Individual Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships 1994-1996

The research reports reproduced here are the responsibility of the individual authors. Their reproduction does not imply any form of official or unofficial endorsement by NATO. The reports are offered in unedited form, as presented by their authors, with a view to make their findings available to a wide audience. Enhancing Security of Lithuania and Other Baltic States in 1992-94 and Future Guidelines Ceslovas Stankevicius [Back to Index] Chapter 5. The 'Kaliningrad Oblast' as a Factor in the Security of the Baltic Region. Section 1. Discussions About the Future of the Kaliningrad Region. [1] The Koenigsberg/Kaliningrad region which is under Russia's authority is an important factor in the security of the Baltic area because of the geographical position of the region as well as its military development. On land, this region which is under Russia's authority is separated from Russia by the territories of other states, Russia, however, has a direct and free access by sea and air. At the Potsdam Conference (July 17 - August 2, 1945), this part of Eastern Prussia together with the Koenigsberg city was handed over "until a peace conference" to the jurisdiction of the USSR by whom this region was annexed. In 1945-1947, in this region the Russian occupational administration carried out genocide of the local civic population and pursued the policy of ethnic cleansing. The area was militarised, its cultural and natural environment was devastated. Russians claim that this is an indigenous Russian land ("iskonno russkaya zemlya").(1) With the integration of Poland, Lithuania and Latvia into the European Union under way, the 'Kaliningrad oblast' becomes a militarised Russian colony inside the EU integration space. [2] The Russian Vice Prime Minister, Sergej Shakhraj acknowledged in mid 1994 that the Kaliningrad district has been turned into a huge military base and a "'closed territory' with a unique military industry."(2) In 1993-1994, during the withdrawal of the Russian army from the Baltic States, some military units were transferred to this territory. Since 1993 intensive construction of dwelling houses for officers has been observed. Russians claim that until 1994 there were 100 thousand troops in the region. Western sources indicated as many as 200 thousand troops.(3) At the conference in Vilnius, in November 1994, Admiral Vladimir Yegorov said that in the future the total number of troops in Kaliningrad will be 40-50 thousand.(4) In March 1994, the Russian Defence Minister, Grachev announced plans to create a special defence district of Kaliningrad with a unified command of all the services in Kaliningrad.(5) He emphasised that the CFE treaty allows Russia to keep large numbers of weapons in this area.(6) [3] The US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Holbrook declared in 1994 that the US does not consider the Koenigsberg area a source of threat on its own.(7) Such a conclusion may be correct if referring to NATO members. However, in the case of the Baltic States the militarised 'Kaliningrad oblast' remains a distinct threat. The Russian-CIS military forces are concentrated in the most militarised territory in Europe - the Kaliningrad region and Belarus - and encircle Lithuania from two sides. These armed forces belong to the same grouping of the Russian Western military zone.(8) Lithuania cannot remain indifferent to this encirclement. With the help of large armed forces in Kaliningrad Russia is trying to impose its regular military transit on Lithuania through its territory and air space which naturally poses a direct threat to the security of this country. [4] Unnatural composition of the population presents a considerable impediment for a normal development of the region. The absolute majority of the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad region comprise military officers, former military officers and members of their families.(9) During the coup in Moscow in August 1991, the "hard line" supporters were especially active in the region. In 1995 in the Kaliningrad region, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation together with the Liberal Democratic Party (Zhirinovsky's party) had a total of 200 000 members and are supported by the majority of the region's inhabitants.(10) There are reports about underground organisations of Russian officers in the region.(11) On September 15-16, 1994, in Kaliningrad a meeting of Russian revanchist imperial forces was held unhindered. This creates good opportunities for Russia to provoke conflicts. It is not difficult to instigate a "local initiative" in the region, actions of "leaders who disregard Moscow" and other conflict provoking actions which would then be followed by Moscow's "peacemaking" interference and defence of its interests by force. Only an immediate demilitarisation of the region can reduce these potential threats. [5] In Article 1 of the Agreement of July 29, 1991, on co-operation in social and cultural development of the Kaliningrad region signed between Lithuania and Russian Federation,(12) both parties confirmed that they recognise "the inviolability of the existing border." This statement refers to the factual situation that Lithuania borders the territory of Koenigsberg region, i.e. the territory which was administered by the Soviet Union following the decision of the Potsdam Conference and consequently by the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. The parties agreed to prepare a separate agreement concerning border delimitation and control procedures, as well as delineation of territorial waters, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone in the Baltic Sea. Negotiations concerning these matters started in 1992. It means that the Lithuania's state land border which was established by the agreement between Lithuania and Germany on January 29, 1928, is being marked with all the necessary clarification made in the process. In 1994 negotiations on the marking of the land border were drawing to an end, but in 1995 it became evident that Russia was not interested in concluding negotiations in a fair and quick manner, especially with respect to the border in the Baltic Sea. [6] In order to ensure its security, Lithuania is seeking demilitarisation of the Kaliningrad region. This issue was raised on February 16, 1992 by the Head of State of the Republic of Lithuania, Vytautas Landsbergis.(13) On September 28, 1994, in his speech to the UN General Assembly, the Lithuanian President, Brazauskas proposed a round table discussion within the framework of the European Stability Pact on the issue of the Kaliningrad region.(14) The then Russian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vitalij Churkin opposed this proposal.(15) On November 13, 1994, the Baltic Assembly (the Parliamentary Assembly of the Baltic States) adopted a resolution in which it indicated that the future of the Kaliningrad region was an issue of concern to the whole of Europe, stressed the necessity of demilitarisation of the region and proposed an international round table discussion on the issue."(16) [7] In Copenhagen, in September 1994, the Chairman of the Council of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Shumeiko supported the idea of "an international conference on the issue of the development of the Kaliningrad region and Baltic co-operation."(17) Russia issued several statements in reply to the afore-mentioned resolution. In the statement of November 15, 1994, the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry described the resolution as an open interference into Russia's internal affairs. At the same time Russia criticised the draft resolution on the replacement of names of places in the Kaliningrad area by the old ones which was submitted to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe for deliberation. The Russian Federation Council maintained in its statement of November 17, 1994 that "the demilitarisation of this region is Russia's internal affair," and demands to restore the old names of places "are detrimental to the sovereignty of the Russian Federation." A similar statement was issued by the Russian Duma on November 18, 1994. By the end of 1994, the Russian Duma decided to prohibit the restoration of the old Baltic and Germanic names of places.(18) [8] Neither Lithuania nor other states made territorial claims to this region. The Lithuanian President, Brazauskas has confirmed that "Lithuania recognises the decisions of the Potsdam Conference that the Kaliningrad region is part of Russia, and bears this political reality in mind."(19) This does not mean, however, that the future of this region should be exclusively Russia's concern. Demilitarisation of the region and its future development is an international issue the solution of which will have an effect on the security of the neighbouring countries. A similar attitude is reflected in the resolution on the situation in the Kaliningrad region adopted by the European Parliament in early February 1994.(20) It indicated that the future of the region is of great concern to Russia, the neighbouring states and the European Union. In the resolution it was also stressed that "lack of action and the insistence on the economic and political status quo in the region can have a de stabilising effect on the Baltic States and all states around the Baltic See."(21) [9] In Moscow the status of the 'Kaliningrad oblast' and the possibilities of turning it into a free economic zone have been discussed since 1993. At the same time, in 1994-1995, a possibility of an autonomous Russian Baltic republic was considered in Kaliningrad. On February 11, 1994, in a Kaliningrad newspaper, Korgopolov, Professor of Law, published an article(22) in which he said that the decisions of the Second World War with regard to the status of Kaliningrad must be reviewed within the context of the European integration. The author maintained that "one should not overlook the possibility of an emergence of a separate state in the Kaliningrad region - a member of the European Community and the UN, a subject of international law," which would bring an ultimate peace to the Baltic region. In his opinion, however, "today we can contemplate this only theoretically." The author stressed that "Russia will never agree to give the Kaliningrad region away to anybody, whoever it may be." He was of the opinion that "in the event of a similar danger they [the inhabitants] can declare a republic in their region" through a referendum. [10] In his article of March 1994, Sergei Korgopolov writes that "it is becoming increasingly dangerous" to delay the realisation of the idea of the republic. According to him, if an economically independent republic is declared in the region and remained as part of Russia, nobody could revoke this status. The result would be "a powerful economic but not political formation" and it would not entail Russia's disintegration.(23) In his article of August 1994, the same author writes that "Kaliningrad can obtain a new form of statehood in two ways. The first one is international: a conference of the countries of Europe and the CIS. It is already being implemented. (...) The second way is purely national - a referendum of the residents of the Kaliningrad region when the European Union and the CIS give their approval of such a decision."(24) It should be noted that the articles by Prof. Korgopolov did not induce any negative official reaction. [11] The head of the 'Kaliningrad oblast' administration, Yury Matochkin said in an interview on March 1994: "I'm not dismissing a possibility of a Baltic Russian republic in a unified state at a later date."(25) While on a visit in Vilnius on May 5, 1995, he remarked that Lithuania's accession to the European Union and membership in NATO will change the geopolitical situation of the Koenigsberg region. He said that "it is necessary to prepare for such a regime of an economic zone which would allow to use this part of the Russian territory for a more efficient entrepreneurship under the conditions of the EU" and for a quicker accession to the EU as a tiny piece of Russia.(26) [12] In March 1994, in Kaliningrad, the Chairman of the Russian Federation Council, Vladimir Shumeiko said that after the adoption of the law on the status of the region at the Russian Duma "the same type of a federative agreement will have to be signed with it [the 'Kaliningrad oblast'] as with Tatarstan." The superior status of a region and privileges will allow it to engage actively in external economic (vneshekonomicheskaya) activities.(27) He also said that with the approach of the 50th anniversary of the Potsdam Conference which transferred a part of Eastern Prussia to the USSR, a campaign is unfolding as to the legitimacy of the rights of Russia who is a successor of the USSR. "The purpose of elevating the status of the region and creating a free economic zone on its territory is to stress at the international level that it belongs to Russia."(28) [13] The Party of the Baltic Republic, registered in December 1993 in Kaliningrad, set a goal to change, through a popular referendum, the status of the region into that of "a republic associated with Russia, adopt a constitution of the Baltic Republic and conclude a bilateral treaty with Russia on the separation of authority.(29) It was announced at the Kaliningrad Duma that 20% of the region's population are in favour of the creation of a Baltic republic.(30) The head of the region administration, Matochkin, in his interview on September 1994 also referred to a referendum as a means to solve the problem of the region's status.(31) [14] Russia speaks only about the reduction of the armed forces but not about demilitarisation of the region. In April 1994, in Strasbourg, the Chairman of the Russian Federation Council, Vladimir Shumeiko announced Russia's intention to reduce its force down to 30 000, and together with families - down to 90 000 persons; however, he did not specify any terms. He said that "the issue is exhausted and it is not subject to deliberations."(32) In September 1994, in Copenhagen, he repeated the promise to reduce the armed forces .(33) Meanwhile, Admiral Vladimir Yegorov maintained that the total number of troops will comprise 40-45 thousand.(34) In 1995 Russia started playing the card of demilitarisation of Kaliningrad against NATO expansion. Shumeiko declared that Russia cannot accept the encirclement of the Kaliningrad region by NATO countries which will occur in the event of NATO expansion.(35) In late May 1995, Russia's Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, Krylov even suggested an ostensible alternative: either Poland and the Baltic States join NATO and the Russian army stays in the Kaliningrad region, or they abandon their plans for NATO membership and this region will be demilitarised.(36) This is an acknowledgement of the fact that the militarised Kaliningrad region is a security threat to the neighbouring states. [15] On March 28, 1995, Congressman Christopher Cox submitted a draft Concurrent resolution to the House of Representatives of the US Congress on the removal of the Russian troops from the Kaliningrad region.(37) The draft resolution says that turning Kaliningrad into a military outpost raises a threat to the Baltic States and it sets forth a proposal that the Kaliningrad region become a demilitarised zone and its administration delegated to an international body. In the statement of the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry of July 4, 1995 it says that "the 'Kaliningrad oblast' is a subject and an integral part of the Russian Federation" and that "American congressmen would hardly be delighted if someone from abroad suggested to demilitarise Alaska, for example."(38) [16] Russia's Vice Prime Minister, Sergej Shakhraj, acknowledges the contradiction between the economic and residents' interests of the region on the one hand, and Russia's military political interests on the other. He sees the following alternative: "If Russia turns this territory into a part of the European market which has no room for tanks, it will be rendered all possible assistance and granted economic privileges. If Russia obstinately refuses to disarm its "western outpost", Europe and the Baltic States will make economical and political pressure on the Russian Federation."(39) According to him, if economic interests are chosen as a priority, the development of this region would be consistent with the recommendations of the Resolution of the European Parliament of February 1994, the territory of the region would acquire a special international status and in future it would become the fourth independent Baltic republic. Economic benefits for the region's population would entail real strategic losses for Russia.(40) Shakhraj expressed his firm support for military interests as top priority. He proposed to form an unified command of the North Western and Baltic military sea bases in the Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg districts, to sign a treaty of political-military co-operation with Belarus and Lithuania, and to build a "transportation bridge" across Belarus and Lithuania.(41) [17] Yury Matochkin qualified Shakhraj's proposals as imperial and to Shakhraj's question "market or tanks" replied: "Both market and tanks." "Tanks must protect the market but should not obstruct its activities."(42) At the same time a representative of the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry in the 'Kaliningrad oblast', Anisimov writes: "It is from Kaliningrad that Russia should build a new bridge to Europe. It is time to understand that Kaliningrad and the region are no longer a "shield", nor an "outpost" or "a special territory" in the system of Russia's security guarantees. This is an ice-free gate leading from Russia to Europe and from Europe to Russia."(43) In his interview on July 1994, Vladimir Shumeiko defined the role of the Kaliningrad oblast as that of Russia's western outpost and "a prospering zone of business co-operation among entrepreneurs of the Baltic region."(44) [18] In the resolution adopted by the European Parliament in early February 1994 concerning the situation in the Kaliningrad/Koenigsberg region, it is recommended: to the Russian Government - to grant wider competence to the region through an appropriate status; to Poland, the Baltic States and the Kaliningrad region - to develop trilateral co-operation. The European Parliament in its resolution considers that the Kaliningrad region "should develop into a solid bridge linking Western Europe with Belarussia, Russia and the three Baltic States into a kind of and Russia as with a 'Euro-region'."(45) The Baltic States regard such prospects as unacceptable and dangerous in that in such a "Euro-region" they would be tied to Russia again, fall into Russia's sphere of influence, their status and role would be reduced to that of the Kaliningrad region or the future "Baltic Russian republic", and they would no longer be a part of Europe but "bridges" and "territories" between Europe and Russia. [19] One could agree with Korgopolov's assertion that the formation of a new independent state on the territory of the Kaliningrad region would mean ultimate peace in the Baltic region. The proposal in US Congressman Christopher Cox's draft resolution that the region be controlled by an international body is also in line with security interests of the Baltic Littoral. Whereas the creation of a formal "Baltic Russian republic" within Russia could be used as a tool to establish Russia's sphere of influence in the south-east of the Baltic region. Here lies the danger to the security of Lithuania and the other Baltic States, at least until their membership in NATO. A question arises why Russia views the entry of the Baltic States into the European Union as being in line with Russia's interests and at the same time shows fierce resistance against their membership in NATO.(46) It may be that such a position reveals Russia's plan to establish control over the entire eastern Baltic region with the help of the Kaliningrad region and in this way: (a) in the economic sphere - to delegate the Kaliningrad region to the European Union under the status of a free economic zone or a "republic within Russia", and to turn it and the Baltic States into Russia's economic bridge to Western Europe; (b) in the military-strategic sphere - not to allow the Baltic States to become members of NATO, to keep armed forces in the Kaliningrad region which, being an outpost of the Western military region (Belarus-Kaliningrad-St. Petersburg), would ensure Russia's military strategic control over the Baltic states. Early membership in NATO is the only way for the Baltic States to protect themselves from such a plan which threatens their security and independence. [20] Recalling the precedent of the "Dniester republic" (in Moldova) one should also consider a possibility that in the Kaliningrad region there may emerge a Baltic Russian republic within Russia which would "fight for its rights" and take an aggressive stance towards its neighbours, raise tension and hamper the entry of the Baltic States into NATO. Fictitious independence of the militarised region would only increase its potential danger. On the other hand, if the region is not demilitarised its normal democratic development is impossible. Therefore, demilitarisation of this region is a necessary and urgent matter in any case. It would be wrong to wait for Russia to adopt solutions that it alone would benefit from. They will hardly comply with security interests of the neighbouring states and the whole of Europe, no matter how many options Russia would consider. The problem of the region should be discussed at a round table by the Western states - the Allies of the Second World War, together with Russia and other countries of the Baltic area. Section 2. Russia's Military Transit to the Kaliningrad Oblast [21] Until 1995, Lithuania did not have any commitments to Russia regarding Russian military transit to Kaliningrad. Article 8 of the July 29, 1991 Lithuania-Russia Agreement on co-operation in the social and cultural development of the Kaliningrad district makes no arrangements for military transit. Lithuania had also rejected the draft agreement presented by Russia at the beginning of 1992, which proposed the legalisation of regular Russian military transit to Kaliningrad. By a special November 18, 1993 agreement, Lithuania began to allow only the transit of Russian armaments and military personnel withdrawing from Germany and coming from Mukran through Klaipeda, then following by railway on to Belarus. Until the beginning of 1994, Russian military transit to and from Kaliningrad, across Lithuanian territory, was carried out only on the basis of ad hoc permission. Paragraph (33) of Chapter 4 describes the constant violations of Lithuanian airspace by Russian military aircraft. One can only add that Russia does have an alternative route for its military aircraft flights to the Kaliningrad territory: namely, the neutral waters, a few kilometres across, of the Finnish Bay and the Baltic Sea.(47) [22] After its troop withdrawal in 1993, Russia began exerting pressure on Lithuania in an attempt to impose a military transit treaty. In February 1994, Russia presented a draft treaty for the transportation of military cargo across Lithuanian territory.(48) Following this, for a whole year, Russia did not fulfil the Lithuanian-Russian trade agreement signed in Vilnius on November 18, 1993, tying the beginning of its implementation to the conclusion of the treaty on military transit. The Lithuanian authorities held to the position that it was Lithuania's prerogative to establish conditions of transit across its territory. [23] On the night of February 19-20, 1994, Russia deliberately, without permission, sent a train carrying military cargo (which was then detained) through Lithuanian territory. On February 22, the Russian Ambassador was called to the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explain this incident. In response to this, Russia proposed to conclude the treaty.(49) On February 28, 1994, the head of the Lithuanian negotiating team, Amb. Virgilijus Bulovas, announced that Lithuania was going to prepare its rules and procedures for military transit, and that temporarily, those regulations would apply that were already in force and applicable to the Russian troops withdrawing from Germany.(50) On the same day, President Brazauskas declared that "Lithuania [had] to establish a general procedure for hazardous and non-hazardous cargo for all states, without any exceptions."(51) [24] On July 3, 1994, in Minsk, the Lithuanian President, Algirdas Brazauskas, met with the Russian Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin. After the meeting, Brazauskas said that Russia did not abide by the trade agreement signed on November 18, 1993, and openly tied its implementation to the treaty on transit.(52) The same was affirmed by the Chairman of the Lithuanian Parliament, Ceslovas Jursenas, after his meeting with the Chairman of the Russian Federation Council, Vladimir Shumeiko, that took place in Kaliningrad on July 7, 1994. He said that Russia, "being a big state, [exerted] pressure on a small state."(53) On July 6-7, in Vilnius, a meeting of the Lithuanian and Russian negotiating teams took place, where the Russians were presented with and were explained the regulations drafted by Lithuania.(54) [25] On July 7, 1994, five Lithuanian Parliamentary opposition parties distributed a joint statement, "On the undermining of Lithuania's security and the LDLP [the ruling party] plans to legalise Russian military transit across Lithuania." It opposed the legalisation of Russian military transit by any treaty. The political parties warned the Lithuanian authorities that if they legalised Russian military transit, such actions would be "classified as being contrary to Lithuanian security and not binding on the Republic of Lithuania in any way, and they would be held responsible for their actions." On July 11, on the main street of Vilnius, there was a protest demonstration with thousands of participants who rallied to the call of "No to military transit!" On August 11, 1994, prominent Lithuanian people - 121 signatories - announced their "Appeal for Lithuania's Security."(55) It demanded that no agreements be made that would bind Lithuania and legalise Russian military transit. The appeal received wide public support. Citizens sent more than ten thousand letters in which they wrote that they supported the appeal. Critical articles constantly appeared in the press. It became obvious that the majority of the population was against an agreement with Russia that would legalise military transit. [26] Meanwhile, on August 2, 1994, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, John Major, while on a visit to Vilnius, supported the idea of an agreement with Russia. In his speech, made at an official dinner, he expressed his wish that "Lithuania [would] soon succeed in achieving an agreement with Russia on military transit."(56) When speaking to journalists, he also advocated an agreement with Russia.(57) [27] The Prime Minister, Adolfas Slezevicius, announced once again on August 12 that rules for military transit would be applied not only to Russia, but also to "all countries that wished to transport dangerous cargo and military materiel across Lithuanian territory."(58) On September 5, 1994, when on an official visit to Lithuania, the Chairman of the Russian Federation Council, Vladimir Shumeiko, said that Russia was ready to accept, upon approval by the Lithuanian government, rules for the transportation of military and dangerous cargo.(59) [28] On September 29, 1994, the Prime Minister, Slezevicius, announced that the government had approved the transport regulations for dangerous cargo and military materiel through Lithuania, and that it did all it could so that "the regulations allowed Lithuania to avoid any international commitment and that Russia was obliged to keep to them."(60) He also said that an agreement was to be signed with Russia on adherence to these regulations, and that similar agreements were to be signed with other states as well. On October 3, 1994, the government officially approved the regulations.(61) On October 10, 1994, at the CSCE Review Conference in Budapest, the Lithuanian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, Albinas Januska, said that Lithuania "had to state very clearly that Lithuania did not have and would not be obligated in advance to ensure transit of any type and for any state across Lithuanian territory."62 He also noted that any transit then being carried out was an expression of good will on the part of Lithuania. [29] On October 19, 1994, seven political parties represented in the Seimas, except the ruling LDLP, addressed the President of the Republic with a joint statement where they pointed out the shortfalls of the regulations approved by the government and proposed ways to rectify them by January 1, 1995 - the day when they were to come into effect. The statement of the political parties proposed to adhere to the amended regulations and to terminate the preparation of any type of agreement with Russia on its military transit.(63) On October 21, 1994, the State Defence Council held a meeting where it considered the proposals of the seven political parties and recommended examining them at the meeting of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee with the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.(64) However, this meeting was not convened. [30] The Prime Minister, Slezevicius, admitted on October 26, 1994, that according to opinion polls, "Lithuanian citizens regarded this problem as being of the utmost importance."(65) Under public pressure, the Lithuanian government held to the following positions in October: not to disrupt military transit; not to terminate negotiations, but, at the same time, not to make any agreements with Russia that would be binding on Lithuania; and to apply transit regulations established on the principle of Lithuanian sovereignty.(66) This position was supported by the US Deputy Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Ms. Lynn E. Davis, while on a visit to Vilnius in October 1994. She said that "whatever the solution, it would not obstruct Lithuania's full-fledged membership in European political and military organisations; nevertheless, the issue should be settled in a manner which would not be detrimental to your country's sovereignty."(67) [31] On October 27, 1994, Prime Minister Slezevicius reasserted that "the regulations approved by the government were coming into force on January 1, 1995, and that they could not be the object of negotiations with any foreign country."(68) On October 28, 1994, this was confirmed by President Brazauskas.(69) He announced that a meeting had taken place the day before, where it was decided to inform Russia that the regulations approved by the government were coming into force as of January 1, 1995.(70) However, it was not the regulations or even transit that Russia was concerned with, but rather a treaty on transit that would be binding on Lithuania.(71) [32] The Lithuanian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Januska, had announced as early as October 26, 1994, that the Ministry had received Russia's comments on the Lithuanian regulations and that Moscow was changing its position, although earlier on, the Russian negotiators had promised to recognise the Lithuanian regulations.(72) However, on October 17, 1994, Prime Minister Slezevicius reconfirmed that Lithuania was not going to change its position and that from January 1, 1995, Russian transit would have to proceed in accordance with the Lithuanian regulations.(73) In his interview of November 29, 1994, the Lithuanian President, Brazauskas, said that "Lithuania is not obliged to allow Russian military transit across Lithuania; nevertheless, it is continuing, and nobody can assert that transit is being impeded. (...) From January 1, 1995, Russia, just like other states, will have to comply with the regulations governing the transit of military cargo and dangerous materiel across our territory. This does not mean, though, that Russian transit will be suspended or that we want to terminate the negotiations."(74) On December 5, 1994, President Brazauskas said at the CSCE conference in Budapest that Russia had violated the GATT principles by not fulfilling the signed trade agreement for a whole year and by tying its implementation to an agreement on military transit.(75) [33] It seems that in the beginning of December, Russia had already ensured EU backing for its position. On December 8, 1994, the Lithuanian Prime Minister, Slezevicius, telephoned the Russian Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, and discussed the possibility of a mid-January meeting in Moscow on the problems of trade and military transit.(76) The following day, Slezevicius said at a press conference that it was "necessary to sign an agreement with Russia on military transit."(77) However, according to a high-ranking official at the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry, Udaltsov, the Lithuanian experts who attended a meeting of professionals in Moscow on December 17, 1994, "refused to consider an agreement on military transit", but instead suggested to Russia that "internal transit regulations be discussed."(78) [34] On December 21, 1994, the German Embassy in Lithuania distributed a press release on behalf of the embassies of the EU states which urged Lithuania to make an agreement with Russia, and expressed the opinion that such an agreement would contribute to stability in the Baltic Sea region.(79) The EU-associated members --Austria, Finland and Sweden -- also supported this statement. The representative of the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry, Grigory Karasin, said that "Moscow [supported] the statement of the EU by which acknowledged the importance of the agreement" and that Russia was going to use it in its Moscow consultations with Lithuania on December 22.(80) On December 22, 1994, the Lithuanian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Albinas Januska, and Ambassador Virgilijus Bulovas met in Moscow with the Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergej Krylov.(81) No information was released about the contents of the discussions. [35] On January 18, 1995, the Lithuanian Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a press release about the exchange of notes between the Lithuanian and Russian Foreign Affairs Ministries. It said that in its note, Russia announced that it intended to begin implementing the Lithuanian-Russian agreement on trade and economic relations from November 18, 1993. Lithuania informed Russia that the "government of the Republic of Lithuania extended for the Russian Federation the procedure of transit of military materiel and dangerous cargo across Lithuanian territory" that was established on November 18, 1994, in the Lithuanian-Russian agreement on the transportation through Lithuanian territory of the Russian troops withdrawing from Germany.(82) The extension of the procedure is valid until December 31, 1995, and may be prolonged "for the next one year periods."(83) The text of these notes were not published. During a press conference which was held on that same day, the Lithuanian Foreign Affairs Minister, Povilas Gylys, responded to a question whether the exchange of notes was equal to a treaty by saying: "We have a procedure, we do not have a treaty, but we do have an agreement."(84) [36] By its Decision No. 97 of January 20, 1995, the Lithuanian Government established that the procedure which was stipulated in the regulations of October 3, 1994, would not be applied to Russia until December 31, 1995; instead, the procedure would be applied as provided for by the aforementioned agreements on military transportation from Germany.(85) Although no new treaty was signed, upon the exchange of notes the procedure that was established by bilateral agreement was adjusted to completely different circumstances (while the troops were not yet withdrawn from Lithuania) and different purposes (only for the withdrawal from Germany and only for the route from Klaipeda) than originally intended. In the case of the troop withdrawal from Germany, it was allowed to transport not only military cargo but also military personnel, which was not permitted in the regulations approved by the government. Those agreements contained the norms that were not in the regulations approved by the government and which cannot be applied after the withdrawal of the occupation forces from Lithuania. In the conclusions drawn by a special commission and adopted by the Lithuanian Parliament on July 5, 1995, it said that the procedure which was applied to the military transportation from Germany "was clearly obsolete and not adapted to a new situation. The envisaged transit control measures [did] not ensure transit safety."(86) [37] This is how, against the will of its citizens, Lithuania was forced to accept an obligation, that was tied to terms of trade, which ensured Russian military transit across its territory. Lithuania faced pressure not only from Russia, but also from third countries, to force Lithuania to denounce its sovereign right to exercise control [over transit] following its own regulations and to conclude a binding agreement with Russia. The highest-ranking Lithuanian officials breached the promises that had been officially repeated several times to the Lithuanian people. For Russia, it was important from a political point of view to pressure Lithuania into a commitment regarding military transit, and this was achieved with the approval of the EU. In 1995, Russia organised a sea-ferry route between St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad for the transportation of military cargo. The Russian Baltflot commander, Admiral Yegorov, said that with the sea-ferry route in operation from 1995, Russian military transit by railway through Lithuania was becoming more expensive and not that necessary.(87) Nevertheless, it continued throughout 1995 as before.