Individual Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships 1994-1996

The research reports reproduced here are the responsibility of the individual authors. Their reproduction does not imply any form of official or unofficial endorsement by NATO. The reports are offered in unedited form, as presented by their authors, with a view to make their findings available to a wide audience. Enhancing Security of Lithuania and Other Baltic States in 1992-94 and Future Guidelines Ceslovas Stankevicius [Back to Index] Chapter 4. Russia's Policy in 1993-1995 as a Factor in the Security of the Baltic States [1] Russian policy is an important factor in the security of the Baltic States for a number of reasons. First, following the systemic crisis of the USSR, the development of Russia and the CIS has been a significant Eurasian geostrategic factor; second, the CIS area that is integrated by Russia, immediately adjoins the eastern borders of the Baltic States that are integrating into Europe; third, Russia is attempting to retain this region within its sphere of influence and control. These claims are a continuation of the tradition of Russian historical expansion. They show that Russia has not forgotten the Yalta-Potsdam achievements and is still fostering hopes of their rehabilitation.(1) [2] The proclamation of the Russian Federation as the successor state of the USSR(2) and international recognition of such a status for Russia corresponds to the true state of relations between Russia and the CIS republics. The CIS is not a voluntary union of states equal in their rights. It is just an intermediate product of the reintegration of the Soviet republics being carried out by the Russian Federation which has not yet acquired its final shape. At the international level, Moscow continues to play the main political role of the former USSR. The other former Soviet republics in the CIS remain satellites of Russia. Russia has taken over all the rights of the USSR and has divided duties among other former Soviet republics to make debt payments of the Soviet Union and fulfil other obligations that follow from international agreements concluded by the USSR. [3] With their economies integrated into Russia, the former Soviet republics have gained the certain possibilities for direct economic co-operation with the West. Russia imposed on its satellites, the CIS republics, the developmental model of the so-called "bridge between the East (i.e., Russia) and the West" which they were forced to accept. This was confirmed by the representatives of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia and the Ukraine in the announcement that they would seek to become bridges between East and West, made in 1994 at the 49th Session of the General Assembly of the UN.(3) [4] It is important to note that usually, during discussions about the internal relations of the CIS,(4) Russian politicians use the term "delegating rights" to the CIS republics. This indicates that Russia continues to consider itself sovereign on the territory of the former Soviet Union, delegating its own rights and governing functions to the subordinate CIS republics. A member of the Presidential Council, Sergei Kuragin, admits(5) that "the CIS exists only formally. In reality, however, this is just the Soviet Union suffering from a system-wide crisis." In his criticism of the alternative model of a Eurasian Union proposed by the President of Kazakhstan, Narsultan Nazarbayev, Kuragin presents the principles of restoration of a united state(6) that can be compared with Gorbachev's model of restructuring the Soviet Union according to the formula of "strong centre, strong republics".(7) [5] The reintegration of the Soviet area carried out by Russia, although it copies certain forms of European integration, is essentially different from it. CIS reintegration is not integration between free and independent states. It is only the forceful reintegration of the former Soviet republics into Russia. Refusal to integrate would cost dearly, not excluding the cost of spilled blood. The analysis of Russia's policy shows that imperial goals prevail. Such a policy remains a factor of tension and threat to Central Europe, especially to the Baltic States. Zbigniew Brzezinski's opinion that Russia will not be able to avoid distressing returns back and that it will not become a democratic state soon(8) is not without foundation. [6] Taking into consideration the potential of ethnic Russia, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union it could have only the status of a regional state.(9) However, Russia is seeking international recognition as a great world power ("velikaya mirovaya derzhava").(10) The specific implication is that Russia is determined to continue to rule over the entire territory of the CIS. The entire spectrum of Russia's political groups is united by the idea of a strong, great Russia ("derzhavnost"), and shares a very similar understanding of Russia's interests; only the struggle for power separates these forces.(11) For example, Deputy Chairperson of the Russian Constitutional-Democratic Party, Narochitskaya, asserts that "the whole territory of the Soviet Union is the Russian military-strategic area" and that "naturally, Russia's task is to guarantee its historical boundaries and interests and to defend the entire military-strategic area".(12) [7] Having refused to come to terms with the collapse of the Soviet Union and on the basis of its status as a successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia sets the task "... to expand the integration processes in all spheres of state activities within the boundaries of post-Soviet territory".(13) This territory is considered the "historical territory of the Russian state"(14) on which "it is planned to peacefully restore a united state".(15) According to the statement of the Russian Foreign Affairs Minister, Andrei Kozyrev,(16) "Russia plays a special role and carries out a special mission within the area of the former Soviet Union",(17) and no one has the right to deprive it of this mission. [8] Russian strategists assign special meaning to the reintegration into Russia of the "Slavic triangle", two corners of which are formed by Belarus and the Ukraine. In his interview given in March 1995, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the State Duma, Vladimir Lukin, emphasised the need to unite Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus as a priority.(18) Reintegration of Kazakhstan is of no lesser importance. In Moscow, in March 1995, an initiative group of high-ranking officials was formed to organise referenda for the establishment of a united economic, political and defence union of Russia, Belarus, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan.(19) This task was partially implemented when the Belorussian President, Aleksandr Lukashenko held a referendum on May 14, 1995, whereby 85 percent of the participating Belorussian population voted for integration into Russia, and 75 percent for the return of the flag and the coat of arms of the Soviet republic.(20) The Belorussian referendum is an important achievement for Russia, which undoubtedly has an influence on the positions of the other CIS republics.(21) [9] The conditions that evolved following the collapse of the Soviet Union forced Russia to take into consideration economic and external political factors in order to seek the most suitable way of retaining its domination on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The establishment of a federative state on CIS territory is considered a scenario that would guarantee the stabilisation of the situation.(22) It has been discussed how much its implementation would cost Russia in political and economic terms. Efforts are being made in order to avoid expenses which are too high, to prevent the standard of living in Russia from deteriorating even further, and also to prevent social destabilisation, tension in relations with the West, and, at the same time, Russia's over-extension.(23) [10] After the Supreme Soviet was removed by military force in 1993 and the Russian Duma was elected, new tendencies in Russian politics appeared. A clear change from the straightforward orientation towards the West to the defence of traditional Russian interests gained firm ground.(24) Simultaneously, the prospects for a new Cold War with the West became clear; Yeltsin called it a "cold peace". The Russian political elite understand that this could cost Russia a great deal and frustrate its reforms and ongoing reintegration in the territory of the former Soviet Union.(25) In order to avoid deterioration of relations with the West since reintegration on the territory of the former Soviet Union is handled in such a rough way, Russia is prepared to draw the West into an intensive dialogue about the problems of the CIS.(26) The Russian External Intelligence Service, in its public statement of October 1994, aimed at a Western audience, was trying to justify the policy for reintegrating the CIS republics and informed the West that it must withhold all interference.(27) In his interview, the chief of intelligence, Evgenij Primakov, spoke in favour of including the Baltic States into the integration processes of former Soviet territory.(28) [11] The strategy of creating a system of autonomous republics that show no resistance and are economically bound to Russia has been chosen by Russia as the most worthwhile path to take. To an external observer, this determination should not be considered a restoration of the former Soviet Union, but rather a beneficial development of relations within CIS. A concept of leadership has been chosen "instead of direct control".(29) This allows Russia not only to retain actual control, but also to improve its economic position in the CIS. Thus, it did not lose face in the eyes of the West. [12] Reintegration is defined as a creation of multi-dimensional, military-political and other conditions that would ensure and defend Russia's interests on the former territory of the Soviet Union.(30) There are plans for a high degree of economic, political and military integration of the CIS republics, such as the removal of restrictions on goods and capital movement; the establishment of an integrated price, taxes and customs area; taking industrial and other assets as compensation for debts; political control achieved through interweaving of capital; the establishment of a common system of payments and settlements with reserve currency; the creation of a close military-political union; the formation of integrated armed forces; the implementation of the "right of all the citizens of the former Soviet Union" to dual citizenship;(31) the creation of an integrated area for the rights of national minorities.(32) [13] In the Russian strategy of the reintegration period, flexibility predominates. Bilateral relations eventually turn into multilateral ones. Russia is preparing a separate programme of actions for each of the former Soviet republics. It is easier for Russia to use its advantageous position in bilateral relations; thus these relations are accorded an important place in the reintegration process.(33) Russia has chosen the following way to achieve its goals: Russia has to present developmental models which have to be accepted by the leadership of the CIS countries on behalf of their respective nations. The price of rejection has to be made quite clear.(34) Russia intends to seek even closer integration later, when it recovers from the crisis.(35) [14] Russia establishes its control over the CIS republics through the joint protection and control of their borders with foreign countries. In the Treaty on Co-operation in Protecting the CIS Borders, signed in Minsk on May 25, 1995, by seven CIS republics (except the Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova),(36) the state border is defined as "segments of state borders" of the CIS republics "with the states that are not part of the Commonwealth". Although the Treaty states that responsibility for separate segments of the border lies with each respective republic, the emphasis is put on "the priority of the Commonwealth organs" in all matters of border protection. "The effective fight against any expressions of separatism and nationalism" is indicated among the aims of this Treaty.(37) By signing this Treaty, republics have restored in principle a large portion of the USSR borders. [15] In October 1994, the Belarus President, Lukashenko, confirmed that the western border of Belarus is simultaneously also the border of Russia.(38) On February 22, 1995, the Russian and the Belorussian Presidents signed an agreement "On the Joint Protection of the Belarus Border",(39) which has become a model for all CIS republics.(40) In the agreement, only the Belarus borders with Lithuania, Latvia and Poland are defined as the state border.(41) A Russian representative said that "the definition of borders with Lithuania, Latvia and Poland contained in the signed agreement means that Russia moves its border interests 615 km to the west of its administrative border".(42) The state border of Belarus with Russia has simply become an administrative division. On May 27, 1995, an official ceremony eliminating the border between Russia and Belarus took place. [16] The Statute of the Federal Border Protection Service of the Russian Federation(43) provides for the protection of the state border of the CIS, not of the Russian Federation, on the basis of bilateral agreements. This agency conducts intelligence, counter-intelligence and operational surveillance not only within the Russian Federation but also the CIS, in conjunction with the other structures engaged in these types of activities. The Russian Federal Border Protection Service is divided into two systems: the armed forces which protect the borders, and the special border service which engages in intelligence and counter-intelligence.(44) Hence, the same functions were restored that were previously carried out by the Soviet KGB border armed forces. [17] The aggressive Russian Cossack force acting on the territories of the CIS republics was revived as an important structure for the consolidation and development of the Russian empire. According to public data, at the beginning of 1995, the number of Cossacks reached 3.5-4 million. Even if this number was exaggerated, this armed force is still larger than the regular Russian army. On May 24, 1995, the Defence Council headed by the Russian President adopted a decision to fully re-establish the Russian Cossacks as an official government service.(45) [18] The Joint Memorandum on maintaining peace and stability in the CIS, signed in February 1995 in Alma-Ata,(46) contains an obligation "to refrain from participation in unions and blocks directed against any country of the Commonwealth", and "not to support separatist movements and separatist regimes on the territories of the other member states". Russian politicians maintain that because of NATO expansion to Central Europe, "Russia will be forced to take more active measures to create an effective CIS collective security and defence system", which "will increase disunity in Europe".(47) Meanwhile, intensive efforts were made to restore the former defence system of the Soviet Union. The Concept of Collective Security of the CIS countries(48) provides for a co-ordinated security policy that encompasses co-operation with NATO. The Concept also established that "the introduction of foreign troops on the territories adjacent to those of the member states" is to be considered a military threat, except for authorised peacekeeping cases. The Concept foresees "collective defence on a regional basis", the formation of joint groups of armed forces in regions, and the creation of joint CIS armed forces at a later stage. [19] When introducing the concept of the integration of the CIS armed forces, Secretary of the Defence Council of the CIS countries, Lt.-Gen. Leonid Ivashov, said that "it is imperative for objective reasons that a defence alliance on the territory of the former Soviet Union be formed".(49) At the beginning of 1995, he announced that proposals were underway to form four regional defence zones and to include Belarus, Smolensk and the Kaliningrad regions into the Western zone.(50) The Belorussian and Kaliningrad territories bordering Lithuania are the most militarised in Europe: in Belarus in 1995, there were twice as many tanks as in the UK, more military aircraft than in Germany, and more heavy weapons than in France.(51) [20] The integrated system of CIS air defence, established by the agreement of February 10, 1995,(52) provides for common control of the use of air space and common state border protection in the air. The co-ordination of defence by the on duty armed forces, and measures against an attack from the air, will be performed from the central command post of the Russian Federation. At the CIS Summit in Minsk, on May 26, 1995, an agreement was made concerning the common procedure for military cargo transportation on the territory of the CIS.(53) At the meeting, Yeltsin stressed that the aim was not only to protect borders jointly, but also to use common military facilities on CIS territory.(54) [21] Having become the continuer and successor state of the USSR, Russia took over all the government institutions of the Soviet Union. The former Soviet Ministries and agencies simply changed their plaques, but not the regulations of their activities or traditions.(55) The Russian Federation continues to use Soviet political practices. One such intended practice is the use of force to carry out Russia's interests and to ensure "good neighbourly relations". In the official concept of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, elaborated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (early 1993), it says that "a complex process of the formation of the tightest geopolitical area is underway, the outcome of which will largely depend on our (that is, Russia's - C.S.) ability, by way of persuasion or, in extreme cases, by the application of force, to consolidate the principles of international law, including minority rights, and to achieve stable and good neighbourly relations".(56) [22] In the Russian draft of its military doctrine, the intention is to protect the rights and freedoms of the citizens of the Russian Federation abroad by the use of military force.(57) At the end of April 1994, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Kozyrev, emphasised on several occasions the protection by force of his fellow countrymen abroad as a priority of Russian policy.(58) On April 18, 1995, at a special meeting of the Council of Foreign Affairs, Kozyrev said: "There may be cases whereby it will be necessary to apply armed forces to protect our countrymen abroad".(59) The governments of the Baltic States issued official statements in reaction to this threat.(60) [23] The top Russian military officials also express the opinion that Russia has to regain the status of "velikaya derzhava" and to protect its interests in an assured way and with any means, including military.(61) The intentions of this kind are also reflected in the Russian law, adopted in 1993, on guarantees to the Russian military personnel who "carry out missions under emergency circumstances and in cases of armed conflicts" in the Caucasus, Tajikistan and the Baltic States ("Pribaltika").(62) By Yeltsin's decree of May 16, 1995, this law was extended to Chechenia.(63) [24] Russia's demands to recognise its status as a great power ("velikaya derzhava") also mean that it is seeking recognition of its right to manage the territory of the former Soviet Union. Russia is trying to assure that its use of force in the CIS countries will not be restricted by any mandates. In 1993, it proposed that the CSCE bestow upon Russia legitimate status for its "peacemaking efforts in the CIS".(64) On April 5, 1994, Russia distributed an official document at the UN in which it declared that it needed no permission for peacemaking operations in the CIS, since that has always been requested by the conflicting sides.(65) It may be useful for Russia to provoke conflicts that would allow, for the allegedly purpose of peacemaking, to use its armed forces in the former Soviet republics and to turn the course of events in a desired direction. Chairman of the Committee of the CIS Affairs of the Russian Duma, Konstantin Zatulin, confirmed openly that Russia assisted Shevardnadze in his struggle against the legitimate President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, and in return, Georgia was joined to the CIS.(66) [25] After the war in Chechenia, the factor of military force has been given even more weight in Russia's policy. In his Report sent to the Russian Duma in April 1995, President Yeltsin indicated that to extinguish local conflicts on the territory of the former USSR or to suppress a possible armed revolt on Russian territory, it was necessary to use armed forces, interior forces and the Federal Intelligence Service (the former KGB). In the Report, it was also noted that Russia's interests required that it undertake military participation in the CIS countries. Prospects of a united military-political union were emphasised.(67) [26] The command of the Russian armed forces and the officer corps remain a politically active force as in the Soviet times. In their political struggle, the President and other politicians seek the support of the military. Although historically the military has never been an independent political force in Russia,(68) it has always been a significant pillar in politics. The former Chief-of-Staff of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, Marshal Shaposhnikov, notes that president Yeltsin feels strong only with the support of military structures, and this stimulates the illusions of the "siloviki" (supporters of the use of force) that their role is crucial in politics.(69) The Marshal expressed his negative attitude towards solving political problems with military means; he said, however, that "in Russia the military is the embodiment of order and justice", and there is no danger in having many military officers among politicians. [27] The Russian military elite has not come to terms with the fall of the Russian empire which had been expanded at high cost. It became necessary to find a new purpose of existence for the Russian military to replace the aggressive task of defending the USSR and the achievements of socialism. The prospects of involvement of the army in Russia's internal armed political conflicts is far from attractive to the Russian military hierarchy. The military is aware that if the army were drawn into internal conflicts, this would have an adverse effect on its military might.(70) Therefore, protection of Russians abroad and of the Russian borders have become new goals acceptable to the military elite.(71) On April 21, 1995, the Russian Deputy Minister of Defence, Vladimir Chyuranov, stated that the Russian armed forces could be used to defend the interests of the Russian-speaking population in the countries of "the near abroad".(72) [28] From 1994, the Russian armed forces was no longer controlled by Parliament. After the bloody month of October, 1993, Yeltsin issued a decree on December 21, 1993, by which he abolished those legal norms that had previously maintained the balance of power in the military sphere. The parliamentary control of the armed forces and the interior armed forces was actually eliminated. All the authority over the military structures was concentrated in the President's hands. The use of the Russian armed forces depends on his decision. Thus, the strengthening of authoritarianism could have consequences not only for Russia, but also for foreign countries.(73) [29] The lack of democratic structures in Russia was demonstrated particularly well during the offensive in Chechenia. First, it became clear that the Russian army could still be used against a peaceful population in order to brutally annihilate them on a massive scale. The Chechen war showed that Russia was concerned only with the preservation of its empire and not with the rights of the Russians. Second, it became clear that in Russia no parliamentary control over the use of the armed forces and its actions was possible. Such a state can hardly have prospects for democratic development. The position taken by the Western countries in their evaluation of the massacre in Chechenia as an internal Russian affair seriously affected the development of democracy in Russia. The West did not extend firm support to the dissidents and fighters for human rights of world fame, Sergei Kovalyov, Mikhail Molostov, Valeria Novadvorskaya and Gleb Yakunin who tried to stop the criminal actions of the Russian authorities. [30] The war against the Chechen people also demonstrated what kind of decisions could be taken in Russia by structures beyond parliamentary control. Among such structures is the Security Council headed by the Russian President, which operates like a Politburo of the CPSU or a second Government. Decisions adopted by the Council are signed by the President; however, they are not made public, even though they are binding for all the ministries and agencies. Only some doctrines and concepts are publicised.(74) According to the Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Russian Duma, Sergei Yushenkov, Yeltsin's immediate circle of advisers, including members of the Security Council which organised the Chechen war, is a threat not only to democracy in Russia but to the Russian state itself. In the opinion of Yushenkov, Kozyrev pursues the kind of policy to the fullest extent which he declared as early as December 1992 at the CSCE Stockholm Conference of Ministers.(75) [31] By the law of February 1995, the Russian Duma adopted the Statute of the Federal Security Service (FSS).(76) It is evident that this structure has taken over the functions performed by the KGB. The law gave all the rights to the FSS that were enjoyed by the KGB.(77) The FSS has centres for special training and special purpose units(78). The FSS collaborates with the external intelligence agencies and, among others, carries out intelligence missions beyond the Russian border.(79) The law provides for the establishment of the FSS institutions and organisations, as well as utilisation of other ministries, organisations, departments and documents as a cover.(80) The FSS security bodies also act within the armed forces. [32] The Russian Foreign Affairs Minister, Kozyrev, claimed that not only the CIS countries but also the Baltic States fell into the "historically developed region of influence of Russia and the Russians". Russia desires having the Baltic States recognised alongside the CIS as Russia's "zone of immediate vital interests" or "Russia's near abroad". He declares officially that Russia "should not withdraw from the regions that have been within the sphere of Russia's interests for ages".(81) In the Russian strategy, there is a special policy towards the Baltic States when relations between neighbours are established on condition that "the legitimate Russian security interests" be taken into consideration.(82) Russia's doctrine concerning protection, in any way, even military force, of its interests in the "historical Russian area", poses a direct threat to the Baltic States.(83) [33] After withdrawing its armed forces from the Baltic countries, Russia did not hold true to its international obligations, because its airforce was continuously violating Lithuania's air space. Between April 27, 1992 and May 19, 1995, Lithuania registered 5339 violations of its air space, in which Russian aircraft flew 3018 times without permits. In 1994, Lithuania handed in eleven notes of protest to the Russian Federation concerning violations of air area;(84) Russia replied only with meaningless phrases. In its special resolution of April 18, 1995, "On the Control and Protection of Lithuania's Air Space", the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania declared that it "views the flights of the Russian airforce in Lithuanian air space as dangerous to the security of the Republic of Lithuania and thus not to be tolerated".(85) [34] The Russian academic, Arbatov, regards the Baltic States and Moldova as a group of states which do not want and will hardly integrate into Russia. In his opinion, these states do not pose any threat to Russia if Russia does not push them into military alliances, including integration into NATO and the WEU. Arbatov formulated the following goal of Russian policy: "to ensure the neutrality of these states, as a minimum to restrict their distancing from Russia to their participation in the EU and Nordic or Eastern European sub-regional organisations".(86) [35] Russia has put up especially strong resistance to the integration of the Baltic States into NATO. In the 1993 statement of the Chief of Russian intelligence, Primakov,(87) it says that co-operation between the Baltic States and NATO in the military sphere contravenes the geopolitical interests of Russia in this region. NATO membership of the Baltic countries does not pose any threat to Russia. Therefore, Russia's protests concerning NATO membership of the Baltic States only mean that Russia does not agree to let these states out of its control. It would be consonant with Russia's interests if obligations of neutrality were imposed on the Baltic States. The Ukraine, Belarus and certain other CIS republics have already declared principles of non-alliance and neutrality, all of which Russia needs. On October 31, 1994, "The Independent" published information that EU ministers, following the example of Finland, could raise the condition of neutrality for the Baltic States when the issue of their EU associated membership was raised for discussion. Lithuania's reaction to this was explicit: attempts to apply the Finnish policy of neutrality in solving the security problems of the Baltic States would mean the de facto recognition of the Russian sphere of influence.(88) The Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Krylov, proposed on May 30, 1995 the demilitarisation of the Kaliningrad region as an alternative to the NATO membership of Poland and the Baltic States.(89) In fact, such a proposal contains no real alternative in security. [36] In Russia's strategy, it is envisaged to preserve by any means a belt of militarily weak (demilitarised) states in the middle of Europe and to resist the expansion of NATO at any cost.(90) Influential authors of Russia's policy note that "when in the centre of Europe a circle of neutral and mostly poorly armed states no longer exists Russia would lose a major advantages which it acquired after withdrawing from the Cold War".(91) They maintain that NATO expansion in Central Europe would strengthen even more the desire of the Baltic States to joint NATO, and this would turn the Baltic countries and the Ukraine into a zone of fierce strategic competition.(92) Following from this, the Russian strategists formulate the goal of "active rapprochement with the Baltic States"(93) which, under conditions of partial security, is dangerous to the Baltic States. [37] In the spring of 1994, the Russian Foreign Affairs Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, proposed that Russia and the Western states grant double security guarantees to the countries of Central Europe.(94) On March 28, 1995, the Russian Ambassador in Lithuania, Nikolai Obertyshev, repeated to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, Albinas Januska, Russia's proposal to create appropriate means of consultation between Russia and NATO which would complement NATO membership and security guarantees already being sought by other countries.(95) Russian political strategists have come up with acceptable alternatives to NATO membership other than bilateral Russian and Western guarantees, for the Central European countries: unilateral NATO security guarantees; unilateral security guarantees extended to the Eastern and Central European countries through agreements by the US, Germany and other Western powers; postponement of NATO membership until membership in the EU and the WEU; expansion of at least political, but not military, NATO arrangements to Central and Eastern Europe.(96) [38] The Baltic States, like the other Central European states, are interested in good neighbourly relations with Russia, based on equal rights. However, this depends, first and foremost, on Russia's policy. It is difficult for the Baltic countries and Russia to gain trust from historical experience. Efforts towards enhancing spheres of influence and interests, intentions to establish good neighbourly relations by force, and fierce resistance to NATO membership of the Baltic States can hardly create trust. When Russia says that Europe should not be divided again and that new lines should not be drawn there, it is really seeking to preserve the division of Europe as established by the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. It is only by integrating the Baltic and all of the Central European states into NATO that Russian policy towards them can be changed into a civilised one. Lack of clarity of the situation of the Baltic countries between the CIS and NATO defence areas could provoke Russia. Ensuring security is a fundamental precondition for good relations between the Baltic States and Russia.