NATO HQ 22 Nov . 2005

STOPWATCH 2 , Debate 3: NATO and Ukraine after the Orange Revolution Special interactive video forum series with Jamie Shea Multimedia Audio file .MP3/15643Kb Video forum JAMIE SHEA (Director of Policy Planning, NATO): Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon, and welcome to another edition of Stopwatch here from NATO Headquarters in Brussels . I'm Jamie Shea, and once again it will be my pleasure today to moderate our experts' discussion on a topical NATO issue. And today we've chosen for you one of the most topical issues on our agenda at the moment, which is the topic of Ukraine . One year ago all of us were mesmerized watching our television sets when we saw the Orange Revolution unfold on the streets of Kyiv in front of our eyes. It took us back to those heady days after 1989 when we saw similar democracy movements on the streets of Central Europe . Since that time we've had a new government in Ukraine , a new political orientation and the topic has come up of a possible membership of Ukraine in the Alliance in the years ahead. Indeed NATO has already engaged the first step in this process by awarding Ukraine a so-called Individual Dialogue. In recent weeks the North Atlantic Council, the NATO ambassadors with the Secretary General, recently made a high profile visit to Kyiv and NATO and Ukraine are engaging more practically, more politically than even in recent years. But how realistic is it for NATO to consider Ukraine , an enormous country of 47 million people, as a future ally in the foreseeable future? Well, today to help me look at where Ukraine stands in its reform effort, and what the prospects of NATO membership are, I have the privilege of welcoming three top experts. First of all, Mr. James Sherr, here on my right. James is a long-standing British specialist on Ukraine and Central and Eastern Europe . Currently he is a Fellow with the Conflict Studies Research Centre at the British Defence Academy . On my immediate left a Ukrainian, which of course is only natural, given the nature of the program, Oleksandr Sushko, who is the Director for the Centre for Peace Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine and has travelled from Kyiv, so we're delighted to see him. And last, but by no means least, of course, Michel Duray. Michel is a member of the NATO International Staff, and for the last three years he has been the Director of NATO's Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv. So gentlemen, thank you very much indeed for coming today. As we begin, let's first of all look at where Ukraine stands politically. James, turning to you first: Nearly one year after the Orange Revolution, has there really been a strategic change of direction in Ukraine ? Is the reform effort really under way in what you would consider to be a satisfactory way? JAMES SHERR (Fellow, Conflict Studies Research Centre - U.K. Defence Academy ): Despite what you rightly call mesmerizing events in January, I think those people who knew Ukraine well knew this was not going to be like Poland or Czechoslovakia in 1989. That the problems were more deeply seated, that inevitably mistakes would be made. They have been made. The issue is whether the mistakes and the response to them are in the spirit of the Orange Revolution of what we saw on the Maidan, the Independence Square, which I think comes down to this: The demand from society that Ukraine finally have leaders that work for the benefit of the country and not for the benefit of themselves. Some of what has happened, I think, has shaken that confidence. Internationally there was also a very strong sense that these events demonstrated conclusively a new sense of directly by Ukraine , both about itself and about its relationship with Europe . And again, I think some questions have been raised. So we're in a state of some suspense at the moment. SHEA: Oleksandr, you've come from Kyiv. How do you see the progress in the political and economic reforms? Do the Ukrainian people really perceive a big difference since last January? OLEKSANDR SUSHKO (Director, Centre for Peace Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine): I may say yes and no, because yes there are some evident changes in terms of democracy, media freedom. Ukrainian citizens can enjoy real pluralism on TV and newspapers. It is different so much from that situation we had during Kuchma regime. And there is no obstacle to any kind of freedom of political activity. At the same time, expectations were too high, and people at Maidan expected fast... SHEA: Overnight, sort of transformation. SUSHKO: ...transformation into brilliant European state. And what we have now is some sort of disappointment of those people who were too much hopeful to see so fast changes. And really progress is moderate in different areas. In some areas we have more consistent forces of government to transform countries, but in certain sensitive areas we have very limited success. And that is why... that is why at the moment there is no clear... there is no clear support and no clear belief of the people that these leaders are capable to transform country fastly. SHEA: And the second question, in the elections in March we are likely to see a different sort of constitutional arrangement emerging with more power to the Parliament, the Rada, more power to the Prime Minister. In your view, is this likely to help or slow down the reform effort? SUSHKO: It's hardly to say just because really yes, Ukraine is on the way to more or less... more European model than post-Soviet one, with the presidency in the core. Now we are shifting towards parliamentary model, according to which Parliament is responsible for government. And parliamentary coalition will appoint Prime Minister and house government. But really, this situation provides additional risks for the stability for the maturing a democracy because our democracy is still young and still a little bit unstable and there is a risky process. And I hope that this will bring to the new substance of Ukraine and democracy based upon European model. But we cannot exclude that this model will be used for... by political forces which, for instance, lost last year presidential elections. And we cannot exclude it. This is democracy. SHEA: Michel, for NATO membership, military factors are important, but political factors like democracy, measures against corruption, for instance, transparency in business, free market economy, these political factors are important as well. How do you, from your perspective, assess Ukraine 's progress? MICHEL DURAY (Director, Information & Documentation Centre, Kyiv): Well, I think that definitely there has been some progress made, since the Orange Revolution, basically as far as democracy is concerned. The child was born and it has inherited features from his parents, I would say, and from both his parents. And now the problem is to educate the child and to give the child a model of education, and basically I understand that the new Ukrainian authorities have decided that this model should be a European model, or similar to European model, in terms of fighting corruption, freer media and so. In terms of a democracy there is real progress I would say, but again, this is only the beginning. And as Frank Herbert said in one of his books, every beginning is a moment of extreme delicacy. And so we are witnessing that moment for the moment. So I think on our side we should be patience, we should be helpful and we should understand that yes, there have been a lot of expectations. Whether they are met or not is a question of wiseness from our side, but from the Ukrainian side as well, and still we have to accompany this. SHEA: James, one of the things that came out during the period of the Orange Revolution was the division, at least the political division, between the eastern part of the country and the western part of the country. Is your sense that Ukraine is now overcoming that divide and coming together as a single nation? And a follow-up question, with respect, relations with Russia . Clearly Ukraine is a country which, given its size, has to have relationships both with its neighbour to the east as well as its neighbours to the west. How are things going there? SHERR: Of course, an electoral process heats up whatever divisions there are in any country. So I think between now and the elections these divisions will look stronger than they are. I think they have always looked a bit stronger than they are. I've been struck by a number of continuities and I think in Ukraine , first of all, there is a strong majority of people who are very apprehensive about being asked to make a choice between Europe and NATO on the one hand and Russia on the other. And I think we have not always appreciated this in the West, and I think from our point of view, we're quite clear in our own minds, we are not asking Ukraine to make a choice. And if this message can come through I think we will find that the divisions are less important than we think. SHEA: Michel, Ukrainians since the changes have made it clear that they now seek NATO membership. Why do you think they have taken this decision? Are they putting NATO ahead of the EU at least in terms of their priorities? DURAY: Well, I do believe that many factors are linked here. First of all, the fact that NATO is a Alliance of democratic countries which is guaranteeing the democracy and the culture of democracy and the culture of consensus and the consensus of culture, and therefore the security of culture. So I do believe that Ukrainian are interested by joining NATO from this point of view. When I say Ukraine here I have in mind elite of Ukraine . Most of the intellectuals of Ukraine are in favour of joining both European Union and NATO. It's unfortunately not ye the case with the global population because they don't know what it is about. SHEA: That's right. I read a lot of polls and some of them that you've given me, that suggest despite this aspiration of the government very few people, 20 percent, 23 percent, in terms of public opinion support that. So why is that figure so low, given the government's own enthusiasm? DURAY: Well, there is nothing extraordinary in that. There are two major factors which have influenced this. First of all, is the difficult access to information occurred during the previous regime, and secondly, it is the fact that we have maybe been slow as well, to be finally be very free and independent here. We have been, to some extent, slow to give messages and clear messages to a young democracy which was having a lot of expectations. So, but I still believe that the decision by the government is based on the fair analysis, on the plus and minuses of NATO membership. Certainly I would like to insist very much here that we should have in mind not the membership in itself. We should have in mind the process and the benefits that the country could get from the process, implementing the process itself. It is extremely important not to think in terms of to be or not to be, but we should rather think in terms of to live or not to live... to live better or to live as we live now. SHEA: Well, Oleksandr, coming back to this public opinion thing. Are there specific sort of myths or misconceptions about nation and Ukraine that are particularly sort of durable at the moment, and which explain this low level of support? SUSHKO: Yes, there are lots of them, and some of them are legacy of Soviet era, when NATO was perceived as a major enemy. And there are lots of people educated at that time and there are some stereotypes remaining, that it is a threat from NATO, that it is aggressive bloc, that it is purely military organization that would involve Ukraine into military adventures. But there are also some new myth produced recent time. For instance, there is very popular myth that NATO membership can undermine Ukrainian economy. Especially military industry. Because Ukraine is one of the biggest military exporters in Europe . Number eight or nine in the world. And there are some stereotypes that if Ukraine in NATO it should close all the military factories... SHEA: Aha, so big economic losses. SUSHKO: ...and it will lead to growing unemployment rates and closing the industry. So this is such a stereotype and this is... it has been used in political propaganda, manipulation, without any calculation. This is just a stereotype taken from the air. No calculations on this. But this is... SHEA: James, you wanted to come in on this. SHERR: If I could just add to that. I think there are three very deep and very widespread misconceptions. The first is the failure to realize that NATO can only make decisions by consensus. A lot of controversial policies objected to in Ukraine which are labelled NATO policies are not. They are activities undertaken by some NATO members with some others. It is better, in principle, to be part of the consensus, I think, than to suffer the consequences of somebody else's consensus. Secondly, on the economic point, Oleksandr is absolutely correct. Every NATO member benefits from pooling the resources. Very rich NATO members have done studies and have demonstrated to their own satisfaction that on their on they would have to be spending 20 to 30 percent more on defence and security to be as secure as they are. So the... you know, these are at least two very serious problems that arise, that I don't think we have been able to communicate because of the information or the difficulties that Michel (inaudible)... (SPEAKERS OVERLAP) SHEA: But Michel, in terms of our public diplomacy efforts, are we starting to get these messages across convincingly to politicians in Kyiv? I mean, this visit that I referred to as the North Atlantic Council ambassador recently, did that help to turn these misperceptions on their head? DURAY: Well, I think that definitely since last year, since the Orange Revolution, the debate on NATO has become more popular, and the debate on security as a role has started. It is only the start now. It has started in Kyiv quite well, and it is starting in the regions. The visit of the North Atlantic Council, of course, was a big hit, I think, a very good one. We've managed for the first time ever in the Ukrainian history to have live interviews in all the regions on one day; having, as well the Secretary General giving a live interview on one of the most popular and listened to TV channels. Which was the first time in five years, where we had access to live air. So I think yes, we are now... we have started to debate, and now it's up to us to have the arguments as well and to have the flexibility to answer the demand, which is growing, on information on NATO and security issues. SHEA: I've seen some reports that certain political leaders want to have a referendum on NATO membership, as we've seen in certain countries like Hungry, for instance, or Slovenia . Do you think this is likely to happen? DURAY: Oh, you are asking a very tricky question. I would say that speaking very personally here, you don't ask a teenager when he is 14 or 15 years old whether he wants to marry, telling him that he will marry in five to six years time. I think we should rather give the opportunity to a teenager to learn what marriage means and then he will make his decision, and I think, speaking very personally here, not in the name of NATO, I think it's a little bit premature to have such a referendum and I think that Oleksandr would agree with me and James as well. SHEA: Oleksandr, we've heard a lot about... from Michel in particular, about Ukraine 's political aspiration now to join NATO. What would you think Ukraine would be able to bring to the NATO Alliance as a member? As you know, NATO now is a very busy, very active Alliance with ten operations in various parts of the globe. Membership is more demanding than it was during the time of the Cold War. What do you think Ukraine offers in terms of assets to make NATO stronger? SUSHKO: I hope that Ukraine is capable to be not just a consumer, but a contributor to NATO politics. And what is realistic is that Ukrainian military potential is workable, as was proved in different operation in different regions of the world. And Ukraine participated, for instance, in Balkans in the early nineties. And now Ukraine participates in Afghanistan and other regions of the world. For instance, in Iraq Ukraine has the largest contingent among the non-NATO states. I know that it is not NATO operation, but anyway it is example of real potential. Maybe... and NATO has experience of cooperation with Ukraine in terms of, for instance, military transport aircrafts which is... SHEA: The Antonov fleet that Ukraine has. SUSHKO: Yes, and other... so we can just name certain areas, and I see that the potential is quite high because Ukraine now is in the process of modernization of its army. SHEA: Well, that's a key question. I'd like to bring James in here, because James, you're right, Ukraine has this enormous military establishment, but how easy is it going to be to reform it up to NATO standards in the next few years? SHERR: It is insuperably difficult and the process, when it's undertaken, inevitably creates tension and even enemies amongst some professionals inside the military system. What matters is the direction and what matters once that direction is really there, is the support given to it from other NATO countries. And I'm not emphasizing the countries present here, but particularly countries that have gone through it: Romanians, Bulgarians, Poles, Slovaks. But it's absolutely critical. Ukraine inherited forces not just in the military, but outside. Which in many respects have the potential to be threats to national security rather than strengthen national security. Now if you could turn this around, change the dynamic given the key role that Ukraine plays in the Black Sea region, in energy and all these other areas, Ukraine is going to contribute enormously to European security and Eurasian security as well. SHEA: But is this military reform happening? Have you seen any signs since the Orange Revolution on things like, you know, getting rid of old equipment, modernization, reducing the armed forces, professionalization? What's going on (inaudible)...? (SPEAKERS OVERLAP) SHERR: There's no question in my mind that it is now going on on a very measured and rational basis, but there are two key questions. The first is whether we will start to see staged increases in the military budget that will make it sustainable? And the second, which is still a big if, is whether this process will be effectively supported outside the Ministry of Defence by the highest authorities in the country. And that is absolutely essential because without that it will not go much further. SHEA: Michel, is NATO doing a lot at the moment to assist Ukraine with its military reform? Have you noticed a difference in the last few months? DURAY: Well the Alliance have committed themselves, of course, to do a lot of things from managing the social consequences of the military reform to helping Ukrainian to get rid of the former munitions, the old munitions and small arms. And actually we are putting together now the last legal procedures to implement the Trust Fund project on small arms and munitions in Ukraine , which will be the biggest Trust Fund and similar project in the world. We speak about 25 million euros spent on more than ten years, and this is really a huge investment by the allies to the security of Ukraine . Because this is very dangerous to leave these depots as they are. And there are also other commitments by allies to help Ukraine to reform the training system within its armed forces, and the training of civilians, for example, transforming the military mentality into a modern and civilian management system. And this is very important as well. So when NATO is as well financing programs in the science, which could at some stage be helpful for the military as well. So yes, I do believe that NATO is doing a lot, is doing a lot. Yes. And it's not given sufficient publicity, I think, by the Ukrainian media for the moment. I hope it will be in the future. SHEA: Oleksandr, James spoke about the need, not just for the Ministry of Defence to be organized behind this effort, but for all of the agencies of government. Do you think in Kyiv now that there is that sense of interagency coordination to push forward with NATO's criteria? And James also mentioned an increase in the defence budget to carry out military reform. In most of our NATO countries, unfortunately, there's little enthusiasm to increase defence budgets, but is that likely to happen in Kyiv? SUSHKO: I'd like to start with the last question. As far as I know, according to draft budget for 2006 government proposed serious increase of military budget. What Defence Ministry requests government offers. So it is up to Parliament now to adopt it. As for the coordination question, this is... I cannot respond in very optimistic manner, because this is a problem of Ukrainian state machinery. Not only on NATO case. Different policies are not too much efficient, just because bureaucracy sometime not capable to implement strategies, which are proclaimed by the state officials. So at the moment there is a process of ongoing restructurization of the, for instance, Council of National Security and Defence, which is supposed to be coordination body. And there is also some sort of competition within the government between different bodies established before for the leadership. And this is a little big bureaucratic. An organization obstacle to efficiency. SHEA: James, (inaudible)... (SPEAKERS OVERLAP) SHERR: Particularly... particularly in Ukraine it's very difficult to... for many people to understand the difference between coordination, getting all the countries force structures to work together in a concerted way, and control and interference with what should be the business of ministers. It comes back to an earlier question. Without deep-seated fundamental changes in the way all key institutions work, not just security institutions, the best policies in the world are not going to change the character of Ukraine . And there are certain things that many NATO countries take for granted, such as delegation of authority, initiative by mid-level people, that are really not present in Ukraine 's administrative culture. And some very Soviet ideas still entrenched about information. Treating information as a form of power, rather than as a public good, which we need for the sake of good administration and economy. We're just at the beginning of getting these questions understood as serious questions. SHEA: Well, Michel, you deal with the government everyday. Is that your assessment? DURAY: Well, before going that way, I would like to make a comment on the military budget. I mean, we should not forget that Ukraine is a transition economy and that the military budget is financed by the state budget. And if the Ukrainian government will implement the reforms, the economic reforms, which are being advised by all the friends of Ukraine , including the World Bank, including the European Union, including NATO, they could have a super and splendid window of opportunity to increase their GDP. And if the GDP increases it means that the state coffers will be fuller than they are now and therefore... SHEA: So it's all tied to overall economic reform (inaudible)... (SPEAKERS OVERLAP) DURAY: Exactly. And so everything is linked. Everything is linked, and we should be very clear about this linkage. SHEA: But if Ukraine is to be a member of NATO in the next few years, what does it have to do? In NATO we use this term, MAP, Membership Action Plan. What does that actually mean for Ukraine ? DURAY: Well actually we've not gone that far, and we have now started the process of Intensified Dialogue which is... SHEA: What's that exactly? DURAY: The Intensified Dialogue is the process through which many countries have gone through, which means explaining the possible aspirant, what it means to be a NATO member and what the conditions are, what kind of changes to the Constitution should be done, what kind of freedoms we do expect from this country, for example, freedom of press, democratic values and also technical aspects regarding the security sector. What it would mean for NATO to have Ukrainian armed forces, and what it would mean for Ukrainian armed forces to be in NATO in terms of responsibility. And this is the dialogue which has started very recently. And we are not talking yet about the Membership Action Plan, so I prefer to comment on the Intensified Dialogue, which is doing quite well. A few days ago we had many meetings here and in Kyiv as well, on various issues; security issues, but as well economic issues. We can say today that the Ukrainian delegations coming here are treated as delegations coming from a potential applicant for NATO membership. But I would refrain myself from speaking about the Member Action Plan today. SHEA: So what we're actually saying is that all of this depends very largely on Ukraine 's performance over the next few years then. The door to NATO is open, but it's going to very much depend on what happens in Kyiv. SHERR: Well, first, I think the forward momentum, which has dramatically changed, and the atmosphere which has dramatically changed, rests on a key premise that we've already discussed; that there really has inside Ukraine been a fundamental change of direction. It's the NATO members' assessment of the character of Ukraine , not just its army which is going to affect decisions like MAP and membership. And so if those premises are now challenged I think it will affect the relationship. But the more practical terms, if we're going to move to MAP I think it would be useful to see a commitment to a security sector review, to a plan for staged increases in defence spending as I mentioned, and to a more predictable scheme of national coordinator, which as Oleksandr said, is very difficult. And then I think this becomes a very practical issue. SHEA: But as we draw to the end of this program, it does strike me that you know, membership in NATO of Ukraine is different perhaps than some of the other enlargements we've seen in recent years, because you know, Ukraine is such a very, very, very major significant country in Europe, and therefore with a NATO that enlarges to Ukraine, the map of Europe in some sense changes. Oleksandr, do you share that view, that this is also a major strategic decision forward? For example, what would be the consequences for NATO's relations with Russia or Ukraine 's relations with Russia ? Can the magic circle be squared? SUSHKO: There are so many questions. I will say that this is ambition of our nation, to join Europe , to join European, Euro-Atlantic institutions. Yes, there is a problem of consensus building, about means and ways of doing this, and there is still a debate on NATO, and there is lack of consensus, frankly speaking, about terms and means NATO membership for Ukraine in Ukraine . But the general perception, that Ukraine should be there, should be here together, and it is not against Russia , because most of Ukrainians see Russia as well as a part of European architecture. It may look a little bit paradoxically, but Ukrainians want... the most of Ukraine ... I think the majority of Ukrainians wants to see Ukraine in Europe . And as well they want to see Russia in Europe . And this is not a controversy for them. SHEA: So James, you share that view that Ukraine in NATO is somehow a bridge to Russia from the West and therefore part of an overall process of integration? SHERR: I was going to make that point, and I thought it would be controversial. I think that it is only when Ukraine, if and when Ukraine decides and is able to be a member of NATO, and at the same time Russians see our fleet is still there, our trade is expanding, our human contacts are deepening, and they see Ukrainians are now more confident, they have the psychological space to feel safe and they are more confident now to deal with us on more levels than they did before, will Russia realize, first of all, NATO is not a threat, and will that begin to change discussion in Russia for the better. SHEA: So Michel, you share the overall view of our two independence expert guests today, that essentially this is not only something which would benefit Ukraine, but which would be sort of part of a strategy for building the future Euro-Atlantic architecture in a more general sense? DURAY: Well, I'm totally convinced that today we are seeing a merging of the old understanding of security and I'm always telling that the understanding of security in Russia is not the same understanding of security as it is in the West. But now we witness a merging of the two. So basically (inaudible)... and security are getting together and we all have an interest in having a secure relationship between Russia and Ukraine definitely. SHEA: Well, gentlemen, my three guests, Michel, Oleksandr, James, thanks you very much indeed. I think that's a good note to end on. It suggests that there is a very attractive vision out there, but a lot of hard work on all sides in order to get there. But at least if the vision is there the hard work always become correspondingly easier. Thank you again, and ladies and gentlemen, as always, thank you very much for being faithful to Stopwatch. Please tune in again next month when we will be looking at the theme of NATO transformation. Again, a topical topic because that will be the major subject for NATO's next summit meeting in November 2006.