Speech

Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me start by saying that I am both very pleased and deeply honoured to speak at this commemorative event today.  I want to thank the Hungarian Foreign and Defence Ministers for their kind invitation.  I want to thank the Hungarian Parliament for hosting our meeting in its beautiful premises.  And I want to congratulate the Government, the Parliament and the people of Hungary most sincerely on reaching this milestone of their country’s ten years in NATO. 

Ten years of NATO membership is an excellent opportunity to look back and to reflect upon years gone by.  But it is also a good opportunity to draw some lessons for the future.  After all, NATO’s enlargement is an ongoing process.  Seven more countries have become members of NATO since Hungary joined together with the Czech Republic and Poland ten years ago.  Two countries are about to join.  And we know that several more wish to follow in their footsteps.  We owe it to all candidate countries – whether now or in the future – to share your experience and to help them prepare for membership.

I know that the term "historic" is used too often nowadays.  Yet the significance of what happened on 12 March 1999 can hardly be overstated.  On that day, when the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland formally acceded into NATO, the Cold War ended for good, and justice triumphed over history.  It was an overwhelming demonstration of the right of any European nation to determine its own fate, by its own free choice.  And it was a huge step towards the free, undivided and democratic Europe to which NATO had aspired from its very beginning, now almost sixty years ago.

The accession was important for the three nations themselves, for NATO, and for Europe as a whole.  For the three new members, it marked the return to the Europe from which they had been forcefully separated.  NATO membership gave you a seat at the table where key decisions are taken to shape our strategic environment.  It gave you Allies with whom to share the common burden of security.  And, of course, it gave you, and gives you, the ultimate security guarantee of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, and the assurance that Allies will come to your assistance if you ever came under attack.   

For NATO, the accession marked another step in its post-Cold War adaptation, with three new members adding new military and political weight to shape the strategic environment in a positive way.  And for Europe, it marked both the end of its erstwhile division and a new beginning – at the threshold of the 21st century, when the old continent was finally able to leave its tragic past behind. 

Over the subsequent few years, the accession of Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland proved wrong all those who feared that enlargement could be a net loss for European security.  It proved wrong all those who saw enlargement as the creation of a new division.  And it proved wrong all those who maintained that it would undermine NATO's cohesion and effectiveness, or that it would force the new members to devote too many of their scarce resources to defence.

None of these predictions came true.  Ladies and Gentlemen, thanks to NATO’s enlargement and partnership policies, alongside those of the European Union, our continent has never been more stable and more secure.  And the prospect of membership into these two key institutions, NATO and the EU, remains a major incentive for nations all across Europe to get their house in order, introduce difficult but necessary reforms, and pursue good neighbourly relations.

NATO's cohesion and effectiveness have not been affected, either.  The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have all integrated smoothly.  They have made their voices heard, of course and with good reason.  But they have also displayed the same team spirit as all other Allies, and contributed to the consensus-decision-making which underpins our Alliance. More than that, they have become important and valued contributors to NATO’s operations and missions : let us not forget Hungary today deploys 360 soldiers to ISAF and 480 to KFOR.

The costs of NATO membership have also remained modest.  We acknowledged that they would not be trivial, but that they could be stretched over a longer period of time.  We said that the necessary military reforms of our three new Allies would need to be ambitious, and that they should continue after their accession.  And we said that, while our new Allies would naturally have to make their contribution, the benefits that NATO membership would bring would be very much greater.  And that, I think was borne out by the facts.  And today, while the global financial crisis leaves none of the Allies unaffected, NATO membership continues to offer us all excellent value for money.

Of course, back in 1999, some nations were disappointed to be left out of that first round of enlargement.  But none gave up its ambition to join NATO -- and seven more were admitted just a few years later.  At the beginning of 2004, as one of my first official acts as NATO Secretary General, I had the privilege to communicate to them our invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty.  And I have warm memories of the accession ceremony in Washington D.C. at the White House, in March of that year.

In a few weeks’ time, at NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit, two more nations will be joining our Alliance - I say two because it is my strong hope that both Albania and Croatia will be with us as full members for this great celebratory moment. We have made clear repeatedly -- and no doubt will do so again at our next Summit -- that NATO’s door remains open for future members.  And interested countries, like everyone else, know that we mean what we say.

So, in retrospect then, NATO enlargement has proved the doom-sayers to be totally wrong.  Enlargement has not fallen victim to a zero-sum logic.  NATO members have managed that process well.  And it has been a very clear benefit for European security.

Still, although NATO enlargement has been very successful thus far, we must constantly remind ourselves that it is not an end in itself.  It is a means to an end.  And that end is to safeguard our security in a rapidly changing world.  And if we take this aim seriously, then we must not rest on our laurels, but move on.  In fact, as someone once pointed out to me, he who can rest on his laurels probably wears them in the wrong place!

So what are the challenges ahead?  What must an enlarged NATO do in order to safeguard our security and our freedom in today’s world?  To my mind, three major challenges stand out:

The first are our operations and missions.  We have always said that countries that join NATO must not be mere consumers of security, but providers of security.  And  with the numbers just mentioned of Hungary’s involvement in Kosovo and Afghanistan, Hungary is making a welcome contribution to our common effort.  I hope that your country will continue to demonstrate that same commitment, especially in Afghanistan where the stakes are particularly high.   

We must ensure that we have sufficient troops and enablers on the ground to ensure security, both during and after the coming election period.  As an Alliance, we have had considerable success in training and equipping the Afghan National Army, and we must build on that progress. But there is a lot more that we – and the international community as a whole -- can do on the civilian side as well – in helping the Afghans to build functioning institutions, to fight crime and corruption, and get a better grip of the narcotics problem.  Building up of the ANP is a very good example of where NATO can assist the wider international effort, to ensure the police can begin to fulfill a greater security role in Afghanistan.

And of course we need to look beyond Afghanistan.  We must take into account the wider region, and especially Pakistan, with which we must deepen our engagement.  And we must get our military and civilian institutions to co-operate much more closely and more effectively in what we could call a truly Comprehensive Approach. And I hope that we will be able to make progress in all these areas at the Afghanistan conference, the so called “Big Tent” meeting at the end of this month in The Hague, which will, I hope, enable the NATO Summit to make use of the outcome from that meeting in the deliberations of NATO Heads of State and Government.    

The second major challenge facing our Alliance is our relationship with Russia.  When NATO started its enlargement process in the 1990s, there were fears that we would alienate Russia.  Indeed, there were Russian concerns about what enlargement would mean for them.  Where we judged these concerns to be legitimate, we sought to address them.  Where we felt them to be inappropriate, we made it clear that the future of Europe could not be held hostage to outmoded concepts of "spheres of influence".  On balance, this approach worked.  Within five years NATO grew from 16 to 26 members, and we still managed to deepen our relationship with Russia.

However, the conflict and the crisis in Georgia last August led some observers to believe that our dual strategy of pursuing enlargement and simultaneously engaging Russia had run its course. Some even said that enlargement had turned from being the solution to being the problem of Europe’s security.  So has a success story ended?  I don’t think so quite hontestly. NATO’s enlargement process remains part and parcel of our strategy of consolidating Europe as an undivided and democratic security space. 

At the same time, it is clear that the NATO-Russia relationship is too valuable to be stuck in arguments over enlargement or, for that matter, over missile defence, or for that matter, Kosovo.  Afghanistan is one key area where we have obvious common interests, but there are other areas as well, such as the fight against terrorism and piracy, and the need to counter the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.  So, NATO and Russia need a trustful partnership that encourages dialogue on all issues – where we agree and disagree and there are a good number of issues where we findamentally disagree – with a view towards resolving problems and building practical cooperation.  And that is why NATO Foreign Ministers agreed last week to the reconvening of formal NATO-Russia Council meetings, including at Ministerial level after the Summit and before the Summer.   And I say again, that does not mean we agree on Russian actions in South Ossetia or over the creation of bases there for example.  But we do have to find a way to discuss these issues with them which is why Foreign Ministers agreed at their meeting last week in Brussels, on the need to engage with Russia through the NRC.

The third major challenge for NATO is to define its approach to new risks and threats.  NATO’s enlargement process began when the term “globalisation” applied mainly to economic developments.  Today, challenges to our security have also globalised.  We have seen these past few years that cyber attacks or the interruption of energy supplies can devastate a country without a single shot being fired.  We are witnessing the return of piracy as a serious, global security challenge.  At the same time, Iran’s nuclear programme continues to highlight the pressing challenge of the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

We need to better define NATO’s role in meeting these challenges.  NATO may not provide all the answers, but that should not serve as an excuse for inaction.  So, we must make the best possible use of the Alliance’s unique value as a forum for transatlantic political dialogue, and as an instrument for translating political decisions into concrete action.  After all, these threats don’t wait until we feel that we are ready for them.

At our Summit next month in Strasbourg/Kehl, in the heart of Europe, we must show that the NATO Allies are able to muster the necessary political will, imagination and solidarity to meet these challenges.  And I am confident that we shall.  But, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Summit must do even more.  With a new US Administration settling in office, and with the prospect of France taking its full place in NATO’s integrated military structure -and I was pleased to witness President Sarkozy’s speech in Paris yesterday-, the Summit is also the perfect moment to launch work on a new Strategic Concept for NATO.

Such a new Strategic Concept will need to combine the Alliance’s core purpose of collective defence with the many requirements associated with out-of-area operations.  It will need to emphasise NATO’s role as a unique community of common values and interests.  It will need to make clear NATO’s strong desire to engage with the UN, the EU and other international actors, as partners, in what is called a comprehensive approach to the security challenges of our time.  And it should also underline, just as our current Strategic Concept does, that NATO will keep its door open for new members.

Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

If the history of the 20th century has told us anything, it is that the costs of indifference and neglect are ultimately going to be much greater than cost of investing in a strong, effective Alliance.  Over the past ten years, NATO enlargement has helped your country and nine others in Central and Eastern Europe back on the political map.  Never again will you be the object of someone else's ambitions.  Today, there are several other nations who share this same, very legitimate, aspiration – and others may follow in the future.  Your country, and our Alliance, must remain a shining beacon for them.  And I am sure that we will.

Thank you.