Fr./Eng.

Lessons learned from recent terrorist attacks: Building national capabilities and institutions NRC conference Ljubljana, Slovenia 27 june - 1 july Chairman's Report 1. From 27 June to 1 July 2005, the United States Mission to NATO and the George C. Marshall Centre, with the support of the Slovenian Foreign Ministry, organised an expert conference under NRC auspices on “Lessons Learned From Recent Terrorist Attacks: Building National Capabilities and Institutions” in Ljubljana, Slovenia. This conference was foreseen in the NRC Action Plan on Terrorism. Over 150 experts representing 20 NRC nations participated in the event, whose main objective was to gather policymakers and first responders in a unique expert-level forum for exchange of information on national preparedness and response to terrorist attacks. Opening speakers, including Dr. Dimitrij Rupel, Foreign Minister of Slovenia, noted the importance and timeliness of the conference, which complements an already impressive range of activities related to NATO-Russia co-operation against terrorism. Dr. Rupel also underscored the importance of co-ordination of international efforts against terrorism, and the need to preserve basic democratic values in the face of the terrorist threat. The conference was designed to promote an open, informal exchange of ideas and experience among the participants, whose views did not necessarily represent official national policies or agreed positions of the NATO-Russia Council.  Case Studies 2. Discussion centred on case-studies provided by four national briefing teams (US, Turkey, Spain and Russia). Speakers outlined local and national responses to recent major terrorist attacks, and detailed the challenges encountered in managing the consequences of such attacks. They outlined how that experience had been integrated into national and local consequence management practice. Some speakers also discussed the nature and the motivation of the perpetrators, and underscored the need for timely, co‑ordinated, and flexible intelligence gathering and sharing. The United States 3. The US team presented a comprehensive report on the US emergency management system, as it was applied following the 26 February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York, and following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. In the immediate aftermath of those attacks, initial priorities were established within the framework of the New York City’s Emergency Operations Plan and the President’s Federal Response Plan: delivery of life-saving support to New York City, establishment of mobilisation centres, assessment of infrastructure damage, and assessment of debris management requirements. These were implemented through twelve emergency support functions (transportation, communication, public works and engineering, fire fighting, information and planning, geographical information system, mass care, resource support, health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food, and energy).  4. Major lessons learned from the attacks included: the need for enhanced and more efficient information and intelligence sharing (between the military, law enforcement and emergency response personnel); the need to improve measures for work in a dangerous environment, standardisation of operations throughout all levels of government, especially communications between law enforcement agencies and emergency medical centres; the need for a coherent, credible public information policy; and the need for frequent emergency response exercises. 5. Most of these lessons were taken into account during the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and in the implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directives, as well as with the inauguration of a new National Response Plan. Turkey 6. The Turkish team described the nature of terrorism in Turkey, the planning and execution of the November 2003 terrorist attacks in Istanbul, and the Turkish national law enforcement structure and response to the attacks. Over the last 30 years, Turkey has faced left- and right-wing ideological terrorism, separatist (PKK) terrorism, and, since the early 1990s, religious (Salafist) terrorism. The various groups operating within these broadly defined categories have aimed to subvert Turkey’s secular government. Since the 1990s, domestic terrorist groups have expanded their international connections, particularly with groups linked to Al-Qaeda. 7. The team reported that preparation for the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks began early in 2001. Turkish nationals, many with experience in the Balkans, Chechnya, Afghanistan or Pakistan, established contact with al-Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan, who provided financing and additional training in Taliban camps in Afghanistan. Targets were chosen mainly because lax security around them permitted easy access. Procurement of the explosive material used – commercially available chemical substances – was easy and cheap. None of assailants had a prior criminal record. 8. Consequence management in the aftermath of the attacks was efficient, and a well coordinated investigation by Turkish law-enforcement agencies permitted the quick identification and detention of most of the perpetrators. An international arrest warrant was issued for suspects who succeeded in fleeing the country. 9. Major lessons learned from these attacks included: the importance of investing resources to understand the mind-set of terrorists; the need to concentrate on producing viable cultural, religious, economic, and social alternatives to terrorism; the need to act within the nation’s constitutional framework; the need to ensure smooth inter-agency co-ordination in consequence management; the need for close liaison with the media; and the need for rapid and thorough law-enforcement investigation. Spain 10. The Spanish team provided detailed presentations of the Spanish experience after the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid. They offered comprehensive analyses of the identity and the modus operandi of the terrorist cell that executed the attacks, as well as of the investigative methods of the Spanish law-enforcement authorities. The speakers also presented an overview of the Spanish emergency response medical system and its performance in coping with the 11 March 2004 attacks. 11. The group that carried out the 11 March attacks was not linked directly to al Qaeda or any other international terrorist network, although its members claimed to be al Qaeda followers. The group consisted of legal residents of Madrid, mostly of Moroccan origin, who had gradually come to embrace the radical ideology of international jihad, mainly based on information found on radical Islamist websites. They financed their operations through common criminal activities, such as shoplifting, theft and narcotics trading. The material used in the 13 improvised explosive devices was procured within Spain. 12. The Spanish emergency medical response team, staffed with both professionals and volunteers, reacted quickly and efficiently to the attacks. Disaster response and life‑saving vehicles arrived within minutes after the attacks, and emergency response personnel made efforts to distribute the injured among a number of nearby hospitals. The third and fourth explosions caused some resource and personnel strain, since almost all available resources had been devoted to dealing with the first two. 13. Major lessons learned from the Madrid attacks included: the need to devote serious effort to long-term monitoring and analysis of the link between terrorism and common crime, as well as of the process of radicalisation of fringe elements; the need to re-examine existing immigration laws (some revisions were adopted in the aftermath of the attacks); the need for efficient communication between members of the emergency response teams; and the need for enhanced international law enforcement cooperation. Russia 14. The Russian team shared experiences related to the October 2002 hostage siege in the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow, the August 2004 suicide attacks near a Moscow metro and on civilian aircraft, and the September 2004 hostage crisis at a primary school in Beslan. Speakers highlighted the complexity of emergency response in hostage situations, and outlined relevant legal and constitutional aspects of Russian counter‑terrorism legislation. They further discussed the nature of the terrorist threat in Russia, and provided detailed reports on the Russian emergency rescue and response system, and on the socio-psychological consequences of terrorism on civilians, particularly on children. 15. Efforts to develop comprehensive counter-terrorism legislation continue in Russia. Speakers highlighted on-going discussions on strengthening co-ordination between relevant agencies, such as the Security Council, the Federal Anti-Terrorist Commission, and relevant Ministries. They also stressed the need to avoid duplication of activities and responsibilities, to promote more energetic exchange of information. 16. Speakers praised the efficiency of the emergency medical assistance system during and in the immediate aftermath of the Beslan siege. Transport of additional specialised personnel to the site was quick, and evacuation and hospitalisation of victims expeditious. The creation of specialised operational task forces backed up by reserve teams helped co-ordinate the emergency response within a clearly defined structure. 17. Major lessons learned from the terrorist attacks in Russia included: the need for more effective co-ordination between structures in the legislative and executive branches; the need to synchronise existing national and international legislation; the need to invest additional resources in the training of qualified emergency medical personnel, and of hostage negotiation teams and special assault forces; the need to pay special attention to non-military counter-terrorism strategies, such as the interdiction of sources of terrorist financing, particularly narcotics trafficking, as well as to better international intelligence sharing; the need to ensure adequate transport security; and the need to devote additional resources to effective public information policy, and particularly to the psychological effects of terrorist attacks on the general public. Working groups 18. Nine expert working groups composed of professionals working on specific areas related to the fight against terrorism addressed in greater technical detail national policies and priorities in those areas, allowing for a unique exchange of information, as well as a frank discussion of what might be improved. The working group rapporteurs reported on these discussions as follows: Site Security 19. One working group addressed issues of site security, particularly target vulnerability assessments, early warning intelligence systems, and improved consequence management after terrorist attacks. The group notedthat, while there is no single approach that can guarantee site security, enhanced and comprehensive intelligence gathering and sharing (at both the national and the international level), improved use of available technologies (such as biometrics), and frequent training, exercises and simulations including both public and private sector agencies would be very beneficial. Medical Preparedness and Response 20. Another working group addressed the vulnerability of hospitals and their emergency response preparedness, and conducted comparative analyses of medical procedures and practices in different national systems. Participants discussed ways in which NRC nations might wish toconcentrate on improving training and qualifications for emergency medical personnel, such as producing operational guidelines based on common operative principles, and developing psychological outreach programmes for the public. Civil Law Enforcement And Investigations 21. Civil law-enforcement experts discussed legal norms and the role and investigative methods of enforcement agencies in terrorist cases. Some NRC nations have found it useful to adopt robust temporary legislation to combat terrorism, often retracting such legislation as the immediate terrorist threat subsided. The group also analysed preventive measures aimed at anti-terrorism law enforcement, such as improving immigration laws, confronting hostile reconnaissance, fighting organised crime, including through intercepting financial transactions, and thorough investigation of suspect storage facilities, and of vehicle theft. Participants emphasised the need to share information and resources among both agencies and governments. Military Roles And Tasks 22. Military experts discussed the role of the armed forces in combating terrorism. The group acknowledged the need to continue transformation of military establishments in order to respond more effectively to the terrorist threat. At the same time, most participants noted that the military should play a supporting role in combating terrorism. Such a role might include, for example, explosive detection, CBRN defence, or training of relevant personnel. Participants also addressedthe need todefine the role of the military in the fight against terrorism in the context of specific national and international arrangements. Airspace Control And Monitoring 23. Aviation security experts exchanged views on specific anti-terrorist measures undertaken by NRC member states, such as improved radio and radar coverage, new procedures for intercepting airborne threats, visual warning systems, ground-based defence assets, enhanced personnel, passenger and baggage screening, the use of air marshals, and improved air traffic control procedures. They pointed outthat several challenges in this area persist, such as intelligence sharing, as well as cross-border sharing of situational awareness, funding problems, timely threat assessments, protection of high visibility events, and the need to find an appropriate balance between individual freedoms and necessary security restrictions. Participants emphasised that an effective response to these challenges required enhanced military partnership with civilian agencies, together with improved communication and inter-agency co-ordination. Participants underscoredthat the NRC Cooperative Airspace Initiative would significantly contribute to enhancing anti-terrorism security by providing an effective mechanism for responding to in-flight security threats. Interagency And Vertical Coordination 24. Another group of experts focused on the process of interaction and information‑sharing between national and international agencies involved in the fight against terrorism. Participants discussed the importance of devising a comprehensive approach to emergency planning, so as not to under-invest in non-terrorist emergency situations, the need to designate a lead agency early in the process, the importance of efficient communication, through additional and specially designated frequencies, the need to convey a unified message to the public, and the necessity of ensuring greater international co-ordination, by, for example, using a NATO Civil Emergencies database available to Partners. Building Responsive Legislation And Institutions 25. Legal experts discussed possible enhancements tonational and international legal frameworks on terrorism, including existing export controls, transport and site security, regulation offinancial transactions, immigration laws and extradition agreements, detention of suspected terrorists, intelligence sharing reform, as well as terrorism-related UN Conventions and other relevant instruments, such as the EU Action Plan. They also discussed the importance of individual freedoms, and the need to take these into account when crafting necessary legislationin the context of the fight against terrorism, particularly with regard to media and public information campaigns. With regard to improving institutional efficiency in the fight against terrorism, the group noted the need for a clear coordination structure, better vertical and horizontal integration, enhanced civil-military linkages, improved intelligence sharing and analysis, and improved efforts to reduce bureaucratic turf fights. Nature Of Terrorist Organisations And Operations 26. A group of security and intelligence experts examined in detail their national experiences with the nature and evolution of terrorist cells and networks operating on their territory, their financing and resource management, as well as trans-border terrorist links and movements. Experts pointed outthat the main danger is increasingly posed by small, localised cells, which do not necessarily have direct links to larger terrorist organisations, such as al Queda, but which associate themselves with its ideology, and, generally, with international jihad. Such groups tend to consist of increasingly younger, radicalised individuals, who plan terrorist assaults with few available resources, usually collected through petty crime. The process of recruitment and radicalisation of such individuals is often accompanied by extensive use of the Internet, which can lead to an uncontrolled and unpredictable slide toward Islamic extremism. We must assume, therefore, that careers of young terrorists can also be influenced by the Internet. More often than not, the leaders of such groups have had direct experience in “hot spots”, such as Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq. Participants underscored the crucial importance of trans-national co-operation in intelligence and other areas, understanding terrorist mindsets, and vigorous promotion of intra-cultural tolerance. Hostage Negotiation And Rescue. 27. A group of psychological and medical experts addressed the issue of hostage negotiation and rescue. They pointed to the tension between the general principle of refusing to negotiate with terrorists and the need to employ all available means to safeguard the lives of hostages. Participants exchanged views on effective negotiation techniques, such as easing the sense of urgency, avoidance of bargaining, concessions and hostage exchanges, and establishment of meaningful communication. They also stressed the need to rely on well-qualified negotiators andprofessionals, including from renowned international organisations, such as the Red Cross. Noteworthy points of discussion 28. The NRC conference on “Lessons Learned from Recent Terrorist Attacks: Building National Capabilities and Institutions” provided a unique forum for the exchange of information and experience among some of the policymakers and first responders most directly involved in carrying forward national strategies in the struggle against terrorism in NRC member states. Conference participants welcomed this opportunity to exchange views, experience and information in NRC format. Among the major themes discussed at the conference were: calls to improve mechanisms for intelligence sharing and evaluation of the terrorist threat, both among national agencies (military and civilian), and internationally; the desirability of continuing to review and strengthen, where necessary, existing national legislation and international law relevant to the fight against terrorism, in accordance with the UN Charter and international human rights and humanitarian law; possible strategies for improving institutional linkages and coordination, including internationally; ensuring effective inter-agency co‑ordination at all levels; ways to continue to improve existing emergency response mechanisms through professional training and through international exchanges of experience and personnel, and; the importance of work ing actively with the general public, including through the media and through educational programmes aimed at cultivating intra-cultural tolerance and to promoting viable social alternatives to radicalisation and extremism, in order to improve efficiency in both the prevention and consequence management stages. .