sabotage;
- Ability to deal with mass casualties: ensuring that civilian health systems can cope and that sufficient medical supplies are stocked and secure;
- Resilient civil communications systems: ensuring that telecommunications and cyber networks function even under crisis conditions, with sufficient back-up capacity. This requirement was updated in November 2019 by NATO Defence Ministers, who stressed the need for reliable communications systems including 5G, robust options to restore these systems, priority access to national authorities in times of crisis, and the thorough assessments of all risks to communications systems;
- Resilient transport systems: ensuring that NATO forces can move across Alliance territory rapidly and that civilian services can rely on transportation networks, even in a crisis.
Implementing this commitment is a top priority for Allies. Since 2016, the resilience of Allied members has improved, but challenges and shortfalls remain. At the same time, Allies are confronted with new challenges, such as foreign investments and ownership in critical infrastructures, which could undermine the assured access of these essential critical infrastructures by national governments and military leaders in times of crisis. Allies agreed to revise the baseline requirement in the field of communications to be better prepared to deal with the challenges presented by emerging communications technologies, such as 5G. NATO will further assess, as part of the 2020 Report on the State of Civil Preparedness, whether other baseline requirements from the 2016 Resilience Commitment require updating in the face of these new challenges, particularly in the field of transport and energy.
The current COVID-19 pandemic is a time when resilience is being tested. As part of the Alliance’s work to strengthen resilience, NATO and Allies have been working continuously to enhance preparedness across the whole of government, including in the health sector. In support of Allies, NATO’s primary body that addresses preparedness and resilience – the Civil Emergency Planning Committee – is monitoring and assessing the impact of the crisis and facilitates an exchange of information and best practices among Allies on an ongoing basis.
Role of civil preparedness in support of military operations
When military forces need to deploy, they rely on the civilian and commercial sectors for support. In concrete terms this means that they need support to deploy rapidly and freely across Alliance territory. Military forces are reliant for instance on civilian transport facilities, satellite communication and power supplies, not to mention food and water supplies, to conduct their operations.
The range of functions and facilities the civilian sector covers is broad, and includes: continuity of government, of essential services to the population and support to military operations as the three critical civilian functions that a country must be able to uphold under all circumstances.
Exercises are an effective way to conduct stress tests of national arrangements, in particular when it comes to large-scale problems such as an attack with weapons of mass destruction or dealing with hybrid warfare.
Partnering to strengthen resilience
Enhancing resilience and civil preparedness is also part of NATO’s support to partners and a way to project stability in the Alliance’s neighbourhood. Examples of practical cooperation include the deployment of teams of civil preparedness experts in support of Georgia and Iraq, and the establishment of a joint UN-NATO three-year project to assist Jordan in improving its preparedness in the field of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons.
NATO also partners with the private sector and other international organisations, in particular the European Union, to further reinforce the efficiency and effectiveness of civil preparedness.