NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Improving NATO’s capabilities

NATO has been engaged in continuous and systematic transformation for many years to ensure that it has the policies, capabilities, and structures required, in the changing international security environment, to deal with current and future challenges, including of course the collective defence of its members. With Allied forces engaged in operations and missions across several continents, the Alliance needs to ensure that its armed forces remain modern, deployable and sustainable.

• Meeting immediate and long-term challenges

  Short-term and critical capability shortfalls that arise on operations are tackled through a mechanism whereby urgent operational requirements are raised by the operational commands, scrutinised by the Military Committee and relevant budget committees and put to the North Atlantic Council for consideration as need be.

  Defence planning, on the other hand, takes a more systematic approach and has a medium and longer-term perspective, including with respect to identifying requirements, the development and delivery of capabilities, the adjustment of military and civilian structures, personnel issues, equipment procurement and the development of new technologies. (see later a brief description of the process).

  With the adoption of a new Strategic Concept, Alliance leaders committed to ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of Allies populations. Therefore the Alliance will:

  • maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;
  • maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;
  • develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both our Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance’s expeditionary operations, including with the NATO Response Force;
  • carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring our defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies;
  • ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements;
  • develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance.
  • actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners;
  • further develop NATO’s capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction;
  • develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations;
  • enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with our partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities, including to help train local forces to fight terrorism themselves;
  • develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning;
  • ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats into account;
  • sustain the necessary levels of defence spending, so that our armed forces are sufficiently resourced;
  • continue to review NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes to the evolving international security environment.

  Reforming the command structure

  The Alliance is engaged in a fundamental restructuring of its command structure to ensure that it is more effective, leaner and affordable.  It will also be more agile, flexible and better able to deploy headquarters for remote operations as well as to protect Alliance territory.  A framework for the new structure, without geographic locations for the various facilities, was agreed at the Summit meeting in Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010.   Decisions on the locations themselves followed in the first half of 2011.

  In the same spirit, a major reform of NATO’s agencies is being conducted. It will result in a significantly smaller number of agencies (from 14 to three), with improved efficiency.  NATO Headquarters has also been reformed, including with regard to intelligence-sharing and production, the establishment of a new Division responsible for emerging security challenges, a review of multinational acquisition processes, and a large reduction in the number and responsibilities of committees.
  

  Prioritizing capabilities – the Lisbon Capabilities Package

  A package of capabilities representing the Alliance’s most pressing capability needs was endorsed at the Lisbon Summit. The package goes hand in hand with and underpins the new Strategic Concept. It was developed to help the Alliance meet the demands of ongoing ooperations, face emerging challenges and acquire key enabling capabilities. The package is based largely on existing plans and programmes and a realistic projection of resources. It therefore provides a renewed focus and mandate to ensure that in the competition for resources, these, the most urgent capabilities, are delivered.

  Current priority shorfalls for operations

  Afghan Mission Network

  NATO is creating a single federated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) network to improve information sharing by easing the information flow and creating better situational awareness among countries participating in ISAF operations. The capability has reached initial operational capability and must be further developed to attain its final operational capability.

  Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)

  IEDs are the main cause of many casualties in Afghanistan. NATO has launched an ambitious Counter-IED Action Plan, led by Allied Command Transformation, fostering collaboration inside and outside NATO. The Action Plan combines short-term measures in support of ISAF with long-term capability development for future contingencies. Work is ongoing at different levels (including initiatives to collate and share intelligence, improved training, new technical capabilities and cooperation with other international organizations) to implement measures that will help protect troops against IEDs and address the insurgent networks behind these destructive devices.

  Improving air- and sea-lift capabilities

  Air-and sea-lift capabilities are a key enabler for operations – so that forces and equipment can be deployed quickly to wherever they are needed. While there is significant ongoing procurement at a national level, many Allies have also pooled resources, including with Partner countries, to acquire new capacities through commercial arrangements or through purchase, giving them access to additional transport to swiftly move troops, equipment and supplies across the globe.  This is particularly challenging and important with regard to missions at strategic distance, such as Afghanistan. Helicopter lift in Afghanistan is vital, to increase mobility and save lives; multinational cooperation on maintenance and logistics is bringing additional efficiency on some types operated by more than one Ally. Efforts continue to find further areas of cooperation, including in the context of the HIP Helicopter Task Force.

  Collective Logistics Contracts

  In order to be more effective, NATO is examining the possibility of setting up procedures for the development and administration of rapidly usable contracts, including for medical support, with repayment by countries when used. At present, logistics contracts are negotiated and implemented when an operation starts; this initiative proposes to launch procedures in advance to save time and seek synergy with and between contributing countries and NATO to serve personnel in the field more rapidly. The initiative focuses on areas where collective responsibility and common funding are concerned.

  Dealing with evolving and emerging threats

  Missile defence

  In the context of a broader response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, NATO is pursuing a “Theatre” Missile Defence Programme aimed at protecting Alliance forces against ballistic missile threats with ranges up to 3,000 kilometres. From the end of 2010 the Alliance will have an interim capability to protect troops in a specific area against short-range and some medium-range ballistic missiles.

  At the Lisbon Summit, NATO leaders decided to expand the Theatre Missile Defence Programme to include protection of NATO European populations and territories and at the same time invited Russia to cooperate with this system and to share in its benefits.

  Cyber defence

  NATO is developing new measures to enhance the robustness of its communication and information systems against attempts at disruption through cyber attacks and illegal access. The Alliance is also prepared, on request, to assist Allies in the event of grave cyber attacks against their national systems. These efforts are the practical manifestation of NATO’s policy on cyber defence, which was reinforced in the 2010 Strategic Concept. More specifically, the Lisbon Capabilities Package stresses the importance of the Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), which is currently under development. The NCIRC, which already has an initial operational capability, will protect the Alliance networks against cyber attacks and provide appropriate technical assistance when requested.

  Stabilization and reconstruction

  The Alliance’s experience with crisis response operations has shown the importance of stabilization and reconstruction – activities undertaken in fragile states or in conflict or post-conflict situations to promote security, development and good governance in key sectors. In modern conflicts, conventional military means are often not sufficient to re-establish stable, self-sustaining peace. The primary responsibilities for such activities normally lie with other actors, but the Alliance has recently established political guidelines that will help to improve its involvement in stabilization and reconstruction.

  Critical long-term enabling capabilities for operations

  Information superiority (see further down) is a key enabling element in the battlespace and helps commanders at every level make the best decisions, creating the circumstances for success at less risk and greater speed. NATO will therefore continue to develop and acquire a range of networked information systems (Bi-SC Automated Information Systems) that support the two Strategic Commands. They cover a number of domains, including, land, air, maritime, intelligence, logistics and the common operating picture, with a view to enabling more informed and effective, holistic oversight, decision-making and command and control.

  Air Command and Control

  NATO is putting into place a fully interoperable, automated and integrated Air Command and Control System (ACCS). It will provide for real time command and control, as well as mission planning and associated functions. In addition to air defence tasks, it will also have the potential for missile defence tasks.

  Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR)

  NATO needs a JISR capability that will provide for the coordinated collection, processing, dissemination and sharing within NATO of ISR material gathered by the future Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, the current AWACS and national ISR assets. While NATO is delivering a critical JISR capability in ISAF, an enduring JISR capability, which has yet to be fully defined, has to be developed over the coming years.

  Alliance Ground Surveillance

  The Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system is a key element of transformation and an essential enabling capability for forces across the full spectrum of NATO’s current and future operations and missions. The AGS will be an airborne, stand-off ground surveillance system that can detect and track vehicles, such as tanks, trucks or helicopters, moving on or near the ground, in all weather conditions. Contract award for this key capability is currently being sought.

  Other initiatives

  The NATO Response Force

  The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a highly ready and technologically advanced multinational force made up of land, air, maritime and special forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly to wherever it is needed. It has the overarching purpose of being able to provide a rapid military response to an emerging crisis, whether for collective defence purposes or for other crisis response operations. It is also a driving engine of NATO’s military transformation.

  Usability

  At the turn of the milennium, too many Alliance forces were not adequately structured, prepared or equipped for crisis response and out of area operations.  With the aim of increasing the numbers that could be sustained for such purposes, NATO agreed a goal in 2004 that 40% of land forces should be deployable and that it should be possible to sustain 8% on operations or high-readiness standby (later raised to 50% and 10% respectively).  Over the last seven years, this has led to a 7% increase in the number of land forces that are deployable and a 21% increase in the number that can be sustained on operations and other missions.  Similar targets of 40% and 8% have recently been set for air forces.

  Aviation Modernization Programs

  The Alliance will continue to develop its capabilities in the field of air traffic management and engage in civil aviation modernization plans in Europe (Single European Sky ATM Research) and North America (NextGen) with the aim of ensuring safe access to airspace, effective delivery of services and civil-military interoperability in order to safeguard military mission effectiveness at global level and the ability to conduct the full range of NATO operations, including the airspace integration of unmanned aircraft systems.

  Improving information superiority

  Information superiority aims to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while denying the same to potential adversaries. At the Riga Summit in November 2006, Allied leaders therefore agreed to support efforts to achieve information superiority. Key to these efforts is the implementation of NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC), which aims to make all operational elements, from the strategic down to tactical levels, interoperable and network aware Implementing this network enablement creates a federation of national and NATO networks for which NATO has established the frame, and which can then be used as the bearer for interconnected applications.

  Civil emergency planning

  In accordance with Alliance objectives, the aim of Alliance civil emergency planning (CEP) is to collect, analyze and share information on national planning activities and capabilities to help ensure the most effective use of civil resources in support of national and NATO military authorities (NMAs).

  Within NATO, close civil-military cooperation is key to ensuring an optimum mix of capabilities is available when needed. Coordinated civil-military planning is becoming especially important in the context of support to NATO operations, including those involving stabilization and reconstruction. CEP helps facilitate this through a range of civil emergency planning mechanisms and capabilities, thereby allowing NMAs to draw on civilian expertise and assets in areas such as critical infrastructure, transport, food, water, agriculture, communications, health and industry.

  Energy security

  The disruption of the flow of vital resources could affect Alliance security interests. At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, Allied leaders reiterated their support for efforts aimed at promoting the security of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines. They also declared that they would continue to ensure that NATO’s efforts would add value and were fully coordinated with those of the international community. A number of practical programmes both within the Alliance and with NATO’s Partner countries are ongoing, alongside workshops and research projects.

• Understanding the procedures

  The objectives of the 2010 Strategic Concept have been further specified in the political guidance. This has replaced extant documents, such as the Comprehensive Political Guidance (December 2005), and informed the military implementation of the Strategic Concept.  The political guidance, establishes in broad terms what the Alliance should be able to do, how much it should be able to do, and set priorities, thereby guiding procurement and other key activities in the context of the new NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP).

  Implementing NATO’s new defence planning process

  The NDPP, which was introduced in 2009 to bring more coherence to NATO defence planning activities, encompasses a variety of planning domains: air defence, air traffic management, armaments, C3 (consultation, command and control), civil emergency planning, force, intelligence, logistics, medical support, nuclear, research and technology, resource, and standardisation. 

  The NDPP therefore provides a framework within which national and Alliance processes can be harmonised to meet Alliance objectives.  It establishes in detail how to meet the mandates of the political guidance and sets targets for nations and the Alliance collectively, thereby guiding national and collective capability development.  Implemented in a four-year cycle, the NDPP seeks forces and capabilities that are deployable, sustainable and can contribute to the full range of Alliance missions, allocating the totality of the Alliance’s requirements to nations on the principles of fair burden sharing and reasonable challenge.  The forces provided by Allies have to be able to operate together in a multinational context, prepared, trained, equipped and supported to contribute to the full range of missions, including in distant and remote areas.

• The bodies involved in decision-making

  Efforts to improve NATO capabilities touch on a wide range of activities. Many different bodies are therefore involved in decision-making for their specific areas of expertise. With the aim of bringing additional coherence and eliminating any redundancy, an end-to-end rationalisation of the structures involved in capability development has been initiated. The reform of acquisition processes for NATO common-funded procurement is also to be reviewed.

  Bodies involved in capability development include:

  • the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), the senior NATO committee responsible for Alliance armaments co-operation, material standardization and defence procurement;
  • The Logistics Committee, which advises the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee on consumer logistics matters;
  • The Defence Policy and Planning Committee, responsible to the North Atlantic Council for broad defence policy and planning matters; it is also responsible for streamlining the Alliance’s defence planning process to assist in the transformation of NATO's military capabilities;
  • the Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC), the principal body in the area of civil emergency planning;
  • the Military Committee, the senior military authority in NATO under the overall authority of the North Atlantic Council;
  • The Air Traffic Management Committee (ATMC), the NATO interface with civil aviation, responsible for airspace usage and air traffic management capabilities
  • Allied Command Transformation (ACT), driving, facilitating, and advocating continuous improvement of Alliance capabilities to maintain and enhance the military relevance and effectiveness of the Alliance.
  • the Consultation, Command and Control Board (NC3B); and
  • the Resource Policy and Planning Board, which focuses on the management of military common-funded resources.

• The development of capabilities over time

  Since 1999, NATO Allies have made firm commitments and taken a range of initiatives to strengthen capabilities in key areas.

  The Defence Capabilities Initiative

  Launched at the Washington Summit in April 1999, DCI identified a number of areas where improvements in Alliance capabilities were required. These areas fell into five major categories:

  • Deployability and mobility: getting forces to the crisis quickly;
  • Effective engagement: improving forces’ cutting edge capacity;
  • Consultation, command and control: giving forces maximum awareness and control;
  • Survivability: protecting forces;
  • Sustainability and logistics: supporting forces in the field.

  The DCI contributed to improvements in Alliance capabilities in quite a number of important areas. However, countries were not required to report individually on progress achieved and therefore advancement under the DCI was uneven.

  The Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative

  The Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative was launched, at the same time as DCI, to address the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by intensifying consultations on disarmament and non-proliferation issues. A WMD Centre was set up in May 2000 to coordinate activities in this field.

  The Prague Capabilities Commitment

  At their meeting in June 2002, NATO defence ministers agreed to refocus their efforts and decided that a new initiative should be based on firm country-specific commitments. This initiative would also be economically realistic, should encourage greater multinational cooperation and must be conducted in coordination with the European Union. At the 2002 Prague Summit, this initiative was formally endorsed and launched under the name of the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC).

  The PCC was part of a three-pronged approach to improving defence capabilities, the two others were the creation of the NATO Response Force and the streamlining of the military command structure. Allies also adopted a Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism and initiated a new Missile Defence Feasibility Study.

  Under the PCC, Allies made firm political commitments to improve capabilities in more than 400 specific areas, covering the following eight fields:

  • chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence;
  • intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition;
  • air-to-ground surveillance;
  • deployable and secure command, control and communications;
  • combat effectiveness, including precision-guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defences;
  • strategic air and sea lift;
  • air-to-air refuelling;
  • deployable combat support and combat service support units.

  The PCC was coordinated with the European Union’s efforts to improve its capabilities. A NATO-EU Capability Group was set up for this purpose under the so-called “Berlin Plus” arrangements; simple methods of ensuring that the two processes complemented each other were used, for instance, by having the same countries take the lead on the same capabilities in both organisations.

  NATO monitored and reported on the implementation of the commitments, undertaken both nationally and as part of multinational projects, until mid-2007.